The Pentagon’s (Slimmed Down) 2025 China Military Power Report
On Tuesday, December 23rd, the Department of Defense released its annual congressionally-mandated report on China’s military developments, also known as the “China Military Power Report,” or “CMPR.” The report is typically a valuable injection of information into the open source landscape, and represents a useful barometer for how the Pentagon assesses both the intentions and capabilities of its nuclear-armed competitor.
This year’s report, and particularly the nuclear section, is noticeably slimmed down relative to previous years; however, this is because the format of the report has changed to focus on newer information, rather than repeating and reaffirming older assessments. As a result, this year’s report includes no mention of China’s ballistic missile submarines and their associated missiles, and includes only cursory mention of China’s air-based nuclear capabilities. It also excludes analyses of several types of land-based missiles entirely. However, this does not reflect changed assessments on the part of the Pentagon, but rather a lack of new information to report. Going forward, this means that analysts will need to read multiple years of CMPR reports in order to ensure that they are accessing the complete range of available information.
In addition, this year’s CMPR did not include any mention of China’s September 2025 Victory Day parade––which featured multiple new weapon systems––as the parade took place too recently; it will very likely be analyzed in next year’s report. The maps of missile base and brigade locations also appear to be out of date: the information is listed as “current as of 04/01/2024.”
While this year’s report did not include any earth-shattering headlines with regards to China’s nuclear forces, it provides additional context and useful perspectives on various events that took place over the past 12 months.
Stockpile growth
The CMPR states that China’s nuclear stockpile “remained in the low 600s through 2024, reflecting a slower rate of production when compared to previous years.” However, it reaffirmed previous years’ assessments that China “remains on track to have over 1,000 warheads by 2030.” China’s nuclear expansion over the past five years is now making this projection increasingly plausible, although even if it came to pass, China would still maintain several thousand warheads fewer than either the United States or Russia. Previous CMPRs had assessed that if China’s modernization pace continued, it would likely field a stockpile of about 1,500 warheads by 2035; however, this assessment has not been included in the CMPR since the 2022 iteration.
The dramatic expansion of China’s stockpile is primarily being prompted by the large-scale development and modernization of China’s next-generation intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) forces. In 2021, multiple non-governmental organizations (including our team at the Federation of American Scientists) publicly revealed the existence of three new ICBM silo fields capable of hosting up to 320 launchers for solid-propellant DF-31 class ICBMs. China is also more than doubling its number of silos for its liquid-fuel DF-5 class ICBMs, which the Pentagon assessed in its 2024 CMPR will likely yield about 50 modernized silos. Many of these missile types will be capable of carrying multiple warheads.
While the previous year’s CMPR indicated that China “has loaded at least some ICBMs into these silos,” the 2025 edition offers a valuable update: that China has now “likely loaded more than 100 solid-propellant ICBM missile silos at its three silo fields with DF-31 class ICBMs.” Our team continues to regularly monitor developments at the three silo fields using commercial satellite imagery and has not yet found sufficient evidence to corroborate this assessment; however, it is possible that the Pentagon’s assessment is primarily derived from other sources of intelligence, including human (HUMINT) and/or signals intelligence (SIGINT).
If China plans to continue its nuclear expansion, it will likely require additional fissile material, as China does not currently have the ability to produce large quantities of plutonium. The Pentagon assesses that China’s ongoing construction and planned commissioning of two new CFR-600 sodium-cooled fast breeder reactors at Xiapu “will reestablish China’s ability to produce weapons-grade plutonium.” However, the 2025 CMPR assesses that the first unit “is probably still undergoing testing,” and that “the second reactor unit is still under construction.” It is possible that this information is now out of date, as recent commercial satellite imagery now suggests that the first reactor unit may be operational.
Low-yield warheads
Previous editions of the CMPR had indicated that China was “probably” seeking low-yield warheads for escalation control during periods of small-scale nuclear crisis and/or conflict; however, the 2025 iteration is the first to offer an estimated yield value for such weapons, of “below 10 kilotons.” A recent technical history by Hui Zhang offers highly valuable data points for historical Chinese nuclear weapons tests, and suggests that China likely has the ability to produce smaller, low-yield warheads. Additionally, recent open-source reporting by Renny Babiarz with Open Nuclear Network (ONN) and researchers from the Verification Research Training and Information Center (VERTIC) found that China has been overhauling and expanding its warhead component manufacturing capabilities. Coupled with the expansion of the Lop Nur test site, this could indicate plans to upgrade China’s existing warheads, improve its ability to build more, or both.
The CMPR notes that the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and the air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) carried by the H-6N bomber “are both highly precise theater weapons that would be well suited for delivering a low-yield nuclear weapon.” While the DF-26 had previously been identified as a likely carrier for a low-yield warhead, this is the first time that the H-6N’s ALBM has also been listed as a potential carrier.
