Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA), the likely chair of the House Armed Services Committee in the next Congress, told congressional colleagues that enhancing national security transparency is among his top oversight priorities.

“Together, we have made strides on national security issues but much more must be done to conduct vigorous oversight of the Trump Administration and the Department of Defense,” he wrote in a November 8 letter to House Democrats, declaring his candidacy for HASC chairman.

“Specifically, we must look to eliminate inefficiency and waste at the DOD; boost oversight of sensitive military operations and ensure that the military works to avoid civilian casualties; protect our environmental laws nationwide; advance green technology in defense; take substantial steps to reduce America’s overreliance on nuclear weapons; and promote greater transparency in national security matters,” he wrote.

In an opinion column last month, Rep. Smith elaborated on the topic. He said the Trump Administration and the Pentagon had abused their secrecy authority with counterproductive results.

“The Defense Department under this administration [. . .] declared war on transparency in their earliest days on the job. On issue after issue, they have made conspicuous decisions to roll back transparency and public accountability precisely when we need it most,” he wrote, citing numerous examples of unwarranted secrecy.

A course correction is needed, he said.

“Candid discussion with Congress about military readiness, the defense budget, or deployments around the world; the release of general information about the effectiveness of weapons systems that taxpayers are funding; and many other basic transparency practices have not harmed national security for all the years that they have been the norm,” he wrote. “The efforts to further restrict this information are unjustified, and if anything, the recent policies we have seen call for an increase in transparency.”

See “The Pentagon’s Getting More Secretive — and It’s Hurting National Security” by Rep. Adam Smith, Defense One, October 28, 2018.

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The mystery surrounding a classified US military operation called Yukon Journey was partially dispelled by a news story in Yahoo News.

“Even as the humanitarian crisis precipitated by Saudi Arabia’s more-than-three-year war in Yemen has deepened, the Pentagon earlier this year launched a new classified operation to support the kingdom’s military operations there, according to a Defense Department document that appears to have been posted online inadvertently.”

See “Pentagon launched new classified operation to support Saudi coalition in Yemen” by Sharon Weinberger, Sean Naylor and Jenna McLaughlin, Yahoo News, November 10.

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The need for greater transparency in military matters will be among the topics discussed (by me and others) at a briefing sponsored by Sen. Jack Reed and the Costs of War Project at Brown University on Wednesday, November 14 at 10 am in 236 Russell Senate Office Building. A new report on the the multi-trillion dollar costs of post-9/11 US counterterrorism operations will be released.

Incoming members of Congress face a steep learning curve in trying to understand, let alone master, many diverse areas of public policy such as national defense.

To help facilitate that learning process, the Congressional Research Service has issued a series of “defense primers” that provide a brief introduction to a variety of defense policy topics. Several of them have recently been updated, including these:

Defense Primer: Geography, Strategy, and U.S. Force Design, CRS In Focus, updated November 8, 2018

Defense Primer: Department of the Navy, CRS In Focus, updated November 8, 2018

Defense Primer: Naval Forces, CRS In Focus, updated November 8, 2018

Defense Primer: United States Airpower, CRS In Focus, updated November 7, 2018:

Defense Primer: The United States Air Force, CRS In Focus, updated November 7, 2018

Other new and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service include the following.

Energy and Water Development Appropriations: Nuclear Weapons Activities, updated November 9, 2018

The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute Civilian Law, updated November 6, 2018

The DOD’s JEDI Cloud Program, CRS Insight, updated November 5, 2018

Iran: Efforts to Preserve Economic Benefits of the Nuclear Deal, CRS In Focus, updated November 8, 2018

Iran Sanctions, updated November 6, 2018

Global Trends in HIV/AIDS, CRS In Focus, November 6, 2018

21st Century U.S. Energy Sources: A Primer, updated November 5, 2018

Last February, the Secretary of Defense initiated three new classified anti-terrorist operations intended “to degrade al Qaeda and ISIS-affiliated terrorists in the Middle East and specific regions of Africa.”

A glimpse of the new operations was provided in the latest quarterly report on the U.S. anti-ISIS campaign from the Inspectors General of the Department of Defense, Department of State, and US Agency for International Development.

The three classified programs are known as Operation Yukon Journey, the Northwest Africa Counterterrorism overseas contingency operation, and the East Africa Counterterrorism overseas contingency operation.

Detailed oversight of these programs is effectively led by the DoD Office of Inspector General rather than by Congress.

“To report on these new contingency operations, the DoD OIG submitted a list of questions to the DoD about topics related to the operations, including the objectives of the operations, the metrics used to measure progress, the costs of the operations, the number of U.S. personnel involved, and the reason why the operations were declared overseas contingency operations,” the joint IG report said.

DoD provided classified responses to some of the questions, which were provided to Congress.

But “The DoD did not answer the question as to why it was necessary to designate these existing counterterrorism campaigns as overseas contingency operations or what benefits were conveyed with the overseas contingency operation designation.”

