I. UNILATERAL DESTRUCTION II. MISSILE RELATED ISSUES III. CHEMICAL WEAPONS IV. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS RELATED ISSUES V. DOCUMENTS VI. CONCEALMENT Scope of UNSCOM Mandate and Activities to Oct 1998 The Council established the Special Commission at the end of the Gulf war as part of the ceasefire. It is an innovation in conflict resolution. Two fundamental objectives were set out. First, to get rid of existing prohibited weapons and associated infrastructure and secondly to assure that Iraq does not undertake to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the prohibited items in the future. For this task, the monitoring system of resolution 715 was established. The Commission was worked on these objectives for seven years. A simplified summary of the focus of work would be the following: 1991-1993 Disarmament and accounting for the Obvious--SCUD Force, CW munitions, agent and production facilities. 1994 Design, baseline inspections and establishment of Ongoing Monitoring and Verification system (delayed until Iraq acknowledged resolution 715 in November 1993) 1995 Attempts to complete verification of Iraqi SCUD declarations (imported only) and CW production. Vigorous investigation to prove offensive BW program despite Iraqi denials. Iraqi threats to end cooperation and Hussein Kamal defection. 1996-1997 Attempts to verify the extent of the newly revealed programs and establish extent and termination of concealment efforts. 1998 Resolve crises over rights of access and remaining accountability problems. Review monitoring system. The Commission has had an uneven history in its work in Iraq, but much has been accomplished in disarmament and the basic monitoring system has been established. Given the history of deception in Iraq and the need to account fully for proscribed programs for monitoring to be effective, verifiable accounts and material balances are the immediate priority. It is also important that the work and precedents set now in monitoring recognise that ultimately they will have to work in a post embargo and sanctions environment. This means one in which a much larger amount of commerce and dual use equipment is active in Iraq. It may also be a time of reduced influence by the Commission in Iraq. Hence, the importance of establishing necessary access and compliance in monitoring. In 1991, resolution 687 adopted by the Council demanded that Iraq destroy, under international supervision, all its weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, as well as its related weapons production capabilities. Rather than carry out in full the obligations it accepted, Iraq chose to retain proscribed weapons and capabilities. It declared and presented to UNSCOM only a small portion of its proscribed weapons for supervised destruction, while keeping the rest concealed.
I. UNILATERAL DESTRUCTIONProscribed Weapons Declared Retained Operational Missiles 48 85 Conventional Warheads 18 83 Special Warheads 30 45 Operational Launchers 5 9 Non-Oper. Launchers 5 0 Empty & Filled Chemical Weapons 38,000 46,000 Biological Weapons 0 ALL WEAPONS In March 1992 Iraq revealed to UNSCOM that it had retained some proscribed weapons after the adoption of resolution 687 however, it claimed that it had destroyed them secretly in the summer of 1991. The chart shows the quantities of proscribed weapons that Iraq declared to UNSCOM and those that it retained. It is important to note the order of magnitude of the weapons retained by Iraq: 2/3 of the operational missile force; more than half of the chemical weapons; and all the biological weapons. This unilateral destruction, in violation of resolution 687, has created a major problem for UNSCOM in the verification of Iraq’s compliance. The unilateral destruction was conducted by Iraq in such a manner as to hide the existence of these weapons, and to some extent to cover the level of achievement of its weapons programmes. Iraq recognized this in a letter to the Security Council on 17 November 1997, which reads: "The unilateral destruction was carried out entirely unrecorded. no written and no visual records were kept, as it was not foreseen that Iraq needed to prove the destruction to anybody." For example, missiles and warheads were destroyed by explosives and buried in the desert. Some items were melted down. During the unilateral destruction, some weapons and equipment were diverted and hidden. For example, some items, such as tooling for production of proscribed missiles, which had been set for destruction, were in fact diverted to a hide site and allegedly destroyed later. At least three proscribed missiles were not subject to unilateral destruction in the summer of 1991. Even after revealing the unilateral destruction to UNSCOM in March 1992, Iraq manipulated the evidence. It seeded, moved and removed pieces of destroyed weapons at some destruction sites. During the process of verification, the commission has found some misrepresentations in the Iraqi account of its actions. However, some other Iraqi accounts have been proved to be correct. Examples of misrepresentations include: a. Iraq's current declaration states that on 8 July 1991 at 10.00 PM 15 special missile warheads arrived at Nibai, and were destroyed there on 9 July 1991. To support this claim, Iraq presented a document (picture 1). In order to verify this declaration, UNSCOM checked the aerial photography of Nibai available to it. As the picture shows, on 9 July 1991 no warheads were present and no destruction activity took place at the declared site (picture 2). This puts UNSCOM in a difficult position: should we accept inaccurate declarations? b. Second example: Iraq claimed that some missile launchers were destroyed unilaterally in July 1991 at Bismayah. Iraq took our experts to the destruction area and UNSCOM marked the sites with crosses, so they could be easily seen in an aerial picture (picture 3). Then UNSCOM looked at its aerial pictures of those sites at the alleged time of the destruction. The pictures showed that no destruction activity took place at those sites at that time (picture 4). Only then did Iraq change its story, declaring that the launchers were in fact destroyed in October 1991. However, during six years, until August 1997, Iraq coached its personnel being interviewed by the commission, in order to provide a cover story for its misleading declaration. Iraq waited for many years to tell the truth. The question is why? This creates problems and delays verification. Iraq's unilateral destruction creates the biggest problem for UNSCOM s verification process, as it affects all the weapons areas. Iraq itself recognized, in June 1996, that unilateral destruction is a priority issue for verification. The commission needs to verify completely the facts of the unilateral destruction. Without a full account of such activity, the commission cannot certify, with confidence, that all proscribed weapons claimed to have been destroyed unilaterally by Iraq were indeed destroyed. To help the commission and speed up the verification work, Iraq is asked to provide a full and verifiable disclosure of its decisions and actions related to the unilateral destruction. A proper clarification of this problem will enable the commission to substantially increase the confidence in its assessment of Iraq's compliance with the council requirements. . . . . .
II. MISSILE RELATED ISSUESExamples of Problems Special Warheads As in many other cases, the main problems in the warhead area relate to the unilateral destruction. I will illustrate the problems in the commission's verification with two examples: --The unilateral destruction of special warheads --Hiding of special warheads before the unilateral destruction Iraq has been changing its declarations to match emerging finding. Iraq has recently admitted that in 1992, it had tampered with evidence of the unilateral destruction of 45 declared special warheads. This was done by seeding remnants of conventional warheads at the declared sites of the unilateral destruction of special warheads. Until February 1998, Iraq was providing its statements of the material balance of special warheads using falsified evidence. Example: the p3 site at Nibai: Instead of providing full disclosure, Iraq has been adjusting its declarations to match new findings (table). Initially, the P3 site was not identified by Iraq as a site of unilateral destruction of special warheads. When a few pieces of special warheads were found at P3 in August 1997, Iraq came up with the 'farmer' story: a farmer dug up remnants of special warheads at one site, carried them a kilometer away and reburied them two meters deep at the P3 site. In February 1998, Iraq admitted that P3 was a separate destruction site. Iraq's declaration of March 1998 for P3: 10 CW; current findings: 15 special warheads, most probably BW lab analysis will help to determine the agent fill of the destroyed warheads The commission is waiting for a new declaration that would fit with available findings. This time, we expect Iraq to support its new declaration with documentary evidence. Hide Sites Hide sites are the places that Iraq itself declared to the commission where it had been hiding proscribed missile operational assets after the adoption of resolution 687 in April 1991. Some of Iraq's declarations were verified as correct, others continue to pose verification problems. Examples of the problematic sites: Falujah site Iraq