Missile designations
It is often a complex endeavor to try and match China’s own missile designations to the names that are given to various systems by the Pentagon. This year’s CMPR, however, provides valuable confirmations for some of these missile designations. In particular, it confirms that both the DF-31A and DF-31AG ICBM are known to the Pentagon as CSS-10 Mod 2, which aligns with our understanding that both systems carry the same missile. It also strongly hints at the alignment between the CSS-18 and the DF-26 IRBM, as well as the CSS-10 Mod 3 and the DF-31B ICBM––a missile that was confirmed in the 2025 CMPR as the same missile that was launched from Hainan Island into the Pacific Ocean in September 2024 for the first time since 1980. This was the first mention of the DF-31B in the CMPR since the 2022 edition, and the first time that the missile’s existence under that designation has been confirmed.
The acknowledgement of the DF-31B’s existence coincides with the recent reveal of a likely silo-based version of the same missile during China’s September 2025 military parade. During that event, China unveiled a vehicle carrying a canister with the designation “DF-31BJ;” it is possible that the vehicle was a missile loader and the “J” likely indicates a silo basing mode, as the Chinese character “井” or “jing” means “well” and is used by the PLA to describe silos. We can therefore assume that the DF-31B ICBM has both a mobile and a silo basing mode, with the latter adding the J suffix to its designation.
Doctrinal shifts, arms control, and early warning
Beyond tweaks to China’s force posture and nuclear stockpile, the CMPR also offers some additional details with regards to its assessment of China’s nuclear doctrine. In particular, it expands on its previous assessments of China’s pursuit of an “early warning counterstrike (EWCS) capability,” which it calls “similar to launch on warning (LOW), where warning of a missile strike enables a counterstrike launch before an enemy first strike can detonate.” For the first time, the CMPR offers details into the capabilities of China’s early warning systems, stating that “China’s early warning infrared satellites [Tongxun Jishu Shiyan (TJS), also known as Huoyan-1] can reportedly detect an incoming ICBM within 90 seconds of launch with an early warning alert sent to a command center within three to four minutes.”
It also notes that China’s ground-based, large phased-array radars “probably can corroborate incoming missile alerts first detected by the TJS/Huoyan-1 and provide additional data, with the flow of early warning information probably enabling a command authority to launch a counterstrike before inbound detonation.” If this is accurate, it would appear that China is developing an early warning capability that functions in a similar manner to those of the United States and Russia, which rely on dual phenomenology to confirm the validity of incoming attacks before authorizing retaliatory launches.
The report also notes that “Beijing continues to demonstrate no appetite for pursuing […] more comprehensive arms control discussions,” including those related to a potential US-China bilateral missile launch notification mechanism.
Corruption
The CMPR focuses quite a bit on China’s ongoing measures to combat corruption, which has led to the removal of dozens of senior officials from their posts across the PLA Air Force, Navy, and Rocket Force. The report notes that “[c]orruption in defense procurement has contributed to observed instances of capability shortfalls, such as malfunctioning lids installed on missile silos”––a story which Bloomberg first reported in January 2024. The report notes that “these investigations very likely risk short term disruptions in the operational effectiveness of the PLA.”
Missiles and delivery systems
The 2025 report included a detail that in December 2024, “the PLA launched several ICBMs in quick succession from a training center into Western China.” Contrary to the launch from Hainan Island, there was very little public reporting about this salvo launch.
The CMPR also indicates an estimated growth in China’s ICBM and IRBM launchers by 50 each, although it is unclear whether these numbers include both finished launchers as well as those still under construction.
The following graph indicates the growth of China’s launchers and missiles, as assessed by the Pentagon, over the past 20 years. It is important to note that many of these missiles, including China’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and its ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), are not nuclear-capable.
Our 2025 overview of China’s nuclear arsenal can be freely accessed here.
The Nuclear Information Project is currently supported with generous contributions from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the New-Land Foundation, Ploughshares, the Prospect Hill Foundation, and individual donors.
A Digital Military Talent Initiative for Noncitizen Technologists
Competent and innovative technologists are crucial to the future of U.S. national security. The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) warns that a digital talent deficit at the Department of Defense (DOD) represents the greatest impediment to the U.S. military’s effective embrace of emerging technologies (such as artificial intelligence).
A new Digital Military Talent Initiative could help address the military’s digital-talent gap by providing an expedited path to U.S. citizenship through military service for noncitizen technologists aligned to NSCAI archetypes. Modernization of an already-existing DOD program and military enlistment policy updates could infuse digital talent by providing vetted noncitizens a pathway to accelerated naturalization through military service.
Challenge and Opportunity
A paucity of technical talent threatens the U.S. military’s current and future capability goals, as evidenced by the military’s ongoing inability to staff cyber units or achieve objectives set by the Pentagon’s Chief Data Officer. Global competition for technical talent requires the United States to get more creative with recruitment. The former Director of the DOD’s Defense Innovation Unit noted that the Pentagon’s efforts to add science and technology talent to its workforce are “insufficient” given competitors’ gains in these arenas.
