Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

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The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a key U.S. partner in the Middle East. Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, the two countries have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the years. Jordan remains at peace with Israel and is a key interlocutor with the Palestinians. Jordan’s strategic importance to the United States is evident given ongoing instability in neighboring Syria and Iraq. Jordan also is a longtime U.S. partner in global counterterrorism operations. U.S.-Jordanian military intelligence, and diplomatic cooperation seeks to empower political moderates, reduce sectarian conflict, and eliminate terrorist threats.

U.S. officials frequently express their support for Jordan. U.S. support has helped Jordan address serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan’s small size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and various Arab sources. President Trump has acknowledged Jordan’s role as a key U.S. partner in countering the Islamic State, as many U.S. policymakers advocate for continued robust U.S. assistance to the kingdom.

Annual U.S. aid to Jordan has nearly quadrupled in historical terms over the last 15 years. The United States has provided economic and military aid to Jordan since 1951 and 1957, respectively. Total bilateral U.S. aid (overseen by the Departments of State and Defense) to Jordan through FY2018 amounted to approximately $22 billion. Jordan also hosts over 3,000 U.S. troops.

To date, Jordan has withstood the impact of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) with minimal loss of life (a reported nine deaths), but at a steep cost to its economy. Jordan’s small size and strong public health system arguably contributed to the country’s ability to manage the pandemic effectively. Jordan is one of the first Arab countries to reopen; as of June 2020 the state had lifted most restrictions on economic activity and certain public gatherings, such as religious worship. Analysts anticipate that Jordan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will contract in 2020 by 3.5% after growing 2% last year. Losses in government revenue caused by fewer remittances and a weakened market for tourism are expected to widen the budget deficit in the years ahead.

As the Trump Administration has enacted changes to long-standing U.S. policies on Israel and the Palestinians, which the Palestinians have criticized as unfairly punitive to them and biased toward Israel, Jordan has found itself in a difficult position. While King Abdullah II seeks to maintain strong relations with the United States, he rules over a country where the issue of Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population; more than half of all Jordanian citizens originate from either the West Bank or the area now comprising the state of Israel. In trying to balance U.S.-Jordanian relations with Palestinian concerns, King Abdullah II has refrained from publicly criticizing the Trump Administration on its moves, while urging the international community to return to the goal of a two-state solution that would ultimately lead to an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Jordanian leaders have expressed strong opposition to a possible Israeli cabinet and Knesset vote on annexing West Bank territory—in coordination with the United States—after July 1, 2020. King Abdullah II has signaled that should Israel go ahead with annexation, Jordan is prepared to escalate its confrontation with Israel. As Jordan considers whether to revisit ties to Israel, the range of possible options Jordan may be considering include withdrawing its ambassador from Israel, reducing security cooperation, cancelling its natural gas deal with Israel, and either partially or fully suspending the 1994 peace treaty.

Congress may consider legislation pertaining to U.S. relations with Jordan. On February 18, 2016, President Obama signed the United States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-123), which authorizes expedited review and an increased value threshold for proposed arms sales to Jordan for a period of three years. It amended the Arms Export Control Act to give Jordan temporarily the same preferential treatment U.S. law bestows upon NATO members and Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. S. 28, the United States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Extension Act, would reauthorize the United States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Act (22 U.S.C. §275) through December 31, 2022. In the House, H.R. 4862 also would reauthorize the 2015 Act while also calling on the United States International Development Finance Corporation to issue a call for “proposals pursuing investment funds with a focus on Jordan.”
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Overview: COVID-19 and the Jordanian Economy

As of June 2020, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (hereinafter referred to as “Jordan”), led by 58-year-old monarch King Abdullah II bin Al Hussein (hereinafter King Abdullah II), has managed to navigate the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) with minimal loss of life (a reported nine deaths), but at a steep cost to its economy. Jordan’s small size and strong public health system arguably contributed to the country’s ability to manage the pandemic effectively. Jordan is one of the first Arab countries to reopen; the state has lifted most restrictions on economic activity and certain public gatherings, such as religious worship. Analysts anticipate that Jordan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will contract in 2020 by 3.5% after growing 2% last year. Losses in government revenue caused by fewer remittances and a weakened market for tourism are expected to widen the budget deficit in the years ahead; the Economist Intelligence Unit predicts that public debt will peak at 124% of GDP in 2022-23. It is currently 97% of GDP.