declared in 1997 that 10 CW warheads had been excavated at Falujah, brought to Nibai on 10 July (4:00 AM) and destroyed at P3. The imagery displayed does not support this declaration as no excavation activity was evident at Falujah on 11 July 1991--i.e. after the declared removal of warheads from this site. Where were these warheads actually hidden? Tigris Canal site Iraq declared in 1997 that 15 bw warheads stored at this site had been transported away on 7 July 1991 for decontamination at another location. The imagery displayed shows that warheads were removed from the hide site some 10 days before the declared date. Why were they removed? Where did they go? Basic questions: Should the commission accept incorrect declarations? Why would Iraq provide inaccurate declarations? Lack of realism in the declarations complicates the verification work. Such issues need to be resolved by Iraq to allow the commission to report with confidence on Iraq's compliance. Missile Propellants SCUD missiles use two main propellants: TMI85 and AK271. These are SCUD specific components not dual purpose items. Iraq has never admitted that it had manufactured these propellants, nor that it had retained them for non-proscribed missile activities or for use in its civilian industry. Conflicting Iraqi actions and declarations on destruction of SCUD propellants: Iraq declared in 1991-1992 that the propellant tanks at the destruction site were empty. Then during discussions of the propellant material balance, it changed its declaration to the effect that nearly half of them had been full of propellants. Iraq is not providing the inventory document on the declared destruction of propellants. Iraq's declaration of propellants unilateral destruction is unsubstantiated. Should the commission accept an inaccurate declaration? The solution is simple: Iraq should provide a documentary record of propellant destruction. Iraq should provide full disclosure of the unilateral destruction of proscribed missile propellants. The solution is simple and quick. A failure to resolve the issue will complicate compliance assessment as the only reason to retain these proscribed propellants is for use in proscribed engines. Taji Hide Site Iraq declared in 1997 that 30 conventional warheads had been hidden in 5 pits at this site. Iraq stated that all of the warheads had been excavated from this site and destroyed unilaterally not later than 17 July 1991. This could be confirmed indirectly by the displayed imagery. However, additional imagery shows that excavation work at this declared hide site continued after 12 August 1991 and that items had been removed from the hide site after the declared end of the unilateral destruction in mid July 1991. Where are these items now? Indigenous Missile Production Capabilities Following the successful development of the Al Hussein from imported SCUD missiles, Iraq undertook to produce indigenously these missiles. Iraq procured, through importation, the necessary components, production equipment and tooling. In early 1990, Iraq established a production goal of 200 missiles. Iraq intended to eventually produce 1000 missiles, per its declarations. By April 1991, Iraq had made significant progress in its indigenous production efforts. Since 1995, Iraq has declared that it successfully manufactured and tested virtually all major components for its indigenous missiles with the exception of gyroscopes. Iraq had contracts for the foreign procurement of gyroscopes. It also retained some original imported gyroscopes until the last quarter of 1995. Iraq has declared that it conducted 12 static tests and four flight tests of indigenously produced engines. Several of these tests were successful. Concealment Iraq has acknowledged that, until August 1995, it undertook efforts to conceal the extent of its success in the indigenous production of missiles. This is another example of Iraq's attempt to protect its most advanced capabilities in the proscribed areas. For these purposes, Iraq falsified declarations of its manufacture and testing of indigenously manufactured engines, misrepresented the purpose and use of production machinery in order to spare it from destruction, and under reported the quantities of imported components. Additionally, Iraq stated that it chose the method of unilateral destruction to conceal specifically both the acquisition or manufacture of certain components and success that the programme had achieved. Iraq has declared that additional efforts were taken, even after its declaration of the unilateral destruction in March of 1992, to secretly excavate and further destroy components to conceal these programmes. Many critical components, tools and documents were diverted from the unilateral destruction and retained. Unilateral Destruction Iraq intentionally chose methods for the unilateral destruction of components and tooling for its indigenous production efforts which would frustrate the Commission's efforts to discover or account for these materials. Iraq has declared that most of the materials were collected from destroyed facilities and separated into groups of usable and damaged items. The damaged items were generally melted in foundries and the resulting ingots sent to scrap yards. The usable components were retained and then reportedly destroyed by exploding them and burying the remnants. The gyroscope components were destroyed by disposal in rivers or canals. A full accounting of these gyroscope components has never been provided. Following Iraq's declaration of the unilateral destruction in 1992, Iraq secretly recovered destroyed components from burial sites and sent them for melting in foundries or disposal in rivers. Iraq has declared that most documents related to the production or disposal of these items were destroyed. Verification The Commission's efforts to verify Iraq's destruction of proscribed components have included the use of interviews, discussions, document searches and technical assessments of Iraq's statements and declarations. These methods were complicated by Iraq's changing declarations. The Commission has established that by late 1990 Iraq had the capability to indigenously manufacture a limited number of proscribed missiles. One Iraqi document records that the Army had possessed seven Iraqi manufactured Al Hussein missiles. Iraq claims that they were training missiles and that they had been destroyed unilaterally. Although thousands of pieces of unilaterally destroyed imported missiles had been recovered, no component from these Iraqi manufactured missiles were found. Iraq now claims that it had secretly removed them from the debris at the destruction site. The Commission also attempted to establish a material balance of the imported and manufactured critical components for proscribed missile production. For example, the Commission attempted to verify Iraq's declarations of the unilateral destruction of components for its engine programme at a site near Tikrit called Al Alam. Of an estimated 100 tonnes of material declared to be destroyed at this site, only 12 tonnes could be accounted for. This verification finding resulted in Iraq providing a new statement, in late 1997, concerning the re-excavation of these items in April or May of 1992 and their further destruction by melting. Following its efforts to verify the destruction at Al Alam, the Commission undertook to account for the estimated mass of material which should have been melted. In March 1992, the Commission attempted to locate all of the ingots of materials which should have been the result of five different melting events related to the unilateral destruction. Of an estimated 200 tonnes of material, only 50 tonnes could be verified. Iraq then stated that some of the proscribed material had been diverted for disposal in rivers and canals. To date, the Commission has been unable to verify this declaration. By way of illustration of the complexity of the verification process, I will focus on the destruction of materials at Al Alam. Iraq has declared that, in July 1991, it sent 10 semi-trailers of undamaged components for its indigenous missile engine production to the Tikrit area for concealment from the Commission. After a week of hiding it was allegedly decided to destroy the components from 9 of these semi- trailers by explosion and burial at the Al Alam site. The tenth semi- trailer was diverted from the destruction for retention and concealment at the Farm near Baghdad. Following its declaration of the unilateral destruction in March 1992, Iraq allegedly re-excavated the Al Alam site and secretly removed all "assembled" components in order to conceal its achievements in the indigenous production of missiles. These re- excavated components were taken for melting. The remaining components were shown to the Commission in May 1992, but nothing of the concealment activities were declared. As the Commission has attempted to verify Iraq's declarations, Iraq has continued to modify them. Actions for Closure It is unlikely that all critical components for Iraq's indigenous production programme can be completely accounted for by excavation or recovery activities. As such, the provision of documents such as monthly status reports, quality control records, inventory documentation and destruction certificates are needed to resolve this issue technically. Extended Length Warhead Canisters On a separate issue, the Commission has requested Iraq's explanation of