Last week the National Archives announced the release of the final report to Congress (pdf) on implementation of the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, which is said to be the largest single-subject declassification program ever performed by the U.S. government. Millions of pages of records from World War II and the early Cold War years relating to Nazi war crimes have been released as a result.

But the lessons learned from declassifying the “extraordinary collection” of documents may prove even more important than the documents themselves, wrote Steven Garfinkel, the chairman of the interagency working group (IWG) that led the program.

In particular, he said, the effort “has demonstrated that disaster does not befall America when intelligence agencies declassify old intelligence operations records.”

“Before the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, intelligence agencies, supported by the President, the Congress, and the Federal courts, routinely and consistently exempted files containing intelligence sources and methods from declassification, regardless of the age or actual sensitivity of the information.”

The Act deliberately rejected that policy of absolute denial and authorized the publication of intelligence sources and methods, albeit historical ones.

And so the newly disclosed records do “indeed reveal the vast interrelationship between British intelligence and the OSS [Office of Strategic Security, a U.S. predecessor to the CIA].”

Yet “it is preposterous to suggest that releasing OSS records under the [Act] is a threat to our current working relationship with the United Kingdom,” Mr. Garfinkel wrote in the preface to the new report.

“The declassification lessons learned during the implementation of the Disclosure Acts can and should be applied to other intelligence records of similar age, and may even be applied to records of somewhat more recent vintage, no matter how sensitive the information within these records once was,” said Mr. Garfinkel, who served as director of the Information Security Oversight Office from 1980 to 2002.

It is essential that such lessons be learned, he said, because in practice the declassification process is arbitrary, unpredictable and subject to the whims of individual declassifiers.

“Whether a request for declassification is answered with a yes or a no is essentially determined by whoever happens to make the disclosure or non-disclosure decisions,” Mr. Garfinkel candidly stated.

“All of the laws and orders and regulations, all of the classification and declassification guides and guidance can be cited to support either answer this person cares to give.”

“The individual in charge makes the call based on his or her experiences, biases, proclivities, knowledge, or ignorance, and for many years thereafter, all of us may be stuck with it,” he wrote.

In light of this unsatisfactory situation, Mr. Garfinkel expressed the hope that classification officials throughout the government might learn that “government secrets, even intelligence secrets, are finite,” and should be subject to ultimate declassification.

A copy of the final report to Congress of the Interagency Working Group on Nazi War Crimes Disclosure, including Mr. Garfinkel’s preface, is available here.

There are significant uncertainties associated with the design of the Reliable Replacement Warhead, the proposed new nuclear weapon, according to the JASON defense science advisory panel.

The unclassified executive summary (pdf) of the new JASON report, first reported by Walter Pincus in the Washington Post on September 30, is here.

Related background is available in “Nuclear Weapons: The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program” (pdf), Congressional Research Service, updated September 18, 2007.

U.S. Army intelligence has issued an updated version of its handbook on terrorism in the 21st century.

“The handbook is a high level terrorism primer that includes an overview of the history of terrorism, descriptions of terrorist behaviors and motivations, a review of terrorist group organizations, and the threat posed to our forces, both in the United States and overseas.”

Two of the four supplements to the handbook, one on case studies in terrorism (pdf) and one on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (pdf), have also been recently updated.

See “A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century,” U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity — Threats, Version 5.0, 15 August 2007.

Noteworthy new reports from the Congressional Research Service obtained by Secrecy News include the following (all pdf).

“Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2007,” updated September 12, 2007.

“The Military Commissions Act of 2006: Analysis of Procedural Rules and Comparison with Previous DOD Rules and the Uniform Code of Military Justice,” updated September 27, 2007.

“Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999-2006,” September 26, 2007.

“Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy,” updated September 14, 2007.

“Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues,” updated September 19, 2007.

“Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy,” updated September 12, 2007.

“Presidential Signing Statements: Constitutional and Institutional Implications,” updated September 17, 2007.

J. William Leonard, the director of the Information Security Oversight Office, is resigning from that position effective January 2008, leaving a significant void in the fragile mechanism for overseeing the government’s national security classification system.

The move was announced today in a National Archives news release. Mr. Leonard’s letter of resignation is here (pdf).

Since becoming ISOO director in 2002, Mr. Leonard has been the preeminent official spokesman for a credible classification policy, which means he has also been an outspoken critic of classification practice as it actually exists.

