chemical and biological weapons,
iran’s nuclear program
Christopher A. Bidwell, JD is a Senior Fellow for Nonproliferation Law and Policy at FAS. He recently retired from the U.S. Navy where his last key assignment was as National Security Counselor at an internal DoD think tank (DTRA-ASCO) dedicated to the study of WMD and Nonproliferation issues. Bidwell is also an accomplished civilian litigation attorney and has focused his efforts on the interplay between law and WMD for the last several years.
He is especially knowledgeable on issues related to attribution, deterrence, WMD free zones, sanctions, anticipatory self-defense and the Middle East region in general. He has lectured/spoken at several universities and academic fora throughout the world on nonproliferation issues and has taught courses on nonproliferation at Georgetown University.
Bidwell is an active member of the California Bar and currently serves as Chair of the Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Interest Group of the American Society of International Law.
FAS and FLI partnered to build a series of convenings and reports across the intersections of artificial intelligence (AI) with biosecurity, cybersecurity, nuclear command and control, military integration, and frontier AI governance. This project brought together leaders across these areas and created a space that was rigorous, transpartisan, and solutions-oriented to approach how we should think about how AI is rapidly changing global risks.
AI is already consequential, but its future trajectory remains contested. Policymakers should make their assumptions explicit, focus on what can be shaped rather than what can be perfectly predicted, and build institutions that can learn and respond as evidence changes.
From grassroots community impacts to global geopolitical dynamics, understanding developing data center capacities is emerging as a critical analytical challenge.
The last remaining agreement limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons has now expired. For the first time since 1972, there is no treaty-bound cap on strategic nuclear weapons.
The goal of this Task Force report is to offer findings and make recommendations regarding nonproliferation monitoring and verification in general; our observations are grounded in large part on the Task Force’s continued attention to nonproliferation developments such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between the P5+1 and Iran, nuclear developments in North […]
Most of the world (including the U.S.) seems to be relieved now that there is affirmative progress towards eliminating Syria’s ghastly chemical weapon (CW) stockpiles, thereby avoiding (at least for now) a military strike that no one really wanted to undertake. The Syrian government has announced that it will soon join the Organization for the […]