Summary

The Biden-Harris Administration should aim to make the United States a world leader in privacy-preserving machine learning (PPML), a collection of new artificial intelligence (AI) techniques capable of providing the benefits of machine learning while minimizing data-privacy concerns. By some estimates, improvements to the speed, accuracy, and scale of AI could augment global GDP by 14%, or $15.7 trillion, by 2030. Yet Americans fear that expansion of AI will have moderate to severe negative consequences. They are particularly concerned about the privacy implications of how companies and agencies use personal data to generate new developments. To assuage these concerns, this proposal recommends targeted initiatives for the Biden-Harris Administration to bring PPML techniques to maturity, including

1. Investing in PPML research and development.
2. Identifying compelling opportunities to apply PPML techniques at the federal level.
3. Creating frameworks and technical standards to facilitate wider deployment of PPML techniques.

Summary

In the 20th century, the costly nature of surveillance made it easier to maintain constitutional guarantees protecting U.S. persons from mass surveillance. In the 21st century, digitization of our everyday lives and communications has sharply reduced surveillance costs—and indeed, changed the nature of surveillance itself.  The core responsibility of any President is to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution,” but recently unsealed federal court rulings show that intelligence agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Security Agency (NSA) are routinely accessing the digital communications of U.S. persons and otherwise using digital surveillance in ways that violate Americans’ Fourth Amendment rights against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” To fulfill their oath of office, the next president should take concrete steps to reform federal operations with respect to digital surveillance. This is important not only for protecting basic American rights, but also for diplomatic relations with key foreign allies.  Instituting meaningful protections against government surveillance in the United States would have the significant diplomatic benefit of helping reestablish the credibility of American calls for other countries to adhere to high human-rights standards.

Summary

The organ-donation crisis is one of the most persistent, expensive, and yet solvable public-health challenges of our time. As of January 2020, nearly 115,000 Americans were waitlisted for an organ transplant.  The vast majority have kidney failure, which, as one of the rare conditions qualifying patients for Medicare, imposes billions of dollars of costs on taxpayers. In 2016 alone, taxpayers spent an alarming $113 billion on kidney disease — more than the entire budgets of the National Institutes of Health ($39 billion), the Department of Homeland Security ($44 billion), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA, $21.5 billion) combined. The clear solution is to shorten the organ waiting list. For every Medicare patient who receives a kidney transplant, taxpayers save $250,000 in avoided dialysis costs.  This proposal presents a discrete set of actions for the federal government to take to quickly and decisively to address the organ-donation crisis.

Summary

The next Administration should accelerate federal basic and applied research investments over a period of five years to return funding to its historical average as a share of GDP.  While this ambitious yet achievable strategy should encompass the entire research portfolio, it should particularly seek to reverse the long-term erosion of collective investments in physical and computer science, mathematics, and engineering to lay the foundation for economic competitiveness deep into the 21st century. This proposal outlines a strategy and series of steps for the federal government to take to reinvigorate U.S. competitiveness by restoring research and development investments. 

Summary

State and local governments are not taking full advantage of data and technology innovation that could help address key priorities such as delivery of local public services, management and design of the built environment, and fulfillment of climate goals. Supporting innovation across these domains is difficult for state and local governments due to limited technical staff, procurement challenges, and poor incentives and mechanisms to develop and scale creative solutions. Civic research is a collaborative process for addressing public priorities and improving communities by connecting technical experts to policymakers and civic partners, creating a platform for evidence-based, research-informed action. This process relies on partnerships among universities, state and local agencies, and community organizations, and has proven successful in communities nationwide. This paper recommends seven actions the next administration can take to advance civic research nationwide.

Emerging technologies developed in the United States are routinely scaled up overseas due to a lack of domestic engineering skills, manufacturing know-how, investment capital, and supply chains.¹ A new national initiative is needed to ensure that discoveries and inventions made in the United States are manufactured at scale in the United States. Such an initiative will create good-paying jobs, strengthen defense preparedness, and protect intellectual property (IP) created through federally funded research. Building a strong manufacturing base at home will also strengthen the domestic innovation cycle, as the knowledge gained through manufacturing supports process improvements and new product iterations. 

Manufacturing cuts across multiple disciplines and the missions of multiple federal agencies, but no agency has the nation’s long-term manufacturing success as its sole objective. We propose creation of a new agency—a National Manufacturing Foundation (NMF)—to address this gap. The goal of the proposed NMF is not to restore lost industries, but to rebuild our lost capabilities and capacities to build and scale up products in the United States. 

