Costs Come First in a Reset Climate Agenda

Building Blocks to Make Solutions Stick

Durable and legitimate climate action requires a government capable of clearly weighting, explaining, and managing cost tradeoffs to the widest away of audiences, which in turn requires strong technocratic competency. 

Democratic governance needs

State Capacity needs

Key Takeaways

Introduction

Public policy involves tradeoffs. The primary tradeoff for climate change mitigation is economic cost. Secondary tradeoffs include commercial freedom, consumer choice, and the quality or reliability of goods and services. Political movements seeking to address a collective action problem, such as climate change, are prone to overlook the consequences of tradeoffs on other parties, like consumers and taxpayers. This paper posits that the cost tradeoffs of climate change mitigation have been underappreciated in the formation of public policy. This has resulted in an overselection of high cost policies that are not politically durable and may erode social welfare. It also results in overlooking low or negative-cost policies that are durable and hold deep abatement potential. These policies can have broad political appeal because they align with the self-interest of the United States, however they typically require dispersed beneficiaries to overcome the concentrated lobby of entrenched interests. 

A core, normative objective of public policy is to improve social welfare, which “encourages broadminded attentiveness to all positive and negative effects of policy choices”. Environmental economics determines the welfare effects of climate change mitigation policy by the net of its abatement benefits less the costs. The conventional technique to determine abatement benefits is the social cost of carbon (SCC). The barometer for whether climate policy benefits society is to determine whether abatement benefits exceed costs. Accounting for full social welfare effects requires consideration of co-benefits as well, granted these tend to be conventional air emissions with existing mitigation mechanisms covered under the Clean Air Act. Nevertheless, accounting for costs is essential to ensure climate policy benefits society. 

Abatement costs also have a discernable bearing on the likelihood and durability of policy reforms. Climate policies exhibit patterns of passage, mid-course adjustments, and political resilience across election cycles based on the constituency support levels linked to benefit-allocation and cost imposition. This paper develops four policy classifications as a function of their abatement benefit-cost profile, and uses this framework to examine the political economy, abatement effectiveness, and economic performance of select past and potential policy instruments. 

Political Economy and Policy Taxonomy 

The translation of climate policy concepts into legitimate policy options in the eyes of policymakers can be viewed through the Overton Window. That is, politicians tend to support policies when they do not unduly risk their electoral support. The Overton Window for climate policy is constantly shifting within and across political movements with the foremost factor being cost. 

In a 2024 survey of voters, the most valued characteristics of energy consumption were 37% for energy cost, 36% for power availability, 19% for climate effect, 6% for U.S. energy security effect, and 1% for something else. Democrats slightly valued energy cost and power availability more than climate effects. Independents and Republicans heavily valued energy cost and power availability more than climate effect. 

Figure 1. Voters’ Energy Values

Progressives have long exhibited greater prioritization of climate change policy, but cost concerns are driving an overhaul of the progressive Overton Window on climate change. In California, which contains perhaps the most climate-concerned electorate in the U.S., progressives have begun a “climate retreat” to recalibrate policy as “[e]lected officials are warning that ambitious laws and mandates are driving up the state’s onerous cost of living”. Nationally, a new progressive thought leadership think tank is encouraging Democrats to downplay climate change for electoral benefit. Importantly, they find that 61% of battleground voters acknowledge that “climate change is at least a very serious problem,” but that “it is far less important than issues like affordability.” 

Similarly, veteran progressive thought leaders, such as the Progressive Policy Institute, now stress that “energy costs come first” in a new approach to environmental justice. While emphasising the continued importance of GHG emissions reductions, those policy leaders are making energy affordability the top priority, amid a broader Democratic messaging pivot from climate to the “cheap energy” agenda. The rise of cost-conscious progressives is particularly notable because the progressive electorate has expressed a higher willingness to pay to mitigate climate change than moderate and conservative electoral segments. 

Economic tradeoffs, namely costs and more government control, has long been the central concern on climate policy for the conservative movement. The conventional climate movement messaged on fear and the need for economic sacrifice, which is the antithesis of the conservative electoral mantra: economic opportunity. Yet the conservative climate Overton Window emerged with a series of state and federal policy reforms when climate change mitigation aligned with expanded economic opportunity. However, pro-climate conservative thought leaders remain opposed to high cost policies, such as calling to phase out Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) subsidies for mature technologies. 

Many leading conservative thought leaders continue to challenge the climate agenda writ large because of its association with high cost policies. For example, President Trump’s 2025 Climate Working Group report was expressly motivated by concerns over “access to reliable, affordable energy” while acknowledging that climate change is a real challenge. Similarly, a 2025 American Enterprise Institute report finds that the public is most interested in energy cost and reliability and unwilling to sacrifice much financially to address climate change. Meanwhile, climate-conscious conservative thought leaders like the Conservative Coalition for Climate Solutions and the R Street Institute continue to emphasize a market-driven, innovation-focused policy agenda that prioritizes American economic interests and drives a cleaner, more prosperous future. Altogether, it indicates a conservative Overton Window on negative and low-cost climate change mitigation. 

While cost is driving the Overton Window within each political movement, it also buoys the potential for alignment across political movements. Political movements are not monoliths, but rather exhibit major subsets within each movement. The progressive movement has seen gains in popularity among its populist left flank, often identified as the “democratic socialist” wing, which contributes to ongoing debate about Democrats’ ideological direction. Climate policy initiated by this wing, however, is associated with high economic tradeoffs (e.g., degrowth) and has prompted a backlash within the progressive movement. By contrast, a subset of the progressive movement, sometimes labelled “abundance progressives,” has emerged to support a more pro-market, pro-development posture. This movement is especially responsive to energy cost concerns, and is an emerging substitute for the anti-development traditions of the progressive environmental movement. Overall, variances in the progressive movement are fairly straightforward to categorize linearly on the economic policy spectrum. 

The Republican electorate views capitalism far more favorably than Democrats, but with modest decline in recent years. Republicans have trended away from consistently conservative positions associated with limited government, which historically emphasized the rule of law and a strict cost-benefit justification for government intervention in the market economy. They have migrated towards right-wing populism associated with the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement. Right-wing populism is hard to operationalize for economic policy because it is not a standalone ideology, but a movement vaguely attached to conservative ideology. Generally, the “America First” orientation of MAGA implies positions based on the self-interest of the U.S., with the Trump administration prioritizing cost reductions in energy policy. 

MAGA is further to the right of conventional conservatives on environmental regulation and general government reform. For example, conservatives have noted the contrast between conservative “limited, effective government” and the Department of Government Efficiency’s “gutted, ineffective government” reform approach. On the other hand, MAGA will occasionally back leftist policy instruments, such as coal subsidies, wind restrictions, executive orders to override state policies, and emergency authorities for fossil power plants. These are often justified to counteract the leftist policies passed by progressives (e.g., renewables subsidies, fossil restrictions, emergency authorities for renewables), resulting in dueling versions of industrial policy. In other words, ostensible overlap between MAGA and progressives on policy instrument choice actually reflects the use of similar tools used for conflicting purposes (e.g., restrictive permitting or subsidies for opposing resources; i.e. picking different “winners and losers”). Nevertheless, the disciplinary agent for right-wing energy populism has been cost concerns, which have influenced the Trump administration to pursue more traditionally conservative energy policies like permitting reform and lowering electric transmission costs. 

This political economy identifies the broadest cross-movement Overton Window between moderate or “abundance progressives” and traditional conservatives. Regardless, both broad movements exhibit cost sensitivity and growing prioritization of U.S. self–interest. Distinguishing the domestic SCC from global SCC is essential to determine what policies are consistent with the self-interest of the U.S. versus the world as a whole. Traditionally, the U.S. government only considers domestic effects in cost-benefit analysis, yet the vast majority of domestic climate change abatement benefits accrue globally. 

The first SCC, developed under the Obama administration, relied solely on a global SCC. Leading conservative scholars, including the former regulatory leads for President George W. Bush, criticized the use of the global SCC only to set federal regulations. They argued for a “domestic duty” to refocus regulatory analysis on domestic costs and benefits. Similarly, the first Trump administration used a domestic SCC. Although the second Trump administration moved to discard the SCC outright, this appears to be part of a regulatory containment strategy, not a reflection of the conservative movement’s dismissal of the negative effects of climate change. In other words, even if the SCC is not the explicit basis for policymaking, it is a useful heuristic for policymakers.

The proper value of the SCC is the subject of intense scholarly and political debate. It has fluctuated between $42/ton under President Obama, $1-$8/ton under President Trump, and $190/ton under the Biden administration (all values for 2020). The main methodological disagreement has been over whether to use a domestic or global SCC, with the Trump administration position guided by “domestic self-interest.” This suggests the original domestic and global SCC values may approximate the Overton Window parameters the best. This underscores the following policy taxonomy that characterizes climate abatement policies by cost relative to domestic and global SCC levels:

Policy Applications

There are myriad policies across the abatement cost spectrum. This analysis applies to particularly popular domestic policies already pursued or readily considered. This includes policies targeting the environmental market failure via direct abatement (GHG regulation) and indirect abatement (public spending, clean technology mandates, and fuel bans). It also includes policies targeting non-climate market failure, yet hold deep climate co-benefits (innovation policy). The analysis also examines policies that correct government failure and have major climate co-benefits (permitting, siting, and electric regulation reform). 

Fuel Mandates and Bans

For the last two decades, the most prevalent climate policy type in the U.S. has been state level fuel mandates and bans. Last decade, the environmental movement came to prefer policies that explicitly promote or remove fuels or technologies, not emissions. This is despite ample evidence in the economics literature that market-based policies are more effective and carry far lower abatement costs. Nevertheless, the most common domestic climate policy instrument this century has been state renewable portfolio standards (RPS). The literature notes several key findings from RPS:

Micro-mandates have also sprung up, primarily in progressive states. These have often targeted the promotion of nascent or symbolic energy sources that the market would not otherwise provide, with the costs obscured from public view (e.g., rolled into non-bypassable electric customer charges). A good example is offshore wind requirements in the Northeast, which carries a high abatement cost (over $100/ton). 

Fuel bans have become increasingly popular climate policy in progressive states and municipalities. Beginning in 2016, a handful of progressive states began banning coal. However, this does not appear to have created much cost or abatement benefit, as evidenced by a lack of commercial interest in coal expansion in areas without such restrictions. In fact, neither federal nor state regulation was responsible for steep emissions declines from coal retirements. Coal retirements were mostly driven by market forces, especially breakthroughs in low-cost natural gas production and high efficiency power plants. Policy factors, like the Mercury and Air Toxics Rule, were secondary drivers of coal plant retirement. 

Around 2020, California, New York, and most New England states began adopting partial natural gas bans or de facto bans on new gas infrastructure through highly restrictive permitting and siting practices. Unlike coal restrictions, these laws have markedly decreased commercial activity, namely gas pipeline and power plant development, and in some cases caused economically premature retirements. This has caused “pronounced economic costs and reliability risk.” Resulting pipeline constraints drive steep gas price premiums in these states, which translate into a core driver of elevated electricity prices. 

Insufficient pipeline service in the Northeast is especially problematic, as demonstrated by a December 2022 winter storm event that nearly led to an unprecedented loss of the Con Edison gas system in New York City that would have taken weeks or months to restore. Further, preventing gas infrastructure development does not provide a clear abatement benefit, because more infrastructure is needed to meet peak conditions even if gas burn declines. A prominent study found a 130 gigawatt increase in gas generation capacity by 2050 was compatible with a 95% decarbonization scenario. 

Progressive states and municipalities have also pursued natural gas consumption bans. This policy may carry exceptional cost, especially for existing buildings, with potentially well over $1 trillion in investment cost to replace gas with electric infrastructure. One estimate put the cost of natural gas bans at over $25,600 per New York City household. A Stanford study projected a 56% electric residential rate increase in California from a natural gas appliance ban. Generally, conservative thought leaders and elected officials have opposed natural gas bans for cost as well as non-pecuniary reasons, including security concerns and the erosion of consumer choice. This applies even for prominent members of the Conservative Climate Caucus. Altogether, gas bans are considered class IV policy with virtually no Overton Window alignment. 

