Government Capacity

Anyone Who Promised Government Would Work Better Should Steal This Experience

11.18.26 | 17 min read | Text by Loren DeJonge Schulman

This is the first in a three-part series on what the federal Life Experiences effort can teach anyone trying to make government deliver for people instead of for the bureaucracy. The series summarizes, excerpts, and takes inspiration from Making Government Work for People: Putting Life Experiences at the Center of Policy and Service Delivery, the retrospective Schulman co-authored with Amira Boland of New America’s New Practice Lab for the IBM Center for The Business of Government. This post covers what worked, what very much did not, and a little of what this Administration and a new Congress and even future transition teams can do about it. Part 2 applies the same lens to fields FAS works on (climate disasters, federal R&D, and clean energy deployment). Part 3 gets meta and asks what government should organize itself around.

In 2018 a farmer walking into a USDA county office could find three doors: one for the Farm Service Agency, one for the Natural Resources Conservation Service, and one for the Risk Management Agency, each handling work questions about the same farm (eventually, Farmers.gov set up a single front door for those farmers, which helped but was a Band Aid).  A small group of early federal customer experience folks looked at those doors and silos and, feeling somewhat crazed, asked what felt like a reckless question: what would simplify the doors across the whole government, organizing around the moments in people’s lives instead of the boxes on an org chart?

The effort that grew out of that question eventually touched 36 agencies, dozens of states and territories, and thousands of stories. It ran out of an OMB team that started with just one person and some volunteers and less than $1M  and grew to support five cross-agency teams, growing in ambition but less so in resources or enabling infrastructure. The gap between those two is why this essay exists and why I think it’s an important moment to give it attention.

Amira Boland and I just published a retrospective on the Life Experiences initiative with the IBM Center for The Business of Government, Making Government Work for People. It draws on our (mostly her) time running the work at OMB and on a March 2026 convening of more than 40 people who were part of the work. This is the much-summarized version, sharing what someone who is frustrated with how bureaucracy drives work instead of people’s experiences (Permitting? Grantmaking? Procurement? R&D?) could do radically and differently. 

Teeing up a new Congress and getting a head start for 2029

November’s election sends a new Congress to Washington in January with 127 new members and also starts the clock on 2029 transition planning. A lot of the people who won promised voters a version of a government that works, whether answering the phone faster, clearing backlogs, cutting paperwork, or making help easier to access. 

That’s fantastic, and they have so much fodder to build on! Starting with everything we learned from the Life Experiences initiative. It began as a pilot under the 2018 President’s Management Agenda and expanded under the next Administration’s customer experience executive order. Its Newborn Supply Kit won bipartisan support for scaling in 2025 appropriations, and states and cities (and other countries!) are excited to design their own versions of experienced-based services. We think we got a lot right and also think all these newly energized leaders are well positioned to supercharge what we were often forced to get wrong. So the lessons below are a head start for anyone who just told voters government would work better (or plans to) and now has to figure out how.

TLDR: Life Experiences 

The Life Experiences initiative was an attempt to run parts of the federal government the way people experience their lives, starting from a moment in someone’s life and working backward to every program, agency, form, and contact center number they hit along the way. Instead of asking “how do we improve FEMA’s website?” a team might ask what it’s like to have a baby, or to lose a job, or to rebuild after a hurricane, and then go find out how that intersected with government interactions. After a hurricane, for example, a survivor might apply for help from FEMA, the Small Business Administration, HUD, their state, and their insurer, describing the same damage on every application. Based on that the disaster team put together a clear north star: that survivors should only have to share their information once (spoiler: they didn’t quite get there – but we could!).

The overall effort grew in two stages. Three pilots ran between 2018 to 2020 (transitioning to adulthood with an intellectual disability, seeking employment after military service, and recovering from a disaster). In December 2021, Executive Order 14058 formalized the approach, culminating in five life experience initiatives: having a child, recovering from a disaster, facing a financial shock, approaching retirement, and transitioning to civilian life.

Each life experience got a small cross-agency team made up of staff borrowed from the agencies involved, often with designers and researchers from USDS, 18F, and similar groups, all coordinated by the customer experience team at OMB. Teams spent their first several months listening – something government is strangely terrible at, at least on a consistent basis. They interviewed people across the country, sat with frontline staff who already knew what wasn’t making sense, and pulled feedback and administrative data to find any patterns. Their outputs were journey maps (which explain every step a person goes through as they navigate a government system and how that interacts with government review and decision points) and a list of “how might we” problems that seemed worth taking on with the collective might and sway of a White House-led initiative. From there teams picked fixes they could build, piloted them with willing agencies and states, and reported back to senior leaders on how to make it bigger or better. Those fixes ranged from the very small (drafting plain language on webpages that bounced people between SSA.gov and Medicare.gov) to the structural (changing how states handle Medicaid renewals so fewer eligible people lose coverage on paperwork).