To cope with the economic fallout from the pandemic, the government has delayed public sector salary increases that were promised as part of the 2020 budget. Jordan has experienced widespread social unrest in recent years stemming largely from its lackluster economy and cuts in domestic spending. In fall 2019, 100,000 public school teachers organized a nationwide strike, demanding that the government raise teacher salaries. After the strike shut down schools for a month, the government partially acceded to teachers’ demands, despite budgetary strains. The teachers’ strike marked the second major instance of unrest in the last two years over economic conditions. In 2018, when the government tried to raise income taxes, mass protests ensued; the government ultimately revised its tax plan and turned to the Arab Gulf monarchies for additional funds.

Jordan relies heavily on international financial support to cover chronic balance of payment shortfalls. In May 2020, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) lent Jordan $396 million to “help address the country’s balance of payments needs and allow for higher spending on healthcare, containment, and assistance to households and companies most affected by [the] COVID-19 crisis.” The IMF had already provided another multi-year $1.3 billion loan package to Jordan in March 2020 (after an earlier three-year $723 million Extended Fund Facility reform program), but due to the pandemic, the government is now facing a $1.5 billion shortfall in its balance of payments.

Country Background

Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues for decades. Jordan’s small size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and various Arab

sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its powerful neighbors, but has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these countries in their largely adversarial relations with one another.

Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initially consisted of desert or semidesert territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people of Bedouin tribal background, the original “East Bank” Jordanians. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 brought large numbers of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, which subsequently unilaterally annexed a Palestinian enclave west of the Jordan River known as the West Bank. The “East Bank” Jordanians, though probably no longer a majority in Jordan, remain predominant in the country’s political and military establishments and form the bedrock of support for the Jordanian monarchy. Jordanians of Palestinian origin comprise an estimated 55% to 70% of the population. They tend to gravitate toward employment in the private sector, most likely due to their alleged general exclusion from certain public-sector and military positions.

The Hashemite Royal Family

Jordan is a hereditary constitutional monarchy under the prestigious Hashemite family, which claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad. King Abdullah II (age 58) has ruled the country since 1999, when he succeeded to the throne upon the death of his father, the late King Hussein, who had ruled for 47 years. Educated largely in Britain and the United States, King Abdullah II had earlier pursued a military career, ultimately serving as commander of Jordan’s Special Operations Forces with the rank of major general. The king’s son, Prince Hussein bin Abdullah (born in 1994), is the designated crown prince.

The king appoints a prime minister to head the government and the Council of Ministers (cabinet). On average, Jordanian governments last no more than 15 months before they are dissolved by royal decree. The king also appoints all judges and is commander of the armed forces.

Political System and Key Institutions

The Jordanian constitution, most recently amended in 2016, gives the king broad executive powers. The king appoints the prime minister and may dismiss him or accept his resignation. He also has the sole power to appoint the crown prince, senior military leaders, justices of the constitutional court, and all 75 members of the senate, as well as cabinet ministers. The constitution enables the king to dissolve both houses of parliament and postpone lower house

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8 Though there was little international recognition of Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, Jordan maintained control of it (including East Jerusalem) until Israel took military control of it during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and maintained its claim to it until relinquishing the claim to the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1988.
9 Speculation over the ratio of East Bankers to Palestinians (those who arrived as refugees and immigrants since 1948) in Jordanian society is a sensitive domestic issue. Jordan last conducted a national census in 2015, and it is unclear whether or not the government maintains such national-origin statistics. Over time, intermarriage has made it more difficult to discern distinct differences between the two communities, though divisions do persist.
10 In July 2009, King Abdullah II named Prince Hussein (then 15 years old), as crown prince. The position had been vacant since 2004, when King Abdullah II removed the title from his half-brother, Prince Hamzah.
The king can circumvent parliament through a constitutional mechanism that allows the cabinet to issue provisional legislation when parliament is not sitting or has been dissolved. The king must also approve laws before they can take effect, although a two-thirds majority of both houses of parliament can modify legislation. The king can also issue royal decrees, which are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The king commands the armed forces, declares war, and ratifies treaties. Finally, Article 195 of the Jordanian Penal Code prohibits insulting the dignity of the king (lèse-majesté), with criminal penalties of one to three years in prison.

Jordan’s constitution provides for an independent judiciary. According to Article 97, “Judges are independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions they are subject to no authority other than that of the law.” Jordan has three main types of courts: civil courts, special courts (some of which are military/state security courts), and religious courts. State security courts administered by military (and civilian) judges handle criminal cases involving espionage, bribery of public officials, trafficking in narcotics or weapons, black marketeering, and “security offenses.” The king may appoint and dismiss judges by decree, though in practice a palace-appointed Higher Judicial Council manages court appointments, promotions, transfers, and retirements.