GHG Transparency 

GHG regulation takes various forms. The least stringent is GHG transparency, which addresses an information deficiency and lowers transaction costs in voluntary markets. This begins with reporting and accounting requirements on emitters (Scope 1 emissions). Public policy can help resolve measurement and verification problems that have eroded confidence in voluntary carbon markets. GHG transparency policy can also standardize terminology and provide indirect emissions platforms. For example, making locational marginal emissions rates on power systems publicly available lets market participants identify the indirect power emissions of power consumption (Scope 2 emissions). Progressives have consistently favored GHG transparency policy, while conservatives have typically supported light-touch versions of it like the Growing Climate Solutions Act. 

The second Trump administration recently pursued removal of basic GHG reporting requirements on ideological grounds, specifically repeal of the GHG Reporting Program (GHGRP). This appears to reflect an optical deregulatory agenda over an effective one. Conservative groups have warned of the downsides of GHGRP repeal. Pressure to course correct may prove fruitful, given that the industry the Trump administration aims to assist – oil and natural gas – maintain that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) should retain the GHGRP. A recent analysis found that if states replace the GHGRP, new programs will be more expensive (Figure 2). 

Figure 2. Cost Comparison of Federal and California Reporting Programs

Many regulated industry and conservative groups instead support a low compliance cost GHG reporting regime with durability across future administrations. This not only applies to direct emissions reporting but indirect emissions reporting, as in the absence of federal policy industry faces a patchwork of compliance requirements across states and foreign governments. The same economic self-interest rationale justifies a role for limited government in emissions accounting, with an emphasis on the capital market appeal of showcasing the “carbon advantage” of the U.S. in emissions-intensive industries. An example is liquified natural gas, whose export market is enhanced by showcasing its lifecycle emissions advantage over foreign gas and coal. 

The abatement effectiveness of GHG transparency has grown appreciably in the 2020s, as voluntary industry initiatives have sharply increased. This policy set enables an efficient “greening of the invisible hand” with staying power, as corporate environmental sustainability efforts appear resilient regardless of political sentiment, unlike corporate social endeavors. In fact, the aggregate willingness to pay for voluntary abatement from producers, consumers, and investors suggests that well-informed domestic markets go a long way towards self-correcting the externality of GHGs (e.g., convergence of the private and social cost curves). Certain voluntary corporate behaviors may even exceed the global SCC, especially commitments to nuclear, carbon capture, and other higher cost abatement generation financed by the largest sources of power demand growth. Well-functioning voluntary carbon markets could yield roughly one billion metric tons of domestic carbon dioxide abatement by 2030. Providing locational marginal emissions data can slash abatement costs from $19-$47/ton down to $8-$9/ton while doubling abatement levels from some power generation sources. 

Overall, efficient GHG transparency policy described above is a low-cost mitigation strategy consistent with class II designation. Basic, federal GHG transparency policy may even constitute class I policy, because it avoids the higher compliance cost alternative of a patchwork of state and international standards that would manifest in the absence of federal policy. However, stringent GHG transparency policy may constitute class III or IV policy. Prominent examples include a recent California climate disclosure law and a former Securities and Exchange Commission proposed rule to require emissions disclosure related to assets a firm does not own or control (Scope 3). Such efforts may obfuscate material information on climate-related risk and worsen private-sector led emission mitigation efforts.

Direct GHG Regulation 

Classic environmental regulation takes the form of a command-and-control approach. These instruments include applying emissions performance standards or technology-forcing mechanisms, typically for power plants or mobile sources. These policies vary widely in stringency and cost. Overall, command-and-control is widely considered in the economics literature to be an unnecessarily costly approach to reducing GHGs relative to market-based alternatives. It can also result in freezing innovation, by discouraging adoption of new technologies. 

Federal command-and-control GHG programs have not been particularly environmentally effective, cost-effective, or demonstrated legal or political durability. The first power plant program was the Clean Power Plan, which was struck down in court, and yet its emissions target was achieved a decade early from favorable market forces and subnational climate policy. The most recent federal command-and-control approaches for GHG regulation were 2024 EPA rules for vehicles and power plants. A 2025 review of these and other federal climate regulations over the last two decades of federal climate regulations found:

The 2025 review study implies that past federal command-and-control had very high cost – well into class IV range. It has also been a top priority of conservatives to undercut. However, it is possible for modest command-and-control policy with class II or III costs. 

Some conservatives, noting EPA’s legal obligation to regulate GHGs and the cost of regulatory uncertainty from decades of EPA policy oscillations between administrations, suggested modest requirements as a better option to replace high cost rules in order to mitigate legal risk and provide industry a predictable, low-cost compliance pathway. For example, conservatives argued that replacing high cost requirements for power plants to adopt carbon capture and storage (CCS) with low cost requirements for heat rate improvements may lower compliance costs more than attempting to repeal the Biden era rule for CCS outright. Similarly, the oil and gas industry opposed stringent GHG regulations on power plants and mobile sources, but often validated alternative low cost compliance requirements. 

The first Trump administration pursued modest replace-and-repeal GHG regulation. The second Trump administration has opted for repeal policies and to eliminate the endangerment finding via executive rulemaking. However, regulated industry and many conservative thought leaders believe this is a strategic blunder, given the low odds of legal success, resulting in the perpetuation of “regulatory ping-pong that has plagued Washington, D.C., for decades.” If the courts uphold Massachusetts v. EPA and the associated endangerment finding, this implies that modest command-and-control policy may have durable political alignment potential. Yet this does not hold much abatement potential. In the absence of a legal requirement to regulate GHGs, there is unlikely to be broad political alignment for even modest command-and-control policy. Conservatives tend to view this as a gateway to more costly policies that will probably not meaningfully affect global GHG trajectories. 

The 2025 review study understates the full cost of U.S. climate regulations because they exclude state and local levels. Although no comprehensive study of state climate regulation is known, command-and-control state regulations often raise major cost concerns as well. The cost and environmental performance of such state programs varies immensely, often owing to differences in the accuracy of abatement technology costs that regulatory decisions are based upon (e.g., the failure of California’s zero-emission vehicle program compared to success with its low-emission vehicle program). A recent example is California’s rail locomotive mandate, which projected to impose tens of billions of dollars in costs before being withdrawn. State command-and-control regulation is commonplace in progressive states, but not beyond, implying meager Overton Window alignment. 

A more economical version of GHG regulation is a system of marketable allowances, or cap-and-trade (C&T). Over three decades of experience with C&T programs reveals two things. First, C&T is environmentally effective and economically cost effective relative to command-and-control policy. Second, C&T performance depends on its design quality and interaction with other policies. Abatement costs depend on stringency and other design features, but C&T in a backstop role is generally close to the domestic SCC, rendering it class II policy. Robust C&T generally falls in the class III policy range. C&T is an example of abatement policy that can be cost-effective on a per unit basis, but given the breadth of its coverage its total costs can be substantial. Recent developments in Pennsylvania indicate a possible preference for policies with higher per-unit abatement costs than C&T, which may reflect a political preference for policies with less cost transparency and lower aggregate costs. 

Some environmental C&T complaints are valid, such as emissions leakage, but C&T effectiveness concerns are generally readily fixable design flaws. C&T effectiveness complaints are often the result of interference from other government interventions like fuel mandates, relegating C&T to a backstop role and suppressing allowance prices. Such state interventions triggered anti-competitive concerns in wholesale power markets overseen by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). This prompted conservative state electric regulators to call for a conference to validate mechanisms like C&T as a market-compatible alternative to high cost interventions. Conservative expert testimony at that conference, invited by conservative FERC leadership, explained that interventions layered on top of C&T merely reallocate emissions reduction under a binding cap, which raises costs, creates no additional abatement, and undermines innovation. This implies that such states might increase abatement and lower aggregate costs by upgrading the role of C&T and downgrading the role of costlier interventions. 

In the 2000s, bipartisan interest in federal C&T policy arose, but it failed and has not resurfaced. In its absence, states have supplanted federal policy with subnational C&T programs. However, the durability of C&T beyond progressive states is unclear. Moderate states have sometimes joined a regional C&T program under Democratic leadership, but sometimes departed them under Republican leadership. Conservative state groups typically challenge C&T adoption and seek repeal of C&T programs like the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. This suggests that C&T is at the fringe, but typically outside, an Overton Window across political movements. 

Permitting and Siting 

Permitting policy can base decisions explicitly on GHG criteria, or they can be based on non-GHG factors but hold indirect GHG consequences. Generally, only progressive states and presidents have pursued the former. Federally, these include the Obama administration’s “coal study” and Biden administration’s “pause” on liquified natural gas (LNG). The LNG pause did not provide any apparent emissions benefit, yet carried substantial foregone economic opportunity and strategic value to U.S. allies. Pragmatic progressive thought leaders expressed concern with the pause, noting the creation of economic and security risks, and suggested lifting the pause in exchange for companies to commit to strict, third-party verified methane emissions standards. Relatedly, some conservative thought leaders have supported policy that enables voluntary participation in certified programs that provide market clarity and confidence to harness private willingness to pay for lower GHG products. This has been buttressed by support from an industry-led effort to advance a market for environmentally differentiated natural gas based on a standard, secure certification process. 

Permitting constraints on clean technology supply chains can have perverse economic and emissions effects. A prime example is critical minerals, which are essential components to clean energy technologies. A net-zero emission energy transition, relative to current consumption, would increase U.S. annual mineral demand by 121% for copper, 504% for nickel, 2,007% for cobalt, and 13,267% for lithium. Market forces, unsubsidized, are poised to produce a sufficient amount of domestic copper and lithium supply to satiate a large share of domestic demand, but face undue barriers to entry that restrict production far below its potential. To meet net-zero objectives, permitting reform allowing all currently proposed projects to enter the market would lower U.S. import reliance for copper from 74% to 41%, while dropping lithium import reliance from 100% to 51%. 

Expanding domestic mining no doubt carries local environmental tradeoffs. However, the U.S. has some of the most stringent and comprehensive mining safeguards in the world. Thus, foregoing development domestically is likely to push mining toward foreign countries with inferior environmental, safety, and child labor protections. It is therefore critical that domestic permitting decisions account for the unintended effects of denying permits, not merely the direct consequences of approving a project. 

Permitting and siting constraints on energy infrastructure also impose major costs and foregone abatement. These entry barriers largely exist as environmental safeguards, yet almost always inhibit projects with a superior emissions profile to the legacy resources they replace. In fact, 90% of planned and in progress energy projects on the federal dashboard were clean energy related as of July 2023. In 2023, the ratio of clean energy to fossil projects requiring an environmental impact statement to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was 2:1 for the Department of Energy and nearly 4:1 for the Bureau of Land Management. A 2025 study estimated that bringing down permitting timelines from 60 months to 24 months would reduce 13% of U.S. electric power emissions. 

Permitting has proven to be a litmus test for the progressive environmental movement, as the movement bifurcates between anti-development symbolists and pragmatic pro-abundance progressives. While a minority of mainstream environmental groups have become amenable to permitting reform, such as The Nature Conservancy and Audubon Society, the core of progressive environmental groups have not. Instead, new progressive groups like Clean Tomorrow and the Institute for Progress filled the pro-abundance void alongside traditional market-friendly progressive groups like the Progressive Policy Institute. This progressive subset has helped influence moderate Democrats to support permitting reform in a collaborative way with conservatives. 

Permitting reform has long been championed by conservatives for its economic benefits, with climate considerations typically a secondary-at-best rationale. Yet permitting reform has become a priority for the newer climate-minded conservative movement. However, permitting has also proven to be a differentiator between conservatives and right-wing populists. The latter engages in forms of government intervention that sometimes contradict conservative principles. For example, the Trump administration enacted an offshore wind energy pause that followed the same problematic blueprint as the Biden administration’s LNG pause. This elevates the importance of technology-neutral permitting reforms with an emphasis on permitting permanence safeguards. 