Among these pilots, several found permanent homes at SAMHSA, the VA’s Veterans Experience Office, and the Administration for Community Living, and states have picked up the Newborn Supply Kit. Many other pieces–and much of the overall thesis–didn’t survive, for reasons anyone attempting this again might run into. More on that below.

We can have nice things! Ingredients for Successful Life Experience Approaches

A lot of people did this work on top of their day jobs, for years. Here’s what kept them coming back and we think serve as a baseline for anyone trying their own version.

Basic but true: a shared north star is vital. Just describing the big outcome every agency, state, and partner is aiming at, even when each takes its own route, is a set of magic words and yet often lacking in government reform. Governance charters and coordination frameworks were much harder to get anyone excited about, and much easier to drop when leadership changed. For facing a financial shock, it was “apply in 20 minutes, enroll in 24 hours, receive services within a week;” for disaster recovery, survivors should only have to share their information once during the most stressful time of their lives. Other fields could set the same kind of target and leave the methods open.

Championing specific fixes you could explain to your mom (or deputy) in a sentence. Wonks often treat government like foreign language and get lost between actions and goals, but integrating FAFSA with IRS data to make it easier to apply, changing how Medicaid renewals work to make it easier to stay enrolled, and sending a kit of supplies to families with newborns were things a skeptical deputy secretary or appropriations staffer could grasp the merit of immediately and, crucially, defend in the context of their north star.

Showing the problem mattered more than the best memos (and I can write a good memo). A video of a veteran describing their struggle to apply for benefits, or a journey map of every agency a new parent contacts in the first year, made the problems with these systems understandable to colleagues in a way briefing memos or power points just won’t. Demo days for Hill staff and gallery walks for senior leaders kept the work alive through forgetful administrative cycles and staff turnover. 

Rethinking which risks count is mindblowing (complimentary). Government is built to see the risks of trying something new and almost blind to the risks of leaving something struggling as is. The early pilots asked agencies “what happens if we do NOT act?” and made the status quo something leaders had to defend. Anyone writing report language, a hearing question, or a transition memo can borrow the move by putting the cost of the current process on the record, so doing nothing stops looking free.

Flexible talent and pilots made it cheaper to say yes. Teams like USDS, 18F, the Office of Evaluation Sciences, and Lab at OPM brought skills agencies couldn’t hire fast enough for life experience initiatives, and outside partners reached communities federal teams couldn’t. That central amd outside capacity got agencies past the feeling that they were too stretched to start. Calling something a pilot let skeptical leaders participate without betting their operating model on it. But all of that requires both the flex to be available to begin with and a transition plan for sustainment.

(As always) Everything depended on the right people inside the agencies. A presidential mandate was necessary but nowhere near sufficient. The life experience initiative made progress in places where someone with operational responsibility and the ear of the Deputy Secretary could drive it. It stalled where everyone agreed it was important and but nothing really changed day to day. Peer pressure for deputies to take off their agencies hats worked, as they tended to care how the White House compared them with their peers. The work also went furthest when long term agency program staff were part of the life experiences team, sitting in on interviews, running parts of workshops, and joining design sessions, instead of receiving updates as clients or outsiders. 

And the life experiences frame itself turned out to be a recruitment tool. Organizing around how people live, instead of which agency runs which program, reminded civil servants who they were serving and why they came on board in the first places.

Brakes and breaks and breakdowns: why working across agencies is so tough

The walls that life experiences teams hit were built into how the federal government organizes money, process, authority, and accountability, which means anyone trying to deliver across agency lines (in any field) will find them waiting. Learn out lessons, build better ladders and doors!

Indecision as Policy, or “Nobody” owned journeys. Accountability in the federal government runs vertically, from Congress to agencies to the programs that report up their own chains. A new parent’s experience runs horizontally across all of them. But no one’s really in charge of that overall, or often even in pieces. Charters and steering committees only gave life experiences teams permission to act differently and worked when the people on them had authority. They also took far longer to stand up than anyone expected and their hammer fades over time. Someone who woke up every day in charge of an outcome would have been the difference maker. 