King Abdullah II in 2013 laid out a vision of Jordan’s gradual transition from a constitutional monarchy into a full-fledged parliamentary democracy, but in reality, successive Jordanian parliaments have mostly complied with the policies laid out by the Royal Court. The legislative branch’s independence has been curtailed not only by a legal system that rests authority largely in the hands of the monarch, but also by electoral laws designed to produce pro-palace majorities with each new election. Due to frequent gerrymandering in which electoral districts arguably are drawn to favor more rural pro-government constituencies over densely populated urban areas, parliamentary elections have produced large pro-government majorities dominated by representatives of prominent tribal families. In addition, voter turnout tends to be much higher in pro-government areas since many East Bank Jordanians depend on family/tribal connections as a means to access patronage jobs. The next parliamentary election for the 130-seat House of Deputies (lower chamber) is tentatively scheduled for September 2020.

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11 The king also may declare martial law. According to Article 125, “In the event of an emergency of such a serious nature that action under the preceding Article of the present Constitution will be considered insufficient for the defense of the Kingdom, the King may by a Royal Decree, based on a decision of the Council of Ministers, declare martial law in the whole or any part of the Kingdom.”

12 New amendments to Article 94 in 2011 have put some restrictions on when the executive is allowed to issue temporary laws.


Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians

The Jordanian government has long described efforts to secure a lasting end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as one of its highest priorities. In 1994, Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty. Nevertheless, the persistence of Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be a major challenge for Jordan, as the issue of Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population. Twenty-five years after the signing of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, the Israeli-Palestinian

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18 Jordan and Israel signed the peace treaty on October 26, 1994. Later, the two countries exchanged ambassadors, Israel returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan, the parliament repealed laws banning contacts with Israel, and the two countries signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to normalize economic and cultural links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, was partially resolved in May 1997 when the two countries reached an interim arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000 cubic meters of water from Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent to 26.3 million cubic meters per year—a little over half the target amount envisioned in an annex to the peace treaty). See, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on Water Agreement with Jordan, May 27, 1997.
conflict has soured attempts to improve Jordanian-Israeli people-to-people relations. Even before the current annexation issue, various short-lived diplomatic disputes (see below) between Jordan and Israel have led to tensions in government-to-government relations, despite ongoing security cooperation. Israeli control of Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem (see text box below) is a perpetual concern for the Jordanian monarchy and its domestic legitimacy.19

### Holy Sites in Jerusalem20

Per arrangements with Israel dating back to 1967 (when the Israeli military seized East Jerusalem—including its Old City—from Jordan) and then subsequently confirmed in the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, Israel acknowledges a continuing role for Jordan vis-à-vis Jerusalem’s historic Muslim shrines.21 A Jordanian waqf (or Islamic custodial trust) has long administered the Temple Mount (known by Muslims as the Haram al Sharif or Noble Sanctuary) and its holy sites, and this role is key to bolstering the religious legitimacy of the Jordanian royal family’s rule. Jordanian monarchs trace their lineage to the Prophet Muhammad. Disputes over Jerusalem that appear to circumscribe King Abdullah II’s role as guardian of the Islamic holy sites create a domestic political problem for the King. Jewish worship on the Mount/Haram is prohibited under a long-standing “status quo” arrangement that dates back to the era of Ottoman control before World War I.

### Jordan and Trump Administration Peace Plans

Since December 2017, when the Palestinians broke off high-level political contacts with the United States after President Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and relocate the U.S. embassy there, Jordan has been caught in the middle of acrimony between the Trump Administration and the Palestinian Authority. Jordan has expressed solidarity with the Palestinians and tried to encourage the Administration to commit to the two-state solution. Jordanian officials have repeatedly stated that it is the kingdom’s long-standing position that any final Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement should include a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.22 While Jordan did not outright reject President Trump’s January 2020 Peace-to-Prosperity plan, two days before the plan’s release, King Abdullah II stated “Our position is perfectly well known. We will not agree to proposals that come at our expense.”23 Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi also issued a statement responding to the proposed Peace-to-Prosperity plan that reiterated Jordan’s support for a two-state solution, warned against the “dangerous consequences of unilateral Israeli measures,” and called for direct negotiations on all final status issues.24


20 For more information on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.

21 Article 9, Clause 2 of the peace treaty says that “Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.” In 2013, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) reaffirmed in a bilateral agreement with Jordan that the King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will continue to serve as the “Custodian of the Holy Sites in Jerusalem,” a title that successive Jordanian monarchs have used since 1924.