the presence of extended length warhead shipment canisters during the last half of 1990. The Commission's concern is that this may represent an undeclared activity to modify proscribed warheads. The Commission first raised this issue with Iraq in 1995. Iraq has consistently denied the existence of extended length warhead shipment canisters, including in its letter dated 14 May 1998. Can the Commission accept such a statement? The facts: Iraq has modified originally imported warheads as well as has indigenously produced some. The indigenously produced warheads that were delivered to the Army were mainly for the delivery of chemical or biological agents. The issue: In order to be able to ascertain that all Al Hussein missile warheads have been destroyed, including those filled with CW/BW agents, international missile experts at the TEM found it necessary to verify first the reference figure: how many warheads were left in Iraq at the end of the Gulf War. Indigenous Warhead Production Status Iraq's Full Final Complete Declaration does not provide solid evidence for the verification of the declared total warhead production, its nature and its timing. Accounting of warheads might be contested if there is not enough confidence in the total number of warheads to be accounted for. Iraq has attempted to set an upper limit of its total indigenous production by referring to its declaration of imported U-rings. Due to the absence of practically any supporting documentation to confirm the declared figure of indigenous production of warheads, the international group of experts at the TEM attempted, based on discussions with Iraqi experts, to conduct an evaluation of Iraq's pre-war industrial warhead production capabilities and limitations, Main TEM result: Unsatisfactory level of verification. Fo1low-up actions from the TEM Accounting of U-rings Provision by Iraq of written explanation, however, without any supporting evidence. Actions Required to Close this Remaining Issue: To resolve this outstanding issue the international group of experts at the TEM believes that additional efforts should be made to obtain Iraq s warhead production records. During the TEM, Iraqi experts were requested to fill a production planning chart. This chart has been completed but it still needs to be supported with documents (such as quality control acceptance documents for produced or modified warheads and completed work orders, original production records, administrative orders, workshop activity reports). Without such supporting documentation, no solid evidence could be obtained to prepare an objective technical evaluation. Without such evidence experts are unable to verify the declared warhead production, including the total number of warheads produced indigenously. . . .
III. CHEMICAL WEAPONSThe next priority issue is the extent of Iraq's attempts to produce VX · VX is the most toxic of all known chemical warfare agents · Iraq undertook large-scale efforts to produce VX · These efforts comprised R&D activities, procurement, production of precursors, modification of a production facility, production of VX, and weaponization · The verification of Iraq's VX-related activities is complicated due to the unilateral destruction of all traces of such activities, including remaining VX and its precursors, carried out secretly by Iraq · The existence of large-scale VX activities was acknowledged by Iraq only in 1995, when UNSCOM confronted Iraq with evidence of such activities The current level of verification of Iraq's declarations could be characterized as following (slide # 8): · Declared R&D activities in 1985-1990, were verified by UNSCOM only up to 1988 · Declared procurement in 1987-1988 was verified, however, evidence of undeclared procurement was found by UNSCOM · Verification of production of VX precursors revealed significant discrepancies between Iraq's declarations and information available from Iraq's documents found by UNSCOM: production of precursors was continued in 1989 when production of VX, according to Iraq, had already been stopped · Iraq's declarations on the modification of the VX production facility were verified * Declared production of VX could be verified only for the period 1987-1988, but not in 1990 * Weaponization of VX could not be verified Main outstanding issues on VX remain in the areas, where Iraq did not provide documents and verifiable evidence to support its declarations (slide #9) In particular, Iraq's declarations on the production of VX in 1990, weaponization and disposition of VX are not supported by documents or other evidence which could be verified by UNSCOM The following concerns were outlined in conclusion of the international expert team to the technical evaluation meeting on VX in February 1998 (slide # 10): · Iraq had precursors sufficient for the production of 200 tonnes of VX, which is incongruent with declared quantity of produced VX--3.9 tonnes · At the R&D level, Iraq obtained sophisticated technology for the production of VX. This is incompatible with Iraq's statement that the industrial production of VX had failed · In contrast to poor stability of VX as declared by Iraq, UNSCOM, through its sampling activities, found traces of a VX stabilizer · These facts, in combination with Iraq's attempts to conceal the VX-related activities until 1995, lead the international expert team to the technical evaluation meeting to the conclusion that Iraq was able to produce VX in quantity and had obtained the VX production technology... Material Balance of Equipment is the Last Priority Issue in the Chemical Weapons area (slide #12): · UNSCOM continued in the verification of the issue of material balance of CW production equipment after several pieces of undeclared equipment from the Muthanna state establishment, Iraq's prime CW production site, had been found by UNSCOM in 1996. · In August 1997, Iraq, in responding to the Commission's questions, found and admitted some 200 additional pieces of production equipment from Muthanna. This equipment was destroyed under UNSCOM supervision in 1997. · The investigation of the history of this event is important to assure that all equipment from Iraq's CW programme has been accounted for and is covered by the declared material balance. · Iraq explained that this equipment was removed from Muthanna in 1990 and was stored in 20 shipping containers at Taji in 1991-1996. UNSCOM’s verification revealed that these explanations were incorrect. Taji Electrical Light Bulb Factory · In 1994, in contrast to Iraq's statement, there was no evidence of shipping containers with equipment at Taji light bulb factory (slide # 13) * However, 20 shipping containers appeared at this facility in mid 1995 (imagery # 12) * It may suggest that Iraq did not provide the full story related to the hidden equipment · This leads to the necessity to check the material balance of equipment once again * Recently, in May 1998, Iraq provided further clarifications on the issue of disposition of CW production equipment · The commission is continuing the verification and, hopefully soon, would be able to finalize this issue . . .
IV. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS RELATED ISSUESIntroduction From 1991 to 1995, Iraq categorically denied it had a biological weapons programme. During that period it took active steps to conceal the program from the Special Commission which involved specific deception, fraudulent statements false and forged documents, and misrepresentation of people and facilities. Only in 1995 after pressed by UNSCOM with evidence that demonstrated that Iraq had a BW programme did Iraq reveal its offensive BW programme. Subsequently, after acknowledging this program, Iraq provided only the minimum amount of information required. It continues to downplay and trivialise the programme. Even since August 1995, Iraq has provided altered documents and taken other measures to mislead the Commission. In March 1997 an expert panel recommended the rejection of Iraq's June 1996 FFCD because of its overall inadequacies throughout the document. In September 1997 Iraq provided a new FFCD that contained essentially the same information, ignoring all advice provided to it by UNSCOM. As reported to the Council, international expert panels have reviewed Iraq's biological Full Final and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) on September 1997 and considered it to be deficient in most aspects. In March of this year. a biological Technical Evaluation Meeting (TEM) between UNSCOM international experts from 15 countries and Iraq was convened in Vienna dealing with all aspects of the biological FFCD submitted by Iraq. The TEM concluded the FFCD had substantial deficiencies in all areas and Iraq's account of its BW program could not be verified as being a full and complete disclosure as required by the Council. Thus on three occasions three expert panels have reviewed essentially the same information and all concluded the FFCDs were inadequate scientifically, technically, militarily and managerially. To facilitate understanding of the current situation the various elements of the BW program described in the FFCD may be grouped as follows: Key Elements First and most important are time tangible core items. That is, acquisition of supplies, equipment and material for the program production of types and quantities of BW agents and production of munitions weapons; and agent and weapon destruction. Surrounding