If current efforts are insufficient to meet technical talent needs, future efforts may be worse. Projections suggest the U.S. population is aging, such that fewer working-age persons will be available relative to the broader population in years to come. This trend may have an outsize negative impact on the military’s available talent pool, as the military fills its ranks predominantly with younger workers. Only 12% of the nation’s young adults are qualified and available to enlist, further exacerbating the larger recruiting shortage. Compounding the problem is the fact that military-eligible tech talent is often lost to the higher-paying private sector. Last, lack of lifestyle flexibility may make the military a hard sell, especially for innovative and free-thinking talent.
Even the newest models for bringing private-sector talent into the military, such as the U.S. Digital Corps and cyber direct-hire authorities, only harness talent from existing U.S. citizens. Proposals for training more government technologists (e.g., by creating a federal digital service academy) are limited by the number of citizens who may be willing and able to participate.
There is a blueprint that may help overcome these challenges. During the Global War on Terror, the U.S. military enlisted over 10,000 noncitizen volunteers through the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program. Under this program, a select group of pre-screened recruits was offered the chance to remain in the U.S. and obtain citizenship in exchange for military service. Notwithstanding an untimely termination that gave rise to a series of lawsuits, MAVNI was widely recognized as a success. It should be noted that over 14,000 individuals expressed interest in the first year that the U.S. Army sought to enlist recruits in the Global War on Terror pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 504(b)(2)). However, the program was limited in scope. Although many MAVNI participants held advanced degrees, the skillsets the program sought (due to DOD’s self-imposed restrictions) were limited to certain foreign languages and medical specialties. Modernizing and expanding MAVNI with statutory authority commensurate with the realities of modern conflict could help mitigate technology talent shortages in the military.
Modernizing and expanding MAVNI would also align with the NSCAI’s recommendation for a “comprehensive” legislative strategy to enable “highly skilled immigrants to encourage more AI talent to study, work, and remain in the United States.” Our nation’s inadequate strategies for recruiting foreign technical and STEM talent have caused leading companies like Google to appeal for Congressional assistance, even as peer nations like Canada have developed novel, effective policies to support digital immigration. During the Trump administration, Toronto became the fastest-growing location for tech-sector jobs in North America. The upshot is clear: the U.S. military—and the United States generally—faces a widening tech talent gap that requires out-of-the-box thinking to address.
Plan of Action
We propose a two-part plan of action for launching a national Digital Military Talent Initiative. Part One entails minor modifications to existing law governing U.S. military eligibility. Part Two involves modernizing the existing MAVNI program by expanding the definition of skills deemed “vital to the national interest” and evolving recruitment and technology practices to incorporate this new talent. More detail on each of these components is provided below.
Part 1. Amend existing law governing U.S. military eligibility.
Two paragraphs of 10 U.S.C. § 504(b) should be modified to enable the Department of Defense to access noncitizen technologists. First, 10 U.S.C. § 504(b)(2)—which governs military enlistment of individuals who are neither U.S. citizens, permanent residents, nor citizens of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, or Palau— should be modified to read:
“Notwithstanding paragraph (1), and subject to paragraph (3), the Secretary concerned may authorize enlistment of a person not described in paragraph (1) if the Secretary determines that such person possesses a critical skill or expertise that is vital to the national interest.”
In other words, 10 U.S.C. § 504(b)(2) should be modified by removing provision (B), which currently requires that an enlistee use their referenced “critical skill or expertise” in their “primary daily duties.” This requirement unnecessarily inhibits military commanders at all levels, since critical skills and expertise often include skills and expertise deployed only in moments of the utmost exigency.
Second, 10 U.S.C. § 504(b)(3) should be modified to read:
“A Secretary concerned may not authorize more than 10,000 enlistments under paragraph (2) per military department in a calendar year until after the Secretary of Defense submits to Congress written notice of the intent of that Secretary concerned to authorize more than 10,000 such enlistments in a calendar year.”
This language increases the enlistment number at which the Secretary of Defense is statutorily obligated to notify Congress and does away with the 30-day waiting period that the Secretary must wait between notifying Congress and proceeding with the enlistment authorization.
These modifications are needed to accommodate anticipated recruitment under an expanded MAVNI and help the Secretary to move quickly on leveraging such a talent pool. Congressional changes can be slow and difficult to change; however, without these changes, the MAVNI program will continue to be constrained when bringing noncitizen tech talent into the military.
Part 2. Modernize the DOD’s existing MAVNI program by authorizing enlistment for certain vetted noncitizens with critical digital competencies.
The MAVNI program authorizes certain noncitizens to enlist if they possess critical skills limited to certain foreign languages and medical specialties. As the demands of modern conflict have adjusted at the speed of technological advancement, so too should the way the U.S. staffs its military. The DOD should expand the MAVNI program to include skills aligned to the NSCAI’s digital-talent archetypes, the 2021 Executive Order 14028 on improving the nation’s cybersecurity, FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act, and the 2023 Executive Order 14110 on the development and use of artificial intelligence. The DOD should also consider the following recommendations to modernize the existing MAVNI program.
MAVNI Program Setup:
- Determine talent needs of military service-software factories, as well as tactical-level units and enterprise programs pursuing technology transformations.