“To be effective, the classification process is a tool that must be wielded with precision,” Mr. Leonard said last year (pdf).

Despite this fact, he added, “few, if any, both within and outside Government, would deny that too much of the information produced by our agencies is classified.”

“The integrity of the security classification program is essential to our nation’s continued well-being. The consequences of failure are too high.”

In pursuit of that integrity earlier this year, Mr. Leonard famously challenged the Office of the Vice President, which decided in 2003 that it would no longer submit to longstanding classification oversight procedures.

After the Federation of American Scientists filed a formal complaint concerning the OVP’s non-compliance, Mr. Leonard urged Cheney aide David Addington to reconsider its position. When Addington ignored the request, Mr. Leonard exercised his authority to raise the issue with the Attorney General, who is obliged by the executive order on classification to render an interpretation of the order’s requirements.

Although no response from the Attorney General was forthcoming, the episode turned the Vice President and his unchecked secrecy into an object of public ridicule. (See “Vice President Makes Secrecy Policy a Joke (Literally),” Secrecy News, June 26, 2007).

Mr. Leonard’s unexpected resignation naturally invites speculation that the friction between him and the Office of Vice President was a factor in his departure. However, his associates say there is no specific evidence of that.

As a career security professional, Mr. Leonard has been immune to bluster and to bogus national security claims. He could not be intimidated by the cult of secrecy, since he was practically a founding member of it. As ISOO director, he conducted himself with dignity and with respect for the citizens and the national security that he served. It’s hard to imagine who will replace him.

Recent publications of the Congressional Research Service on defense policy and related topics include these (all pdf).

“Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress,” September 20, 2007.

“The FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues,” updated September 17, 2007.

“Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76: Implications for the Future,” August 21, 2007.

“Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies: FY2008 Appropriations,” updated August 2, 2007.

If you have a bold new idea for improving the production and delivery of news and information, the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation wants to hear about it.

The Knight Foundation, a backbone of American philanthropy in journalism and First Amendment causes (and a supporter of Secrecy News), has millions of dollars to give to help nurture new ideas for the future of news.

“Whether you’re a high school student, a college professor, a truck driver, a brain surgeon, a stay-at-home parent, a journalist, an entrepreneur, a nonprofit organizer or anything else, anywhere in the world: If we like your idea, we will give you money to make it happen.”

The deadline for proposals is October 15.

Updated below

After a congressional committee requested a copy of an unclassified internal State Department report on corruption in the Iraqi government (pdf), the Department classified the report and declined to provide it. But the document is in the public domain and widely accessible.

“The State Department initially informed Committee staff that the reports were designated ‘sensitive but unclassified’,’ wrote Rep. Henry Waxman, chair of the House Oversight Committee, in a letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (pdf).

“After receiving the Committee’s inquiry, however, the State Department retroactively classified the documents and refused to provide them voluntarily to the Committee.”

“The Committee subpoenaed the documents last week, but they still have not been provided to the Committee in either classified or unclassified form,” Mr. Waxman complained.

The primary document at issue is an assessment of Iraqi corruption that was prepared by the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. The document was first reported in The Nation magazine last month, and it was published last week on the Federation of American Scientists web site.

“Obviously, the State Department’s position on this matter is ludicrous,” wrote Rep. Waxman.

“If there is widespread corruption within the Maliki government, this is information that both Congress and the public are entitled to know.”

But according to State Department officials, “any information about corruption within the Maliki government must be treated as classified because public discussions could undermine U.S. relations with the Maliki government.”

Update: The story is picked up by Justin Rood of ABC News in ‘Classified’ Iraq Corruption Report Posted Online.

In his new book “Enemies of Intelligence,” Columbia University political scientist Richard K. Betts warns that ambitious attempts to correct failures in U.S. intelligence may cause more damage than they repair.

“The awful truth is that the best of intelligence systems will have big failures,” he writes. Eliminating failure altogether is therefore not a reasonable or achievable goal.

Nor can any one component or function of intelligence be optimized without incurring damage to others. So prudent reformers, he says, will seek incremental changes, not radical ones.

Betts hedges his account with a series of paradoxes that underlie his skepticism about the feasibility of reform.

“Experts usually are better predictors than those who know less about a question, but in unusual situations the nonexpert may do better.”

“Bureaucratization is both the great weakness and the great strength of the U.S. intelligence community.”