In recent years, a coalition of Republicans, centrist Democrats, and clean energy and abundance advocates have pressed for reform to NEPA. A broad suite of federal permitting reforms with bipartisan appeal was identified in a 2024 report by the Bipartisan Policy Center. Bipartisan alignment led to the passage of the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 into law and the Senate passage of the Energy Permitting Reform Act of 2024 (EPRA). Although a 2025 Supreme Court decision suggests executive actions alone may substantially reduce NEPA obstacles, plenty of NEPA and other federal statutory reforms remain of high value and hold considerable bipartisan potential. 

The positions of leading progressive, conservative, and centrist thought leadership organizations highlight alignment on various federal permitting and siting reforms. These include statutory changes to NEPA, the Endangered Species Act, the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act and the National Historic Preservation Act. Substantive alignment includes reforms that reduce litigation risk (e.g., judicial review reform), limit executive power to stop project approvals and undermine permitting permanence, maintain technology neutrality, strengthen federal backstop siting authority for interstate infrastructure, codify the Seven County decision, and streamline agency practices while ensuring sufficient state capacity. 

Despite considerable positive momentum at the federal level, the greatest permitting and siting barriers generally reside at the state and local levels and trending sharply in a more restrictive direction. Wind and solar ordinances have grown by over 1,500% since the late 2000s. Oil and gas pipelines and power plants face mounting permitting and siting restrictions in progressive states, which not only raise costs but do not necessarily reduce emissions. In fact, the New England Independent System Operator said that a lack of natural gas infrastructure in the region has raised prices and pollution by forcing reliance on higher-cost resources like oil-fired power plants. The only major power generation resource with a less restrictive trend is nuclear, as six states recently modified or repealed nuclear moratoria to ease siting. 

Motivation for opposing energy infrastructure permitting has included the well-known “not in my backyard” concerns, such as noise, construction disruptions, or land use conflicts. Interestingly, much opposition appears to come from perception, as much as substantiated negative effects. Relatedly, permitting resistance rationales increasingly appear to result from ideological opposition to particular energy sources. Finally, much opposition and most litigation of energy projects comes from non-governmental organizations, not the land owners directly affected. Altogether, this underscores the importance of permitting and siting reform that improves the quality of information to agencies and parties, ties decisionmaking to specific harms not speculative claims, limits standing to affected parties, and creates appeals processes for landowners to challenge obstructive local government laws and decisions. A key tension to overcome is that technology-agnostic legislation has been more likely to advance in states with one or more Republican chamber, yet environmental advocates resist “all-of-the-above” reforms.

Policies that reduce permitting and siting burdens are class I: they boost economic output and are increasingly key to emissions reductions. Permitting and siting policies that are restrictive on fossil development are not particularly effective at reducing emissions and often add considerable cost, granted costs vary widely depending on the nature of the policies and implementation. Effective fossil restrictions can range from class II to class IV policy, while ineffective ones actually increase emissions. The political economy of permitting and siting must overcome the lobby of entrenched suppliers, who seek to maintain competitive moats. An ironic example was incumbent asset owners funding environmental groups to oppose transmission infrastructure in the Northeast that would import emissions-free hydropower. 

Electric Regulation

The power industry is at the forefront of energy cost concerns and decarbonization objectives. In the early 2020s, electric rates have risen most in Democratic states. These concerns reoriented progressives towards cost containment, even at the expense of climate objectives. In the 2024 election, cost of living concerns propelled Republicans to widespread victories as President Trump vowed to halve electricity prices. A year later, voter concerns over rising electricity rates in Georgia, New Jersey, and Virginia boosted Democrats in gubernatorial and public service commission (PSC) elections. 

At the same time, electricity is arguably the most important sector for climate abatement given its emissions share and the indirect effects of electrifying other sectors, namely transportation and manufacturing. Ample pathways exist to reduce electric costs and emissions simultaneously, primarily by fixing profound government failure embedded in legacy regulation. Electric industrial organization shapes economic and climate outcomes, with market liberalization an advantage for both. 

Electric regulation falls into two basic formats. The first is cost-of-service (CoS) regulation, where the role of government is to substitute for the role of competition in overseeing a monopoly utility. The alternative is for regulation to facilitate competition by using the “visible hand” of market rules to enable the “invisible hand” to go to work. 

CoS regulation historically applied to power generation, though about a third of states enacted restructuring to introduce competition into power generation and retail services, in response to rising rates and the recognition that these are not natural monopoly services. Nearly all transmission and distribution (T&D) historically and today remains under CoS regulation. Importantly, CoS regulation motivates a utility to expand the regulated rate base upon which it earns a state-approved return. Generally, the main sources of cost discipline problems in the power industry stem from its CoS regulation segments: transmission, distribution, and the portion of generation that remains on CoS rates. 

Generally, restructured jurisdictions see greater innovation and downward pressure on the supply portion of customer bills. The economic performance of restructuring is highly sensitive to the quality of implementation. This includes the quality of wholesale energy price formation and capacity market design. It also includes various elements of retail choice implementation. They have also seen improved governance, whereas CoS utilities are prone to cronyism and corruption given the inherent incentives of their business model. Competitive wholesale and retail power markets hold cost and emissions advantages through several mechanisms:

Electric cost increases are multifaceted, prompting many misdiagnoses that blame markets for non-market problems. Utilities have begun pushing campaigns in restructured states to revert back to CoS regulation, whereas the growing consumer segment – namely data centers and industrials – are organizing campaigns to expand consumer choice. Independent economic assessments warn against a return to CoS regulation, and instead encourage state regulators to implement restructuring better. This includes better market design, consumer exposure to wholesale prices, and effective coordination with transmission investment. 

T&D costs, generally, are the core driver of electricity cost pressures nationwide. Over the last two decades, utility capital spending on distribution has increased 2.5 times while nearly tripling for transmission. This reflects profound flaws in CoS regulation of T&D, resulting in overinvestment in inefficient infrastructure and underinvestment in cost-effective infrastructure. This projects to worsen, given T&D expansion needed to meet grid reliability criteria as a result of aging infrastructure, turnover in the generation fleet, and load growth. 

T&D expansion is also central to abatement. Even partial transmission reforms can reduce carbon dioxide emissions by hundreds of million of tons per year. This explains why progressives have made reforms that expand transmission a top priority. This needs to be reconciled with the cost concerns of consumers and conservatives to result in durable policy. Consumers and conservatives have a budding transmission agenda rooted in upgrading the existing system, removing barriers to voluntary transmission development, using sound economic practices for mandatorily planned transmission, streamlined permitting and siting, and improved governance. A particularly promising frontier is reforms to enhance the existing system, given the expedience of their cost relief and consistency with a Trump administration directive. 

Recent federal regulatory actions have demonstrated bipartisan willingness to improve transmission policy and the related issue of interconnection, which has emerged as a major cost and emissions issue. In 2023, FERC passed Order 2023 on a bipartisan basis to reduce barriers to new power plants trying to interconnect to regional transmission systems. Subsequent reforms were motivated by a coalition of consumer groups and the center-right R Street Institute. In 2024, FERC passed Order 1920-A on a bipartisan basis to improve economic practices in regional transmission development. EPRA, a gamechanger for interregional transmission development, passed the Senate with bipartisan support in 2024. 

Demand growth has sparked reliability concerns over tight supply margins and recently put upward pressure on wholesale market prices. However, states with the greatest price decreases typically had increasing demand from 2019 to 2024 (Figure 3). This shows the importance of infrastructure utilization on electric rate pressures, as many areas had supply slack previously. The past may not be prologue. Emerging conditions show supply-constrained scenarios where marginal generation and T&D costs increase steeply to meet new load increase. The Energy Information Administration observes steady retail price increases and projects further rises to exceed inflation. 

Figure 3. Relationship Between Load Growth and Changes in Retail Electricity Prices (2019-2024)

Source: Wiser et al., 2025.

In an era of resurgent power demand growth, the states poised to keep rates and emissions down have wholesale competition, retail competition, efficient generator interconnection processes, economical T&D practices, and low permitting and siting barriers. The only state that reasonably accomplishes all of these is Texas, which is experiencing the most commercial interest among competitive suppliers and growing power consumers. Texas has experienced industry-leading clean energy investment and earned the distinction of Newsweek’s “greenest state” in 2024. 

All aforementioned electric reforms are considered class I policy. Despite cost-reduction appeal, power industry reforms have proven challenging for two reasons. First, reforms are highly technical in nature and face limited state capacity among legislative advisors and technocratic agencies, namely PSCs and FERC. For example, recent FERC and PSC activities reveal that these entities do not have the bandwidth or expertise to properly implement existing transmission policy, much less reform it. Secondly, reforms face strong resistance from incumbent utilities who hold concentrated interests in the status quo, creating a strong lobbying incentive. By contrast, the beneficiaries of reform, especially consumers, are dispersed interests that do not organize as effectively as a lobbying force. 

Although the Texas electricity experiment and associated federal power market reforms under President George W. Bush is a conservative legacy, most restructured states are progressive. This reflects significant bipartisan historic appeal. However, traditional conservatives have sometimes conflated pro-utility positions as the “pro-business” position, while it is unclear whether right-wing populist influences will catalyze pro-market reforms by challenging the status quo or retrench monopoly utility interests based on technocratic market skepticism (e.g., Project 2025). CoS utilities also commonly oppose cost-effective T&D reform, especially vertically-integrated utilities, which is consistent with their financial incentives to expand rate base and deter lower-cost imports from third parties. Nonetheless, the political economy of bipartisan electric regulatory reform remains promising, given voters’ prioritization of reducing electricity costs. 

Public Spending 

Government spending occurs through direct spending outlays or indirect spending through tax expenditures. Spending takes the form of industrial policy or innovation policy. The economics literature is historically critical of industrial policy, while positive literature on industrial policy usually conflates it with innovation policy. A distinguishing element is that innovation policy selects policy instruments suited to specific market failures, namely the positive externalities of knowledge spillovers and learning-by-doing. These generally apply to research and development (R&D) and early stage technologies, including those in demonstration stage and infant industries that have not achieved economies of scale. 

Predictably, progressives have been consistent backers of robust innovation policy, while conservatives typically scrutinize such expenses closely. Although differences of opinion exist on optimal funding levels, historically conservatives and progressives have agreed on a role for the government in supporting R&D. There is also a history of good governance agreement, such as a joint project between the Center for American Progress and the Heritage Foundation in 2013 on improving the performance of the national lab system. Improving outcomes-based Department of Energy program performance may have broad appeal, including better performance metrics, stronger linkages to private sector needs, and program reevaluation to determine government investment phase-out. Improvements to state capacity are paramount in this regard. 

Conservatives are often critical of public spending on infant industry, where government failure can outweigh market failure. For example, policymakers often struggle to identify when to end industry support, while industry engages in rent-maintenance behavior even after it has achieved maturity. Historic evidence indicates that direct subsidies and tax exemptions for infant energy industry continue well after the targeted technologies mature. Conservative and progressive scholars have historically framed the merits over subsidies for infant industry as a debate over government versus market failure. 

Since innovation policy targets non-climate market failures (e.g., knowledge spillovers) it may have a high static abatement cost. However, it is an inexpensive abatement policy when accounting for dynamic effects, because of induced innovation and learning-by-doing. Importantly, innovation policy holds massive climate benefits, because achieving abatement cost parity between clean and emitting resources is central to clean technology market adoption. Efficient R&D policy can be classified as class I policy, because the upfront cost of the policy is outweighed by long-term cost savings. Demonstration and infant industry support falls into class II-III range, depending on its implementation, and often exhibits substantial durability. 

In recent years, climate-minded conservatives have shown stronger inclinations of public spending for innovation policy. However, there is a stark difference between conservatives and right-wing populism on innovation policy. Conservatives note that the adverse consequences of Department of Government Efficiency’s “gutted, ineffective government” approach to the Department of Energy is inconsistent with limited, effective government practice. The economic self-interest benefits of innovation policy may induce a course-correction with MAGA, which has not deliberately targeted innovation policy insomuch as sacrificing it amid a rash government downsizing exercise. 