Possible Israeli Annexation of the West Bank

Multiple Jordanian leaders have expressed strong opposition to a possible Israeli cabinet and Knesset vote on annexing West Bank territory—in coordination with the United States—after July 1, 2020. Since its peace treaty with Israel in 1994, Jordan has emphasized that any final Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement should include a Palestinian state based on 1949-1967 Israel-Jordan armistice line, with East Jerusalem as its capital. According to one account, Jordanian leaders are concerned that should Israel proceed with annexation, it would end the possibility of a viable two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and lend credence to the claim by influential elements on the right of the Israeli political spectrum that “Jordan is Palestine.”

It is unclear to what extent Jordanian-Israeli tensions are permeating Jordan’s traditionally strong relationship with the United States. In a late May 2020 conversation between U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, the Jordanian foreign minister expressed strong opposition to Israeli annexation of the West Bank, claiming that it would endanger prospects for peace. While King Abdullah II has refrained from directly criticizing Trump Administration policy changes in its approach toward Israel and the Palestinians, as well as the President’s January 2020 peace plan, the king has signaled that should Israel go ahead with annexation, Jordan is prepared to escalate its confrontation with Israel. In a May 2020 interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel, King Abdullah II remarked:

What would happen if the Palestinian National Authority collapsed? There would be more chaos and extremism in the region. If Israel really annexes the West Bank in July, it would lead to a massive conflict with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. … I don’t want to make threats and create a loggerheads atmosphere, but we are considering all options. We agree with many countries in Europe and the international community that the law of the strongest should not apply in the Middle East.

Possible Jordanian Reactions to Annexation

As Jordanian officials have used strong rhetoric to signal opposition to annexation, many observers have speculated as to what concrete steps the kingdom may take should Israel begin any annexation process. Jordan has already taken one step to signal possible displeasure with Israel. In November 2019, Jordan did not renew a provision in its 1994 peace treaty with Israel.

25 U.S. officials have said that any U.S. approval for Israeli annexation of West Bank areas would come after a U.S.-Israel committee (established under the Trump Administration peace plan) can pinpoint areas earmarked for eventual Israeli sovereignty. See, CRS Report R44245, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief, by Jim Zanotti.


that allowed Israel access to the Jordanian territories of Baqoura and Al Ghumar (see below), which are agricultural areas in northern and southern Jordan, respectively.

Since its 1994 peace treaty with Israel, Jordan has oriented its foreign policy toward promoting Middle East peace, combatting extremism, and developing close ties to the United States. The 1994 treaty enables water sharing between the two countries, as well as Jordanian overflight of Israeli territory.\(^{32}\) Beyond the treaty, Jordan now imports natural gas from Israel (see below).

Any departure from these aspects of cooperation would be a major reorientation for the kingdom. Before taking any steps, Jordanian leaders would be likely to calculate the degree of public opposition to any Israeli action, how much support the kingdom enjoys from key international partners such as Saudi Arabia and the European Union, and most importantly, how any reaction would be perceived in Israel and the United States. Partly because of the complexity and uncertainty involved in whether and how Israel might annex West Bank territory, and how other key international actors might react, many analysts argue that Jordan is likely to take calculated, gradual steps in revisiting ties with Israel rather than any drastic action.\(^ {33}\) The following offer a range of possible options Jordan may be considering.\(^ {34}\)

- **Recall Jordan’s Ambassador to Israel.** Although Article 5 of the 1994 peace treaty calls on both parties to establish full diplomatic relations, Jordan has frequently recalled its ambassador from Tel Aviv either to protest Israeli military action in Gaza or because of a bilateral dispute over Jerusalem and other issues. Most recently, Jordan left the ambassador position in Israel vacant from 2009 to 2012 and recalled its ambassador from Israel in 2014 and 2017. Given this history, the recall would be a likely option and would not be a significant departure from precedent.

- **Reduce Jordanian-Israeli Security Cooperation.** Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’s May 2020 declaration abrogating all agreements and understandings with the American and Israeli governments, including security cooperation, could be a precursor to Jordan reducing its own security cooperation with Israel should annexation occur. According to Bruce Riedel of the Brookings Institution, “For decades, the two countries’ intelligence agencies have been close partners in counterterrorism…. Drastically cutting down on the covert connection will have impact. But of course by definition, cutting the clandestine relationship is not public, which leaves Abdullah still in need of a dramatic response.”\(^ {35}\)