this core area of material balance are those elements that support the full understanding of the program. Finally, we have the more peripheral items that, while important for a complete perspective, are less critical in comparison with the material balance and structural groupings. To establish substance and credibility of the assessment of the biological weapons program, the material balance data should be based on hard evidence fully supported by records, documents and physical evidence. It is difficult to accept data when it is based on soft estimates, guesses and recollections by Iraq's personnel: recollections that have been shown repeatedly to be faulty, misleading, misleading and sometimes plainly false. As this information is not reliable, more weight must be placed on a full account and understanding of the structure and organizational aspects of the program. Unfortunately Iraq denies virtually all organizational aspects and minimizes all structural elements of the BW program. Establishment of a material balance and a determination of the structure and organization of the BW program is required for effective monitoring of Iraq's dual capable facilities. While the TEM experts found the peripheral elements such as history of the program and site detail deficient as well. Iraq appears willing to supply additional information or explanations on those peripheral issues, but this is not and cannot be a substitute for solid evidence at the core of the matter. Material Balance The material balance is the core area of the biological weapons program. It is not adequately documented by Iraq and is only based on estimated figures which cannot be verified. The TEM experts concluded that without a complete accounting of all BW program acquisitions, bulk agents, munitions and weapons, the creation of a material balance is not possible. Iraq's biological FFCD is deficient in reporting the acquisition of supplies, material. microbiological strains, munitions and equipment. Making Biological Weapons Elements of material balance appear on both the input and output side of the program. On the input side we have the precursor materials such as microbial growth media used to produce bulk quantities of BW agent; we have the production of these agents and the production of munitions. Filling of the agent into the munitions leads to the output of weapons. In a simplified context, the elements of material balance in biology consist of 1) growth media such as yeast extract, casein or thioglycollate 2) microorganisms 3) production of bulk BW agents microorganisms or their toxins 4) production of munitions 5) the union of bulk biological or toxin agents with munitions to make BW weapons 6) the destruction of unused bulk agents and munitions and 7) ultimately the use or destruction of the weapons The Commission is unable to verify Iraq's declaration in all of these areas. Acquisition of Media Substantial quantities of microbial growth media are not reported and/or not included in the material balance. Iraq has not reported all of the purchases of growth media for the BW program imported by Iraq's main procurement agency for the BW program, the Technical and Scientific Materials Import Division (TSMID). For example, the quantity of yeast extract known-to-UNSCOM imported for Iraq's BW program by TSMID and not reported by Iraq is sufficient for 3 to 4 times more anthrax production than declared by Iraq in the FFCD. On 29 May 1998, Iraq stated that this is due to confusion on the part of UNSCOM between media ordered for the Forensic Laboratory versus for the BW program. This is an unwarranted and untrue assumption by Iraq. Because the import has not been acknowledged, this media has not been accounted for by Iraq in its material balance calculations. Even among the growth media reported by Iraq, there are unresolved discrepancies in accounting for consumed media, lost/stolen/discarded media and media remaining after bulk agent production ceased. Growth media material balance is not supported by documentation. Iraq asserts that it has provided all known procurement activities. No new information related to microbial growth media has been provided since the TEM. Production Iraq has not provided a credible accounting of bulk agent production. No production documents have been provided to support Iraq's statements on production of anthrax spores, botulinum toxin and spores, gas gangrene spores or aflatoxin. Iraq has stated that the production figures are only estimates. Explanations offered for not using fermenters at various time periods, or for relatively high production failure rates, or for fermenters being unused are not consistent with information available to the Commission. The TEM concluded that there is an unexpected and unexplained discrepancy between production capability and stated agent production. Iraq maintained that it was difficult if not impossible to provide any verifiable account for bulk production of BW agents because relevant documents had been unilaterally destroyed rather than made available to UNSCOM. The FFCD does not adequately support the actual production quantities of the four BW agents acknowledged by Iraq to be intended for weaponization. Iraq claims that there was no strategic plan or coordinated effort for agent production. The TEM further concluded that there is low confidence in Iraq's account of the production of the BW weapons agents. Since the TEM in April this year, Iraq has simply stated it has presented all the information it has regarding production. It claims that what has been presented is corroborated by solid evidence. No new information has been provided. Al Hussein Warhead Production Iraq asserts that only 25 Al Hussein special warheads were produced for filling with BW agents. This assertion can not be verified. Most of the BW warheads were indigenously produced by Iraq. As presented earlier today in the missile area, Iraq has not provided documents or credible explanations for the indigenous production of special warheads, including those for BW. Accounts have changed over time. Thus the quantity produced can not be determined. R400 Bombs Quality control acceptance documentation by the Air Force has been provided for the period June to September 1990. There is no evidence that production ended in September. Furthermore during June through September 1990, 1359 bombs were produced, but Iraq asserts that only 1242 were delivered to Muthanna State Establishment, Al Hakam, or to the Air Force. Iraq states that the remaining 117 bombs were melted in 1991 and not filled with CW or BW agents. However, this account can not be verified. Other Munitions Production of other munitions, including drop tanks, aerosol disseminating devices developed for helicopters, pilotless aircraft (drones), or slow moving fixed wing aircraft are not adequately documented. The information on the development and testing of the aerosol disseminating device was excluded from the September 1997 FFCD. Iraq has recently stated that the activity related to this aerosol disseminating device was not mentioned in the 1997 declaration because the effort was primitive and inconsequential and that nothing has turned up to change that and no added credibility is gained by keeping the text in the 1997 FFCD. These explanations provided by Iraq are not supported by documents. The modified drop tanks and the aerosol disseminating devices are judged by the experts to be the most serious development of BW munitions by Iraq. Weapons Iraq has not provided any evidence to support its account of what agents were filled into munitions, the quantity of agents consumed in the filling process, and the quantity and type of munitions filled with each agent. Interview information conflicts with and is inconsistent with official Iraqi accounts. Filling and deployment issues were not adequately addressed at the TEM because of Iraq's unwillingness to discuss these aspects of its BW weapons program. Within the overall production figures of CW and BW R-400 bombs, it is not possible to determine how many weapons were filled with particular biological weapons agents. As Iraq can not adequately explain inconsistencies in this area, no confident assessment can be made of the number of BW filled bombs. This remains a major concern. Iraq asserts that the number of R400 bombs filled with each agent declared by Iraq is an estimate of each type of agent that adds up to the total number of bombs stated by Iraq to be destroyed. Iraq's declaration on the distribution of the different biological agents among the filled warheads was based on a diary. The number of warheads filled with different agents declared by Iraq is in fact based on one page given to UNSCOM to substantiate Iraq's claims. However a different page of this same diary contradicts Iraq's account of which agent was filled into which warhead. Iraq claims the rest of this diary was recently destroyed. The quantity of each bulk biological weapons agent destroyed, the location of its destruction, and evidence of its destruction also remain unresolved. Iraq has provided different written accounts and oral accounts concerning the destruction of the 25 BW agent filled warheads it has acknowledged having produced. The one document provided in support of the account of R400 aerial bomb destruction is not conclusive. Physical evidence, documents, and laboratory evidence does not support Iraq's account for filling and destruction