Errors in the Cox Report Mark Wade [email protected] 28 May 1999 I also note many errors of fact, just in Chapter 4. One of them is even attributes to me: "In comparison, the U.S. Delta 3925 rocket could place 2,140 pounds into low earth orbit. The U.S. space shuttle could transport 15,400 pounds into low earth orbit.53" (!!) For the record, my site gives 3451 kg and 24,400 kg as LEO payloads for these vehicles (and 1283 kg / 5900 kg for GTO). These are both about 60% more than the mass given in pounds, which makes me wonder if the House doesn't understand how to convert kg to lb (but in checking the wrong figures given for Chinese launch vehicles, I don't get the same ratio off - usually 3.3 - 4.0 x as a conversion factor, so maybe it's just a coincidence). It all seems very bizarre. Other members of this list may wish to check if information which gives their material as a source is equally incorrect. I was quite startled by the allegation, attributed to a 'classified briefing', that Tsien was working on the Titan I. The contract for the Titan I was not even let until October 1955, over five years after Tsien's security clearance was revoked (6 June 1950). At the time in question even the Atlas was still in its interregnum between the cancellation of the MX-774 and the contract (September 1951) for the MX-1593. Tsien may have been working on some structures or propulsion study contracts at GALCIT that led to Navaho, Atlas, or Titan I but I find it very hard to believe how such work could be linked specifically to the Titan I as opposed to Atlas. (let alone the inference that the DF-5 is somehow a 'copy' of a Titan I). As a student of space history, it pains me to see the United States embarking on Cold War II. From a 'forces of history' viewpoint certainly a struggle in some form between China (if it stays stable and unified) and the United States in the 21st Century is inevitable as China becomes the richest (in terms of total GDP) country in the world. But do the Americans need to accelerate the process? The whole thing is much too reminiscent of the non-existent 'missile gap' of 1960, leading to the mutually detrimental construction of over 1,500 ICBM/SLBM by the sides during the next decade.