The Department of the Treasury blocked one transaction by a foreign person or entity who was engaged in malicious cyber activities earlier this year, using the national emergency powers that are available pursuant to a 2015 executive order.
But the value of the intercepted transaction was only $0.04, the Department said in a new report to Congress.
No other transactions were blocked by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) during the reporting period from March 15 to September 8 of this year, according to the Department’s latest report. See Periodic Report on the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities, October 3.
Meanwhile, the cost of implementing the national emergency on malicious cyber activities was approximately $770,000 during the latest six-month period, the same report said.
Is this normal? Should Americans be concerned about the stark disparity between the amount of government expenditures and the reported proceeds? The Department of the Treasury did not respond to our inquiry on the subject yesterday. [see update below]
Background on OFAC’s Cyber-Related Sanctions Program can be found here.
Update: An official said that it would be a mistake to judge the efficacy or the efficiency of a particular sanctions program from a single periodic report, especially since these reports are not comprehensive assessments of the program.
Nor are blocked transactions the sole or primary measure of impact. Persons subject to sanctions may experience a range of other impacts, including: the disruption or loss of existing or planned contracts and other relationships with U.S. and foreign business partners; the blocking or rejection of transactions with persons outside of U.S. jurisdiction; the disruption of financial and other activities due to complementary actions taken by U.S. allies and partners; reputational damage due to the exposure of malign activities; the cost of altering and rebuilding cyber infrastructure exposed due to the imposition of sanctions; disavowal by associated governments; and loss of visas to travel to the United States and potentially to other countries.
By definition, scientists who perform classified research cannot take full advantage of the standard practice of peer review and publication to assure the quality of their work and to disseminate their findings. Instead, military and intelligence agencies tend to provide limited disclosure of classified research to a select, security-cleared audience.
In 2013, the US intelligence community created a new classified journal on cybersecurity called the Journal of Sensitive Cyber Research and Engineering (JSCoRE).
The National Security Agency has just released a redacted version of the tables of contents of the first three volumes of JSCoRE in response to a request under the Freedom of Information Act.
JSCoRE “provides a forum to balance exchange of scientific information while protecting sensitive information detail,” according to the ODNI budget justification book for FY2014 (at p. 233). “Until now, authors conducting non-public cybersecurity research had no widely-recognized high-quality secure venue in which to publish their results. JSCoRE is the first of its kind peer-reviewed journal advancing such engineering results and case studies.”
The titles listed in the newly disclosed JSCoRE tables of contents are not very informative — e.g. “Flexible Adaptive Policy Enforcement for Cross Domain Solutions” — and many of them have been redacted.
However, one title that NSA withheld from release under FOIA was publicly cited in a Government Accountability Office report last year: “The Darkness of Things: Anticipating Obstacles to Intelligence Community Realization of the Internet of Things Opportunity,” JSCoRE, vol. 3, no. 1 (2015)(TS//SI//NF).
“JSCoRE may reside where few can lay eyes on it, but it has plenty of company,” wrote David Malakoff in Science Magazine in 2013. “Worldwide, intelligence services and military forces have long published secret journals” — such as DARPA’s old Journal of Defense Research — “that often touch on technical topics. The demand for restricted outlets is bound to grow as governments classify more information.”
A compilation of online documents and databases related to cybersecurity is presented by the Congressional Research Service in Cybersecurity: Cybercrime and National Security Authoritative Reports and Resources, November 14, 2017.
Other new and updated publications from CRS include the following.