of BW weapons. Iraq refused to address the destruction of missile warheads for the delivery of BW agents during the biological TEM. Consequently, destruction of munitions, weapons and bulk agents were not addressed at the TEM. Since the TEM Iraq has not provided any additional information to UNSCOM. Interview testimony of those Iraqi personnel presented as having been directly involved in the destruction process differs from all the "official" Iraqi accounts. Also hard physical evidence presented by Iraq does not support their own accounts. The number of warheads, filled and unfilled, that must be accounted for are equally uncertain. For the R400 bombs, Iraq has provided some evidence of destruction. Physical evidence supports Iraq's account that some BW agent filled R400 bombs were destroyed at a firing range called Azzizziyia. However, laboratory analysis of the contents of three bombs recovered does not support Iraq's account of their filling. One bomb that by Iraq's account should have contained aflatoxin instead tested positive for botulinum toxin and negative for aflatoxin. The only supporting evidence that 157 bombs were destroyed at the firing range is a diary. Full recovery of bomb remnants at the firing range can not be accomplished due to the presence of unexploded munitions and only the destruction of 25 of the 157 can be verified. The remaining unverified gap is of concern. The significance of the modified drop tank--a device to spray weapons-grade biological warfare agent from fighter aircraft--is greatly underplayed, taking into account that the assessment of the TEM is that this weapon appears to be the most efficient for the delivery of biological warfare agents produced by Iraq. Evidence that Iraq was investigating existing patents in this area several years before the claimed start of this phase of the weapons development is also of concern. During the TEM Iraq recognized that this situation concerning unaccounted for biological weapons can only be rectified by the presentation of a full account backed-up by documents and physical evidence. Since the TEM Iraq has provided no new information to UNSCOM. Structure Structure and organization is the next most important area after the core area. Virtually all aspects of organization and structure is denied by Iraq. Research and development is minimized. The TEM in general concluded that the interplay amongst acquisition, production and selection of weapons contradicts Iraq's assertion that there was no planning of the BW program. The TEM experts concluded that the general lack of information concerning the organization from the highest levels down and their connections to functional organs, considerably hampers the ability of UNSCOM to understand the full scope of the BW program. Since the TEM Iraq has not addressed this issue except to deny the existence of annual or five year plans indicating planning and interplay between the biological weapons development organizations and the Armed Forces. The research program must be presented in its totality to make it possible to understand the overall extent and purpose of the BW program. The selection of BW agents has not been fully explained. The rationale given by Iraq for the selection of the fungal and viral agents is not credible. Iraq was unable to justify the weaponization of aflatoxin from the research data obtained from its own experimentation. The down-playing of research in general and the absence of a rationale for genetic engineering and research into ricin, mycotoxin and viruses is disturbing. Iraq's portrayal of the aerosol dissemination program for biological agents as immature, with no bearing on other components of the research program is contradicted by information supplied by Iraq. Since the TEM Iraq has provided no new information. It contends that the FFCD depended basically on recollection and the lack of detail is to be expected. Iraq provided additional statements on germ (warfare) strains acquired and investigated for the BW program; some of those statements are known to be wrong. Military Involvement/Concepts of Use Iraq continues to deny virtually all military involvement in the program except in the most incidental ways. Without a realistic accounting of MoD input, including concepts of use for individual agents, particularly aflatoxin, and other organizational input to the BW program, BW weaponization issues can not be resolved. The denial of any planning or military involvement in weapons selection, filling, deployment or destruction is not credible. The TEM concluded that this is unacceptable. During the TEM Iraq denied any significant military involvement or the development of concepts of use. Since the TEM Iraq has not provided any additional statements. To note: If we have a poor knowledge in the area dealing with organization and structure we do not know whether the whole program has been revealed or not. Concealment The TEM experts concluded that an elaborate effort was undertaken to conceal and preserve Iraq's BW program after April 1991. Iraq has acknowledged this concealment took place until 1995 but states that it has then terminated. The mechanisms by which this concealment was accomplished, the organizations and individuals involved have not yet been presented to the Special Commission. Many technical and military aspects are omitted, misrepresented or trivialised. Iraq claims that the BW program was obliterated in 1991and says this is demonstrated by the unilateral destruction of the weapons deployed, the bulk agent and some documents associated with the BW program. Iraq, however, retained the facilities, growth media equipment and groupings of core technical personnel at Al Hakam, and continued to deny the existence of the BW program. Iraq altered documents to conceal the programme. Iraq's actions in concealing and denying the program including the planning and issuance of orders to individuals to take actions to hide the program from discovery raise serious doubts about Iraq's assertion that the BW program was truly obliterated in l991. Since the TEM Iraq has provided more explanations but fundamentally no new information. Iraq's statement in response to the TEM is that Iraq in April 1991 decided to destroy and obliterate entirely all signs and materials of the BW production and weaponization. Cross~References help in providing an overall perspective. These areas are of minor importance but are needed to provide a full understanding of Iraq's BW program. Iraq has not provided an evolutionary account of the various aspects of the BW program so that an overall understanding can he gained. For example, Iraq belittles the importance of the Al Hazen institute where the offensive BW program was begun following the presidential decree that Iraq pursue this form of WMD. Iraq has been unable to provide UNSCOM with this latter document—-clearly a fundamental pillar of the program. With respect to the early part of the BW program, Iraq provided information on the Al Hazen Institute, originally in its June 1996 FFCD. This material was than intentionally omitted in the September 1997 version of the FFCD. Iraq has not provided, in its FFCD, site and building plans for all areas involved in its BW program. The TEM experts asserted to Iraq that to enable full and proper analysis by experts, the FFCD should be a stand-alone and coherent document and therefore Iraq should provide a full and complete account of all sites including site diagrams and building plans. After the TEM, Iraq has provided some additional explanations on some buildings and sites. Some site and building plans were also provided. Those accounts and site and building plans fall far short of that requested by the international experts. SUMMARY · Growth media No basis for deriving a material balance · Agent produced/destroyed Not verifiable · Munitions available Not verifiable · Munitions filled Not verifiable · Weapons destroyed Not verifiable Iraq's current declaration is not verifiable. The absence of detail in this presentation is consistent with the absence of detail declared by Iraq. Iraq denied until 1995 any BW program. Even in its first two sets of declarations in May and June 1991 when it, at that time, still had all combat BW weapons in its possession, Iraq did not acknowledge an offensive BW program. Iraq declares its destruction of BW weapons for 9 July 1991, which again can not be supported by the evidence available to the Commission. Furthermore, Iraq retained its production facilities, equipment and raw materials until 1996 when most were destroyed or rendered harmless under UNSCOM supervision. In addition, Iraq maintained its personnel group intact as a core. On 1 July 1995, Iraq declared an offensive BW program to the Commission. This occurred only through evidence presented by the Commission to Iraq, i.e. growth media acquisition in large quantities suited for a BW program. Before this acknowledgment by Iraq, it had given an ultimatum to the Commission to close the missile and chemical files. The declaration presented to UNSCOM again minimized the program and did not include weaponization of BW agents was only admitted after the departure of Hussein Kamel on 8 August 1995. The weaponization admitted included 25 BW filled missile warheads and 157 bombs. . . . .
