The Congressional Research Service has updated several of its reports on Navy ship and submarine programs:

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, December 17, 2015

Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress, December 17, 2015

Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, December 17, 2015

Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, December 17, 2015

Navy TAO(X) Oiler Shipbuilding Program: Background and Issues for Congress, December 17, 2015

Navy LX(R) Amphibious Ship Program: Background and Issues for Congress, December 17, 2015

Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, December 17, 2015

Military terms and symbols that are used by the U.S. Army have been compiled in an updated reference manual, along with acronyms and abbreviations. See ADRP 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols, December 2015.

Intended to foster a common vocabulary, the manual can also help outsiders to interpret distinctive Army expressions and patterns of speech.

The manual devotes several chapters to “military symbology.”

“A military symbol is a graphic representation of a unit, equipment, installation, activity, control measure, or tactical task relevant to military operations that is used for planning or to represent the common operational picture on a map, display, or overlay.”

“The symbology chapters (chapters 3 through 10) provide detailed requirements for composing and constructing symbols. The rules for building a set of military symbols allow enough flexibility for users to create any symbol to meet their operational needs,” the manual said.

The U.S. Air Force is attempting to develop and procure multiple major aircraft systems at the same time, generating programmatic and budgetary uncertainty.

“The United States Air Force is in the midst of an ambitious aviation modernization program, driven primarily by the age of its current aircraft fleets,” a new report from the Congressional Research Service observes. “Four major programs are in procurement, with five more in research and development (R&D).”

“The need to replace several types of aircraft simultaneously poses challenges to future budgets, as the new programs compete with existing program commitments and normal program growth under a restricted service topline.” The CRS report examined the options for addressing these challenges. See The Air Force Aviation Investment Challenge, December 11, 2015.

Other new and updated CRS reports that have been issued in the past few days include these:

Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress, updated December 14, 2015

Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, updated December 14, 2015

Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, updated December 11, 2015

Effect of Corinthian Colleges’ Closure on Student Financial Aid: Frequently Asked Questions, updated December 14, 2015

Medicaid Financing and Expenditures, updated December 14, 2015

Is the Penalty for Failing to Report Overseas Accounts (FBAR) Unconstitutional?, CRS Legal Sidebar, December 14, 2015

FDA Naturally Requests Public Comments on the Use of “Natural” on Food Labels, CRS Legal Sidebar, December 11, 2015

Cybersecurity: Legislation, Hearings, and Executive Branch Documents, updated December 10, 2015

Kuwait: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, updated December 11, 2015

The H-2B Visa and the Statutory Cap: In Brief, December 11, 2015

China-U.S. Trade Issues, updated December 13, 2015

The number of chronically homeless persons in the U.S. dropped from more than 120,000 in 2008 to around 84,000 in 2014, a new report from the Congressional Research Service notes. The federal government has undertaken to end chronic homelessness by 2017.

“One of the reasons that federal programs have devoted resources to ending chronic homelessness is studies finding that individuals who experience it, particularly those with serious mental illness, use many expensive services often paid through public sources, including emergency room visits, inpatient hospitalizations, and law enforcement and jail time,” the CRS report said. “Even emergency shelter resources can be costly. In addition to potential ethical reasons for ending chronic homelessness, doing so could reduce costs in providing assistance to this population.”

See Chronic Homelessness: Background, Research, and Outcomes, December 8, 2015.

Other new and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service obtained by Secrecy News include the following.

Genetically Engineered Salmon, updated December 8, 2015

Legislative Actions to Repeal, Defund, or Delay the Affordable Care Act, updated December 9, 2015

Potential Policy Implications of the House Reconciliation Bill (H.R. 3762), December 9, 2015

Provisions of the Senate Amendment to H.R. 3762, December 9, 2015

Unemployment Insurance: Programs and Benefits, updated December 9, 2015

Crime Victims’ Rights Act: A Summary and Legal Analysis of 18 U.S.C. 3771, updated December 9, 2015

Crime Victims’ Rights Act: A Sketch of 18 U.S.C. 3771, December 9, 2015

Military Retirement: Background and Recent Developments, updated December 10, 2015

Immigration: Noncitizen Eligibility for Needs-Based Housing Programs, updated December 8, 2015

The Islamic State and U.S. Policy, updated December 8, 2015

The national census in 2020 will be the first to rely primarily on the Internet for collecting census data, thereby creating new avenues for fraud and disruption.

A new report from the JASON scientific advisory panel describes the problem and outlines some solutions.