- Source and prioritize needs related to specific problem statements and technology applications that can be developed with minimal risk and have potential for significant impact.
- Educate internal stakeholders on leveraging noncitizen technologists capable of developing and shipping code in zero trust environments.
- Evolve and scale MAVNI program infrastructure in alignment with DOD zero trust principles and architecture requirements.
- Develop professional-development and career pathways that incentivize recruited technical talent to remain engaged in their military careers.
- Gather and implement feedback from program alumni and participants on topics including recruitment, retention, training, incentives, and community-building.
Recruitment Process:
- Define enlistment pathways for recruited technical talent. For instance, a recruit might first enter into a non-classified military occupational specialty—whether a unique specialty for uncleared technical talent or a traditional specialty. After receiving a clearance naturalization, the recruit could a) shift to an existing enlisted role in information technology/networking, cyber, and electronic warfare, b) enter a potentially new technology-specialty role, or c) commission as a warrant or officer.
- Understand military recruiter pain points and concerns specific to MAVNI and technical talent identification to ensure appropriate talent screening, talking points, and incentivization for both the recruiter and potential service member.
- MAVNI participants enlisting in the military are encouraged to join any of the Regular or Reserve components.
- Naturalization should occur prior to MAVNI participants reporting to initial active duty training to avoid creating any U.S. visa complications.
Conclusion
The DOD’s current technology talent deficiencies may evolve into an existential vulnerability without significant course correction, while our competitors increase investments in both R&D and STEM education. The DOD can begin addressing these deficiencies through an integrated Technical Military Talent Initiative. Such an initiative should comprise two parts: (1) amending existing law governing enlistment eligibility and (2) modernizing the existing MAVNI program to recruit talent for the military in alignment with STEM skills “vital to the national interest.” Together, these actions will dramatically grow the U.S. military’s eligible technology talent pool, thus enabling it to better compete in future sub-threshold and armed conflict.
This idea was originally published on February 9, 2022; we’ve re-published this updated version on November 13, 2024. The views expressed are those of the authors. The analysis presented stems from the authors’ academic research of publicly available sources, not from protected operational information. All errors and omissions are those of the authors.
This action-ready policy memo is part of Day One 2025 — our effort to bring forward bold policy ideas, grounded in science and evidence, that can tackle the country’s biggest challenges and bring us closer to the prosperous, equitable and safe future that we all hope for whoever takes office in 2025 and beyond.
PLEASE NOTE (February 2025): Since publication several government websites have been taken offline. We apologize for any broken links to once accessible public data.
The Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program recruited noncitizens with needed language and/or medical expertise to serve in the U.S. military. Though widely regarded as successful, MAVNI did encounter friction, such as security concerns. The DOD can address such concerns for an expanded version of MAVNI by ensuring that the totality of contributor service through the program occurs in zero trust security environments, including those already championed by the Army’s Enterprise Cloud Management Agency. This will enable program participants to support critical mission requirements without placing underlying capabilities or operational data at risk. The DOD should also consider piloting a modernized MAVNI in software engineering use cases. Software can be vetted through continuous integration-continuous deployment (CI/CD) pipelines prior to release. Recruited software engineers can generate features and capabilities for interacting with sensitive data without the engineers actually needing access to that data.
In a global post-digital era, military operations and capabilities are also redefined. The military needs more technology talent to staff cyber units, operate military-software factories, and more. Furthermore, the most recent National Security Strategy’s emphasis on artificial intelligence and “attract[ing] and retain[ing] inventors and innovators” in the digital space highlights the need to think creatively about opportunities to recruit tech talent.
A key reason why relying on contracted talent is a problematic approach is that the success of projects carried out by contractors depends on the education and experience of the military personnel providing project guidance. Recruitment and development of in-house STEM talent is a better, more efficient way for the military to approach technical talent needs for the long term.
Very. Naturalization is the process for an individual to become a U.S. citizen if that individual was born outside of the U.S.. Since 2002, the U.S.has naturalized more than 148,000 members of the U.S. military, both at home and abroad. In the last five years (FY2017–FY2021), the U.S. naturalized almost 30,000 service members. In FY2021, the U.S. naturalized 8,800 service members, a 90% increase over the previous year.
A military service member who has served for one year or more—or who served during a designated period of conflict—can apply for naturalization with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services through the N-400 process. Other requirements for military naturalization include that the service member in question be separated under honorable conditions, be a lawful permanent resident upon application unless serving during wartime, and more. This process, while functional, can also be slow due to DOD’s new policies that prevent recruits from filing their applications early in their period of service. An expedited path towards naturalization for service members with tech talent could help the military meet its technical talent needs.