- **Cancel Natural Gas Deal with Israel.** In September 2016, Jordan’s state-run National Electric Power Company (NEPCO) signed a 15-year, $10 billion natural gas import deal with a consortium of U.S. (Noble Energy Inc.) and Israeli (Delek Drilling-LP and others) companies. The contract would reportedly meet an estimated 40% of Jordan’s electricity needs and save the Jordanian government hundreds of millions of dollars annually in energy costs. However, anti-normalization forces (Jordanians opposed to cooperation with Israel) within Jordan have used the gas deal as a rallying cry, calling on the government to cancel the deal. The Lower House of parliament approved a draft bill to ban gas

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\(^{32}\) See footnote 18.


imports from Israel in January 2020, but Jordan's Constitutional Court ruled in May 2020 that only the king can declare war, ratify, or amend treaties and international agreements. If the king were to cancel the deal in response to annexation, Jordan would need to find alternative sources of imported natural gas, perhaps at higher costs. NEPCO also may be liable for cancellation fees that could run into the hundreds of millions of dollars.

- **Partially or Fully Suspend the 1994 Treaty.** Perhaps the most serious step would involve Jordan suspending its treaty with Israel. Jordan might argue that a suspension is justified because Israeli annexation of the Jordan Valley would violate the delineation of borders between Israel and Jordan.\(^36\) However, Israel could counter that the peace treaty only outlines the international border between Jordan and Israel, and does not address boundary questions where Jordan’s territory meets the West Bank. Article 3 Clause 2 of the treaty states, “The boundary, as set out in Annex I (a), is the permanent, secure and recognized international boundary between Israel and Jordan, without prejudice to the status of any territories that came under Israeli military government control in 1967.”\(^37\)

Regardless of the legal justifications for doing so, any Jordanian revocation or suspension of the peace treaty, while potentially popular domestically,\(^38\) would risk jeopardizing key Jordanian national interests, such as Israeli recognition of King Abdullah II’s role as guardian of the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem. Perhaps most importantly, Jordan’s peace with Israel has been one of the foundations of strong U.S.-Jordanian ties. According to one Israeli news report, an unnamed senior Jordanian official said that the king wants to maintain his status as custodian of holy sites in Jerusalem and his good relations with President Trump.\(^39\)

One major unknown factor in the discussion of heightened Israeli-Jordanian tensions over annexation is the possible Jordanian public reaction and what it bodes for the stability of the kingdom. Given Jordan’s precarious financial situation (exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic), recent instances of public protests, and longtime public support for Palestinian national aspirations, it is conceivable that the issue of annexation could ignite popular anger against Israel, the United States, and the king himself. Recent large-scale protests in Jordan have been focused on economic grievances, rather than on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Nevertheless, some Israeli commentators have stressed that Israel has a vested interest in Jordan’s stability and have cautioned against taking provocative steps that could trigger unrest next door.\(^40\)

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39 Daniel Siryoti, “‘Next Few Weeks will Determine Whether Future Decades will see Peace or Bloodshed,’” *Israel Hayom*, May 27, 2020.
Jordan Ends Israeli Access to Two Territories

In late 2018, the king announced (via Twitter) that his government would not renew a provision in its 1994 peace treaty with Israel that allowed Israel access to the Jordanian territories of Baqoura and Al Ghumar, which are agricultural areas in northern and southern Jordan, respectively.\(^{41}\) According to one Jordanian commentator, “Domestically, the King’s decision is a much-needed shot in the arm for the government at a time when it is facing public pressure over its unpopular economic policies.”\(^{42}\) After several failed Israeli attempts to negotiate with Jordan over the renewal of access to the territories, Jordan ended its lease to Israel on November 10, 2019. A day later, King Abdullah, the Crown Prince, and several high level military officials made an official visit to Baqoura to publicly demonstrate Jordanian sovereignty over the area.\(^{43}\)

Syria

Jordanian-Syrian relations have been strained since 2011. King Abdullah was the first Arab leader to openly call for Syrian President Bashar Al Asad’s resignation in November 2011, and Jordan supported moderate Syrian rebel groups operating in southwestern Syria until Asad largely defeated these groups in 2018.\(^{44}\) Since the Asad regime reclaimed control of southern Syria (with the help of Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah), Jordan has sought to return to normal bilateral ties. Along the kingdom’s northern border with Syria, many Jordanian residents share familial ties with Syrian families. While Jordan and Syria opened the Nasib/Jaber border crossing to facilitate greater bilateral trade, economic relations have not returned to pre-2011 levels, arguably because of trade barriers, sanctions, and security impediments.\(^{45}\)