Why would anyone want to interfere with the constitutionally-mandated census, which maps the population of the United States every ten years and serves as the basis for apportioning congressional districts? The JASONs identified a number of reasons.

“Several distinguishable types of fraud against the census must be considered, including: hacking the census for fun or bragging rights; social media attempts to discredit the census and reduce cooperation; mimicry of the census forms or apps for purposes including phishing; city or district-level attempts to changes population numbers or distributions; large scale attempts to affect apportionment of the House of Representatives; individual mischief and anti-government protest.”

Not all of these threats are equally important.

“Non-organized fraud from random individuals (e.g. pet names listed as family members) is unlikely have any significant impact on the outcomes of the U.S. Census,” the JASONs said. And “individual mischief, for example, a response from Seymour Butts of 6 E. Psycho Path” is to be expected.

But large-scale, organized fraud could pose a threat to the integrity of the census, and the threshold for effectively manipulating the census process is surprisingly low.

“Occasionally, small numbers of census responses determine the loss or gain of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. For example, in the 2000 U.S. Census, Utah fell only 80 persons short of gaining a congressional seat, which was instead allocated to North Carolina.”

The JASON report, prepared for the U.S. Census Bureau, included several technical and procedural recommendations to impede fraudulent activity, to facilitate its detection, and to mitigate its consequences.

“The goal of the 2020 Decennial Census is… to count every person, exactly once, onApril 1, 2020, by the geographical location within the U.S. where they ‘live and sleep most of the time’ (or a similar formulation). The total number of people thus counted is expected to be about 335 million.”

A copy of the JASON report was obtained by Secrecy News. See Respondent Validation for Non-ID Processing in the 2020 Decennial Census, November 2015.

Employees of the U.S. intelligence community are expected to be bold, innovative and imbued with moral courage.

At least, those are the desired qualities that are defined in a series of Intelligence Community Standards (ICS) first issued in 2008 that have just been released under the Freedom of Information Act.

Even a non-supervisory employee at levels GS-15 and below is expected (under ICS 610-3) to demonstrate creative thinking (he or she “designs new methods and tools where established methods and procedures are inapplicable, unavailable, or ineffective”); to consider alternative points of view (she “seeks out, evaluates, and integrates a variety of perspectives”); and to display intellectual integrity (he “exhibits courage when conveying views, presenting new ideas, and making/executing decisions irrespective of potentially adverse personal consequences. Does not alter judgments in the face of social or political pressure.”).

Higher-level, supervisory personnel are to do all of that, and more (ICS 610-4).

And senior officers (ICS 610-5) “are expected to personally embody, advance and reinforce IC core values: a Commitment to selfless service and excellence in support of the IC’s mission, as well as to preserving, protecting, and defending the Nation’s laws and liberties; the integrity and Courage (moral, intellectual, and physical) to seek and speak the truth, to innovate, and to change things for the better, regardless of personal or professional risk.”

Considering the state of the species, it would be remarkable if more than a small fraction of the IC workforce comes close to meeting the lofty standards for performance and conduct that are described here. But perhaps these statements of expectations themselves serve a wholesome, instructive purpose, making their own fulfillment somewhat more likely.

And the standards are more than rhetorical flights. They are to be used (pursuant to Intelligence Community Directive 610) for “qualification, training, career development, performance evaluation, [and] promotion.”

The guiding principles for implementing and operating the Intelligence Community (IC) Information Technology Enterprise (ITE) were set forth in a 2013 memorandum from the Director of National Intelligence that was recently released under the Freedom of Information Act.

The purpose of IC ITE (pronounced “eye sight”) is to establish a common information architecture for the entire U.S. intelligence community, thereby fostering integration and making information sharing among agencies the default option.

“Information acquired, collected, or produced by IC elements shall be available for access for all IC missions and functions, subject to applicable legal and policy requirements,” the 2013 DNI memo said.

Once available through IC ITE, however, access is still to be limited by need-to-know. “Determinations about access to and use of such information within IC ITE shall continue to be based upon content and mission need.”

Nevertheless, agencies are expected and required to make “their” information available to the larger IC. “Unless a discovery exemption has been obtained, originating IC elements shall authorize and provide for automated discovery and retrieval of intelligence and intelligence-related information in IC ITE.”

“IC ITE moves the IC from an agency-centric IT architecture to a common platform where the Community easily and securely shares technology, information, and resources,” according to an ODNI fact sheet. “These new capabilities, with seamless and secure access to Community-wide information, will positively and deeply change how users communicate, collaborate, and perform their mission.”

IC ITE technically “went live” in 2013, but it is still at an early stage of development.