In contrast to innovation policy, industrial policy aims to directly promote a given industry, typically using mature technology, with interventions untethered to any underlying market failure (e.g., negative emissions externality). This generally takes the form of public spending on mature industries. For decades, traditional conservatives and climate-minded conservative scholars have been critical of green industrial policy for carrying high costs with modest emissions reductions. 

The most relevant case study in climate industrial policy versus innovation policy is the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022. IRA represented the “largest federal response to climate change to date.” It consisted mostly of subsidies for mature technologies, especially wind, solar, and electric vehicles (EVs). It also contained subsidies for infant industry. IRA was passed exclusively by Democrats, with Republicans voicing concerns over its cost. Republicans then passed the One Big Beautiful Big Act (OBBBA) in 2025, which phased-out subsidies for mature technologies, but generally retained those for infant industry. This underscores the political durability of innovation policy and the fragility of industrial policy. 

A broader debrief on IRA and OBBBA reveals:

The takeaway from IRA and OBBBA is that subsidies for mature technologies are high cost, likely to erode social welfare, and not politically durable. Efficient public spending for RD&D, however, enhances social welfare and falls in the Overton Window due to its value for economic self-interest. Late-stage infant industry is at the fringe of the Overton Window. It is the area where conservative and progressive scholars have historically had contrasting views on whether market failure outweighs government failure, yet political outcomes have largely supported infant industry. 

Generally, the literature finds strong evidence of opportunity cost neglect in public policy, which “creates artificially high demand for public spending.” The IRA was a case-in-point. Meanwhile, the opportunity cost of public spending is rapidly rising given the dire fiscal trajectory of the United States. In 2025, moderate experts emphasized a pivot away from unsustainable and ineffective “Green New Deal thinking” for clean technology subsidies in favor of an innovation-driven strategy. 

Takeaways 

This analysis finds chronic flaws of cost considerations in ex ante policy analysis. Many medium and high-cost policies have passed without any robust accounting of costs at all (e.g., IRA, fuel bans). Interventions with cost-benefit analysis have had a tendency to underestimate costs (e.g., regulation). These flaws contribute to public misconception and play into political economy dynamics that tend to incent policies with hidden costs over those with transparent ones. 

High-cost policies have typically only been enacted by progressive governments and have come under greater scrutiny as energy costs escalate. This calls their social welfare effects and durability into question. It has cast climate action in the public eye as requiring deep economic sacrifice. 

Conservatives have been hesitant to engage on climate policy outright, largely over dire economic tradeoff perceptions. Such concerns have instigated a conservative backlash to climate policy, including to policies that are compatible with U.S. economic interests. This has been exacerbated by right-wing populism, which often strays from limited government conservatism in pursuit of cultural identity objectives. For example, in a 2024 piece promoting energy affordability, the Heritage Foundation correctly attributed cost increases to renewable energy mandates, but incorrectly presumed that a broad shift towards renewable energy and away from fossil fuels would always increase costs. 

High abatement cost policies not only risk reducing aggregate social welfare, but they create distributional concerns. Policies that raise energy costs tend to be regressive. This has challenged the social justice narrative of progressives, prompting a rethink by progressive leaders to take a “cost-first approach to [the] clean energy transition.” Although subsidies are a common response to lower burdens on low-income households, the most popular green subsidies pursued have exacerbated distributional concerns. Specifically, renewables subsidies favored by progressives have been challenged by conservatives as “green corporate welfare.” Progressives have also faced criticism for EV tax credits for disproportionately benefiting wealthy households. 

Encouragingly, negative- and low-cost policies comprise a rising share of the abatement curve. The Overton Window for pursuing such policies has grown remarkably for “abundance progressives” and conventional conservatives. However, populist subsets within both movements challenge the potential for political alignment. Enacting negative-cost policies also faces the collection active problem of dispersed beneficiaries versus a concentrated incumbent supplier lobby favoring the status quo. Mobilizing consumer and taxpayer groups is an underappreciated strategy to enact these policies. 

Abatement cost categoryOverton Window StrengthSocial Welfare EffectPolicy Examples
Class I. negativeStrongVery positiveLiberalized permitting and siting; Liberalized power markets; Streamlined generator interconnection; Economical transmission expansion; Efficient R&D policy
Class II. lowSubstantialPositiveEfficient GHG transparency; Efficient demonstration policy; Modest RPS; Backstop cap-and-trade; Modest command-and-control regulation
Class III. mediumInconsistentGlobally positive, often domestically negativeModerate RPS; Robust cap-and-trade; Moderate command-and-control regulation; Infant industry support
Class IV. highPoorOften negativeStringent RPS; Stringent command-and-control regulation; Onerous GHG transparency; Mature technology subsidies

This analysis is far from comprehensive. A notable omission from this paper is transportation policy, the largest GHG sector in the U.S. A scan of the transportation literature underscores major abatement potential for negative and low-cost policies, including reducing government barriers to efficient heavy-duty transportation like railways, shipping, and heavier trucking. Further, the electrification of transportation requires extensive fixes to government failure, such as liberalizing markets to enable competitive charging infrastructure, which lowers costs. The merits of innovation and GHG transparency policy, previously discussed, also appear to hold promise for transportation applications such as aviation fuel. The transportation sector has also been the target of GHG regulation, mostly in progressive states, which warrants close assessment of costs. For example, one study identified a vast abatement cost range for fuel standards ($60-$2,272/tonne). 

A shortcoming of this analysis is that it only characterizes costs by their efficiency (i.e., $/ton). Political decisions are highly sensitive to aggregate cost and its visibility to the public, which our taxonomy does not characterize. It is possible that efficient, transparent, and higher aggregate cost policies (e.g., C&T) fare less favorably in some political settings than inefficient, opaque, and sometimes lower aggregate cost policies (e.g., RPS solar carveouts). 

Despite the limitations of this analysis, the sample of policies evaluated is sufficient to support the thesis. That is, a retooled climate policy agenda that prioritizes cost considerations should elevate social welfare and achieve greater abatement by selecting more durable policies. 

Conclusion 

Abatement costs have huge bearing on whether climate policies benefit society, their likelihood of passage, and whether they prove politically durable. Most abatement need not come from dedicated climate policy, per se, but rather sound economic policy that carries deep climate co-benefits. Chronic disregard for cost considerations has led to an overselection of high-cost policies and underpursuit of low- and negative-cost policies. This has undermined policy durability and exacerbated political polarization over climate change abatement. 

This paper finds extensive abatement opportunities within negative-cost policies. These largely constitute fixes to government failure and include permitting, siting, and power regulation reforms. This analysis also finds considerable low-cost policies that are compatible with U.S. economic self-interests. These policies primarily spur voluntary private sector abatement through efficient innovation policy and GHG transparency. 

We offer three sets of recommendations moving forward for influencers of the climate policy agenda:

  1. Focus on results. Climate change abatement is a function of global GHG concentrations. Too much attention pursues symbolic objectives, like preventing fossil fuel infrastructure. This tends to undermine abatement goals and impose high costs.
  2. Emphasize cost considerations in policy agenda setting, formulation, and maintenance. Negative abatement cost policies should take top priority, with an emphasis on mobilizing beneficiaries. Robust cost-benefit analyses should precede all cost-additive policies and be reconducted periodically to guide policy adjustments.
  3. Prioritize quality state capacity. The net benefits of abatement policies are sensitive to government capacity and performance. Public management is in great jeopardy in an era of institutional decay. Negative-cost policies are often highly technocratic and require sufficient staffing expertise and accountable management at public institutions like DOE, FERC, PSCs, and permitting and siting agencies. 

In an era of energy affordability precedence, a reset climate agenda should anchor itself in good policy basics. That is, a sober-minded return to results-driven, net-benefits prioritized policy. This should improve the durability of climate policy and ensure it enhances social welfare. Executing reforms well requires a recommitment to improving the quality of institutions as much as the policy itself. 

FAS Launches New “Center for Regulatory Ingenuity” to Modernize American Governance, Drive Durable Climate Progress

WASHINGTON, D.C. — February 12, 2026 — The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) today announced the launch of the Center for Regulatory Ingenuity, a new hub designed to reimagine how the government tackles “wicked” modern problems while delivering everyday benefits for Americans.

“We can’t manage today’s problems with yesterday’s laws,” said Dr. Jedidah Isler, FAS Chief Science Officer. “The Center for Regulatory Ingenuity will bridge the gap between high-level policy design and on-the-ground implementation, ensuring that government promises translate into real-world results that Americans experience.”

FAS is launching the Center for Regulatory Ingenuity (CRI) to build a new, transpartisan vision of government that works – that has the capacity to achieve ambitious goals while adeptly responding to people’s basic needs. CRI does this by (1) creating high-trust environments to brainstorm and refine the big ideas that will breathe new life into government, and (2) building a “network of networks” that supports policymakers and practitioners in implementing those ideas at scale.

“The administrative state has delivered extraordinary achievements in the past, but today’s operating model is a complete mismatch for the complexity we face. As a result, trust in government has been in the basement for decades,” said Loren DeJonge Schulman, Director of Government Capacity at FAS. “Strengthening government capacity is an investment in democracy and deeply intertwined with climate progress. It requires thinking creatively about how to build the government we need, not endlessly pointing fingers at the government we have–CRI aims to do just that.”

CRI is launching with a focus on climate: a space where there’s an increasingly evident mismatch between the functions the government needs to provide and the tools it has to deliver. FAS is pleased to welcome Climate Group North America, ICLEI USA, and the Environmental Law Institute as core partners in this initial work.

“Today’s rollback of the endangerment finding underscores that we are in a new era for U.S. climate policy,” said Dr. Hannah Safford, Associate Director of Climate and Environment at FAS. “To be clear: there’s no credible scientific basis for that rollback, which FAS strongly opposes. At the same time, it’s worth recognizing that while foundational environmental laws like the Clean Air Act worked to curb industrial pollution, they weren’t designed to guide the economy-wide transition to clean technologies that’s currently underway. There’s tremendous opportunity for innovation on how we design and deliver climate policies that are equitable, efficient, effective, and durable. With EPA stepping back on this front, it’s time for others to step forward.“

With the support of contributors from across the ideological spectrum, CRI is already charting paths for a renewed administrative state, a more responsive government, and ambitious climate policy that lasts. These paths are explored in CRI’s inaugural essay collection, Bureaucracy as Social Hope: An Argument for Renewing the Administrative State. The first two of these essays, “Rebuilding Environmental Governance: Understanding the Foundations”, by Jordan Diamond and collaborators at the Environmental Law Institute, and “Costs Come First in a Reset Climate Agenda”, by Devin Hartman (R Street Institute) and Neel Brown (Progressive Policy Institute) are available now; the remainder will be released in coming weeks. Other authors featured in the collection include:

In addition, CRI is today releasing “From Ambition to Action: Shovel-Ready Policy Solutions for Climate Leaders”. This policy primer, crowd-sourced from dozens of experts and policy entrepreneurs, outlines how motivated public leaders – especially at the state and local level – can turn big ideas into reality, cutting emissions while delivering cheaper electricity, ensuring affordable housing, and improving transportation for all of America.

Moving forward, CRI intends to deliver more detailed playbooks illustrating how an approach grounded in regulatory ingenuity can improve outcomes and achieve goals in these key sectors, which collectively account for two-thirds of U.S. emissions and contribute at least 25% of U.S GDP. 

More information about CRI is available here. For updates, and to stay connected, click here. 



ABOUT FAS

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) works to advance progress on a broad suite of contemporary issues where science, technology, and innovation policy can deliver transformative impact, and seeks to ensure that scientific and technical expertise have a seat at the policymaking table. Established in 1945 by scientists in response to the atomic bomb, FAS continues to bring scientific rigor and analysis to address national challenges. More information about FAS work at fas.org.

Media Contact: Katie McCaskey, kmccaskey@fas.org, (202) 933-8857

FAS Opposes EPA Move to Revoke 2009 Endangerment Finding

Today, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced that it is revoking its 2009 “endangerment finding” that greenhouse gases pose a substantial threat to the public. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) stands in strong opposition.