Syria remains a primary problem for Jordan’s security. The kingdom shares security concerns with Israel over the presence of Iranian and Hezbollah forces operating near Jordan’s borders. According to one account, “Former Free Syrian Army rebels who have returned to their hometowns in southern Syria after an amnesty agreement with the regime say Hezbollah is effectively ‘governing’ several towns and villages. Hezbollah and Shiite militias patrol areas

\(^{41}\) These two Jordanian-leased agricultural territories to Israel are known in Hebrew as Naharayim and Tzofar, where Israeli farmers have tilled the land since 1949. In 1997, three years after the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, on the island of Naharayim, a Jordanian soldier killed seven Israeli schoolgirls who were visiting Naharayim on a field trip. The late King Hussein of Jordan visited Israel after the shooting, and Naharayim was renamed the “Isle of Peace” (it is a man-made island in the vicinity of the Jordan River) to commemorate those killed. See, “At Bloodied Isle of Peace, Some Israelis Still Hope to Bridge Divide with Jordan,” \textit{Times of Israel}, March 13, 2019.


\(^{43}\) Petra (Jordan News Agency), website of the official news agency of the Jordanian Government, November 12, 2019.


dressed as uniformed Syrian regime forces in order to avoid being hit by Israeli airstrikes, they say, or, more frequently, deploy former rebel fighters to patrol areas and provide intelligence directly to the Iran-backed paramilitary group.  

The kingdom also continues to host hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees, many of whom are reluctant to return to their homes for fear of Syrian regime retribution against them. Since 2011, the influx of Syrian refugees has placed tremendous strain on Jordan’s government and local economies, especially in the northern governorates of Mafraq, Irbid, Ar Ramtha, and Zarqa. As of June 2020, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are 657,287 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan.

The United States has used Jordanian territory to monitor and implement U.S. assistance programs to opposition-held areas in Syria. While the Trump Administration ended U.S. funding for stabilization assistance to Syria in 2018, some programs have continued using non-U.S. funding, and the Southern Syria Assistance Platform (SSAP) based in Amman continues to monitor foreign assistance to opposition-held areas in Syria.

U.S. Relations

U.S. officials frequently express their support for Jordan, citing its role in countering the Islamic State, supporting U.S. policy toward Syria, and having a moderating influence in the Arab world, both in its regional outlook and internal politics. At a time when traditional U.S. partnerships with key regional actors like Saudi Arabia and Turkey are fraught, U.S.-Jordanian relations remain solid. President Trump has acknowledged Jordan’s role as a key U.S. partner in countering the Islamic State, as many U.S. policymakers advocate for continued robust U.S. assistance to the kingdom. Annual aid to Jordan has nearly quadrupled in historical terms over the last 15 years. Jordan also hosts U.S. troops. According to President Trump’s June 2020 War Powers Resolution Report to Congress, “At the request of the Government of Jordan, approximately 3,145 United States military personnel are deployed to Jordan to support Defeat-ISIS operations, enhance Jordan’s security, and promote regional stability.”

50 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, June 9, 2020.
The Case of Ahlam al Tamimi

Ahlam al Tamimi is a Jordanian national who participated in the 2001 suicide bombing of a Jerusalem pizza restaurant that killed 15 people, including two Americans. In Israel, she had been sentenced to life in prison but was released and returned to Jordan in 2011 as part of a prisoner exchange deal between Israel and Hamas. The U.S. Justice Department filed criminal charges against Al Tamimi in 2013, and those charges were unsealed in early 2017. Al Tamimi is on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Most Wanted Terrorist List. The United States and Jordan have an extradition treaty, which, according to the U.S. State Department, entered into force on July 29, 1995. The United States requested Al Tamimi’s extradition in 2017, but Jordan’s Court of Cassation ruled that the extradition treaty was invalid. In November 2019, the State Department, said that “The United States regards the extradition treaty as valid.”

On April 30, 2020, seven House lawmakers sent a letter to the Jordanian Ambassador in Washington DC stating that “We believe it is of the highest importance to US/Jordan relations that an outcome is found that honors Jordanian law while ensuring this unrepentant terrorist and murderer of innocent Americans is brought to US justice.”

Section 7055 of P.L. 116-94, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, prohibits certain foreign assistance funds for the central government of a country that has “notified the Department of State of its refusal to extradite to the United States any individual indicted for a criminal offense for which the maximum penalty is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or for killing a law enforcement officer, as specified in a United States extradition request.” Section 7055 does contain a clause allowing the Secretary of State to waive the provision if it is important to the national security interests of the United States.