The NSCAI buckets the archetypes the U.S. needs to train for AI competitiveness into Researchers, Implementers, End Users, and Informed Consumers. The Technical Military Talent Initiative will focus on recruiting researchers and implementers to enhance the U.S.’s capacity to transform national security. Recruitment efforts should emphasize individuals with industry experience, informal training (self-taught, coding boot camps, and other industry-recognized, non-academic accreditation courses), and formal academic STEM education across AI, electrical and computer engineering, mechanical engineering, computer science, molecular biology, computational biology, biomedical engineering, cybersecurity, data science, mathematics, physics, human-computer interaction, robotics, and design. The objective is to recruit individuals who can operate in uniform as software engineers, data scientists, data analysts, product designers, hardware engineers, product management, technical program management, solutions architects, and technical information technology and cybersecurity specialists.
There are two categories of visas– immigrant and nonimmigrant. Immigrant visas are issued to foreign nationals who intend to live permanently in the U.S.; an immigrant visa allows the person to obtain “lawful permanent residence,” known as a “green card.” Immigrant visa categories include EB-1A for Extraordinary Ability or EB-1C for Multinational Managers and Executives. Unfortunately, immigrant visas are subject to restrictive quotas both annually and per country, such that it can take many years and thousands of dollars for a person to obtain one. For MAVNI, the focus will be on accessions of nonimmigrant visa holders with STEM degrees or technology skills and experience mapped to NSCAI archetypes seeking to legally remain in the country. These visas include F-1 (and Optional Practical Training “OPT”) for international students, J-1 for STEM exchange students, L-1 for intracompany transferees, O-1A for extraordinary ability, H-1B for specialty occupations, and TN for certain tech workers who hold Canadian or Mexican citizenship. Such individuals have also been extensively vetted by the U.S. Government prior to being accorded their visas, so they are a relatively low risk population compared to persons with other immigration statuses that do not require extensive vetting.
First, the DOD can direct military recruiting centers to prioritize the MAVNI program as one of many pathways to meet broader recruitment goals. Second, the DOD can redefine “critical skills” to include the NSCAI archetypes to identify and recruit individuals with STEM talent. Third, the DOD can implement zero trust principles (or other models) to enable Regular and Reserve components to utilize MAVNI STEM talent with appropriate technology and operational risk management tools and education.
First, Congressional action is needed to remove formal barriers that prevent MAVNI participants from using their STEM skills without limitation from their Military Occupational Specialty “primary daily duties.” Second, Congress needs to increase the number of enlistments available to the DOD for MAVNI participants before triggering Congressional notification, resulting in a 30-day waiting period.
Commonly used in software development pipelines, a zero trust stance “assume[s] that an attacker is present in the environment…an enterprise must continually analyze and evaluate the risks to its assets and business functions and then enact protections to mitigate these risks.” Federal zero trust cybersecurity practices are outlined in NIST Special Publication 800-207. Applying these principles to all operations and units using MAVNI recruits will help mitigate potential security vulnerabilities.
US Army Views Chinese Military Tactics
How would China fight a war against the US?
A new US Army publication sets out to answer that question, offering a detailed account of the military tactics China could employ. See Chinese Tactics, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 7-100.3, August 9, 2021.
The 250-page document is mainly intended to help provide a realistic basis for training of US forces. But in doing so it sheds some new light on China’s military forces, at least as they are perceived by US military observers. It is based primarily on open sources.
“This publication presents PLA [People’s Liberation Army] military theory largely as written and prescribed by the PLAA [PLA Army],” the manual says. “Real world practices of PLA units are . . . generally not included as part of the analysis underpinning this document.”
The description of Chinese military tactics is necessarily speculative to some extent. “The PLA has not participated in an active conflict in nearly half a century, so real-world applications are minimal. [But] available information on Chinese military training exercises and the few recent examples of conflict seem to indicate that PLA practices — including those of the PLAA — conform closely to its military theory.”
As for the command structure of the Chinese military, it “is complex and opaque to outsiders. . . . There are no fewer than ten different national-level command organizations in China, organized across at least three different levels of a complex hierarchy.”
“Deception plays a critical role in every part of the Chinese approach to conflict,” according to the document. “Rather than focusing on defeating the opponent in direct conflict — as most Western militaries do — [Chinese military] stratagems consider deception, trickery, and other indirect, perception-based efforts to be the most important elements of an operation.”
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The current volume on China is the second in a new Army series on foreign military tactics. A previous volume on North Korean Tactics (ATP 7-100.2) was published last year. Two more volumes on Russian Tactics (ATP 7-100.1) and Iranian Tactics (ATP 7-100.4) are expected to appear later this year.
While unclassified, “these assessments are based on the most up-to-date information available,” wrote Army intelligence specialist Jennifer Dunn (“Training Today’s Army for Tomorrow’s Threats,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, Oct-Dec 2020). “Subject matter experts within the Department of Defense and intelligence communities have vetted them, ensuring their veracity and applicability to the greater Army training and intelligence community.”
“It is also essential for the Army, especially for the regionally aligned elements, to thoroughly understand the adversary they are most likely to encounter in future conflicts,” she wrote, in an unwitting paraphrase of Sun Tzu’s famous dictum about knowing the enemy.