“The classified annex of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 required the CIA, DIA, NRO, NGA, and NSA to provide specific plans for adoption of IC ITE-compliant capabilities,” the Senate Intelligence Committee noted in a report earlier this year.

A newly updated Department of Defense publication affirms the importance of public outreach, not simply as a gesture towards democratic governance, but also as an instrument of operational utility.

“The US military has an obligation to communicate with its members and the US public, and it is in the national interest to communicate with international publics,” the DoD doctrinal publication said.

“The proactive release of accurate information to domestic and international audiences puts joint operations in context, facilitates informed perceptions about military operations, undermines adversarial propaganda, and helps achieve national, strategic, and operational objectives.” See Public Affairs, Joint Publication (JP) 3-61, Joint Staff, November 17, 2015.

The public affairs function described in the new publication encompasses most interactions between the Department and the public. It includes all the various ways that the Pentagon tells its own story to the world.

The new iteration of JP 3-61, which supersedes the 2010 edition and is about 50% longer than the prior edition from 2005, describes a hierarchy of “Public Affairs Postures”, ranging from active, affirmative disclosure of information all the way to nondisclosure and absolute unresponsiveness (Appendix B).

“Active release” is appropriate “for those plans and activities where it is necessary and/or desirable to be as proactive and transparent as possible in communicating on a subject to include actively soliciting for media and public attention.” Examples include “announcing a personnel policy change” or “promoting an air show.”

Active disclosure can be modulated and limited to a “restricted release” when necessary. Under yet more sensitive conditions, DoD Public Affairs will not initiate disclosure on its own but will adopt a posture of “response to query,” answering questions if and when asked.

Finally, a public affairs posture of “no response” is available “for those plans and activities that due to [classification] and other sensitivities we will not offer any information on, even when directly requested.” Examples include “ongoing special operations” and “capabilities that are classified.”

The new publication also ventures definitions of four categories of interviews that are sometimes confused or misunderstood: On the record, background, deep background, and off the record (Chapter I, p. I-8).

While military deception (MILDEC) to mislead adversaries is an integral part of military operations, it would be counterproductive to employ public affairs (PA) for that purpose, the DoD doctrine says. “PA resources cannot be used as MILDEC capability because such use would undermine the legitimacy of the office and destroy future trust in PA messages” (page II-9).

In any event, “Official information should be approved for release prior to dissemination to the public,” the publication states.

    *    *    *

Another newly updated DoD doctrinal publication addresses Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (Joint Publication 3-68, 17 November 2015).

It notes in passing that “The Department of Justice maintains a world-wide database of biometric data that could be used to positively identify and support security screening of individuals seeking evacuation, if necessary” (page II-8).

The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) allows foreign nationals from 38 countries to travel to the United States for up to 90 days without obtaining a visa. The travelers must still present a valid passport and meet certain other requirements. There were 20 million visitors who entered the United States under this program in FY 2013.

“Concerns have been raised about the ability of terrorists to enter the United States under the VWP, because those entering under the VWP undergo a biographic rather than a biometric (i.e., fingerprint) security screening, and do not need to interview with a U.S. government official before embarking to the United States,” a newly updated report from the Congressional Research Service observes.

“Nonetheless, it can be argued that the VWP strengthens national security because it sets standards for travel documents, requires information sharing between the member countries and the United States on criminal and security concerns, and mandates reporting of lost and stolen travel documents. In addition, most VWP travelers have to present e-passports (i.e., passports with a data chip containing biometric information), which tend to be more difficult to alter than other types of passports,” CRS wrote. See Visa Waiver Program, updated December 4, 2015.

The Visa Waiver Program was the subject of legislation to modify its requirements that passed in the House of Representatives yesterday. Among other things, the bill would exclude individuals who have visited Syria, Iraq, Iran, or Sudan since March 2011 from utilizing the visa waiver.

Other new or updated reports produced by the Congressional Research Service over the past week include the following.