Overseas contingency operations are funded as “emergency” operations that are not subject to normal procedural requirements or budget limitations.

“The DoD informed the DoD OIG that the new contingency operations are classified to safeguard U.S. forces’ freedom of movement, provide a layer of force protection, and protect tactics, techniques, and procedures. However,” the IG report noted, “it is typical to classify such tactical information in any operation even when the overall location of an operation is publicly acknowledged.”

“We will continue to seek answers to these questions,” the IG report said.

Under the 25th amendment to the Constitution, a U.S. President could be declared “disabled” and removed from office against his will by the Vice President acting together with a majority of the Cabinet.

A new report from the Congressional Research Service details the background and provisions of the amendment.

Proponents of the 25th amendment insisted that it was “not intended to facilitate the removal of an unpopular or failed President,” and that safeguards were in place to prevent abuse.

While Presidents have voluntarily and temporarily declared themselves disabled on three occasions — in 1985, 2002 and 2007 — the provisions for involuntary removal from office have never been implemented. See Presidential Disability Under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Constitutional Provisions and Perspectives for Congress, November 5, 2018.

Other new and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service include the following.

The Citizenship Clause and “Birthright Citizenship”: A Brief Legal Overview, CRS Legal Sidebar, November 1, 2018

Internships, Fellowships, and Other Work Experience Opportunities in the Federal Government, updated November 1, 2018

U.S. Trade Policy Functions: Who Does What?, CRS In Focus, November 1, 2018

U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, updated November 2, 2018

The 2020 Decennial Census: Overview and Issues, CRS In Focus, October 31, 2018

Implementation of Treasury’s New Customer Due Diligence Rule: A Step Toward Beneficial Ownership Transparency?, CRS In Focus, October 31, 2018

U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Considerations for Congress, November 1, 2018

Last year the number of patent applications that were subject to a “secrecy order” under the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951 was the highest that it has been in more than two decades, according to data obtained from the US Patent and Trademark Office.

Whenever disclosure of a new invention is deemed to be “detrimental to national security,” a secrecy order may be imposed on the patent application, preventing its public disclosure and blocking issuance of the patent. Most affected inventions seem to involve technologies that have military uses. But the current criteria that are used to make the determination have not been released, so the actual scope of invention secrecy is not publicly known.

At the end of FY 2018 (September 30, 2018), there were 5,792 secrecy orders in effect, up slightly from 5,784 the year before.

There were 85 new orders imposed, and 77 existing orders that were rescinded. The remaining orders, which were originally imposed in previous years, were renewed. Among the new orders, there were 43 that were imposed on private inventors (i.e., not government employees or contractors). These so-called “John Doe” secrecy orders are a constitutionally suspect category, since they involve prior restraint on the speech of a private citizen or business.

The new total of 5,792 secrecy orders in effect is the highest since 1993, when the total was 5,909.

When a secrecy order is rescinded — years or sometimes decades after it was imposed — the invention may finally be patented.

When asked whether any of the inventions that were released from a secrecy order in 2018 had subsequently been patented, the US Patent and Trademark Office said it had no record of such patents.

See, relatedly, “The U.S. Government’s Secret Inventions” by Arvind Dilawar, Slate, May 9, 2018.

In the recent past, refugees who were fleeing gang or domestic violence in their home countries were able to present a claim for asylum in the United States on that basis. Though such claims were not always accepted, they could at least be adjudicated.

But in June of this year, Attorney General Jeff Sessions ruled that fear of gang and domestic violence would no longer be considered grounds for asylum in the U.S.

“The asylum statute does not provide redress for all misfortune,” the Attorney General wrote.

He held that violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors would no longer justify consideration of an asylum application. The decision was recounted in detail by the Congressional Research Service in a new publication. See Asylum and Related Protections for Aliens Who Fear Gang and Domestic Violence, CRS Legal Sidebar, October 25, 2018.

Other new and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service include the following.

Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations, updated October 24, 2018

Protection of Executive Branch Officials, CRS In Focus, updated October 25, 2018

U.S. Secret Service Protection of Persons and Facilities, CRS In Focus, October 25, 2018

Defense Primer: Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO), CRS In Focus, October 23, 2018

Iran and Israel: Tension Over Syria, CRS In Focus, updated October 24, 2018

U.S.-Japan Relations, CRS In Focus, updated October 23, 2018

U.S.-India Trade Relations, CRS In Focus, updated October 24, 2018

Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations, October 26, 2018

What Legal Obligations do Internet Companies Have to Prevent and Respond to a Data Breach?, CRS Legal Sidebar, October 25, 2018

The Federation of American Scientists asked the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense to declassify and disclose the current size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, as they have done in past years.

The number of nuclear weapons presently in the U.S. arsenal is deemed “Formerly Restricted Data” (FRD) that is classified under the Atomic Energy Act. Unlike information that is classified by executive order, there is no provision for automatic declassification of such information. Furthermore, information that is classified as FRD requires the concurrence of both the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense in order to be declassified.