V. DOCUMENTSWhat I would like to do in this short presentation is to explain why the Commission has been insisting so much over the last months on getting documents relevant to the WMD proscribed programs. Finding documents is not an aim per se. Getting documents from the Iraqi side, on the other hand, would enable us to have a full understanding of the way those weapons were conceived, produced and in some cases destroyed. Some documents could indeed be considered as prohibited items themselves, since they contain sensitive information on the way to produce, for instance, chemical weapons. If Iraq wishes or tries to keep relevant documents for building new weapons of this kind in the future, this is a prohibited act. Therefore, we think it makes sense from the perspective of clearing up issues related to proscribed programs as well as strengthening ongoing monitoring, to keep asking for such documents. Iraq has been claiming for years that it does not hold any more documents. However, we know that Iraq has always been able to bring forward new information when under pressure from the Commission or the Security Council. The question is therefore not so much to wonder if Iraq still has documents, but how much does it hold back. For example, the Commission would like to get documents from the ministry of Defense, such as orders, related to the destruction of weapons. Can we accept Iraq's declaration that there are no documents proving that such orders were given? For such a crucial decision, the office of the President would not have been informed in writing? We believe it would, and we would like to have access to these papers What documentation the Commission has been able to gain access to clearly indicates that these and other organizations did in fact produce a document trail which would be relevant to the Commission's work. Iraq has taken a strategic decision to deny the Commission access to these, and other archives. One question, especially in light of the fact that access to these documents would provide the Commission with a verifiable body of data is why? Why would Iraq seek to secretly maintain these document archives? For what purpose? In the past, the Commission received confidential declarations on the destruction or disappearance of documents. We therefore try to confront the statements with facts. We are concerned Iraq does have documents. The millions of pages of documents obtained by the Commission and the IAEA in August 1995 at the Haidar Chicken Farm fo1lowing the defection of Hussein Kamal are a matter of concern. Since August 1996, whenever Iraq tried to make a point of significance, such as the special biological warfare briefing provided to the Commission by Lieutenant General Amer al-Sa'adi in September 1995, relevant supporting documentation has been produced. The Iraqi document story is a long, complex one that is ever changing and often self-contradictory. I will brief the Council on two items which will show that the Iraqi version of events concerning their handling of documents is puzzling, and that the Commission has reason to be concerned that significant documentary resources related to past proscribed programs could today exist in Iraq. I. The first item is a document dated 1993 obtained by an UNSCOM inspection team in March 1998. It deals with an establishment formerly known as the Al-Farouk Factory, or Project 144/5. It produced fixed and mobile launchers for the Al Hussein missile. According to the official Iraqi version of events, this factory, together with all other relevant sites and facilities associated with Project 144 (the Iraqi SCUD missile program), had assembled all relevant documentation by September 1991. All of it was handed over to representatives of Hussein Kamal for destruction no later than October 1991. This document refers to a meeting held on 20 February 1993, in which the factory undertakes to ensure that no official documents related to the work of the Commission remain at either the factory or at any establishment with which the factory dealt. The document states that documents will be removed to alternative sites and that "soiled" documents will be destroyed, with the exception of documents pertaining to the factory's commercial section. This newly discovered document raises serious concern for the Commission, for the date of the activity in question does not coincide with the detailed chronology prepared by Iraq to support its elaborate story relating to the Haidar Chicken Farm document cache. Additionally, the document makes specific references to both alternative sites and the keeping of commercial documentation. Alternative sites is a euphemism for hide sites, and is indicative of the systematic approach undertaken by Iraq to conceal and safeguard material and documents from the Commission. Commercial documentation has proven to be proven to be among the most useful category of documentation to the Commission. Contracts enable us to track the importation of material to be accounted for, as well as provide a pointer into the intent and capabilities of proscribed programs. Is there a reason for Iraq to retain these documents in such a secretive fashion, but for hiding the information contained within them from the Commission? II. The second item pertains to the Haidar Chicken Farm itself. Iraq has undertaken systematic efforts to move around, reclassify, destroy or retain documents related to its past proscribed weapons programs. Iraq has admitted such. Iraq has declared to the Commission a program from April 1991 until February 1993 to hide documents from the Commission, destroy duplicate sets of documents, and microfiche documents. Iraq claims that this effort was ordered by one man, Hussein Kamal, and that it was done in secret from the rest of the Iraqi leadership. The Iraqis claim that the Chicken Farm cache is the product of this secret effort. However, the Iraqi story does not stand up to close scrutiny. Establishing the veracity of the Chicken Farm story is critical to the verification of all current Iraqi declarations. The events of August 1995 uncovered major aspects of concealment on the part of Iraq. In order to accept Iraq's current declarations that the Haidar Farm cache represents the totality of the Iraqi retained documentation and material, the Iraqi version of events leading up to the discovery of this material needs to be accurate and verifiable. What will now be shown are photographic images which cast doubt on what was found at the Haidar Farm represented all of Iraq's retained proscribed documentation and material. Furthermore, Iraq's declaration that the mechanism used to safeguard and conceal the Farm cache from the Commission was the act of a single man, vice the actions of a centrally orchestrated campaign on the part of the Government of Iraq, is also brought into question. The first slide shows an image of the Haidar farm, commonly known as the chicken farm. You see on this picture, taken on 26 July 1995, that containers have been brought to this farm, which belongs to Hussein Kamal, the son-in-law of Saddam Hussein. The containers can be seen there, between two sheds. There are about ten of them. Iraq has since claimed that these containers were used to transport the annual potato harvest. However an examination of imagery for previous years, as well as the years since 1995, revealed no indication that such containers or for that matter any like them, were present for his purpose at the Haidar Farm. On 8 August 1995, Hussein Kamal left the country. On 9 August, as seen on the next slide, there are no more containers in front of the farm. A lot of trucks are coming in and out. Boxes and crates are stacked up in this location, near where the Commission eventually discovered boxes and crates of similar dimensions containing documentation relating to Iraq's past proscribed weapons programs. On the third slide, you see a picture taken on 19 August, a day before the arrival on the spot of the Executive Chairman and his team. You can see that there are no more trucks or containers. In one of those containers present when UNSCOM inspected the site, documents on the biological program were found, along with documents pertaining to all areas of Iraq's proscribed weapons programs. We have some concern that the Chicken farm might have been cleansed before the arrival of the team. The Farm manager himself stated that he was taken into custody by the Special Security organization on 9 August the same day that we see considerable activities on the farm. Iraq denies any involvement on the part of the Special Security Organization with the Farm. Iraq claims the arrest and subsequent investigations into the Chicken farm were carried out by Military Industrialization Commission Security. The political leadership of Iraq concocted stories to tell UNSCOM, what actually occurred at the Farm. The current story, that the investigation was carried out by Military Industrialization Commission Security personnel who themselves were relieved of their duties in October 1995 due to their close ties with Hussein Kamal, is difficult to accept. The Commission is expected to believe that MIC Security became aware of the document cache on 9 August and forgot to report it until late 18 August. The reality of the matter might be, as reported by the Farm manager, that the Farm was seized by Special Security on 9 August, and that material was brought to the site at that time. The Farm had been used to store material earlier. This material was probably contained in the containers observed in July 1995. Special Security, concerned about