In June 2020, the Associated Press published U.S. Ambassador to Jordan Henry Wooster’s written responses to questions for the record on Tamimi’s case after his confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In one response to a question posed by Senator Ted Cruz, Wooster wrote that “The United States has multiple options and different types of leverage to secure Ahlam Aref Ahmad Al-Tamimi’s extradition … We will continue to engage Jordanian officials at all levels not only on this issue, but also on the extradition treaty more broadly. US generosity to Jordan in Foreign Military Financing as well as economic support and other assistance is carefully calibrated to protect and advance the range of US interests in Jordan and in the region…. If confirmed, I would explore all options to bring Ahlam Aref Ahmad Al Tamimi to justice, secure her extradition, and address the broader issues associated with the extradition treaty.”

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan

The United States has provided economic and military aid to Jordan since 1951 and 1957, respectively. Total bilateral U.S. aid (overseen by the Departments of State and Defense) to Jordan through FY2018 amounted to approximately $22 billion. Jordan also has received over one billion dollars in additional military aid since FY2014 channeled through the Defense Department’s various security assistance accounts. Currently, Jordan is the third-largest recipient of annual U.S. foreign aid globally, after Afghanistan and Israel.

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52 The kingdom’s courts have ruled that Al Tamimi cannot be extradited until such a treaty is endorsed by the Jordanian parliament.
Table 1. Bilateral Aid to Jordan
current U.S. dollars in millions

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<th>FY2016 actual</th>
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<th>FY2019 actual</th>
<th>FY2020 enacted</th>
<th>FY2021 request</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESF/ESDF</td>
<td>812.35</td>
<td>832.35</td>
<td>1,082.40</td>
<td>1,082.40</td>
<td>1,207.40</td>
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<td>FMF</td>
<td>450.00</td>
<td>470.00</td>
<td>425.00</td>
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<td>350.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.80</td>
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<tr>
<td>NADR</td>
<td>8.85</td>
<td>13.60</td>
<td>13.60</td>
<td>13.60</td>
<td>13.60</td>
<td>10.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,274.93</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,319.83</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,525.01</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,524.99</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,650.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,275.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Congressional Budget Justifications (FY2017-FY2021), P.L. 116-94, and CRS calculations and rounding.

Notes: The Administration amended the FY2021 request to realign funding with the MOU. Funding levels for FY2020 enacted include $125 million in ESF from prior acts. Under P.L. 116-6 (FY2019 omnibus), Congress provided an additional $50 million in prior-year Relief and Recovery Fund (RRF) aid for Jordan. Funding levels combine both regular appropriations and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO).

U.S.-Jordanian Agreement on Foreign Assistance

On February 14, 2018, the United States and Jordan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on U.S. foreign assistance to Jordan. The MOU, the third such agreement between the United and Jordan, commits the United States to providing $1.275 billion per year in bilateral foreign assistance over a five-year period for a total of $6.375 billion (FY2018-FY2022). This latest MOU represents a 27% increase in the U.S. commitment to Jordan above the previous iteration and is the first five-year MOU with the kingdom. The previous two MOU agreements had each been in effect for three years.

Economic Assistance

The United States provides economic aid to Jordan for (1) budgetary support (cash transfer), (2) USAID programs in Jordan, and (3) loan guarantees. The cash transfer portion of U.S. economic assistance to Jordan is the largest amount of budget support given to any U.S. foreign aid recipient worldwide. U.S. cash assistance is provided to help the kingdom with foreign debt payments, Syrian refugee support, and fuel import costs (Jordan is almost entirely reliant on imports for its domestic energy needs). According to USAID, ESF cash transfer funds are deposited in a single tranche into a U.S.-domiciled interest-bearing account and are not commingled with other funds.

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55 Other budget support aid recipients include: the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau.
USAID programs in Jordan focus on a variety of sectors including democracy assistance, water conservation, decentralization, and education (particularly building and renovating public schools). In the democracy sector, U.S. assistance has supported capacity-building programs for the parliament’s support offices, the Jordanian Judicial Council, the Jordan Integrity and Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Ministry of Justice. The International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute also have received U.S. grants to train, among other groups, the Jordanian Independent Election Commission (IEC),\(^{57}\) Jordanian political parties, and members of parliament. In the area of decentralization, Chemonics International is USAID’s primary U.S. partner in implementing the Cities Implementing Transparent, Innovative, and Effective Solutions (CITIES) project, which aims to improve how Jordanian municipalities deliver core services.\(^{58}\) USAID also uses ESF to fund infrastructure development in Jordanian municipalities in order to help create jobs for Syrian refugees and Jordanians. In the water sector, the bulk of U.S. economic assistance is devoted to optimizing the management of scarce water resources. As mentioned above, Jordan is one of the most water-deprived countries in the world.\(^{59}\) USAID subsidizes several waste treatment and water distribution projects in the Jordanian cities of Amman, Mafraq, Aqaba, and Irbid.\(^{60}\)

U.S. Sovereign Loan Guarantees (or LGs) allow recipient governments (in this case Jordan) to issue debt securities that are fully guaranteed by the United States government in capital markets,\(^{61}\) effectively subsidizing the cost for governments of accessing financing. Since 2013,

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\(^{57}\) USAID also has provided grant assistance to the IEC to improve the transparency of elections administration.