Funding for the NMF should be at least five percent of the total annual federal research and development (R&D) budget, about $150 billion in 2018. Five percent for the NMF would be $7.5 billion annually appropriated as an increase in total funds, not as a carve out from existing funds.

The NMF would do the following:

1. Engage with other federal S&T agencies to set technology priorities, mature promising product and process technologies funded through other federal agencies, access relevant expertise, and coordinate funding to ensure that promising technologies receive full support from discovery and invention to commercial-scale domestic production.
2. Invest in translational R&D to help advance emerging technologies beyond the pilot stage. This would include awarding grants and contracts to U.S. universities and other research institutions to support translational engineering (not science) research and manufacturing process technologies common to multiple industrial applications. This would also include establishment of a series of Translational Research Centers (TRCs) affiliated with universities. TRCs would focus on advancing technology and manufacturing readiness of emerging technologies in order to enable successful hardware start-ups and to transform research results to new products and processes manufactured in the United States.
3. Build connections between hardware start-ups and other federal agencies, especially the DOD, to support translational research in defense-critical technologies. This would include leveraging federal purchasing power and the federal government’s role as a customer to help American companies procure financing for plants and equipment to establish and ramp up production of new technologies.
4. Facilitate public-private partnerships to create Manufacturing Investment Funds (MIFs). These MIFs would fill gaps in existing venture-capital markets, providing sufficient funding for hardware start-ups to scale production in the United States beyond pilot plants.
5. Support small and medium-sized manufacturers (SMMs) through technical assistance and financial support: including loans, grants, loan guarantees, and tax incentives. As the foundation of manufacturing value chains and the geographic distribution of diverse industrial clusters, it is essential that SMMs have the capacity to upgrade equipment, train staff, and fully participate in Industry 4.0.
6. Grow engineering and technical talent at all levels by significantly increasing federally funded graduate fellowships in engineering for U.S. citizens, partnering with state and local governments to increase the number of four-year engineering technology degree programs and to expand successful apprenticeship and skillstraining programs.

The NMF will not be able to fulfill its promise and achieve its objectives if inventions continue to be manufactured abroad. Therefore, recommend a binding rule that if the intellectual property for a product or process is developed based on federally funded R&D, then that product or process must be manufactured substantially (e.g., a 75% minimum value-add) in the United States, without any exceptions or waivers.

Why a National Manufacturing Foundation

Thanks in large part to decades of offshoring manufacturing, the United States has compromised its ability to realize the full potential of its tremendous investments in research and development (R&D). An increasing amount of corporate R&D is done abroad, closer to where most factories are now located. Worse, products built on federally funded R&D in advanced technologies (such as organic electronics and nanomaterials) are increasingly manufactured abroad. The erosion of important industrial centers throughout the United States—machine tools in Cincinnati, steel in Pittsburgh and Youngstown, furniture in North Carolina—has resulted in a loss of engineering skills, infrastructure, supply chains, and production know-how domestically, limiting the ability of U.S.-based manufacturers to build and scale new technologies.² Overseas manufacturing of products based on taxpayer-funded R&D essentially subsidizes foreign producers in creating jobs and wealth from American inventions. Because of these dramatic changes in the nation’s industrial base, it is difficult for the United States to establish—let alone lead—the industries of the future. The longstanding U.S. strategy of “invent here, manufacture there” is fast becoming “invent there, manufacture there”— a dangerous trend for our nation.

Restoring U.S. manufacturing leadership requires the public sector to step in to correct a market failure. Short-term profit incentives will drive the private sector to continue offshoring manufacturing (and R&D) as long as it is economically favorable. But because the societal benefits of domestic manufacturing (in the form of national wealth, jobs, and national security) exceed the concentrated benefits of offshore manufacturing (see Section 3.4), the U.S. government has a critical role to play in realigning incentives.

Unfortunately, the U.S. government is not well positioned to respond effectively. No single federal agency has the health of the nation’s manufacturing sector as its primary mission. Multiple agencies—Defense, Energy, Commerce, and others—have programs to support manufacturing.³ But these programs are neither strategic nor coordinated, poorly funded (relative to the need), and have not been successful at arresting the decline in engineering and manufacturing capabilities to support domestic production of emerging technologies.