The science couldn’t be clearer: unchecked emissions of greenhouse gases are increasing the frequency and toll of disasters like flash flooding in Texas, catastrophic wildfires in Los Angeles, and stifling heat domes that repeatedly blanket huge swathes of the country. Revoking the endangerment finding would shove science aside in favor of special interests – and at the expense of American health and wellbeing.

“The Environmental Protection Agency claims that the endangerment finding led to ‘costly burdens’ on American families and businesses, when in reality it’s the cost of failing to regulate climate pollution that will hit people the hardest,” said Dr. Hannah Safford, Associate Director of Climate and Environment at the Federation of American Scientists. “Climate change is driving up the costs of food, energy, and housing even as Americans feel pinched by an affordability crisis. Our government has a responsibility to address this cross-cutting issue, not shrug it off.”

The EPA’s proposal is the latest move by the Trump administration to gut federal climate policy, a campaign that runs counter to public opinion: 4 in 5 of all Americans, across party lines, want to see the government take stronger climate action.

At the same time, revocation of the endangerment finding underscores the need for a durable new approach to climate policy that integrates innovative regulatory design, complementary policy packages, and attention to real-world implementation capacity. FAS’s new Center for Regulatory Ingenuity is leading on this priority, alongside a broad, transpartisan network of partners and public leaders.

“The clean energy transition has unstoppable momentum, and there is tremendous opportunity for innovation on how we design and deliver climate policies that are equitable, efficient, effective, and durable,” added Dr. Safford. “The Trump administration may be stepping back, but many others are stepping forward to create a world free from climate danger.”

Bureaucracy as Social Hope: An Argument for Renewing the Administrative State

I. Why Isn’t Government Working?

The “administrative state” is an unlovely bureaucratic term for a bureaucracy that has grown increasingly unloved: the network of government agencies that implements and enforces laws. In the United States, critiques of the administrative state abound. The nativist right pushes back against a purportedly dangerously powerful “deep state” while the left sees a meek state beholden to big corporations and incumbent interests. Libertarians bemoan bureaucratic inefficiency and hubris, while the newer “Abundance” movement describes a state choking on its own procedures. Though different narrators are telling different stories, they are arriving at the same moral that the core mechanics of the world’s greatest democracy just don’t work. From there, it is not too big a jump towards casting a nihilistic eye on democracy itself, and towards reckless deconstruction.

Erosion of faith in government is manifesting acutely in the climate movement. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) was by far the largest climate investment the world has ever seen. Biden-era regulations were intended to further spur rapid decarbonization of the world’s largest economy. And yet. If we had a dollar for every word written about the administrative state’s failure to effectively implement the IRA, we’d be shaving truffles on our eggs. Meanwhile, the current administration’s regulatory rollbacks are the latest play in what seems to be a never-ending game of political football around federal climate policy. If the administrative state can’t effectively address challenges it deems an “existential threat”, one might ask, what good is it?

Our answer: the American administrative state, since its modern creation out of the New Deal and the post-WWII order, has proven that it can do great things. Vast bureaucracies now successfully care for the elderly, the sick, the poor. Many communicable diseases are close to elimination. The administrative state, by directing tremendous amounts of public and private effort, built the power grid, the internet, the interstates. Nor are our glory days behind us: The American administrative state played the primary role in ending the Covid pandemic, saving millions of lives.

Even when it comes to climate change, the record simply isn’t one of failure. American bureaucratic regulation, including from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and from the states, and from air pollution standards for cars to carbon trading systems for entire economies, combined with significant incentive investments, has brought us technological transformation. Renewable energy is the dominant source of new energy globally. Electric cars now comprise 20% of sales globally and will replace internal combustion by mid-century. Whole industries are decarbonizing and emissions will shortly be beginning to fall. For all the many dubiously legal rollbacks of the second Trump administration, the United States continues to decarbonize.

And so, we argue, it’s hardly time to abandon the administrative state. But it is time to reinvent it. Our core supposition is that the sense of malaise and stasis characterizing current views of the bureaucracy has a substantial amount to do with mismatches between tools that produced current successes and the next set of tools that will be required to sustain and grow them. In the same way that nations might have a first or a second Republic, with constitutional reforms intervening, it is likely time for the next American administrative state.

Again, grounding in climate illustrates the point. Significant administrative pushes have commercialized the technologies needed to address the climate crisis and substantially pushed them into use. The Inflation Reduction Act supercharged this process in the United States, while China – which has sought to dominate clean energy supply chains via its own administrative state and invested accordingly – did so globally. As we enter 2026, there is no real doubt that many clean technologies are available, profitable, and better than fossil technologies. Every nation, including those that do not substantially produce these clean technologies, benefits from their adoption. 

But we are now running into a “mid-transition” moment, in which rival technologies, energy systems, and the economic and political systems on which they depend, are in collision. Consider electric vehicles (EVs). It is one thing to call EVs into being by imposing traditional “supply-side” regulations on manufacturers. It is quite another, as gasoline demand begins to sharply decline, to manage knock-on consequences for the entirety of the fossil economy, from refineries to pipelines to gas stations – much less the local and state budgets and jobs that the fossil economy underpins. Though regulatory strategies can be designed to address these economy-wide consequences, we won’t get there by running the same plays harder and faster. We’ve got to seriously interrogate where the most significant bottlenecks are, who is equipped to address them, and what tools they have or will need to deploy.

Now add two further wrinkles. 

First, procedural tangles that were created for all the right reasons, but that now hamper problem solving. In the environmental space, laws and processes were put in place decades ago to carefully scrutinize the impacts of potentially polluting infrastructure and factories. These measures have, in many instances, succeeded in preventing harm and protecting communities. But they are also indisputably making it harder to rapidly, massively scale up green technologies. This “Greens’ Dilemma” playing itself out in debates over the national environmental regulatory regime nationally is, in fact, a specific manifestation of broader dynamics. Incumbent systems, and those invested in them, do not particularly like to change. Indeed, the American administrative state generally was designed to move deliberately and deliberatively, including multiple veto points to avoid capture by industry or any particular interests. A worthy goal, but distinct from moving with speed towards the public good. When system inertia makes it too easy to grind the gears, the result, unsurprisingly, is painfully slow progress on building new public infrastructure and harnessing new innovations. If we zoom back in on the environmental space with these broader dynamics in mind, the particular obstacle inhibiting climate progress emerges with startling clarity: a system that was designed to produce cleaner technologies within the fossil economy is simply not set up to replace the fossil economy.

Second, the fact that capacity of the government to navigate these challenging dynamics has been sapped. There are multiple drivers of eroding government capacity. At the state and local level, years of corrosive narrative attacks translated into unwise revenue restrictions that in turn made forward-looking capacity investments all but impossible. At the federal level, a variety of policies and misaligned incentives have led to stasis and overreliance on contractors as opposed to internal expertise. At all levels, well-intentioned good-government and environmental reforms have imposed layers of analytic requirements that, while initially successful, ultimately contributed to “kludgeocracy”, while a highly litigious American society has, unsurprisingly, produced a highly risk-averse American government. Make no mistake: U.S. government at all levels has, and has always had, countless dedicated and talented civil servants who find ways to accomplish great things. But generally, this government is riddled with systems and structures that make it ever-more difficult for even the most effective individual to quickly and creatively deliver, especially when armed with aging legal and regulatory tools. 

The upshot? We need not lose faith in the administrative state itself; we would do better to view it as having functioned with its hands tied tighter and tighter. But we are now starting, particularly in the climate and energy space, to hit real limits.

These aren’t issues we can resolve with one-off budget bills or Band-Aid workarounds. The vision, and the fixes, will have to run much deeper. The second Trump administration’s massive federal shake-ups, if nothing else, have opened the field for reconstruction. There is an opening – and, we believe, transpartisan appetite – for a bold, positive vision of a government that is attuned and responsive to the needs of American people and communities, that people can trust to deliver things like cheap, reliable energy; affordable, abundant housing; and fast, safe transportation even as it adeptly manages complex, higher-order challenges like climate change.

To launch its new Center for Regulatory Ingenuity, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) engaged an ideologically diverse cohort of experts on government capacity and climate to describe how we might realize that vision. This cohort was asked to consider how to advance a paradigm of “regulatory ingenuity” – that is, creativity and cleverness in service of societal objectives alongside basic democratic values – in one or both of the following ways:

  1. Ingenuity in regulatory design. Looking across the entire regulatory lifecycle – from underlying statutory construction, to rule development, to implementation and (ideally) iterative improvement – to seriously examine how existing regulatory systems in the United States can be improved, and identify where fresh thinking is needed.
  2. Ingenuity in regulatory application. Considering how regulations can be coupled with other tools (e.g., innovative market designs, financial instruments, contracting mechanisms, etc.) to achieve societal goals quickly, equitably, and durably.

“Bureaucracy as Social Hope: An Argument for Renewing the Administrative State” is a collection of essays capturing the cohort’s insights. Essay authors envision new alignments of regulatory and financial power, new tools to enable multiple levels of government to move fast, to address distributional impacts, to channel capital at scale, to finally build infrastructure, and to, most fundamentally, break free from stasis. They are, eminently, not cynics. Though clear-eyed about the failings they seek to remedy, they understand that these failings are largely the shadows cast by past success. 

While these essays are grounded in climate policy, they address cross-cutting themes. They use climate as a lens to evaluate where government is and isn’t working. Indeed, the authors’ commentary with respect to government performance on climate challenges is easily extrapolated to other domains.

In writing, the authors revive an older American tradition of a vital administrative state in service of an equally vital and egalitarian democracy. Our nation used to regularly reorganize its government, and the Congress used to legislate regularly on hard problems. The recent reality of agencies working within aging statutes and confined by outdated structures was not the dominant face of government during the creative ferment of the New Deal or the Great Society or, indeed, of the Reconstruction itself. It is, in fact, deeply odd that we still largely live with the same administrative agencies and processes that we had in the 1970s.

So what should – what could – a modernized administrative state look like? The authors together imagine: 

A government that can deliver. It doesn’t need to take a generation to build a railroad, a power grid, or new housing. We can trade a veto-ocracy for the older progressive tradition of governance that rapidly responds to public needs – and secures us the service and infrastructure we need.

A government that can make decisions. The rules of the economy need to stop changing with every election and every major lawsuit. Re-empowering Congress to make big choices, and administrative agencies to deliver without constant swerves, will allow us to stop re-reading the manual and actually play the game.

A government for a modern economy. The future should be innovative and egalitarian. Realizing this future requires the de-risking and direction-setting powers of government to invite bold bets and spur investment, and the distributive powers of government to ensure that benefits are appropriately shared.

A government that listens and responds. We can replace the prevailing procedural labyrinth with a government that asks focused questions on the key issues, acknowledges and addresses real disagreements, and then moves forward thoughtfully yet confidently. That would involve, in part, staffing government fully and organizing it well – reversing decades of attacks on public servants and putting people to work on the right problems.

A government that works on all levels. Federal, state, and local governments each have unique levers and comparative strengths when it comes to serving our communities and society. A modern administrative state should recognize these, and emphasize frameworks that enable them to work well together.

Americans have spent too long living within a slowly failing version of last century’s government. The resulting civic frustration has largely fueled further attacks on government, spiraling us downwards. But an upwards spiral is possible too, in which structural reforms yield a government better equipped to chip away at tough problems in ways that improve daily life and rebuild civic satisfaction.  Because while the “administrative state” as a term is about as wonky as you can get, a renewed administrative state in practice is just common sense.

II. New Approaches for Climate and Democracy

As you will discover as you read, the authors do not all agree on every particular; our goal in inviting this collection was good-faith debate, not artificial consensus. Yet a survey of the collection’s component essays reveals common themes.