Congress has authorized\textsuperscript{62} LGs for Jordan and appropriated $413 million in ESF (the “subsidy cost”) to support three separate tranches, enabling Jordan to borrow a total of $3.75 billion at concessional lending rates.\textsuperscript{63}

**Humanitarian Assistance for Syrian Refugees in Jordan**

The U.S. State Department estimates that, since large-scale U.S. aid to Syrian refugees began in FY2012, it has allocated more than $1.5 billion in humanitarian assistance from global accounts for programs in Jordan to meet the needs of Syrian refugees and, indirectly, to ease the burden on Jordan.\textsuperscript{64} U.S. humanitarian assistance is provided both as cash assistance to refugees and through programs to meet their basic needs, such as child health care, education, water, and sanitation. To help prevent the spread of COVID-19 in Jordan, the United States has provided $8.4 million in aid, most of which is targeted toward Syrian refugees living in Jordan.\textsuperscript{65}

**Military Assistance**

U.S.-Jordanian military cooperation is a key component in bilateral relations. U.S. military assistance is primarily directed toward enabling the Jordanian military to procure and maintain U.S.-origin conventional weapons systems.\textsuperscript{66} According to the State Department, Jordan receives one of the largest allocations of International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding worldwide, and IMET graduates in Jordan include “King Abdullah II, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman, the Air Force commander, the Special Forces commander, and numerous other commanders.”\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{62} Congress initially authorized additional economic assistance to Jordan in Section 7041 of P.L. 112-74, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012. P.L. 113-6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 specified that such assistance should take the form of a loan guarantee. Section 1706(j) of the same act also appropriated $30 million (from FY2011) for the initial cost of sovereign loan guarantees. Congress reauthorized loan guarantees for Jordan in Section 7034 in each of the last six consolidated appropriations acts (FY2015-FY2020).


\textsuperscript{66} According to Jane’s Defence Procurement Budgets, Jordan’s 2020 defense budget is $2.05 billion. See Jane’s Defence Budgets, Jordan, May 15, 2020.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and DOD Security Assistance

FMF overseen by the State Department is designed to support the Jordanian armed forces’ multiyear (usually five-year) procurement plans, while DOD-administered security assistance supports ad hoc defense systems to respond to immediate threats and other contingencies. FMF may be used to purchase new equipment (e.g., precision-guided munitions, night vision) or to sustain previous acquisitions (e.g., Blackhawk helicopters, AT-802 fixed-wing aircraft). FMF grants have enabled the Royal Jordanian Air Force to procure munitions for its F-16 fighter aircraft and a fleet of 28 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters.68

As a result of the Syrian civil war and U.S. Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State, the United States has increased military aid to Jordan and channeled these increases through DOD-managed accounts. Although Jordan still receives the bulk of U.S. military aid through the FMF account, Congress has authorized defense appropriations to strengthen Jordan’s border security. U.S. assistance has helped finance the creation of the Jordan Border Security System, an integrated network of guard towers, surveillance cameras, and radar to guard the kingdom’s borders with Syria and Iraq.69 Since FY2015, total DOD security cooperation funding for Jordan has amounted to nearly 1 billion dollars.70

Excess Defense Articles

In 1996, the United States granted Jordan Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status, a designation that, among other things, makes Jordan eligible to receive excess U.S. defense articles, training, and loans of equipment for cooperative research and development.71 In the last five years, excess U.S. defense articles provided to Jordan include three AH-1 Cobra Helicopters, 45 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs), and M577A3 Tracked Command Post Carriers.72

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Economic Assistance</th>
<th>Total Military Assistance</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$13,846,400</td>
<td>$8,252,900</td>
<td>$22,099,300</td>
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Author Information

Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs


70 DOD congressional notifications to Congress.

71 See Designation of Jordan As Major Non-NATO Ally, Determination of President of the United States, No. 97-4, November 12, 1996, 61 F.R. 59809.

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