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The US government can and should do far more to produce such open source materials on national security and foreign policy, say some members of Congress. A bill (HR 4747) sponsored by Rep. Joaquin Castro and several bipartisan colleagues, would create a new “Open Translation and Analysis Center (OTAC).”
“OTAC would be charged with translating into English important open source foreign-language material from the People’s Republic of China, Russia, and other countries of strategic interest,” according to a July 28 news release. “The translated material would be available on a public website, serving as a key resource for the U.S. and allied governments, media outlets, and academics and analysts around the world.”
“Along with translations, OTAC would provide information to help readers understand the meaning and significance of the published material. It would also produce key analyses of translated material to enhance the understanding of the governments and political systems it covers.”
For decades the US intelligence community provided open source materials to the public through the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). But that mission has been abandoned by US intelligence and the Open Source Enterprise, the successor to FBIS, has gone completely dark as far as the public is concerned.
Pentagon Sees “Increased Potential” for Nuclear Conflict
The possibility that nuclear weapons could be used in regional or global conflicts is growing, said a newly disclosed Pentagon doctrinal publication on nuclear war fighting that was updated last year.
“Despite concerted US efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international affairs and to negotiate reductions in the number of nuclear weapons, since 2010 no potential adversary has reduced either the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy or the number of nuclear weapons it fields. Rather, they have moved decidedly in the opposite direction,” the Department of Defense document said.
“As a result, there is an increased potential for regional conflicts involving nuclear-armed adversaries in several parts of the world and the potential for adversary nuclear escalation in crisis or conflict.”
The publication presents an overview of U.S. nuclear strategy, force structure, targeting and operations. See Joint Nuclear Operations, JP 3-72, April 2020.
The document replaces a 2019 edition titled Nuclear Operations that was briefly disclosed and then withdrawn from a DoD website. (See “DoD Doctrine on Nuclear Operations Published, Taken Offline,” Secrecy News, June 19, 2019.)
The current document no longer includes some of the more unfiltered and enthusiastic language about achieving “decisive results” through nuclear strikes and “prevail[ing] in conflict” that appeared in the 2019 version. The statement that “The President authorizes the use of nuclear weapons” was changed to a more restrained declaration that “Only the President can authorize the use of nuclear weapons.”
Meanwhile, new material has been added, including an assessment that the threat from potential adversaries has grown even as the US nuclear posture is said to have been moderated:
“While the United States has continued to reduce the number and salience of nuclear weapons, others, including Russia and China, have moved in the opposite direction. They have added new types of nuclear capabilities to their arsenal, increased the salience of nuclear forces in their strategies and plans, and engaged in increasingly aggressive behavior.”
“Russia’s strategic nuclear modernization has increased, and will continue to increase, its warhead delivery capability, which provides Russia with the ability to rapidly expand its deployed warhead numbers.”
“China continues to increase the number, capabilities, and protection of its nuclear forces.”
“North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities poses the most immediate and dire proliferation threat to international security and stability.”
“Iran’s development of increasingly long-range ballistic missile capabilities, and its aggressive strategy and activities to destabilize neighboring governments, raises questions about its long-term commitment to forgoing nuclear weapons capability.”
Given the mounting threat, DoD said, “Flexible and limited US nuclear response options can play an important role in restoring deterrence following limited adversary nuclear escalation.”
The updated document gives expanded attention to the role of intelligence in potential nuclear conflict including “knowledge of an adversary decision maker’s perceptions of benefits, costs, and consequences of restraint” and “information about adversary assets, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.” Intelligence is also needed for post-strike damage assessments.
Strategic messaging is key to deterring conflict, DoD said, though this often seems to involve the threat of force. “The ability to communicate US intent, resolve, and associated military capabilities in ways that are understood by adversary decision makers is vital. Direct military means include: forward presence, force projection, active and passive defense, strategic communications/messaging, and nuclear forces.”
DoD asserts that its system of nuclear command and control is “ready, reliable, and effective at meeting today’s strategic deterrence requirements. There are no gaps or seams that adversaries could exploit.” Maybe so.
“Possibly the greatest challenge confronting the joint force in a nuclear conflict is how to operate in a post-NUDET [nuclear detonation] radiological environment,” DoD said. “By design, nuclear weapons are highly destructive and have harmful effects that conventional weapons do not have. Commanders must plan for and implement protective measures to mitigate these effects and continue operations.”
Joint Nuclear Operations is not available in DoD’s online public library of Joint Publications. But a copy of the April 2020 document was released to the Federation of American Scientists last week under the Freedom of Information Act.
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The Biden Administration adopted a somewhat conciliatory tone concerning nuclear weapons policy in its March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance:
“As we re-engage the international system, we will address the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons. We will head off costly arms races and re-establish our credibility as a leader in arms control. That is why we moved quickly to extend the New START Treaty with Russia. Where possible, we will also pursue new arms control arrangements. We will take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, while ensuring our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective and that our extended deterrence commitments to our allies remain strong and credible.”
But even some simple changes from past practice remain to be accomplished. For now, at least, the Biden Administration is still adhering to the Trump policy of classifying the size of the US nuclear stockpile rather than following the Obama policy of disclosing it.