Women in Combat: Issues for Congress, updated December 3, 2015

Fact Sheet: Selected Highlights of the FY2016 Defense Budget Debate and the National Defense Authorization Acts (H.R. 1735 and S. 1356), updated December 4, 2015

Venezuelan Opposition Wins December 2015 Legislative Elections, CRS Insight, December 7, 2015

Spain and Its Relations with the United States: In Brief, December 4, 2015

Selected Securities Legislation in the 114th Congress, December 4, 2015

EPA and the Army Corps’ Proposed Rule to Define “Waters of the United States”, updated December 3, 2015

Factors Related to the Use of Planned Parenthood Affiliated Health Centers (PPAHCs) and Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs), December 3, 2015

District Court Holds Appropriations Language Limits Enforcement of Federal Marijuana Prohibition, CRS Legal Sidebar, December 4, 2015

Supreme Court to Decide Case with Important Implications for Tribal Authority Over Nonmembers, CRS Legal Sidebar, December 4, 2015

School Locker Rooms Become the New Battleground in the Gender (Identity) Wars, CRS Legal Sidebar, December 4, 2015

The possible outcomes of the ongoing Paris climate change conference, and the challenges remaining to be overcome, are considered in a new report from the Congressional Research Service. See International Climate Change Negotiations: What to Expect in Paris, December 2015, November 27, 2015.

The shifting numbers of U.S. troops and contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past eight years were compiled in another newly updated CRS report. “As of June 2015, there were almost 29,000 DOD contractor personnel in Afghanistan, compared to 9,060 U.S. troops,” the report said. “As of September 2015, there were 1,349 DOD contractor personnel in Iraq, compared with up to 3,550 U.S. troops.” See Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007-2015, December 1, 2015.

Another CRS report notes that there are currently 53 judicial vacancies in the nation’s 91 judicial districts, and that 25 of those vacancies are considered to be “judicial emergencies.” The situation is described in U.S. District and Circuit Court Vacancies: Overview and Comparative Analysis, CRS Insight, December 3, 2015.

“The federal executive branch controls an extensive real property portfolio that includes more than a quarter of a million owned and leased buildings,” according to another new CRS report. “The cost of operating and maintaining these diverse properties, which total more than 2.8 billion square feet, exceeded $21 billion in FY2014.” See Federal Real Property Data: Limitations and Implications for Oversight, November 25, 2015.

Other new and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that Congress has declined to make publicly available online include the following.

Tying Up Loose Ends… Supreme Court To Evaluate Federal Firearm Provision Again, CRS Legal Sidebar, December 3, 2015

College and University Endowments: Overview and Tax Policy Options, December 2, 2015

State Management of Federal Lands: Frequently Asked Questions, November 12, 2015

The Enactment of Appropriations Measures During Lame Duck Sessions, updated December 2, 2015

Courts Grapple with States’ Efforts to Bar Medicaid Funds from Providers that Also Perform Abortions, CRS Legal Sidebar, December 2, 2015

Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS): Final Rule for 2014, 2015, and 2016, CRS Insight, December 2, 2015

Doubling Research and Development for Clean Energy: “Mission Innovation”, CRS Insight, December 1, 2015

Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE): Authorizations of Appropriations Proposed by the Energy Policy Modernization Act of 2015 (S. 2012), November 25, 2015

Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress, updated December 2, 2015

President Obama’s $1 Billion Foreign Aid Request for Central America, CRS Insight, November 25, 2015

Venezuela’s December 2015 Legislative Elections, CRS Insight, December 2, 2015

Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC): Background and Issues for Congress, updated December 3, 2015

Corporate Expatriation, Inversions, and Mergers: Tax Issues, updated November 30, 2015

The Lobbying Disclosure Act at 20: Analysis and Issues for Congress, December 1, 2015

Federal Reserve: Oversight and Disclosure Issues, updated December 1, 2015

There are “substantial gaps” in the ability of the Department of Defense to counter Islamic State propaganda and messaging, the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) informed Congress earlier this year.

But now Congress has moved to narrow some of those gaps.

Until recently, the Pentagon’s authority to act in this area had been deliberately curtailed by Congress in order to preserve a civilian lead role for the State Department’s public diplomacy program.

“Congress has expressed concern with DOD engaging violent extremist propaganda on the Internet, except in limited ways,” wrote General Joseph L. Votel, the SOCOM Commander, in newly published responses to questions for the record from a March 18, 2015 hearing of the House Armed Services Committee (at page 69).

“They [Congress] tend to view… efforts to influence civilians outside an area of conflict as Public Diplomacy, the responsibility of the Department of State or Broadcasting Board of Governors.”

By contrast, “We [at US Special Operations Command] believe there is a complementary role for the Department of Defense in this space which acknowledges the need for a civilian lead, but allows DOD to pursue appropriate missions, such as counter-recruitment and reducing the flow of foreign fighters,” he wrote.

General Votel suggested that “An explicit directive from Congress outlining the necessity of DOD to engage in this space would greatly enhance our ability to respond.”

Now he has it.