But there is a provision of DOE regulations that enables anyone to request the declassification of specific FRD. And so we (once again) invoked that provision to request declassification of the stockpile size.

“We have formally sent this [request] over to the DoD for their consideration,” said Dr. Andrew Weston-Dawkes, director of the DOE Office of Classification, to whom the request was directed.

The U.S. Navy this month updated its regulations on the use of marine mammals — such as whales, dolphins, and seals — for national defense purposes. See Acquisition, Transport, Care, and Treatment of Navy Marine Mammals, Secretary of the Navy Instruction 3900.41H, 10 October 2018.

The Navy policy on marine mammals follows a 1987 statute (10 USC 7524) under which the Secretary of Defense may authorize “the taking of not more than 25 marine mammals each year for national defense purposes.”

The term “take” in this context is ominously defined (in 16 USC 1362) as meaning “to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine mammal.”

Dolphins and some other sea mammals can be trained to detect and track undersea objects, among other missions. See U.S. Navy Marine Mammal Program.

The Oceana environmental organization criticized the FY2019 defense authorization act for reducing legal protection for sea mammals.

The act “includes a harmful provision that weakens protections for marine mammals from the U.S. Navy’s use of high-intensity active sonar and underwater explosives,” the organization said.

New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service include the following.

Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, updated October 22, 2018

Congress Considers Possible Responses to the Killing of a Saudi Journalist, CRS Insight, updated October 22, 2018

The United States and the “World Court”, CRS Legal Sidebar, October 17, 2018

The Global Compact on Migration (GCM) and U.S. Policy, CRS In Focus, October 16, 2018

U.S.-Japan Announce New Limited Trade Negotiations, CRS Insight, updated October 17, 2018

China’s Status as a Nonmarket Economy (NME), CRS In Focus, updated October 22, 2018

China’s Currency Policy, CRS In Focus, updated October 22, 2018

The National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC): An Overview, CRS In Focus, October 18, 2018

Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protections: In Brief, updated October 18, 2018

Last year, the Department of Energy decided to declassify the fact it intended to make 25 metric tons of Highly Enriched Uranium available from “the national security inventory” for downblending into Low Enriched Uranium for use in the production of tritium.

However, the decision to declassify that information was classified Secret.

This year, the Department of Energy decided to declassify the declassification decision, and it was disclosed last week under the Freedom of Information Act.

While the contortions in classification policy are hard to understand, the underlying move to downblend more HEU for tritium production probably makes sense. Among other things, it “delays the urgency — but doesn’t eliminate the eventual need — to build a new domestic enrichment capacity,” said Alan J. Kuperman of the University of Texas at Austin.

There were 160 MT of US HEU downblended by the end of FY 2018, according to the FY 2019 DOE budget request (volume 1, at page 474), and a total of 162 MT was anticipated by the end of FY 2019, as noted recently by the International Panel on Fissile Materials.

“The overall amount of HEU available for down-blending and the rate at which it will be down-blended is dependent upon decisions regarding the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, the pace of warhead dismantlement and receipt of HEU from research reactors, as well as other considerations, such as decisions on processing of additional HEU through H-Canyon, disposition paths for weapons containing HEU, etc,” according to the DOE budget request.

Democracy as a political system has not advanced around the world in the past decade and by some measures it has actually declined, a new report from the Congressional Research Service observes.

The obstacles are not all located abroad. Unlike its predecessors, the Trump Administration does not include democracy promotion as part of its national security strategy, CRS noted. And for the first time last year, the Economist Intelligence Unit categorized the United States as a “flawed democracy.”

See Global Trends in Democracy: Background, U.S. Policy, and Issues for Congress, October 17, 2018.

Other new and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service include the following.

FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues, October 16, 2018

The Peace Corps: Current Issues, updated October 12, 2018

NIH Funding: FY1994-FY2019, updated October 15, 2018

Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs Funding for FY2019, CRS In Focus, updated October 15, 2018

The planning and execution of US Army information operations are the subject of a new Army manual for practitioners.

Information operations are activities that involve the use of information to support US and allied military objectives and/or to degrade adversary functions. The field of information operations includes military deception, cyberspace operations, and other sub-disciplines.

The first step is to characterize and assess the information environment.

Information Operations (IO) officers “identify human networks, groups, and subgroups that affiliate along religious, political, or cultural lines, including commonly held beliefs and local narratives.”

Once such networks are identified, information operators devise ways to influence, control or subvert them.

“IO officers focus their analysis on preferred means, methods, and venues that each social affiliation uses to interact and communicate and the ways each collectively constructs reality. Analysis examines biases, pressure points, general leanings, and proclivities, especially as they pertain to support or opposition of friendly and adversarial forces.”

SeeThe Conduct of Information Operations, ATP 3-13.1, October 4, 2018.