In 2018, MForesight, a federally funded advanced manufacturing research consortium, conducted a nationwide study of challenges facing the United States in developing and implementing advanced product and process technologies. An overarching recommendation in the resulting report, Manufacturing Prosperity, is to establish a new agency, a National Manufacturing Foundation (NMF), tasked with (1) developing and implementing a national manufacturing strategy and (2) providing sufficient, sustained, and coordinated federal resources focused on ensuring the long-term success of U.S. manufacturing.

Additional work by MForesight in 2019, Reclaiming America’s Leadership in Advanced Manufacturing, confirmed the findings and recommendations in Manufacturing Prosperity, emphasizing the growing urgency to rebuild the nation’s capacity for manufacturing innovation. Creating a National Manufacturing Foundation would clearly demonstrate U.S. commitment to strengthening national manufacturing capacity and to the steps needed to achieve this goal. The proposed NMF would be an independent agency akin to the National Science Foundation (NSF). It would invest in translational R&D (engineering and manufacturing R&D) to advance promising results from the R&D investments made by other science and technology (S&T) agencies from bench/pilot scale to large/commercial scale. It would also coordinate early adoption of emerging technologies for national security, help small and medium-sized manufacturers invest in technology and equipment upgrades, and help build the pipeline of domestic talent for all components of a robust, modern manufacturing. Overall, the NMF would build the intellectual, financial, and physical infrastructure needed for the United States to regain its capacity to manufacture its inventions at scale and to leverage its R&D for economic growth and national security.

the State of U.S. Manufacturing

American manufacturing—especially in advanced technology products—is under threat. In 2017, as Figure 1 illustrates, the United States had a positive trade balance in only two advanced industries: aerospace and (minimally) engines and turbines. The United States does not maintain a positive trade balance even in industries such as medical devices and pharmaceuticals: industries where the U.S. federal government invests significant R&D and is the single largest customer. Furthermore, most domestic manufacturing industries use substantially more imported content than they did 20 years ago.⁴

Between 2006 and 2016, some of the largest reductions in U.S. manufacturing output were in advanced industries, including pharmaceuticals (down 3.1%), industrial machinery (2.9%), communications equipment (2.5%), and computers and peripherals (2.3%). Imports increased in all of these industries. Since 2013, imports from Asia have increased by 19% while U.S. manufacturing gross output has increased by just 1%.

It is worth noting that Japan, Germany, and South Korea have maintained trade surpluses in advanced manufacturing, are well ahead of the United States in their use of industrial robots, and have a greater share of high-technology production in their manufacturing sectors. In 2017, the U.S had a $859 billion trade deficit in goods, whereas Germany, Japan and South Korea (all high-wage countries with strict regulations and higher energy costs) had trade surpluses of $279 billion, $27 billion, and $95 billion respectively.

Since 2011, labor productivity in manufacturing has risen by only 0.7% total. Worse, total factor productivity in manufacturing actually fell by 5.8% between 2011 and 2015.

Much of these declines can be explained a nationwide drop in capital investment in machinery and equipment. Fixed assets fell from nearly 10% of U.S. GDP in the 1980s to less than 5% in 2018. The rate of investment in fixed assets by non-financial corporations averaged more than 5% between 1947 and 2000, but has been half that since then. The result is not only greater dependence on imports in virtually every industry (and especially in defense-related industries), but also an older capital stock that makes domestic production much less competitive than it could be.

Since the 1980s, when U.S. manufacturing competitiveness was initially challenged by Japanese automotive and electronics companies, a few economists made the case that manufacturing matters to the innovative capacity and overall health of the nation. Shifts in the composition of industrial production over time are to be expected in a healthy, dynamic economy. The United States was expected to shift from low-value, labor-intensive products to high-value, advanced technology products. But more than other advanced economies, the United States shifted away from advanced manufacturing, maintaining a consistent trade balance only in aerospace. Only recently have the negative consequences of this shift away from manufacturing been widely recognized: consequences that include precarious defense production, drug shortages, lost wages, declining communities, and missed opportunities. In too many cases, game-changing inventions emerging from U.S. labs have become blockbuster products manufactured somewhere else.