A Primer on U.S. Immigration Policy, November 14, 2017
Defense Primer: Department of Defense Maintenance Depots, CRS In Focus, November 7, 2017
Potential Effects of a U.S. NAFTA Withdrawal: Agricultural Markets, November 13, 2017
State Exports to NAFTA Countries for 2016, CRS memorandum, n.d., October 24, 2017
Membership of the 115th Congress: A Profile, updated November 13, 2017
Drought in the United States: Causes and Current Understanding, updated November 9, 2017
Impact of the Budget Control Act Discretionary Spending Caps on a Continuing Resolution, CRS Insight, November 14, 2017
Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations, updated November 14, 2017
Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, updated November 14, 2017
The Latest Chapter in Insider Trading Law: Major Circuit Decision Expands Scope of Liability for Trading on a “Tip”, CRS Legal Sidebar, November 14, 2017
In Any Way, Shape, or Form? What Qualifies As “Any Court” under the Gun Control Act?, CRS Legal Sidebar, November 14, 2017
Generalized System of Preferences: Overview and Issues for Congress, updated November 14, 2017
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Frequently Asked Questions, updated November 14, 2017
For at least the past six months, and perhaps longer, the Federation of American Scientists website has been blocked by U.S. Cyber Command. This week it was unblocked.
The “block” imposed by Cyber Command meant that employees throughout the Department of Defense who attempted to access the FAS website on their government computers were unable to do so. Instead, they were presented with a notice stating: “You have attempted to access a blocked website. Access to this website has been blocked for operational reasons by the DOD Enterprise-Level Protection System.”
The basis for the Cyber Command block is unclear, and official documentation of the decision that we requested has not yet been provided. In all likelihood, it is due to the presence on the FAS website of a small number of currently classified documents that were obtained in the public domain.
The basis for the removal of the block is likewise unclear, though we know that a number of DoD employees complained about the move and advised US Cyber Command that direct access to the FAS website was needed for them to perform their job.
The record of a 2015 hearing of the House Armed Services Committee on Implementing the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy was published last month.
In April 2015, President Obama issued Executive Order 13694 declaring a national emergency to deal with the threat of hostile cyber activity against the United States.
But six months later, the emergency powers that he invoked to punish offenders had still not been used because no qualifying targets were identified, according to a newly released Treasury Department report.
In a White House statement coinciding with the release of last year’s Executive Order, the President said that “Cyber threats pose one of the most serious economic and national security challenges to the United States, and my Administration is pursuing a comprehensive strategy to confront them…. This Executive Order offers a targeted tool for countering the most significant cyber threats that we face.”
The Executive Order authorized the Secretary of the Treasury “to impose sanctions on individuals or entities that engage in malicious cyber-enabled activities that create a significant threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic health or financial stability of the United States.”
In the first periodic report on the implementation of the order, Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew said that “No entities or individuals have been designated pursuant to E.O. 13694.” Accordingly, the Department of the Treasury took no punitive licensing actions, and it assessed no monetary penalties, Secretary Lew wrote.
A copy of the Treasury report was obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. See Periodic Report on the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities, October 1, 2015.
Even though it generated no policy outputs, implementation of the executive order nevertheless incurred costs of “approximately $760,000, most of which represent wage and salary costs for federal personnel,” the Treasury report said.
Unbeknownst to most people, there are typically multiple “national emergencies” in progress at any given time. A helpful introduction to the subject was prepared by then-CRS specialist Harold C. Relyea a decade ago.
By invoking emergency powers derived from the Constitution or from statutory law, Relyea wrote, “the President may seize property, organize and control the means of production, seize commodities, assign military forces abroad, institute martial law, seize and control all transportation and communication, regulate the operation of private enterprise, restrict travel, and, in a variety of ways, control the lives of United States citizens. [However], Congress may modify, rescind, or render dormant such delegated emergency authority.” See National Emergency Powers, updated August 30, 2007.
One other ongoing “emergency” pertains to North Korea. A Treasury Department Periodic Report on the National Emergency With Respect to North Korea, dated May 21, 2015, reveals that five financial transactions involving North Korean agents or interests — and totaling $23,200 — were blocked by executive order between December 2014 and April 2015. That’s an increase from $17,600 during the previous reporting period.
When Gen. Keith Alexander became the new director of the National Security Agency in 2005, “his predecessor, Mike Hayden, stepped down, seething with suspicion”– towards Alexander.
As told by Fred Kaplan in his new book Dark Territory, Gen. Hayden and Gen. Alexander had clashed years before in a struggle “for turf and power, leaving Hayden with a bitter taste, a shudder of distrust, about every aspect and activity of the new man in charge.” The feeling was mutual.