the revelations of data expected to be made by Hussein Kamal brought material back to the farm for the purpose of discovery by the Commission. However, this material was not at the Haidar Farm on 8 August 1995. High-level defectors have informed the Commission that this material was, on 8 August, stored at a number of locations throughout the Baghdad area to include residences associated with several high-ranking Iraqi Government officials. The Special Security Organization might have quickly acted to consolidate those caches, and from 9 August until 18 August, worked to sort the material into two categories: what was to be turned over to the Commission, and what was to be retained. While the Commission does not have strong evidence to state with absolute assurance that this was the case, its available data is credible and raises questions to which Iraq should answer. We have informed Iraq that one of the best solutions towards resolving this issue would be to turn over to the Commission for examination the official Iraqi investigation into the Haidar Chicken Farm. Iraq has refused to do so, and claims that no such investigation took place. An analysis of documents which could have been present in the Chicken Farm include: --integration drawings for the SCUD missile. Of all technical drawings, this is the one needed if Iraq is to be able to resume production of the SCUD missile. --"Cookbooks" for chemical agent. These are the detailed recipes and manuals for producing the chemical precursors and agents, None were found. --Any meaningful documentation concerning the biological weaponization programs. The Commission views the analysis of the contents of such documents as being critical to any final assessment. Continued Iraqi possession of these documents would be of concern The question we ask of the Council is: should we accept the declaration made by the authorities of Iraq concerning the Chicken Farm? Does the Council consider it legitimate that the Special Commission keeps on searching for and investigating the fate of the ten missing containers or not? Should we keep on looking for new documents that might be available in the Presidential Office or in the hands of the Ministry of Defense or other Ministries and/or State Organizations, the inspection of which are matters of great sensitivity and potential friction, or should we stop looking for such evidence? Those are, Monsieur le President, the questions the Commission is asking of the Council.
VI. CONCEALMENT. . . For the past two years the Commission has undertaken a series of investigations and has acquired evidence of a systematic, centrally controlled mechanism within Iraq, tasked with concealing material and activity proscribed by Security Council resolutions. It is important to understand how concealment activities in the past have undermined overall Commission verification work and, obviously, how ongoing concealment affects monitoring confidence. An examination of the events between April and July 1991 shows that Iraq carried out significant concealment efforts aimed at disguising from the Commission and IAEA the true extent of its proscribed activities. The high-level decision to withhold declaring major proscribed programs, as well as to retain capability in these programs despite UNSCOM/IAEA inspections, was reflected in the initial Iraqi declarations made to the Commission in April 1991. These declarations under-stated Iraq's operational ballistic missile force, as well as stocks of chemical weapons and agent. Offensive BW work was also concealed. The Commission concluded that investigating concealment was essential following the defection in August 1995 of Hussein Kamal, the former head of Iraq's Military Industry. In its subsequent disclosure, Iraq misled the Commission concerning the extent of its past proscribed progress. In fact, retained significant quantities of proscribed material and related documentation, much of it alleged to have been stored at Hussein Kamal's Haidar Chicken Farm, demonstrated how much the Commission had been deceived by Iraq. Therefore the Commission needed to know how Iraq carried out these deceptions, and whether they were continuing in the post August 1995 period. As noted earlier, analysis of the content and circumstances of the Haidar Farm documents concluded that significant areas of documentation were missing and likely still retained in Iraq. More significantly, the Commission concluded that a program of concealment, run at a very senior level in Iraq, must have operated successfully for over four years without detection by the Commission. Despite Iraqi efforts to portray this concealment effort as the actions of a single man (i.e., Hussein Kamal), the evidence indicated that the concealment effort was more pervasive, and in fact dominated Iraqi policies towards the Commission, the IAEA and the Council during the period between April 1991 and August 1995. Al Atheer An illustrative piece of evidence of Iraqi concealment is the so-called "Al Atheer" document. This document was discovered among the thousands of pages of documents recovered at Haidar Farm in 1995. It is dated 4 April 1991, and describes concealment activities undertaken at the Al Atheer Plant, a facility dedicated to the design and manufacture of a nuclear weapon. This document details directives from a "high-level Committee" (not an individual) to the Al Atheer facility, on how to conceal its true activities. Such actions were not limited to nuclear activity at Al Atheer, but covered all proscribed weapons disciplines. The Commission and IAEA did discover at an early stage, some Iraqi deception. IAEA inspection teams in June of 1991 discovered equipment and material related to nuclear weapons enrichment programs at a military facility in Abu Ghraib, just west of Baghdad. While Iraq succeeded in blocking the teams access to this material1 the team was able to gather photographic evidence of the existence of undeclared equipment on 28 June 1991. As a result, by Iraq's own admission, (made in 1996) a special High Level Committee was formed on 30 June 1991 to address the issue of retained proscribed material and weapons. This Committee, chaired by Tariq Aziz, allegedly decided that Iraq had to declare its nuclear program to the Commission and the IAEA. This decision was made on 7 July 1991 and a declaration was provided to the Executive Chairman and IAEA Director General on that date. In addition, we understand it was the High Level Committee which decided to undertake the secret unilateral destruction briefed earlier. It was not until March 1992 that Iraq admitted to the Commission its unilateral destruction activities of July 1991. According to Iraq, this activity was done in secret and therefore no documents or other supporting evidence exist to back up Iraq's claims. The Commission was asked to accept at face value Iraq's declaration that it alone had accounted for these materials. Nevertheless, the Commission tried to establish a material balance based on the new information Iraq provided. While much was unverifiable, the Commission in June 1995 was in a position to consider the possibility of transferring the Missile and CW files over to monitoring regime. An implicit deal was struck with Iraq that if the June report of the Commission was adequately positive, Tariq Aziz would provide the Commission with some facts concerning Iraq's hitherto undisclosed BW program. It is worth recalling that in July 1995 Iraq's President threatened to cease cooperation with the UN if no progress was made toward lifting sanctions. Foreign Minister Sahhaf stated a deadline of 31 August that year for the Council to act. Iraq made an admission of an offensive BW programme in July 1995. But even then said, deceptively, that Iraq never weaponized the agents and destroyed all agents before the Gulf War. However, in August 1995 the defection of Hussein Kamal occurred. Immediately, the entire basis upon which the Commission was conducting its assessments and analysis was undermined. It became clear that Iraq's declaration of March 1992 was itself a fraud; everything had NOT been declared to the Commission; everything had not been destroyed. Examples of the types of prohibited activities the Commission learned about which took place after the March 1992 declaration and the unilateral destruction are: -the covert G-l program, to convert surface-to-surface missiles to a proscribed surface-to-surface role, including secret flight tests and an undeclared facility to support this (1993-1994); -covert efforts to reverse engineer SCUD-type missile-guidance gyroscopes, using personnel and facilities monitored by the Commission. The programme incorporated covert procurement activities undeclared to the Commission, and the use of retained gyroscopes and material of a proscribed nature (1993-1994); -covert ballistic missile research programs, to include systems of ranges vastly exceeding the 150 kilometer limit set by Security Council resolution 687 (up to 1995); -deception efforts designed to keep secret from the Commission proscribed program activity, to include: -Iraq's ability to reverse engineer and produce an indigenous SCUD missile; -Iraq's VX chemical weapons production capability; -the true extent of Iraq's large-scale offensive biological weapons programs; -secret crash weaponization programs in the nuclear field, as well as entire enrichment efforts (such as the centrifuge program). The