Factors Contributing to U.S. Manufacturing Decline

Generating knowledge but not wealth

Investments in basic research generate knowledge—scientific discoveries and engineering inventions. Innovation—technological and business—is the process of transforming a promising idea into a new product or a process at a large enough scale to meet societal needs. Investments in translational research generate engineering methods and manufacturing know-how to create national wealth and security. Unless the nation makes large and sustained investments in translational R&D, we will continue to offshore our innovation and manufacturing even if we double our investments in basic research or science.

The benefits derived from federal support for R&D are clear. Starting in the 2010s, nearly one-third of U.S. patented inventions relied on federal government funding.⁵ For example, research supported by the Department of Defense (DOD) underlies touch screens, the Global Positioning System (GPS), and other technologies used in smart phones. Research supported by the Department of Energy (DOE) underlies lithium-ion batteries, hydraulic fracturing, solar panels, and light-emitting diodes (LEDs). Research supported by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) underlies biopharmaceuticals, advanced prosthetics, and gene therapy. But these R&D investments made by the American taxpayers have generated significantly more national wealth in other countries than they have in the United States. Because many of the products resulting from these R&D breakthroughs are manufactured abroad. All of the economic activity associated with that production—factory construction, capital equipment investment, and wages across entire supply chains, as well as the associated multiplier effect—created wealth and spurred economic development in foreign countries, not here in the United States.

On the other hand, aerospace—an industry in which the U.S. continues to lead in advanced technology—is an instructive example of the power of strategic, long-term government support. Aerospace is the last major industry that continues to maintain a strong trade surplus in the United States. Not surprisingly, the aerospace industry is also more dependent on government customers (mostly the DOD) and is the beneficiary of substantial government R&D investments in basic, translational, and applied research. The aerospace industry is the successful beneficiary of a de facto industrial policy to support an industry critical to national defense.

Continued federal support for R&D is essential to American invention. But if U.S. industry does not manufacture the resulting innovations, most of the economic benefits are lost to other countries. Imagine how many millions of jobs were created abroad from products largely invented in the United States over in the past two decades. No smart phones are made here, and China dominates global production of solar panels, lithiumion batteries, and unmanned aerial vehicles (drones). There are other consequences to offshoring advanced manufacturing as well. For instance, growing dependence on pharmaceutical imports has led to recurring shortages of critical drugs such as Heparin.

In addition, offshoring manufacturing greatly diminishes the nation’s long-term capacity for innovation. Consider flat-panel displays such as those used in televisions. The technologies that enable most flat-panel displays were invented by U.S. companies and universities, emerging from basic research funded by the federal government. But few factories for LCD and LED large diameter flat panel displays were ever opened in the United States.⁶ Without that production experience, U.S. companies have been unable to manufacture the next generation of flat and flexible displays, despite significant R&D investments by the U.S. military.⁷

The unfortunate reality is that the United States is at the forefront of enabling scientific understanding, but lags when it comes to producing the resulting global output. Our inability to scale emerging technologies is not due to high wages and strict regulations, but to the loss of our “industrial commons”—i.e., the investment, manufacturing knowledge, suppliers, and skills needed to advance products beyond the concept stage. Indeed, nations such as Germany, Japan and South Korea have robust advanced manufacturing sectors despite also having higher wages, stricter regulations, higher levels of automation and higher taxes than the United States. These countries are weathering China’s rise far better than the United States. The difference is that multinational corporations based in these countries are not as focused on quarterly profits as U.S multinationals. These foreign corporations therefore often have longer investment time horizons, with greater concern for the interests of multiple stakeholders rather than just shareholders. In fact, many of these foreign corporations have been investing in manufacturing facilities in the United States, attracted by the large U.S. market and unencumbered by the same emphasis on financial objectives as U.S. corporations. Some of these same corporations are also taking on significant technical and market risk by investing in nascent but promising technologies developed in the United States. In many cases, these corporations believe that they can leverage the engineering skill and the manufacturing capabilities in their home countries—capabilities that have been lost in the United States—to scale these technologies abroad and realize a profit.

It is important to note that for advanced technologies, a common argument in favor of offshoring manufacturing—lower labor costs—does not hold. Labor is a minor share of production costs for virtually all advanced technology products. Production processes for new advanced technologies are sophisticated and highly automated, and even previously labor-intensive processes such as semiconductor packaging and circuit-board assembly are now fully automated. In the short term, after having lost decades of manufacturing experience, American companies do indeed face challenges in finding the requisite skills and support infrastructure to reshore crucial parts of the value chain for advanced electronics manufacturing. But in the long term, there is no reason why the United States cannot compete with other countries in this arena. Indeed, we must start to compete now, or risk repeating the pattern for critical emerging technologies such as 5G communications, quantum information systems, advanced energy storage, and synthetic biology.