Centralization and decentralization of intelligence each has advantages. “But because it is necessary to exploit both forms does not mean that it is possible to do so.”

And while the paramount policy recommendation following September 11 was to improve information sharing, Betts recalls that a decade earlier, after the Aldrich Ames espionage case, overseers urged new restrictions on dissemination of information relating to clandestine operations.

The new book has some significant flaws, beginning with its title and conceptual framework.

The term “Enemies of Intelligence” refers not only to those adversaries who seek to defeat intelligence, but to anything that imposes restraints on intelligence and curtails its efficacy, from laws to physiological limits on human perception and memory. Thus, the U.S. Constitution would be an “enemy of intelligence,” an absurd conclusion that nevertheless flows directly from Betts’s odd definition, which he admits is not “normal.”

Betts distances himself from a strict civil libertarian viewpoint, which is fine, but proceeds to make startling assertions like this: “Without security, few Americans would be grateful for liberty,” he writes.

This would turn Patrick Henry’s revolutionary slogan “give me liberty or give me death!” upside down into a pusillanimous “take my liberties but don’t hurt me!” After years of fearmongering by government officials, this may turn out to be an accurate reflection of American character today. But Betts offers no data to justify such an appalling claim.

Betts makes the interesting assertion that not all liberties are equally fundamental. Due process under law, he argues, is more important than personal privacy. “Having one’s phone tapped without proper cause is not as damaging as being imprisoned for years without trial.”

Consequently, he sides with those who favor increased intelligence surveillance of the private sphere and contends that liberty can best be assured by strictly limiting the use of domestic surveillance data to counterterrorism purposes, with severe penalties for any deviations.

He has no corresponding suggestions for strengthening due process and the rule of law, which he admits have been under assault. (Granting a full pardon for Jose Padilla would be one way to punctuate the end of the Bush era, and to repudiate one of its most egregious abuses.)

Betts is a stimulating writer and his new book provides plenty of food for thought about intelligence policy.

“National security strategy is not like a chess game. For diplomats it is more like poker, and for soldiers and intelligence professionals it is more like Kriegspiel — a chesslike game in which the players are unable to see their opponent’s pieces or their moves.”

See more information on “Enemies of Intelligence” by Richard K. Betts here.

A newly updated bibliography (pdf) of published Syrian research in nuclear science and technology shows that country’s limited but persistent activity in various aspects of the field.

Along with reactor technology, nuclear physics and nuclear safety studies, the open literature also shows traces of Syrian interest in the use of lasers for isotope separation. The new bibliography was compiled by researcher Mark Gorwitz.

See “Syrian Nuclear Science Bibliography: Open Literature Citations,” September 2007.

Noteworthy new products of the Congressional Research Service that have not been made readily available to the public include the following (all pdf).

“Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations,” updated September 17, 2007.

“Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege: History, Law, Practice and Recent Developments,” updated September 17, 2007.

“Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process,” updated September 12, 2007.

“Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” updated September 10, 2007.

“Extraterritorial Application of American Criminal Law,” updated September 10, 2007.

“Currently, Iraq is not capable of even rudimentary enforcement of anticorruption laws,” according to a confidential draft assessment prepared by the United States Embassy in Baghdad.

As a result, corruption has become “the norm in many [Iraqi government] ministries.”

“All indications point to corruption as undermining the support of the population for Iraq’s government.”

The new report (pdf) presents the detailed findings of an Embassy review of corruption cases in major Iraqi government ministries and the ineffectiveness of the anti-corruption Commission on Public Integrity.

The Maliki government is an enabler of the spreading corruption, the report said.

“The Prime Minister’s Office has demonstrated an open hostility to the concept of an independent agency to investigate or prosecute corruption cases.”

“The Iraqi Government has been withholding basic support and resources” from the anticorruption Commission.

The 82-page document, which has not been approved for public release, is marked “Sensitive But Unclassified: Not for distribution to personnel outside of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad Iraq.”

It was first reported by David Corn in The Nation. See “Secret Report: Corruption is ‘Norm’ Within Iraqi Government,” August 30.

A copy of the Embassy report was obtained by Secrecy News and posted today on the Federation of American Scientists web site.

“Corruption is rampant,” according to the December 2006 Report of the Iraq Study Group (at page 20). “One senior Iraqi official estimated that official corruption costs Iraq $5 to 7 billion per year.”