For instance, the authors generally agree that economic and industrial policy will be central to the next chapter of climate action. Incumbents still heavily invested in mature fossil-linked technologies and supply chains, as well as non-transparent pricing and other barriers to market entry, badly constrain the transition to competitive clean technologies in many sectors. And where promising technologies are still earlier-stage (e.g., as is the case for nuclear, geothermal, or green hydrogen), there are compelling arguments for government involvement to help establish U.S. dominance. Pollution regulators do not typically, though, control fiscal and monetary tools that can (i) correct market distortions, (ii) manage the very considerable distributive impacts of a shift away from fossil fuels that profoundly impacts industries and jobs across regions, and (iii) support a comprehensive strategy for incubating high-potential domestic industries. Nor are these regulators, with little ability to affect trade policy, well positioned to act within the complex geopolitical context of a partial energy transition. To put it frankly, it doesn’t make a lot of sense to run a massive societal transition with substantial global implications through the EPA. But in the absence of purpose-built institutions and statutes, that’s pretty much what we’ve been doing – with politically and legally unstable results.

This problem is compounded by the fact that the Supreme Court’s skepticism of sweeping regulatory mandates based on old statutes has left the administrative state with ever fewer tools to respond to economic transition needs. Regulations are regularly reversed, and the ongoing duel between litigators and executive branch agencies increasingly looks like an unproductive stalemate. The authors generally chart a path towards a reinvigorated role for Congress to settle disputes, for agencies to act more inventively, and for disputes to move away from the courts and back into democratic processes. 

The authors further point out that regulatory efforts alone are not sufficient to drive the infrastructure shifts needed to make those efforts last, or to buffer their up-front costs. Big infrastructure projects – including vastly growing the clean power grid, electrifying freight, expanding and upgrading transit systems, building new housing, and dismantling legacy, non-economic fuel systems – are central to regulatory success and stability, as well as to addressing an ongoing cost-of-living crisis and boosting national economic competitiveness. Infrastructure, the authors emphasize, isn’t an afterthought – it’s a core enabler of regulatory policy. Unfortunately, the now decades-long trench warfare over climate and other regulations has been accompanied by attacks on the state itself, stripping away administrative and delivery capacity along with the ability of many subnational governments to collect sufficient revenue to fund even basic services, let alone flagship infrastructure projects. The authors vehemently agree that there is much room to trim bureaucratic bloat, streamline process, and sensibly reorganize agencies. At the same time, they observe that a government that is smaller doesn’t always work better; not infrequently, the opposite is true. The authors therefore favor approaches that fit government agencies with the staffing, structures, and revenue they need to deliver on outcomes. Sometimes, those approaches are tweaks. Other times, they’re radical reforms.

II.A Towards a Shared Affirmative Vision

So how do we tackle these challenges – how do we start the upwards spiral in which effective delivery reinforces faith in democratic governance that in turn unlocks more delivery capacity? The authors develop a shared affirmative vision, one that broadly looks like this:

The collective vision is one in which the administrative state starts moving again, returning to the ethic of ongoing systematic revision that once characterized it. Rather than relying on the best ideas and institutions of a half-century ago, we would work towards structures more aligned with current needs – and do so in a way that reaffirms the creativity and vigor that has long powered America’s economy.

II.B Laying Out The Pieces

Each of the essays in this collection lays out particular pieces of the shared vision. Broadly: the collection starts by proposing fundamentally different ways to think about environmental and administrative law, seeing its task as delivering a clean economy at scale, rather than simply cutting pollution, and doing so with stable rules derived in democratically legitimate and procedurally stable ways. It then explores how these legal and regulatory structures could help guide the far larger private sector into configuration with public goals, removing barriers to competition that have insulated stubborn fossil incumbents and creating opportunities to move capital at scale into communities in ways that build a fairer and cleaner economy. From there, wrestling with the dislocations that nonetheless will accompany these changes, the collection describes ways to link participatory democracy with economic change, sharpening the focus of the regulatory state and its engagement with the public. The collection concludes by bringing these issues home, describing how state and local governments can deliver today – and presenting a “policy primer” of innovative ideas that can start moving from ambition to action this year. Below, we discuss each of these pieces in turn.

Jordan Diamond and co-authors at the Environmental Law Institute lays the foundation for this collection with a careful look at what environmental law can do, what it can’t, and how we might rebuild its powerful tools for modern challenges. They argue that the pollution statutes of the Nixon era, crucial though they are to addressing environmental contamination from fossil fuels, are at best limited tools for a whole-of-economy shift away from fossil fuels entirely. Viewing that new challenge as fundamentally one about driving economic innovation and infrastructure growth, they chart out areas ripe for legal development. At the same time, they explain why the next round of environmental progress is more likely to be led by infrastructure and economic agencies than pollution regulators – emphasizing that while pollution regulation will remain critical, we should stop asking pollution regulators to drive a national economic transition with aging environmental statutes alone. Their vision is of treating the energy transition like the economic problem it is, with tools to match. They would expand state capacity, bringing to bear a much wider set of agencies and approaches, and therefore also expand what we think of as “environmental law” to respond to the modern era.

Still working within legal reforms, Kirti Datla takes a close look at the profound challenges modern administrative law poses to the regulatory state. The Supreme Court’s new doctrines, she writes, are making it very difficult for environmental agencies, and regulators generally, to address new problems (and often even old problems) through existing statutes. And they suggest that the Court will impose its deregulatory views on even new statutes. These ever-changing rules strain government capacity, make it difficult for subnational governments and investors to plan a path forward, and prevent progress on policy goals. After acknowledging the need for new regulatory approaches, judicial system reforms, and new statutes, Datla focuses on how Congress can and should engage in the constitutional politics of asserting its role within our federal system, both to constrain the Court and to build its own capacity to address pressing problems like climate.

These two foundational essays, then, help us see the challenge before us. They explain why a kludged-together administrative state running off old statutes and aging structures keeps sputtering to a halt – and start to focus us on an expanded field of play, well beyond re-litigating the environmental policy disputes that have seesawed between the Obama, Biden, and Trump administrations. It is not that the regulatory state is inevitably a “hollow hope” for the shared challenges of climate, democracy, and fair economic growth – but that it has been asked to tackle enormous challenges without a shared theory of action or structures to match. Shifting the economy from its incumbent fossil foundations to a new electrified base, while managing the many linked distributive impacts of that shift under growing climate pressure, simply requires more than pollution regulations or one-time tax policy. If politics is the “slow boring of hard boards,” it helps to have the right tools to drill deep.

But, as Devin Hartman and Neel Brown posit, new tools need not – for durability’s sake, must not – be expensive tools. Nor will another round of mandates succeed without thinking seriously about how to address accompanying costs. Hartman and Brown argue that traditionally conservative lenses that look skeptically at giant fiscal policies and regulatory mandates do, in fact, bring to bear a canny understanding of the interests of incumbent economic system actors. The authors point out that the stuttering progress of the transition to clean technologies comes from the ways in which fossil fuels are deeply intertwined with the interests of powerful economic incumbents, and of existing government. And, having traced the root of the challenge, they conclude that opening these incumbents up to competitive disruption through appropriate reforms will be a potent strategy. For instance, Hartman and Brown contend that the repeal of the IRA may appropriately shift focus of subsidies from mature energy technologies (including clean technologies like solar as well as most fossil technologies) towards earlier-stage technologies (e.g., geothermal). From permitting reform to addressing market problems that deny Americans access to affordable EVs, Hartman and Brown set out a creative array of solutions that, with government backing, can push forward a modern economy at low, or even negative, cost.

Sometimes aligning with these arguments, sometimes complicating them, and always making them concrete, Beth Bafford describes how a focused set of government investments can further shift the economy onto new foundations by using public capital to leverage far greater private investments in the fundamental infrastructure American needs. She outlines how to wed together Hartman and Brown’s pro-competitive policies with the expanded and stable regulatory mission state described by Diamond and Datla. Regulators have often operated on a model in which government grants help underwrite regulatory mandates. Bafford instead starts to outline a structure in which government investments – including simple and accessible loan products – instead help shift the economy towards profitable and self-reinforcing clean new industries. Her model is one in which capital access builds entire businesses that can electrify and modernize core sectors of the economy, from the freight sector to the power grid. Regulations can and should still set the direction of travel in this model – but its engine is broadly shared profitability. Rather than forcing innovation into new channels with politically-exposed regulatory mandates, agencies in Bafford’s model would help convene and channel the economy towards new system states entirely, with regulations conceived as tools operating in concert with economic investments and planning to help crowd in capital to communities across the country.

Nicole Steele explores the role of capital in renewing the administrative state from a different lens. Steele observes that mission-aligned financial institutions (including values-based banks, green banks, CDFIs, and other purpose-driven funds) are increasingly functioning as essential partners in the administrative state’s delivery capacity. Sitting at the intersection of public policy and private markets, these institutions translate legislative and regulatory goals into bankable, scalable projects by absorbing early risk, standardizing structures, and aggregating demand. In practice, this has included mission-aligned banks working alongside state and local governments to deploy catalytic capital – whether as first-loss reserves, flexible operating support, balance-sheet backstops, or credit enhancement – in support of simple, repeatable lending platforms (such as residential and commercial PACE financing) that allow households, small businesses, and local governments to access clean energy, resilience, and efficiency upgrades without relying on bespoke grants or one-off subsidies.

By deploying catalytic capital, Steele continues, these intermediaries unlock funding that would not otherwise reach underserved markets or emerging project types. Critically, investment into mission-driven institutions does not substitute for private capital; it enables it. Strengthening the balance sheets and operating capacity of green banks and CDFIs allows them to originate, warehouse, and scale lending products that meet market standards, crowding in institutional capital while maintaining public purpose. In a period of federal uncertainty and shifting incentive regimes, expanding the availability of catalytic capital will require a diversified approach: drawing on state and local public balance sheets, philanthropy and quasi-philanthropic capital, and mission-aligned institutional investors willing to deploy flexible funds through intermediaries rather than relying on centralized federal programs alone.

Nana Ayensu builds on Bafford and Steele’s insights. As Ayensu points out, we have a transformational economic opportunity to deploy modern, clean energy infrastructure at scale. 

Federal and subnational governments have a real chance to catalyze significant capital deployment of mature and emerging clean energy technologies that are primed for growth – both directly and via investment into infrastructure. Widespread social benefits are available if governments use their authorities to assemble the puzzle pieces needed to create more actionable investment environments. Ayensu describes the state’s ability to do so: it can synchronize intra- and intergovernmental policy execution, build high-value foundational infrastructure to provide project stakeholders with the information they need, develop deeper risk and reward sharing partnerships with the private sector, and create the market forces that close align with economic & societal benefits. Making this type of consistent, efficient multi-pronged effort will be critical to garner the scale of investment needed to expand and update critical energy infrastructure systems and deliver lasting value to communities and industries across the nation.

Ali Zaidi makes the case for bringing this ingenuity to the arena of critical minerals and materials, what he calls “the atomic foundation for reindustrialization and any shot at lasting prosperity and security.” Zaidi draws moral inspiration from America’s post-oil shock response, a crisis moment that authored a broad policy playbook with a spine for experimentation. New laws and regulatory authorities, institutions and infrastructure, and moonshot moves on research…that moment, he writes, gave life to policy to solve a problem. It was “policy with helmets and pads”: playing offense, not defense. Zaidi urges bringing that same positioning to minerals and materials security policy today. In his conception, that policy should entail three pillars – production, partnership, and a drive for increasing productivity – that together support the shared goal of strengthening American competitiveness.

The third pillar is where Zaidi spends the most time. The oil shock of the 1970s propelled domestic standards designed to achieve greater fuel economy and appliance efficiency. Such standards have been weighed down over time by clunky test procedures, multi-year rulemakings, and heavy hand of government auditors. Zaidi proposes a framework for materials productivity that adopts the same solutions-oriented spirit of the 1970s energy policy environment, but is characterized by standards that bind instead of burden. To unlock minerals and materials security, Zaidi writes, “we should replace red tape with rubber bands, just enough structure to allow us to slingshot forward new production, processing, and partnerships — and increased productivity.” Zaidi details a framework that is digital, dynamic, and data-driven: where enforcement is algorithmic, not bureaucratic; and the work is easily federated and easily staffed. This light, flexible scaffolding will accelerate capital formation and technological innovation. 