The subject (and subtitle) of Kaplan’s book is “the secret history of cyber war.” But the most interesting secrets disclosed here have less to do with any classified missions or technologies than with the internal bureaucratic evolution of the military’s interest in cyber space. Who met with whom, who was appointed to what position, or even (as in the case of Hayden and Alexander) who may have hated whom all turn out to be quite important in the ongoing development of this contested domain.
Kaplan seems to have interviewed almost all of the major players and participants in this history, and he has an engaging story to tell. (Two contrasting reviews of Dark Territory in the New York Times are here and here.)
Meanwhile, the history of cyber war is becoming gradually less secret.
This week, the Department of Defense openly published an updated instruction on Cybersecurity Activities Support to DoD Information Network Operations (DoD Instruction 8530.01, March 7).
It replaces, incorporates and cancels previous directives from 2001 that were for restricted distribution only.
New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that Congress has withheld from online public distribution include the following.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): In Brief, updated January 8, 2016
Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress, updated January 11, 2016
Guatemala: One President Resigns; Another Elected, to Be Inaugurated January 14, CRS Insight, updated January 11, 2016
China’s Recent Stock Market Volatility: What Are the Implications?, CRS Insight, updated January 9, 2016
Navy John Lewis (TAO-205) Class Oiler Shipbuilding Program: Background and Issues for Congress, updated January 8, 2016
Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress, updated January 8, 2016 (This report explains that “John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers, previously known as TAO(X)s, are being named for people who fought for civil rights and human rights.” An oiler is a fuel resupply vessel that is used to transfer fuel to surface ships at sea.)
Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, updated January 8, 2016
Free Riders or Compelled Riders? Key Takeaways as Court Considers Major Union Dues Case, CRS Legal Sidebar, January 12, 2016
Unauthorized Aliens, Higher Education, In-State Tuition, and Financial Aid: Legal Analysis, updated January 11, 2016
The TRIO Programs: A Primer, updated January 11, 2016
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016: Effects on Budgetary Trends, CRS Insight, January 11, 2016
President Obama Announces Executive Actions to “Reduce Gun Violence”, CRS Legal Sidebar, January 8, 2016
Juvenile Justice Funding Trends, updated January 8, 2016
Community Services Block Grants (CSBG): Background and Funding, updated January 8, 2016
A new report from the Congressional Research Service looks at the commercial prospects for the emerging drone industry.
“It has been estimated that, over the next 10 years, worldwide production of UAS for all types of applications could rise from $4 billion annually to $14 billion. However, the lack of a regulatory framework, which has delayed commercial deployment, may slow development of a domestic UAS manufacturing industry,” the report said. See Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS): Commercial Outlook for a New Industry, September 9, 2015.
In advance of the September 22–27 visit to the United States by Pope Francis, another new CRS report “provides Members of Congress with background information on Pope Francis and a summary of a few selected global issues of congressional interest that have figured prominently on his agenda.” See Pope Francis and Selected Global Issues: Background for Papal Address to Congress, September 8, 2015.
Another new report from CRS on encryption and law enforcement presents “an overview of the perennial issue involving technology outpacing law enforcement and discusses how policy makers and law enforcement officials have dealt with this issue in the past.” See Encryption and Evolving Technology: Implications for U.S. Law Enforcement, September 8, 2015.
Other new and newly updated publications from the Congressional Research Service include the following.
Syrian Refugee Admissions to the United States, CRS Insight, September 10, 2015
An Analysis of Efforts to Double Federal Funding for Physical Sciences and Engineering Research, updated September 8, 2015
Cybersecurity: Data, Statistics, and Glossaries, updated September 8, 2015
Cybersecurity: Legislation, Hearings, and Executive Branch Documents, updated September 8, 2015
The EMV Chip Card Transition: Background, Status, and Issues for Congress, updated September 8, 2015
Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive, udpated September 10, 2015
Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations, updated September 8, 2015
Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, updated September 10, 2015
Iran Nuclear Agreement, updated September 9, 2015
Statutory Qualifications for Executive Branch Positions, updated September 9, 2015
Federal Reserve: Emergency Lending, September 8, 2015
The Department of Defense plans to complete the establishment of a new Cyber Mission Force made up of 133 teams of more than 6000 “cyber operators” by 2018, and it’s already nearly halfway there.