Gaps in the national innovation cycle

The United States still leads the world across a broad spectrum of discoveries, publications, and citations. Being the best in the world in science is important—but it’s not sufficient to ensure success. As a nation, we’re not investing sufficient public resources in turning these basic discoveries into new products and processes. Gaps in our nation’s innovation cycle, from basic research to manufacturing, help explain why the United States is not capturing the full value of its investments in R&D. These gaps include:

1. Brain drain. The United States has long been dependent on foreign graduate students in science and engineering (S&E). Over one-third of S&E doctoral degrees (56% in engineering) from U.S. universities are awarded to foreign students, a figure that is projected to grow to 50% in 2020 and beyond. Historically, most of these students have stayed and worked in the United States for at least 10 years after graduation, but there is evidence that this pattern may be changing as opportunities increase in students’ home countries. In particular, the Chinese government provides tuition and scholarships for many of its students to pursue advanced degrees in the United States with the expectation that those students return home after graduation. Many do, taking with them the cutting-edge knowledge, research experience, and results gained from their work.
2. Foreign investments in translational R&D. The U.S. provides plenty of funding for basic science, but relatively little to support development and scale-up of commercial products. U.S. research institutions therefore partner with foreign entities to access capital and infrastructure needed to advance home-grown emerging technologies. Foreign investment often fills the gap. Many academic researchers establish research labs at foreign institutions to access funding needed to develop technologies created with initial support from U.S. federal agencies, sometimes in contradiction to U.S. laws and institutional policies.
3. Willingly giving away intellectual property (IP). While IP theft by foreign competitors is an important concern, most instances of American IP use abroad are U.S. companies willingly licensing IP and U.S. startups voluntarily exporting their IP for production abroad, frequently by contract manufacturers in China. Foreign entities also access promising technologies from U.S. research institutions (as stated above), invest directly in high-risk, high-reward U.S. startups, and buy U.S. companies with specialized production processes (thereby gaining access to new technologies).
4. Lack of investment, skills and know-how. Scaling new technologies to volume production is costly and often requires engineering skills, production know-how, and a comprehensive supply base that is not readily available in the United States. Investors therefore frequently push startups to produce in China. A recent study of 150 hardware startups based on MIT technology found that none scaled production domestically mainly the “industrial commons” (see previous section) needed to do so was not available.

For decades, our “strategy” has been to fund basic research and leave the follow-on activities to the magic hand of the free-market. As these gaps in the innovation cycle emerged, it has become increasingly clear that a new national initiative is need to convert research output into successful products and competitive industrial sectors in this country.

Conflating science with engineering

Science is not the same as engineering. Engineering involves not just analysis and discovery, but also synthesis and innovation aimed at turning abstract ideas into tangible products. Too frequently, engineering research at American institutions is hypothesisdriven rather than problem- or application-driven. This results in arcane, highly specialized investigations that lead to journal publications but little practical benefit.

Distinguishing between science and engineering may seem trivial but actually has profound effects on national R&D investments and outcomes. How a government allocates its resources among the two disciplines is both a reflection of and an influence on the prevailing national mindset.

The United States is already behind many foreign competitors in funding practical engineering research. Federal spending on manufacturing-related R&D is difficult to determine precisely due to insufficient information and inconsistent labeling. Estimates range from $773 million to $3.7 billion.⁸ A recent analysis by MForesight estimates that in 2017, $796 million of federal R&D spending could be reasonably attributed to manufacturing. Most of this money is federal spending through DOE’s Advanced Manufacturing Office, NSF’s Advanced Manufacturing Program, and DOD’s Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) programs. The remainder is federal funding (from DOD, DOE, and the Department of Commerce) and required non-federal cost share for the Manufacturing USA institutes. By comparison, Germany spends $4.34 billion on “Industrial Production and Technology” research (six times U.S. spending). Japan and South Korea spend three and eight times as much, respectively. 

Some would argue that manufacturing-related translational research is the role of private companies. However, American Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), other than in the semiconductor and pharmaceutical industries, do not invest much in the translational R&D needed to mature the nascent technologies coming out of basic research and to mature manufacturing capabilities needed to scale up technologies of the future. Over three-quarters of business R&D is development focused on incremental product improvements.