Indeed, Jennifer DeCesaro, Jennifer Pahlka and Hannah Safford add, we’d do well to apply a similar mindset to planning: a standard feature, and all-too-common bug, of climate policy. Environmental statutes are rife with planning mandates, from Clean Air Act implementation plans to natural hazard mitigation plans required by the Stafford Act to all things NEPA. Look beyond pure statute and become quickly overwhelmed: climate-related plans are mandated by public utilities commissions, developed by task forces, produced as a precondition for grant eligibility, and on and on. Though plans are easy to ask for, they’re often expensive and time-consuming to develop; moreover, lack of coordination among overlapping plans can lead to duplication or even contradictions. DeCesaro, Pahlka, and Safford therefore ask a simple question: “What are all these plans getting us?” They argue that climate policy too often falls into the trap of “planning primacy”, where planning becomes the end goal instead of an intermediate step towards progress. Put another way, it’s rarely the case that a plan is developed and its directions are then followed to the letter. Rather, the process of thinking through scenarios, understanding constraints, building mental models, and developing relationships with other plan stakeholders is what really matters. DeCesaro, Pahlka, and Safford draw from both the climate space and other domains to illustrate how treating plans as compasses, not maps, can improve efficiency and outcomes. Because to quote Eisenhower: “In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.”

Shifting incumbent systems requires not just low-cost solutions, access to capital, and competent, efficient regulatory capacity. It also requires ways to reconcile or resolve competing interests. Our current regulatory system has gotten bogged down with ineffective procedural approaches to dispute resolution, yielding a litigation-driven collection of process fouls and veto points that no one really likes. Our next set of authors observes that improving this system requires more than a simplistic call for deregulation. Moreover, they argue, the solution can’t be to ignore stakeholder input altogether – that runs the risk of policies that are poorly informed, technically unfeasible, and brittle given lack of buy-in by the businesses, communities, and people they serve. Rather, our authors propose a range of reforms to help administrative bodies effectively collect input from stakeholders, weigh hard trade-offs and disputes, and move forward fairly, but expeditiously: thereby using democratically legitimate decisionmaking to strengthen industrial policy.

The first of these authors is James Goodwin, who argues for an “agonistic” view of the regulatory state in which regulators must actively surface and invite input on genuine disputes. Goodwin proposes replacing today’s box-checking engagement exercises and voluminous stacks of public comments with a focused participation process. In this process, administrators would at each state of a project or regulation, identify the core disputes and disagreements that need resolving, and draw in input specifically on these issues. By targeting engagement – and avoiding consensus – in this way, administrators would be able to efficiently advance dialogues with the public that are both quicker and inherently more resistant to status quo bias.

Loren DeJonge Schulman and Shaibya Dalal pick up on this theme. They argue that treating public engagement as a strategic asset, not a box-checking exercise, leads to smarter, more durable policies that reflect real community needs and build trust in government. Participation is not a distraction from governing – it is how government governs well. They argue that the failure of many engagement processes is not that agencies invite too much input, but that they do so too late, too perfunctorily, and in ways that exclude the communities most affected by public decisions. When participation is treated as compliance rather than governance, it fuels distrust, invites procedural obstruction, and produces policies that are fragile and contested. By reflecting the full range of transactional public participation and relational community engagement options, and by applying clear principles (purposeful design, mutual respect, transparency, accessibility, and iteration) agencies can use engagement to surface lived experience, anticipate conflict, improve policy design, and strengthen the legitimacy and durability of their actions. Done well, participation becomes a form of ingenuity that reduces conflict, eases implementation, and reinforces democratic accountability.

Of course, inviting public participation only works when people are interested in participating. Angela Barranco and Kristi Kimball argue that the American climate movement faces a critical public engagement crisis that threatens to undermine decades of progress on clean energy adoption – and explore how advocates can speak to the public to build interest and support for the shifts that government seeks to deliver and legitimize. Despite nearly 70% of Americans expressing concern about climate change, Barranco and Kimball contend that current advocacy strategies fail to tee up paths for politically durable dispute resolution (and eventual support) because those strategies are unduly rooted in fear-based messaging and technical data. Barranco and Kimball make the case for a shift towards a public conversation that approaches Americans as consumers (who must adopt new technologies and cannot be persuaded through regulatory mandates alone) making lifestyle choices rather than political constituents to be mobilized. Drawing on proven strategies from consumer marketing, behavioral psychology, and community-based social marketing research, Barranco and Kimball observe tremendous opportunities for (i) reframing climate engagement around consumer choice, and (ii) leveraging the unprecedented infrastructure investments necessitated by extreme weather impacts to build lasting climate coalitions while simultaneously strengthening democratic institutions and community trust. 

Ultimately, these changes and debates occur not in the abstract, and not just in Washington, DC. State and local governments are the theaters in which economic and democratic change play out, mediating federal policy and global geopolitical shifts in the lives of real people. Thus both the climate crisis and the economic transition are inherently “polycentric”. Subnational governments have therefore always been at the core of climate and regulatory policy. It is these governments that are most able to set democratically responsive visions for clean economic growth, climate resilience, and infrastructural change that will concretely change lives. If our future is to be shaped more by ordinary people than by technocrats, it is these governments that must have the capacity and creativity to act.

Louise Bedsworth provides a prospectus for local action. As she argues, a rebuilt regulatory state has to position state and local governments for creative action and response. These governments, she writes, are more than subsidiary partners, and more than replacements for federal regulators during deregulatory periods (important though those roles can be). State and local governments are innovators and leaders in their own right. The task is not just to provide ancillary community benefits from federal grants, or to mandate particular state plans, but for state and local democracies to be engines of national and even global change. By expanding their own capacity, aligning capital and economic plans to build regional prosperity and resilience, and engaging in and leveraging networks across geographies, nationally and globally, subnational governments can reshape climate action and the regulatory state.  

Indeed, because of the enormous creativity of subnational governments, and the huge opportunities created by the private sector, in response to past regulatory guidance and government investments, we do not need to wait for a new federal administration to start putting solutions into place. We have already identified a broad network of ideas and actors that can start building these ideas in reality, this year – in a policy primer for that foundational work. The primer, crowd-sourced from leaders across the field, highlights a starting list of policies well within the reach of subnational actors, and focusing strongly on economic and industrial policy interventions that can durably advance clean economic systems while managing real trade-offs with savvy deployment of government capacity. It is a practical point of engagement, allowing for the ideas articulated in these papers to be tested now, not after further electoral cycles.  

III. Conclusion

We do not need more stories of American decline. Critics on the left, center and right have already told us that our government doesn’t work. Americans feel underserved, underrepresented, and ripped off. But Americans also know how to do better. We are always rebuilding our democracy; it is time to do it again.

Collectively, our authors have sketched out the beginnings of an administrative state for this era – grounded in the pressing challenge of climate change and its increasingly evident impacts on American lives. This state would enable governments across scales, and stakeholders across sectors, to realize the vision of a nation where:

This sort of “mission state” – a government that sets a clear vision and brings together public and private sectors to execute it – is actually an old American tradition. What else were the New Deal, the Apollo Program, Operation Warp Speed, and the creation of the internet than missions of this sort? Indeed, when it comes to newer challenges like climate change, we have started, a bit haphazardly, to reach for a mission again. The Inflation Reduction Act’s billions in investments, and the Biden administration’s complementary regulations, were an attempt to bring together the public and private sectors around the vision of a clean and prosperous economy, with good-paying jobs and dominance in the technologies increasingly certain to underpin the 21st-century global order. Yet because of obstacles identified above, that mission was…while not entirely a failure, hardly a resounding success.

But the mission remains necessary. America must not remain mired halfway between the old economy and the new, exposed to climate shocks, with a government unable to satisfyingly respond. Clean technologies are advanced enough that retrenchment and retreat to fossil is a doomed strategy; similarly, we’ve seen that taking a chainsaw to government leaves our whole nation bleeding.

The only logical approach is to tap into the creative, determined spirit that is the essence of American identity. Think of the millions of Americans who, in the midst of the Great Depression, spread out to every part of this country to rebuild it. We still live among the lovely parks, trails, and civic architecture called into being by the Civilian Conservation Corps; our power grid was brought to us by rural electrification, the Federal Power Act, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. We know what it looks like when Americans believe in government and the government is worthy of that belief. 

It looks, to start, like a conversation. As CRI launches, in partnership with a broad network of partners and contributors, we invite debate, dissent, and experimentation. One of our goals is to bring together people and perspectives that are often in tension to identify where there are some threads of common sentiment – and how we can productively move forward despite the tension that remains. We will be gathering thinkers, exchanging ideas, and mapping out pilot projects with growing momentum across the months and years to come, working not just to theorize around solutions but to bring them to life. To adapt the truism about trees: the best time to renew our administrative state was ten years ago. The second-best time is today.

From Ambition to Action: A Policy Primer

How public leaders can boost climate progress, restore trust in government, and make lives better…starting today.

People across the nation are clamoring for solutions that make their lives better. And they’re frustrated by the responses they’re getting. Confronting massive inequality, Americans watch leaders finger-point on the price of eggs; yearning for security and stability, Americans watch politics lurch between radically different agendas. No wonder, then, that public trust in the U.S. government has been in the basement for decades. Americans are facing both everyday challenges and a deep, growing sense of discontent. But they’ve lost faith in government to resolve either.

That sense of stuckness doesn’t need to last. But change means focusing on outcomes, eliminating bottlenecks, and prioritizing delivery. It means embracing tools and talent that better connect big ideas to real-world results. It means resisting the temptation to chase buzzwords – from “abundance” to “dominance” to “affordability” – and focusing on the method over the message.

One place to start is with the shift to clean technologies, a place where there is powerful momentum. One in five cars globally are already electric, while heat pumps have outsold gas furnaces in the United States for four consecutive years. The vast bulk of new energy generation is renewable: globally, clean energy investment is now double the amount spent on all fossil fuels combined.

While the transition to clean technologies is unstoppably underway, it is also in its messy middle. Rival technologies and energy systems (and the economic and political systems on which they depend) are now colliding. Many counties and cities depend heavily on fossil fuel revenues; meanwhile, job quality and union density in the renewable energy industry leaves much to be desired. And core parts of our infrastructure – from the power grid to gas stations – are complex and expensive to convert to serve renewable and clean industries, even if those industries will ultimately boost affordability.

Put simply, remaining globally competitive on critical clean technologies requires far more than pointing out that individual electric cars and rooftop solar panels might produce consumer savings. But we also can’t afford to cede the space. Internationally, clean energy spending is booming. China’s clean energy industry by itself would be the world’s eighth largest economy if it were a country, and Europe’s investments have almost doubled over the last decade. Even if current estimates hold, fossil fuel demand will peak mid-century. If the U.S. continues to hold fast to existing policies until then, we’ll be 30 years behind the rest of the world’s energy economy, and it will be impossible to catch up. The bottom line? Good climate policy is good economic policy, and vice versa.

Good climate policy is also good politics. Climate-induced disasters are increasing by the day, and are impacting both safety and affordability. Americans generally see climate and energy policy as important as immigration. Most Americans, on both sides of the political aisle, support environmental regulations and clean energy development. Many say electricity costs are just as stressful as grocery bills, and they worry about higher insurance rates and local market problems. And they’re tired of entrenched corporate interests calling the shots.

What’s needed are creative, clever strategies that boost climate progress while delivering everyday benefits. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS), as part of our new Center for Regulatory Ingenuity (CRI), developed this primer to put a bunch of those strategies in one place. Our goal is for this primer to serve as a resource for public-sector leaders at the federal, state, and local levels who believe that government can do great things for our communities and our planet.

The strategies herein are open-sourced from a diverse network of contributors and collaborators, and are shovel-ready. Many of these strategies are already being deployed across the country. They’re designed to make energy, housing, and transportation better this year.

Indeed, we hope that readers see the actionability of these solutions not just as a benefit, but as an imperative. Americans aren’t looking for the magic message or the magic moment. They’re looking to government for leadership. Every day that government is paralyzed by gridlock, indecisiveness, or fear of failure is another day that it fails to realize the potential of the good that it can achieve, and that public trust in government further erodes. That’s a downwards spiral that we’ve got to stop.