From FY2014-2018, DoD intends to spend $1.878 billion dollars to pay for the Cyber Missions Force consisting of approximately 6100 individuals in the four military services, DoD said in response to a question for the record that was published in a congressional hearing volume last month.
“This effort began in October 2013 and today we have 3100 personnel assigned to 58 of the 133 teams,” or nearly 50% of the intended capacity, DoD wrote in response to a question from Rep. Rick Larsen (D-WA) of the House Armed Services Committee. The response was included in the published record of a February 26, 2015 Committee hearing (page 67).
“The Department of Defense has three primary missions in cyberspace: (1) defend DoD information networks to assure DoD missions, (2) defend the United States against cyberattacks of significant consequence, and (3) provide full-spectrum cyber options to support contingency plans and military operations,” Mr. Rosenbach said.
“To carry out these missions, we are building the Cyber Mission Force and equipping it with the appropriate tools and infrastructure to operate in cyberspace. Once fully manned, trained, and equipped in Fiscal Year 2018, these 133 teams will execute USCYBERCOM’s three primary missions with nearly 6,200 military and civilian personnel,” Mr. Rosenbach said at an April 14 hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
The new Cyber Mission Force will naturally have both defensive and offensive characteristics.
“Congressman, we are building these cyber teams… in order to, one, protect ourselves from cyber attacks,” said Adm. Cecil D. Haney, commander of U.S. Strategic Command. “We are being probed on a daily basis by a variety of different actors.”
“The protection side is one thing,” said Rep. Larsen at the February hearing of the House Armed Services Committee. “What about the other side?”
“The other aspect of it, we are distributing these forces out to the various combatant commands so that they can be integrated into our overall joint military force capability,” Adm. Haney replied.
* * *
“Worldwide Cyber Threats” was the subject of an open hearing of the House Intelligence Committee on Thursday.
The foreign intrusions suffered by U.S. government and private networks have yielded some useful lessons, said Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper.
“Of late, unauthorized disclosures and foreign defensive improvements have cost us some technical accesses, but we are also deriving valuable new insight from cyber security investigations of incidents caused by foreign actors and new means of aggregating and processing big data. Those avenues will help offset some more traditional collection modes that are obsolescent,” he told the Committee.
New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service include the following.
FY2016 Appropriations for the Department of Justice (DOJ), April 15, 2015
Domestic Human Trafficking Legislation in the 114th Congress, April 16, 2015
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Frequently Asked Questions, April 20, 2015
Mountaintop Mining: Background on Current Controversies, April 20, 2015
Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress, April 17, 2015
A new report from the Congressional Research Service presents an introduction to U.S. military operations in cyberspace and the thorny policy issues that arise from them.
“This report presents an overview of the threat landscape in cyberspace, including the types of offensive weapons available, the targets they are designed to attack, and the types of actors carrying out the attacks. It presents a picture of what kinds of offensive and defensive tools exist and a brief overview of recent attacks. The report then describes the current status of U.S. capabilities, and the national and international authorities under which the U.S. Department of Defense carries out cyber operations.”
The Department of Defense requested $5.1 billion for “cybersecurity” in 2015, the CRS report noted. Cybersecurity here includes funding for cyberspace operations, information assurance, U.S. Cyber Command, the National Cybersecurity Initiative, and related functions. See Cyber Operations in DoD Policy and Plans: Issues for Congress, January 5, 2015.
(The CRS report includes only a capsule summary description of the Stuxnet episode. A fuller account is presented in Kim Zetter’s gripping book Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon.)
Other noteworthy new and updated CRS reports that Congress has withheld from online public distribution include the following.