Commission's analysis found that there had been a systematic program designed to collect, sort and divert certain critical components and material away from destruction and into hiding from the Commission. Partial unilateral destruction was used by Iraq to disguise this diversion. Iraq initially only declared the diversion of the material discovered by the Commission at the Haidar Chicken Farm. However, the Commission was able to uncover other examples of diversion undeclared by Iraq. For example, at the villa of one Major Izzadin, production tools and components related to the indigenous SCUD production program, were hidden. The Izzadin Villa case illustrates Iraq's deceptive presentation of unilateral destruction that took place in July 1991. Major Izzadin al-Majid, an officer of the Special Republican Guard, was tasked by his higher authorities in July 1991 to receive a shipment of production equipment and critical components related to Project 1728, Iraq's indigenous SCUD engine development programme, which had been diverted from secret destruction. He was ordered to hide these materials on the premises of his private Villa in the west Baghdad suburb of Abu Ghraib. These materials remained hidden until March 1992, when the Special Republican Guard again retrieved these materials and took them away to another location. Iraq did not declare this activity to the Commission; it was acquired from other sources and subsequently confirmed. An investigation into the Izzadin Villa incident by the Commission prompted Iraq to declare that the deception was ordered by Hussein Kamal. Iraq stated the material came from a declared unilateral destruction site at Al Alam, a dry riverbed or wadi just north of Tikrit. It was here, according to Iraq, in July of 1991 that some ten truckloads of material from the indigenous SCUD production programme, were taken for explosive destruction. These details were significantly different from the information that had been obtained by the Commission about the Izzadin Villa. When the Commission investigated the Iraqi version of events, it found activity of a scale much larger than that declared by Iraq. Between 1-7 July 1991, during the same time period declared by Iraq as that in which retained undeclared proscribed material was being collected at holding points throughout Iraq for unilateral destruction, the Commission discovered that there had been at Al Alam not 10 vehicles, but over 100 vehicles. Bear in mind that this was the week after inspectors caught the Iraqis with concealed nuclear material at Abu Graib. These vehicles stayed at Al Alam up until 18 July. No destruction activity was observed at Al Alam until 22 July, well after the vehicles in question had been dispersed. Iraq has been made aware of this information by the Commission, but has denied that any such secret unilateral destruction activity ever took place. The Commission's attempts to investigate the activity at Al Alam, to include document searches of Governmental and Security organizations in the Tikrit region, revealed a total lack of documentation concerning vehicle movement of this scale in the Tikrit area during this period. However, the investigation did reveal that convoys under the control of Special Security were able to move without documentation, and could pass through the myriad of checkpoints without hindrance. Nevertheless, Iraq denies that Special Security organizations had any role in the activities associated with unilateral destruction. Evidence available indicates otherwise. This review indicates some key problems. The unilateral destruction events of July 1991, upon which the all-important material balance of proscribed items is based, is not as depicted by Iraq. There was diversion of material, as shown by the Izzadin Farm incident. The possibility of a much greater diversion of material exists, as shown by the movement of over 100 vehicles in Al Alam in July 1991 and subsequent inability to locate the materials involved. The mechanism used by Iraq to accomplish this diversion and safeguard these materials is also under question. Despite Iraq's claims to the contrary, it is clear to the Commission that Special Security played a major, if not leading, role in the diversion and safeguarding of proscribed material during the May-July 1991 period. Iraq has only recently admitted that elements from the Special Republican Guard did in fact play a minor, supporting role in the concealment events of May-July 1991. Analysis by the Commission concludes that this role was of a much greater scope, and involved the most senior elements of Special Security. Why is this important? Iraq wants the Commission to come to closure on its accounting of Iraq's proscribed material and activities. Iraq bases its accounting on unverifiable declarations including Iraq's statements concerning unilateral destruction. Iraq claims there are no supporting documents just as it did prior to the Hussein Kamal defection after which 150 boxes of documents were provided. The Commission believes that a verifiable baseline of data from which to calculate a reliable material balance cannot exist without a full accounting for the disposal of Iraq's proscribed equipment, material and programs. The existence of a systematic mechanism of concealment, combined with serious doubts about the veracity of Iraqi declarations regarding the disposal of its proscribed material, makes such an acceptance of Iraq's position on unilateral destruction problematic. The Commission has attempted to rectify its doubts through engagement with the Iraqis. However, Iraq has refused to discuss certain aspects of the concealment mechanism issue, and refuses to provide basic documentation to back up its claims concerning unilateral destruction and related concealment activity. This has left the Commission with no choice but to carry out on-site inspections of facilities and sites it believes to be associated with concealment mechanism activity. While the results of these inspections, which were often blocked or delayed by Iraq, thus limiting their effectiveness and credibility, provided additional circumstantial information which reinforced the Commission's concerns about the continued existence of a concealment mechanism. Moreover, these inspections have come at a considerable political cost, and have resulted in serious confrontations between the Commission, the Council and Iraq. The Commission also has serious concerns about the current status of Iraqi involvement in activity of a proscribed nature, and the continuation of a systematic mechanism for concealment today--these concerns were underscored by the revelations, in November 1995 (i.e., AFTER the events of August 1995) that Iraq had undertaken a clandestine effort to acquire guidance and control equipment of foreign origin which was clearly of a proscribed nature. This activity, the so-called Gharbiah affair, caused the Commission alarm, and raises concern about whether or not there were, or are, any other activities of this nature ongoing in Iraq without the knowledge of the Commission. It is for reasons such as this the Commission must have complete confidence that concealment is no longer taking place in Iraq today. An important element in establishing this level of confidence is the identification by the Commission of the scope and activities of past concealment efforts, and clear verifiable evidence that such efforts have been terminated. And thus the quandary. The Commission has serious concerns over the verification of Iraq's declarations concerning its disposal of proscribed weapons and activity. Iraq says it cannot provide documentation to verify its assertions. Inspection activity designed to address these concerns have been both inconclusive and Iraq has adopted a confrontational attitude towards such inspections. Positive steps Iraq could take to address this issue could include: Provide access to or hand over documentation that would verify Iraq's declarations concerning both unilateral destruction and the existence of a mechanism of concealment as being correct and complete. Examples of such documentation could include the following: -- Presidential or High-level Directives concerning the decision to mislead the Commission about Iraq's proscribed programs and activity in April-May 1991 -- Presidential or High-level Directives concerning the establishment of special groups to conceal material from the Commission in May-June 199l, to include Orders from the Special Republican Guard assigning identified personnel to special tasks associated with Concealment -- Situation reports concerning the events at Abu Ghraib and Fallujah in June 1991 -- Presidential Directive issued on 30 June or 1 July 1991 concerning cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA; and the Directive ordering the formation of the High Level Committee on 30 June, as well as all minutes relating to meetings held by this Committee and any directives or resolutions issued by this Committee -- Presidential or High-level Directives concerning the activities associated with unilateral destruction, to include initiating directives and policy memoranda outlining the purpose and goals of unilateral destruction -- Report of the Investigation conducted into the Haidar Chicken Farm and the defection of Hussein Kamal All of these things have been asked for repeatedly from Iraq. So far Iraq has refused to hand over claiming, they simply don't exist.