It is also important to recognize that the large companies that conduct the vast majority of R&D in the American private sector have interests that extend beyond the United States. Many of America’s largest OEMs derived between half and two-thirds of their revenue from foreign sales in 2018—including Apple (58%), HP (65%), GE (62%), IBM (63%), and Caterpillar (58%).⁹ Many of these companies employ more than half of their total workforce outside the U.S. and have more than half of their corporate assets outside the U.S. These companies have also been cutting costs by offshoring manufacturing and, increasingly, moving R&D abroad to their foreign affiliates. They cannot be counted on to restore American manufacturing.

Market failures

Restoring U.S. manufacturing leadership requires the public sector to step in to correct a market failure. Short-term profit incentives will drive the private sector to continue offshoring manufacturing (and R&D) as long as it is economically favorable—and it is. American firms are not concerned with the societal benefits that flow from domestic production in the form of jobs, national wealth, and national security. The manufacturing sector offers a wide range of job opportunities for blue-collar production workers and supervisors, as well as for white-collar researchers, design and manufacturing engineers, accountants, and business managers. In 2017, the average U.S. manufacturing worker earned $84,832 in pay and benefits, 27% more than the average worker in non-farm industries, and the multiplier effects from manufacturing exceed those of most other sectors. Manufacturing’s economic footprint is nearly three times as large as its share of direct economic output (value added in 2018 was 11.3% of GDP), and more than four times as large as its share of total U.S. employment. A significant portion of the domestic rise in income inequality, the long-term stagnation of personal income in the United States, and the redistribution of national wealth to coastal states is attributable to the loss of manufacturing employment, especially in the Midwest. Because the societal benefits of domestic manufacturing exceed the concentrated benefits of offshore manufacturing, the U.S. government has a critical role to play in realigning incentives.

Past efforts

Multiple defense programs and initiatives exist to address critical manufacturing issues in the United States. These include the Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) program, Title III, armories, the Manufacturing USA institutes, and the Defense Innovation Unit. Most of these are long-established programs that can at best address defense-specific production issues. They have not and will not arrest the long-term erosion of the U.S. innovation ecosystem and decline of broader U.S. manufacturing.

The Hollings Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) at NIST is one of the few nondefense programs targeting manufacturers. Created in the late 1980s and analogous to the Agricultural Extension Service, MEP provides business and technical assistance to the nation’s small and medium-sized manufacturers. Current funding is about $140 million, but through much of its history, MEP has faced strong opposition from Republican administrations as an example of “industrial policy”. Other advanced countries invest far more on programs to support SMMs and have had significantly better success than the U.S. in maintaining a strong manufacturing sector. Germany, for instance, invests 20 times as much as the United States on manufacturing extension services. Japan invests even more.

Beginning in 2014, the most recent initiative launched to benefit domestic manufacturing, the Manufacturing USA institutes illustrate both the extent of the challenge and the need for a more comprehensive approach. Currently there are 14 institutes, addressing a range of specific production issues and technology segments. Each institute is a public-private partnership that focuses on promoting robust and sustainable manufacturing research and development in a specific, promising advanced manufacturing technology area. The program advances American manufacturing innovation by creating the infrastructure needed to allow U.S. industry and academia to work together to solve industry-relevant manufacturing problems in research and development, technology transition, workforce training, and education.

The Manufacturing USA institutes are a worthwhile concept and deliver value for the niches that they address. But there are three main reasons why these institutes are insufficient to solve the broader manufacturing issues facing the United States. First, there are simply not enough institutes to have much impact across the national manufacturing sector. Federal funding for the institutes is less than $200 million and the total number of member companies, fewer than 2000, is less than one percent of U.S. manufacturers.31 Second, many of the institutes have yet to focus adequately on advancing technology and manufacturing readiness levels. Most of the institutes remain in start-up mode, focusing on building facilities and laboratories and increasing membership. Third, the scale of these institutes is such that only the largest corporations can provide sufficient matching funds and much of that has been in-kind support; larger cash contributions by members would increase research flexibility and strengthen members’ commitment to achieving tangible outcomes.

The NMF would address shortcomings these existing programs by creating a comprehensive support system for the nation’s manufacturing sector. A band-aid approach—spending more on the MEP program or creating a few new Manufacturing USA institutes, for example—will not restore the eroded industrial commons. A new agency with a national strategy and adequate and sustained investment could if we can act with some urgency. Other nations are not standing still.