Without much fanfare, something like the directive from Congress that General Votel requested was included in the FY2016 defense authorization bill that was signed into law by President Obama on November 25:

“The Secretary of Defense should develop creative and agile concepts, technologies, and strategies across all available media to most effectively reach target audiences, to counter and degrade the ability of adversaries and potential adversaries to persuade, inspire, and recruit inside areas of hostilities or in other areas in direct support of the objectives of commanders.”

That statement was incorporated in Section 1056 of the 2016 Defense Authorization Act, which also directed DOD to perform a series of technology demonstrations to advance its ability “to shape the informational environment.”

Even with the requested authority, however, DOD is poorly equipped to respond to Islamic State propaganda online, General Votel told the House Armed Services Committee.

“Another gap exists in [DOD’s] ability to operate on social media and the Internet, due to a lack of organic capability” in relevant languages and culture, not to mention a compelling alternative vision that would appeal to Islamic State recruits. The Department will be forced to rely on contractors, even as it pursues efforts to “improve the Department’s ability to effectively operate in the social media and broader online information space.”

And even with a mature capacity to act, DOD’s role in counter-propaganda would still be hampered by current policy when it comes to offensive cyber operations, for which high-level permission is required, he said.

“The ability to rapidly respond to adversarial messaging and propaganda, particularly with offensive cyberspace operations to deny, disrupt, degrade or corrupt those messages, requires an Execute Order (EXORD) and is limited by current U.S. government policies.”

“The review and approval process for conducting offensive cyberspace operations is lengthy, time consuming and held at the highest levels of government,” Gen. Votel wrote. “However, a rapid response is frequently required in order to effectively counter the message because cyber targets can be fleeting, access is dynamic, and attribution can be difficult to determine.”

No immediate solution to that policy problem is at hand, as far as is known.

The difficulty that the U.S. government has had in confronting the Islamic State on the level of messaging, influence or propaganda is more than an embarrassing bureaucratic snafu; it has also tended to expedite the resort to violent military action.

“Overmatched online, the United States has turned to lethal force,” wrote Greg Miller and Souad Mekhennet of the Washington Post, in a remarkable account of the Islamic State media campaign. (“Inside the surreal world of the Islamic State’s propaganda machine,” November 20).

*    *    *

The House Armed Services Committee now produces the most informative hearing volumes of any congressional committee in the national security domain. Beyond the transcripts of the hearings themselves, which are of varying degrees of interest, the published volumes typically include additional questions that elicit substantive new information in the form of agency responses to questions for the record.

The new hearing volume on US Special Operations Command notes, for example:

*    USSOCOM currently deploys 20-30 Military Information Support Teams to embassies around the world. They are comprised of forces “specially trained in using information to modify foreign audiences’ behavior” [page 69].

*    “Only one classified DE [directed energy] system is currently fielded by USSOCOM and being used in SOF operations” [page 61]. Other directed energy technology development programs have failed to meet expectations.

*    Advanced technologies of interest to SOCOM include: signature reduction technologies; strength and endurance enhancement; unbreakable/unjammable, encrypted, low probability to detect/low probability of intercept communications; long-range non-lethal vehicle stopping; clandestine non-lethal equipment and facility disablement/defeat; advanced offensive and defensive cyber capabilities; weapons of mass destruction render safe; chemical and biological agent defeat [page 77].

Another recently published House Armed Services Committee hearing volume is “Cyber Operations: Improving the Military Cybersecurity Posture in an Uncertain Threat Environment.”

 

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Last month the House Committee on Homeland Security published a report of its task force on combating terrorist and foreign fighter travel. In a footnote, the Committee cited a related report from the Congressional Research Service and, unexpectedly, provided a link to the report on the FAS website (footnote 23).

This was incongruous because Congress has gone out of its way to resist online public distribution of CRS reports, and the cited report was obtained and posted by Secrecy News without authorization. But having an online source for such CRS reports evidently proves useful to Congress nonetheless.

This zone of incongruity is the natural habitat of Secrecy News. It is where declared policies go unmatched by actual practices, and where official promises of transparency are unrealized in fact.

Sometimes we can help to reduce the distance between rhetoric and reality, and to nudge the process along, with measurable results. Thanks in part to a recurring government-wide review of classification guidance that was conceived by FAS in 2009 (and which we advocated at the time as “the single most productive secrecy reform action that could now be undertaken”), the annual number of new national security secrets created last year was the smallest on record, and amounted to just 13% of what it had been a decade earlier.

Anyway, you know best whether this work is of value to you or not. If it is, and if your circumstances permit, we could use your help to carry on.

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