Army Program Seeks to Heighten Soldiers’ Cognition
A properly trained soldier can distinguish a vegetarian from a meat-eater based on their smell, a new Army publication says, since “different diets produce different human odors.”
He or she can to determine the age, gender and even the mental state of a target by studying their footprints.
Not simply a warrior, the ideal soldier is also an intelligence analyst, a cultural anthropologist, and a student of human nature with the ability to confront and overcome adversity — Sherlock Holmes and Leatherstocking and a bit of Tarzan, all in one.
That, at any rate, seems to be the goal of the US Army’s Advanced Situational Awareness program, which trains soldiers to discern even subtle anomalies in the combat environment, to swiftly assess their implications, and to act decisively in response.
Advanced Situational Awareness “optimizes human performance through building the skills necessary to develop agile, resilient, adaptive, and innovative Soldiers who thrive in conditions of uncertainty and chaos.”
The program was described in Advanced Situational Awareness, US Army Training Circular TC 3-22.69, 316 pages, April 2021.
The Military Role in Combating COVID-19
There is a bewildering amount of official guidance on the role of the military in circumstances such as the current pandemic. But the practical impact of that guidance, whatever it may be, is unclear. Like the proverbial war plan that cannot survive first contact with the enemy, Pentagon doctrine on infectious disease seems to have been overtaken by events.
“The mission of DOD in a pandemic is to preserve U.S. combat capabilities and readiness and to support U.S. government efforts to save lives, reduce human suffering, and slow the spread of infection,” according to a 2019 Army manual.
To help accomplish that, another military manual offered a “prioritized and tiered [list of] infectious diseases [to] assist the military research community in focusing on the development of vaccine, prophylactic drugs, diagnostic capabilities, and surveillance efforts.”
Pandemic influenza was among the highest priority diseases, posing a “high operational risk,” but unfortunately the intended military research response appears to have lagged.
Who is in charge?
Well, “USNORTHCOM [US Northern Command] exercises coordinating authority for planning of DOD efforts in support of the USG response to pandemic influenza and infectious disease,” says a Pentagon publication (JP 3-40) on Joint Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.
What is NORTHCOM doing?
“DoD has nearly 11,000 personnel dedicated to COVID-19 operations nation-wide, with nearly 2,500 in the New York City area,” according to an April 10 news release. “DOD is providing expeditionary medical care in several states across the country.”
“NORTHCOM is out there working furiously to carry out its many missions, implementing at least five different operations plans simultaneously,” according to military researcher William M. Arkin.
But “Implementing might be too strong of a word,” he wrote, “because even though these plans run in the hundreds of pages, most are thrown out the window almost as soon as they are taken off the shelf, useful in laying out how things should be organized but otherwise too rigid — or fanciful — to apply to the real world.”
In a new piece, Arkin surveyed 19 operational military plans that in theory govern NORTHCOM activities. Most of them are not publicly available, and some are classified.
“Is there any reason you can imagine that the pandemic response plan shouldn’t be public? Or the plan for Defense Support of Civil Authorities?” Arkin doesn’t think so.
One of the plans he turned up, a 2017 NORTHCOM draft on Pandemic Influenza and Infectious Disease Response, identified what it termed “critical vulnerabilities” including:
“Lack of communication and synchronization among partners and stakeholders, inability or unwillingness to share information / biosurveillance data, limited detection capabilities, and limited laboratory confirmatory testing.”
That particular plan from 2017 “seemingly never went beyond the draft stage,” said Arkin.
The Urgency of Military History
The task of the military historian differs from that of the academic historian because military history has an operational dimension. It is supposed to help inform current military operations with the lessons and the perspectives of the past.
“The historian must always bear in mind that the whole purpose of the history office is to help the warfighter by serving as an advisor and presenting critical documentation when needed,” according to a new US Air Force Handbook on the subject. “The mission drives what is important for the historian, not the historian’s particular interest. ”
The military historian also is responsible for identifying and assembling the raw materials of future scholarship. Contrary to what “many new historians may incorrectly assume, documentation will not automatically arrive in the office. The historian must seek it.” See Aerospace Historian Operations in Peace and War, Air Force Handbook 84-106, April 2, 2020.
But operationally, history can only do so much.
“Military history does not produce solutions for problems and does [not] guarantee success on the battlefield,” an Army manual on the subject explains. “An approach with these goals leads to frustration and biased or inaccurate history.”
“Rather, military history affords an understanding of the dynamics to shape the present and enables Soldiers the perspective of viewing current and future problems with ideas of how similar challenges were confronted in the past. . . If history rarely provides concrete answers, it offers insight and understanding.”
“Historians know that Army history records triumphs, challenges, and failures. Army historians do not judge operations and actions; they seek to tell the full story so that others learn from it.” See Military History Operations, ATP 1-20, US Army, June 2014.
Life Underground: US Army Subterranean Operations
Subterranean operations involving the use of tunnels and underground facilities pose growing challenges to the U.S. military, a new Army manual indicates.