Money, money, money. Federal budgets are built two years ahead, so political enthusiasm for a new priority builds a long time after the relevant money is spoken for–not great for fast moving agile projects like life experiences. Individual agencies have far more resources than any central fund that can invest in novel projects, but few incentives and few vehicles to contribute to shared work, so teams assembled funding through negotiated contributions that took time (a long long time). Even cross-agency priority goal funds drew multiple rounds of review from resource management offices at OMB and agency general counsel offices, on questions as basic as whether one agency’s employee could spend time on a cross-agency project. The transaction costs of moving small amounts of money routinely dwarfed the money itself. 

The drudgery of folk law. When teams asked general counsel offices “can we?” they often got answers to “should we?” Different agencies reached different conclusions about the same statutes (the Economy Act for moving money, the Paperwork Reduction Act for user research, the Privacy Act for data), and the most cautious reading usually won, and won very slowly. But worst of all, myths of what was not allowed were pervasive, referring to mystery statutes and regs that existing only in fever dreams of proceduralization. Research institutions will recognize this one – a lot of what institutions experience as federal requirements turns out to be someone’s cautious interpretation, layered on top of someone else’s who left five years ago.

Government couldn’t access what it already knew. The whole promise of organizing around life moments depends on agencies making it easier to validate or understand facts about a person or community, so that a new parent or a disaster survivor doesn’t have to prove the same thing five times or we have reliable insights on the barriers they face. In practice, every data-sharing arrangement required its own legal negotiation, and teams learned that the technical problem (moving data between systems) couldn’t be solved until someone settled the governance problem (who is allowed to use it, for what, and with what protections). Agencies define basic terms like family, household, and income in incompatible ways, often because the underlying laws were written decades apart, and there were never any serious efforts at reconciling them. Even within single programs, basic data on who is eligible and who actually enrolls often didn’t exist in usable form.

The invisible infrastructure (the things you expect exist but don’t). Most agencies couldn’t produce a definitive list of the services they provide. The research teams had already completed  sat in individual drives. And (I promise this is true) teams coordinating across five departments had no shared calendar or co-editing tool or even access to a common chat platform.

States were vital partners no one has relationship with. Most of what people experience as “the government” is delivered by states, counties, Tribes, and territories, and federal agencies often lack the authority, knowledge, or influence to change how those services run. Teams had to build new networks from scratch and rebuild relationships that were initially mistrustful (and often rightfully so). 

Congress was out of the loop The life experiences effort never had a real congressional engagement strategy.Agencies were often reluctant to go to the Hill with cross-agency work that didn’t fit any one committee’s jurisdiction. That also cut teams off from constituent services offices, which hear about the seams between agencies every day. 

Pilots proved things and then had nowhere to go. Work that succeeded at small scale often had no route to a permanent program home before the administration ended. 

Put all of that together and you get a government that can see a problem spanning five agencies and has almost no way to own, pay for, or staff the fix without driving itself crazy. But! Most of that machinery can be built and yeah, it’s not sexy, but functioning government is.

Steal this report!

Campaign promises about government working better tend to collide with the machinery described above, from folklore legal barriers to months of review on small transfers to lack of ownership. The people who built Life Experiences already found many of the potholes, so the next crew can drive around them – or better yet, fix them! If you just won on a promise like that, or you’re planning for the people who will, steal from it!

For the administration in office now

What a new Congress can do

Here are some report’s initial recommendations (see the report for many more), sorted by the calendar the new folks in town are about to face.

Ahead of early hearings

In the first year of the new Congress

For anyone planning a 2029 transition (in either party) – Amira writes more about these recommended activities in the 2026 State Transition memo on CX), but here’s a few ideas:

Different hallways, same long set of doors

If you work on science, energy, or climate policy, you’ve likely seen every item on that list, just with different descriptions. Almost nothing FAS cares about gets delivered by one agency acting alone –  it runs through several federal agencies and then through states, universities, utilities, contractors, and local offices, each with its own rules and its own money. Picture a researcher filling out three agencies’ versions of the same biosketch, or a homeowner chasing a heat pump rebate through a tax credit, a contractor, a permit office, and a utility. (Or a town after a flood describing the same damage to four different programs.) 

In Part 2, I’’ll point the same lens at fields FAS works on: recovering from a climate disaster, getting an idea funded and into a lab, and getting clean energy infrastructure built. The journeys are different but the doors look awfully familiar.

This blog post summarizes, excerpts, and takes inspiration from Making Government Work for People: Putting Life Experiences at the Center of Policy and Service Delivery, the retrospective I co-authored with Amira Boland of New America’s New Practice Lab for the IBM Center for The Business of Government.

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