Proposed Retirement of A-10 Aircraft: Background in Brief, January 5, 2015
Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, December 24, 2014
The Congressional Research Service has never been more frequently cited or more influential in informing public discourse than it is today, as its publications are increasingly shared with the public in violation of official policy.
But budget cuts and congressional dysfunction seem to have bred discontent among some staff members, judging from an article by former CRS analyst Kevin R. Kosar.
“Thanks to growing pressure from a hyper-partisan Congress, my ability to write clearly and forthrightly about the problems of government–and possible solutions–was limited. And even when we did find time and space to do serious research, lawmakers ignored our work or trashed us if our findings ran contrary to their beliefs. When no legislation is likely to move through the system, there’s simply not much market for the work the CRS, at its best, can do,” he wrote. See “Why I Quit the Congressional Research Service,” Washington Monthly, January/February 2015.
A newly disclosed Department of Defense doctrinal publication acknowledges the reality of offensive cyberspace operations, and provides a military perspective on their utility and their hazards.
Attacks in cyberspace can be used “to degrade, disrupt, or destroy access to, operation of, or availability of a target by a specified level for a specified time.” Or they can be used “to control or change the adversary’s information, information systems, and/or networks in a manner that supports the commander’s objectives.”
However, any offensive cyber operations (OCO) must be predicated on “careful consideration of projected effects” and “appropriate consideration of nonmilitary factors such as foreign policy implications.”
“The growing reliance on cyberspace around the globe requires carefully controlling OCO, requiring national level approval,” according to the newly disclosed Cyberspace Operations, Joint Publication 3-12(R).
That publication was first issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a SECRET document in February 2013 (as JP 3-12, without the R). But this week it was reissued as a public document. It is unclear whether the public document has been redacted or modified for release.
The discussion of “offensive cyberspace operations” in the original, classified version of JP 3-12 led to adoption of that term in the official DoD lexicon for the first time in March 2013, where it has remained through the latest edition.
Offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) are “intended to project power by the application of force in and through cyberspace. OCO will be authorized like offensive operations in the physical domains, via an execute order (EXORD).”
The DoD document is fairly candid about the challenges and limitations of cyberspace operations.
“Activities in cyberspace by a sophisticated adversary may be difficult to detect” and to attribute to their source. Yet such detection and attribution capabilities are “critical” for enabling offensive and defensive cyberspace operations.
By the same token, “first-order effects of [US cyberspace operations] are often subtle, and assessment of second- and third-order effects can be difficult,” requiring “significant intelligence capabilities and collection efforts” to evaluate.
Not only that, but US cyberspace operations “could potentially compromise intelligence collection activities. An IGL [Intelligence Gain/Loss] assessment is required prior to executing a CO to the maximum extent practicable.”
In any event, offensive cyber operations are to be used discriminatingly. “Military attacks will be directed only at military targets. Only a military target is a lawful object of direct attack.” But military targets are defined broadly as “those objects whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a direct and concrete military advantage.”
Meanwhile, there are persistent vulnerabilities inherent in DoD information systems, DoD said. “Many critical [US] legacy systems are not built to be easily modified or patched. As a result, many of the risks incurred across DOD are introduced via unpatched (and effectively unpatchable) systems on the DODIN [DoD Information Network].”
The risks are increased because “DOD classified and unclassified networks are targeted by myriad actions, from foreign nations to malicious insiders.”
“Insider threats are one of the most significant threats to the joint force,” the DoD document said. “Whether malicious insiders are committing espionage, making a political statement, or expressing personal disgruntlement, the consequences for DOD, and national security, can be devastating.”
Overall, “Developments in cyberspace provide the means for the US military, its allies, and partner nations to gain and maintain a strategic, continuing advantage,” the Cyberspace Operations publication said.
But “access to the Internet provides adversaries the capability to compromise the integrity of US critical infrastructures in direct and indirect ways.”
These features represent “a paradox within cyberspace: the prosperity and security of our nation have been significantly enhanced by our use of cyberspace, yet these same developments have led to increased vulnerabilities….”