Finally, we emphasize that this primer is a starting place. We’re at the precipice of a new era for climate and energy policy in the United States, and the strategies that will form the backbone of this new era – by adeptly fitting together government capacity, private innovation, and democratic decision-making – are just starting to come into view. As they do, CRI and its partners are committed to working hand-in-glove with bold doers and thinkers, sharpening our collective focus, and realizing the vision of a more responsive government, more optimistic society, and more resilient nation.

Getting to Work: Opportunities in Energy, Transportation, and Housing

Solving problems requires framing them accurately. As observed above, the truth is that clean technologies are increasingly dominant, and that the United States is rapidly falling behind. A response predicated on propping up the 20th-century fossil economy is doomed to fail. So too, we’ve learned, is a response that relies on the U.S. federal government to muscle the clean-technology transition forward single-handedly.

Fortunately, because so many clean technologies are now commercial, the opportunity for leadership on multiple levels, and multiple fronts, has never been more available – or more crucial. For example, simple economics will do much to propel wind, solar, and battery technologies if needed supporting infrastructure is in place and clean technologies are given the chance to compete on fair terms. Policymakers can worry less about expending political capital on expensive public subsidies for clean power, and focus instead on transpartisan policies enabling broad market access, streamlined interconnection processes, and swift power grid build-out. In the transportation sector, policies that ensure transparent vehicle pricing or increase market competition for legacy car companies may matter more than traditional regulatory standards.

This new reality also makes thoughtful economic, industrial, and social policy indispensable. The advent of new technology often comes with the promise of broad societal benefits, but making good on that promise is hardly a guarantee (witness the emergent effects of AI). It’s incumbent on government to ensure that the clean-technology transition reduces inequality and improves quality of life at scale, and that the transition doesn’t abandon workers in fossil-dependent regions and industries to the vagaries of the market. And it’s government, working across multiple scales, that can assess regional comparative advantages and figure out where the United States can still compete – as well as where it must innovate and diversify.

Government leaders, in short, have the unique ability to see all the way from the kitchen table to the commanding heights of the global economy, and to mediate between them.

We illustrate below the types of approaches that entrepreneurial policymakers can adopt to secure U.S. leadership on critical clean technologies, in ways that benefit all Americans. We focus on energy, transportation, and housing, which are collectively the largest sources of climate pollution and key elements of household and regional economies nationwide. The list below is not exhaustive, or comprehensive, but exemplary – a demonstration that there are real opportunities for change.

Unleashing Modern Energy

There’s massive untapped potential for clean energy in the United States. To realize it, we’ve got to make room for new energy to move.

This isn’t primarily a project of continued renewable energy subsidies: there’s good evidence that renewable energy can compete on a level playing field when it’s given the chance. Rather, the project is one of clearing away barriers to financing and building projects, fixing broken market incentives that favor existing players over new entrants and distort energy pricing, and accelerating construction of major grid infrastructure. 

This project looks a lot like the successful national push towards rural electrification that the United States led a century ago: a serious effort that aligns private and public investments to rethink how and where we deliver energy. In executing this effort, we must grapple with the full set of barriers to building – not just cost and permitting, but also thorny local siting processes, misaligned incentives for electric utilities, and lengthy wait times to connect projects to the grid. 

Today, of course, we’ve also got to reckon with the growing threats of cyberattacks and extreme weather to energy infrastructure, as well as the unprecedented, unpredictable energy demands of hyperscalers. Such challenges can only be managed by a mix of climate stabilization policies, economic risk-sharing strategies, and investments in infrastructure modernization. That’s not a cheap or easy proposition, but it is one with major lasting benefits.

At the consumer level, building more clean energy can help stabilize residential electricity prices (though many other factors also contribute to electricity prices and price volatility). More broadly, clean energy could unlock billions of dollars in potential efficiencies, such as by reducing costs associated with redundant natural gas transmission infrastructure. Expanding clean energy, especially distributed energy resources and virtual power plants, can also upgrade outdated grid infrastructure and secure it against cyber threats. But getting to these benefits requires government leadership.

Energy ingenuity could look like:

Making Transportation Cleaner and Cheaper

People just want to get to where they’re going safely, efficiently, and affordably. Yet despite record levels of federal transportation spending, traffic, emissions, and pedestrian deaths keep rising. And as the Cato Institute observes, “U.S. policy contributes to an inefficient and costly transportation system that reduces workers’ time and incomes.”

We can do better. This starts by recognizing that in much of the United States, cars are both essential and increasingly unaffordable. There’s opportunity for a suite of policies that break market strangleholds while expanding consumer choice, moving us away from involuntary dependence on expensive cars and towards a future with transit that people actually want to ride – as well as affordable yet excellent, and often zero-emission, personal transportation. Core federal clean transportation programs have supported $4.6 billion in domestic investments and created at least 14,000 jobs in manufacturing, demonstrating the large-scale benefits of such programs and the economic case for continued federal support. Because the tools involved are nearly all within the authorities of state and local governments, and independent of ongoing federal regulatory disputes, they also can go into effect quickly.

On the vehicle side, this agenda includes governmental efforts to address legacy company market power. Incentives and protections for domestic manufacturing are sensible so long as they boost local economies, support American workers, and drive American innovation – but they’ve got to be coupled with policies ensuring price transparency and other oversight mechanisms, to ensure that benefits flow to consumers rather than pad company profits. Unlocking a more affordable, competitive, zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) market – with more options for buyers at lower prices – is also a key political foundation to the next round of vehicle regulatory mandates, by creating a larger constituency for further progress.

On the system side, states and cities can significantly build up regional budgets with savvy transportation investments. The data are clear that transit and walkability investments bring more valuable housing into cities and connect people with jobs, raising economic activity and raising property values. Investments in electric-vehicle charging similarly boost local business revenue and spurs economic vitality. Communities thrive when their members have transportation options (that all work well), instead of being steered towards legacy vehicle technology and wrestling with creaky 20th-century infrastructure.

On the vehicle side, transportation ingenuity could look like:

On the system side, transportation ingenuity could look like:

Building Affordable, Abundant Housing

Housing shouldn’t be a luxury: it’s a prerequisite for a stable, healthy life. Yet Americans – facing prohibitively high (and increasing) rental costs as well as unrealistic down payments and pathways to ownership – are struggling to meet this basic need. And with extreme weather on the rise, renters and owners alike are facing concerns about physical safety and skyrocketing insurance as well as price hurdles. The emissions that the housing sector produces only worsen these problems.

Delivering more affordable, resilient, and climate-friendly housing means making it easier to build housing of all shapes and sizes; tailoring solutions to rural communities, urban communities, and different geographies generally; and striking a better balance between development for housing and development for other purposes. These strategies need to be paired with deep investments in government capacity to facilitate permitting and approval of new housing construction, as well as to facilitate more complex projects – like retrofits, infill development, and office-to-residential conversion – at scale. Also critical is reimagining community and stakeholder engagement on housing questions, aiming to maintain trust, democratic process, and local buy-in without overvaluing the perspectives of existing homeowners, developers, or any other particular constituency. at the expense of the rest of the community.

Housing ingenuity could look like:

Making Solutions Stick: The Cross-Cutting Benefits of Government Capacity, Pro-Democracy Design, and Innovative Financing

Each of the policy solutions above offers a way to boost climate progress while delivering everyday benefits across energy, transportation, and/or housing. But how do we make those solutions stick? With trust in government at historic lows, public-sector leaders must quickly follow ambition with action, investing in both ideas and the building blocks that turn ideas into reality. Below, we outline how public leaders can use three of these core building blocks – government capacity, financing, and pro-democracy design – to get on the scoreboard early…and stay there for the long term.

Government Capacity

Government capacity refers to the ability of government to get things done, whether through efficient processes, effective talent, or fit-for-purpose tools. Americans are frustrated by the slow pace of government, but they don’t want the functions that keep them safe and supported dismantled: they want them improved. Accomplishing this requires more than new programs or new funding streams or new inventions. It requires leaders to seriously (and systematically – not via a “wrecking ball” approach) consider which government functions are working, which need to be overhauled, and which should be retired.

Rebuilding government capacity is inseparable from strengthening democracy itself. Both of these goals are wholly intertwined with climate progress. When government acts competently, transparently, and in partnership across levels, it restores public faith that collective action is possible and worthwhile. When it can’t, even well-designed policies stall under the weight of fragmented authority, procedural burden, risk aversion, and institutional inertia. Treating government capacity as a core investment is therefore much more than administrative housekeeping. It’s a prerequisite for durable climate progress.

To boost government capacity, public leaders can:

Finance

Capital is a powerful tool for policymakers and others working in the public interest to shape the forward course of the economy in a fair and effective way. Very often, the capital needed to achieve major societal goals comes from a blend of sources; this is certainly true with respect to climate action and facilitating the transition to clean technologies.

States, cities, banks, community-driven financial institutions (CDFIs), impact investors, and philanthropies have long worked in partnership with the federal government on clean-technology projects – and are stepping up in a new way now that federal support for such projects has been scaled back. These entities are developing bond-backed financing, joint procurement schemes, and revolving loan funds – not just to fill gaps, but to reimagine what the clean technology economy can look like.

In the near term, opportunities for subnational investments are ripe because the now partially paused boom in potential firms and projects generated by recent U.S. industrial policy has generated a rich set of already underwritten, due-diligenced projects for re-investment. In the longer term, the success of redesigned regulatory approaches will almost certainly depend on creating profitable firms that can carry forward the clean-technology transition. Public sector leaders can assume an entrepreneurial role in ensuring these new entities, to the degree they benefit from public support, advance the public interest: connecting economic growth to shared prosperity.

To be sure, subnational actors generally cannot fund at the scale of the federal government. But they can have a truly catalytic impact on financing availability and capital flows nevertheless. 

To boost finance, public leaders can:

Public Participation

Public participation in climate action is often treated as a procedural requirement to be satisfied late in the process, rather than as a core function of governing well. The result is familiar: performative town halls, notice-and-comment processes that invite frustration rather than insight, and transparency tools that are easily weaponized by organized interests. This dynamic erodes trust, slows projects, and fuels the perception that government is both unresponsive and incapable. Yet participation, when designed well and tailored to the moment, is not an obstacle to effective governance:  it is how government discovers what will work, where friction will arise, and how to build solutions that communities will defend rather than resist. Treating participation as a functional component of state capacity means seeing it as an input to smarter design, faster implementation, and more durable outcomes.

Upgrading how government listens and engages is vital to upgrading how government delivers. When residents see clearly how their input shapes decisions, participation builds legitimacy and reduces the incentives for obstruction and litigation later in the process. When agencies invest in the infrastructure, tools, roles, and expectations that make participation meaningful, they create a feedback loop that improves policy design and strengthens democratic trust at the same time. And when climate leaders meet the public where they are in terms of how they experience and make consumer choices in the the climate transition, we can strengthen the connective tissue between government action and public trust.The recommendations below are aimed at helping public leaders move beyond compliance-driven engagement toward participation models that are relational, deliberative, and integrated into the machinery of experience and delivery. This approach ensures that climate solutions are not only technically sound, but socially resilient and democratically grounded. These take time, but we encourage recognition that they enable enormous time, risk and failure saved. 

To boost public participation, public leaders can:

About The Primer

Ambition to Action was authored by Angela Barranco, Zoë Brouns, Megan Husted, Kristi Kimball, Arjun Krishnaswami, Hannah Safford, Loren Schulman, Craig Segall, and Addy Smith.

Many individuals contributed ideas and input to this primer. The authors are grateful to the following individuals and organizations for their time, expertise, and constructive feedback: Patrick Bigger, Laurel Blatchford, Heather Clark, Ted Fertik, Danielle Gagne, Kate Gordon, Betony Jones, Nuin-Tara Key, Alex McDonough, Sara Meyers, Shara Mohtadi, Saharnaz Mirzazad, Beth Osborne, Alexis Pelosi, Sam Ricketts, Bridget Sanderson, Lotte Schlegel, Igor Tregub, Louise White, and Clinton Britt. The content of this primer does not necessarily reflect the views of individuals or organizations acknowledged. Any errors are the sole fault of the authors.