Proposed Action: Establish a National Manufacturing Foundation

Based on research conducted in 2018 by MForesight,¹⁰ the U.S. manufacturing community agrees that bold steps are needed to ensure that the challenges facing U.S. manufacturing are met quickly and aggressively. Market forces alone will not achieve the needed change. In fact, market forces have made manufacturing challenges worse over time. With sustained, strategic investments, the United States can regain fundamental manufacturing capabilities, rebuild its industrial commons, ensure a return on federal investments in R&D, capitalize on technology changes broadly affecting manufacturing, establish leadership in new industries, and restore the broad-based supplier networks that are essential to economic and national security. The objective is not to re-shore lost industries but to rebuild our lost capabilities and capacities to establish and grow industries of the future.

An overarching recommendation in Manufacturing Prosperity is to establish a new federal agency, the National Manufacturing Foundation (NMF), to oversee and coordinate the federal government’s manufacturing-related investments, initiatives, and policies. Currently, no single federal agency has the health of the nation’s manufacturing as its primary mission. Although existing agencies have programs to support manufacturers (mostly targeting defense production) these programs are scattered, uncoordinated, and underfunded relative to the need. Most importantly, these small programs are always subordinate to the primary mission of their managing agency, be it defense, energy, labor, etc. Justifying programs to support manufacturing solely on the basis of national defense disregards the crucial high-wage employment, innovation, and wealth-building that only a strong, balanced commercial manufacturing sector can provide. A robust manufacturing sector is also essential to lessen our dependence on foreign countries for defense-critical technologies and security. And finally, the DOD alone can no longer build/rebuild the domestic industrial base on its own—defense procurement needs today are dwarfed by global commercial markets.

Although it might be politically easier to simply increase funding for existing manufacturing-support programs and to increase spending on engineering research, the results would be suboptimal. Such efforts would lack focus and likely lack the resources and breadth needed to make a meaningful difference. A separate, independent agency is essential to ensuring a bright future for U.S. manufacturing. Similar steps have been taken before. Consider DOE, the NIH, and the National Aeronautics and Space Association (NASA). Each of these agencies was established pursuant to a federal determination that the sectors they manage (energy, healthcare, and aerospace, respectively) are critical to national well-being and so deserve large, focused government resources to ensure long-term American leadership. These agencies have been successful in achieving this goal. Similarly, if national leaders agree that the United States must also be a global leader in manufacturing, then creating a National Manufacturing Foundation is a necessary step.

The NMF would develop and implement a national strategy to achieve a world-leading manufacturing sector and would drive federal policy, programs, and sustained investments in accordance with this strategy. Certain existing programs such as the Hollings Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) and Manufacturing USA would be transferred to the NMF. Other existing programs—for instance, defense-related programs—would retain their current organizational structure in order to avoid unnecessary disruption. The NMF would ensure close coordination among these programs. Most importantly, the NMF would provide strategic direction, fill programmatic gaps, maintain long-term focus, and track metrics to ensure federal efforts are making the expected difference in domestic manufacturing.

Specifically, the NMF would do the following:

1. Engage with other federal S&T agencies to set technology priorities, mature promising product and process technologies funded through other federal agencies, access relevant expertise, and coordinate funding to ensure that promising technologies receive full support from discovery and invention to commercial-scale domestic production.
2. Invest in translational R&D to help advance emerging technologies beyond the pilot stage. This would include awarding grants and contracts to U.S. universities and other research institutions to support translational engineering (not science) research and manufacturing process technologies common to multiple industrial applications. This would also include establishment of a series of Translational Research Centers (TRCs) affiliated with universities. TRCs would focus on advancing technology and manufacturing readiness of emerging technologies in order to enable successful hardware start-ups and to transform research results to new products and processes manufactured in the United States.
3. Build connections between hardware start-ups and other federal agencies, especially the DOD, to support translational research in defense-critical technologies. This would include leveraging federal purchasing power and the federal government’s role as a customer to help American companies procure financing for plants and equipment to establish and ramp up production of new technologies.
4. Facilitate public-private partnerships to create Manufacturing Investment Funds (MIFs). These MIFs would fill gaps in existing venture-capital markets, providing sufficient funding for hardware start-ups to scale production in the United States beyond pilot plants.
5. Support small and medium-sized manufacturers (SMMs) through technical assistance and financial support: including loans, grants, loan guarantees, and tax incentives. As the foundation of manufacturing value chains and the geographic distribution of diverse industrial clusters, it is essential that SMMs have the capacity to upgrade equipment, train staff, and fully participate in Industry 4.0.
6. Grow engineering and technical talent at all levels by significantly increasing federally funded graduate fellowships in engineering for U.S. citizens, partnering with state and local governments to increase the number of four-year engineering technology degree programs and to expand successful apprenticeship and skills-training programs.