“Today, over 10,000 known subterranean facilities exist around the world,” the manual says.
“Whether to protect vital assets and capabilities, mitigate weapon system and sensor overmatch, to strengthen a larger defensive position, or simply to be used for transportation in our largest cities, subterranean systems continue to be expanded and relied upon throughout the world. Therefore, our Soldiers and leaders must be prepared to fight and win in this environment.”
See Subterranean Operations, Army Techniques Publication ATP 3-21.51, November 2019.
Logistical issues aside, subterranean operations can have adverse effects on soldiers’ emotional, moral, and spiritual health, the Army manual said.
“Subterranean environments may reduce a Soldier’s sense of purpose and commitment, causing them to lose combat effectiveness sooner than anticipated due to the psychological and physiological stress of these environments.”
“As a result, Soldiers may have powerful emotional reactions. These may include an overwhelming sense of fear or momentary loss of their moral compass leading to illegal or immoral actions.”
Army Playing Cards Feature Iranian Weapons
In a not very subtle sign of the times, the U.S. Army has produced a deck of playing cards featuring weaponry used or held by Iran in order to familiarize soldiers with Iran’s inventory of weapons and presumably to facilitate their recognition on the battlefield.
The Iran collection follows similar decks of playing cards illustrated with Chinese and Russian weapons.
Another set of U.S. Army playing cards featuring North Korean weapons systems is forthcoming.
DoD Doctrine on Nuclear Operations Published, Taken Offline
The Joint Chiefs of Staff briefly published and then removed from public access a new edition of their official doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons. But a public copy was preserved. See Joint Publication 3-72, Nuclear Operations, June 11, 2019.
The document presents an unclassified, mostly familiar overview of nuclear strategy, force structure, planning, targeting, command and control, and operations.
“Using nuclear weapons could create conditions for decisive results and the restoration of strategic stability,” according to one Strangelovian passage in the publication. “Specifically, the use of a nuclear weapon will fundamentally change the scope of a battle and create conditions that affect how commanders will prevail in conflict.”
The document might have gone unremarked, but after publishing it last week the Joint Chiefs deleted it from their public website. A notice there states that it (JP 3-72) is now only “available through JEL+” (the Joint Electronic Library), which is a restricted access site. A local copy remains publicly available on the FAS website.
USAF Seeks “Resilient” Nuclear Command and Control
The US Air Force last week updated its guidance on the command and control of nuclear weapons to include protection against electromagnetic pulse and cyber attack, among other changes. See Air Force Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3), Air Force Instruction 13-550, April 16, 2019.
“This is a complete revision to the previous version of this instruction,” the new guidance states. “It revises the command relationships, roles and responsibilities, the governance structure, and addresses resourcing, architecture and configuration management, resilience, and assessments.”
“Resilience” here pertains particularly to “two of the most broadly applied challenges: hardening against the effects of electromagnetic pulse and threats in the cyberspace domain.” These topics were scarcely mentioned at all in the previous version of the Air Force Instruction that was issued in 2014, nor did the term resilience appear in the earlier document.
Several new classified directives on nuclear command and control have been issued in recent years (such as Presidential Policy Directive-35 and others) and their content is reflected at least indirectly and in part in the new unclassified USAF guidance.
A broader modernization of the nation’s entire nuclear command, control and communications system is underway at U.S. Strategic Command, costing a projected $77 billion over the coming decade. See “STRATCOM to design blueprint for nuclear command, control and communications” by Sandra Erwin, Space News, March 29, 2019.
Contractors: All Major Military Operations Rely on Them
Military contractors are such an integral part of U.S. military forces that “most military operations will include contracted support,” a newly updated Pentagon manual explains.
In fact, “While some limited-duration operations, such as noncombatant evacuation operations, may use limited contracted support, all major operations will involve significant contracted support.”
Aside from their prominent role in logistics, contractors also provide linguist, signal and security services.
In some circumstances, contractors may even substitute for US military forces. “The use of contracted support as an alternative to deploying US forces may have other benefits, including minimizing the military footprint in the operational area, reducing force operational tempo, and improving domestic US political support or buy-in,” the manual said.
Contractors are considered indispensable, and they can sometimes be used to circumvent policy restrictions on military deployments. “The continual introduction of high-tech equipment, coupled with force structure and manning reductions, mission-specific force cap restrictions, and high operating tempo, means contracted support will augment military forces in most operations.”
Among the various types of military contractors are armed private security contractors (PSCs) that are used to guard personnel and facilities. “PSC-provided services, more than any other contracted service, can have a direct impact (sometimes a very negative impact) on civil-military aspects of the operation,” the Pentagon manual cautioned.
As a general matter, vigilant oversight is needed to ensure the integrity of the contracting process, since “the procurement of supplies and services in support of military operations can be prone to fraud, waste, and abuse (FWA), even more so in a foreign contingency where there are many contracts with local firms.” See Operational Contract Support, Joint Publication 4-10, March 4, 2019.