This 6-point action plan is designed to address multiple shortcomings in the current U.S. manufacturing-innovation ecosystem. But to succeed, this plan must be complemented by policies ensuring that products based on the nation’s R&D investments are manufactured domestically. In particular, we recommend a binding rule that if the intellectual property for a product or process is developed based on federally funded R&D, then that product or process must be manufactured substantially (e.g., a 75% minimum value-add) in the United States, without any exceptions or waivers.¹¹

Implementation

To accomplish these goals and fulfill its mission, we recommend funding the NMF with at least 5% of total federal R&D funding, or roughly $7.5 billion per year. These funds should be appropriated to the NMF as part of an increase in total R&D funds, not as a carve out. This could be reasonably accomplished by starting with first-year funding of $1 billion, then growing the NMF rapidly over 3–5 years until the 5% goal is met. To put these numbers in perspective, consider that the U.S. IP Commission has estimated the cost to the U.S. economy of IP theft, counterfeit goods, and pirated software by Chinese actors alone at nearly $2 billion per day. If we are serious about protecting our IP, bolstering our economy, and increasing defense preparedness, investing an additional 5% of federal R&D to create an NMF is necessary and urgent. Simply spending more on existing programs (e.g., doubling every existing S&T program for the next 10 years) will result in comparable costs but will not result in improved domestic industrial competitiveness—nor will it position the United States to establish the industries of the future. The NMF is the missing piece in our federal S&T programs.

An effective operational model is essential to meet stated goals. This not only includes sensible administrative structures and talented administrative personnel, but also strong mechanisms for engaging experienced engineers and business leaders. These experts would engage with researchers to identify promising technologies, design and conduct necessary translational research, and build the financial, legal, and technical mechanisms needed to transfer production to U.S.-based factories.

Metrics are also needed to assess progress on the NMF’s overall objectives of strengthening domestic manufacturing and advancing commercialization of new technologies emerging from federally funded R&D. Metrics to consider include the number of technologies successfully reaching commercial production, number of jobs created in the manufacturing sector, number of new manufacturing facilities built in the United States., domestic availability of critical defense technologies, exports of advanced technologies, and returns on investment for both public and private stakeholders. Programs and initiatives that fail to demonstrate progress according to these metrics should be adjusted or terminated.

Aggressive action is needed to ensure that any new innovation supports domestic job creation and other economic-development goals in the United States. As stated above, the United States should encourage domestic production through minimal licensing fees and through government-procurement contracts. Legislation may be needed to ensure that any technology based on federally funded R&D must be scaled (e.g., a 75% minimum value add) in the United States. The federal government must provide create clear, meaningful incentives to manufacture new hardware technologies in the United States—though it should not matter whether or not the entity that scales the technology is headquartered in America. In fact, many foreign manufacturers, such as BAE Systems (UK), Thyssenkrupp (Germany), Dassault Systems (France), and Ericsson (Sweden) have recently made large investments in the U.S., joining companies such as Toyota, Honda, Siemens, and Hitachi that have invested in U.S. manufacturing for decades. Such investments must be further encouraged.

Government has played an indispensable role in American industrial development throughout history. Federal investments in basic and translational R&D, combined with early defense procurements, enabled creation of the aviation industry, semiconductors, computers, and the internet. Other federal investments led to horizontal drilling of shale gas/oil human-genome sequencing and CRISPR, and most of our advanced medical devices, pharmaceuticals, and treatments. The leading U.S.-manufactured exports today are aircraft and weapons—areas in which the federal government invests considerably in basic and translational R&D, and areas in which the government is the dominant customer. ¹²

Congressional Action

The concept of establishing an NMF is receiving bipartisan support in the current U.S. Congress. Specific legislation is being developed to create the NMF and clearly define its role and mission. Senator Gary Peters (D-MI) has proposed the creation of a National Institute of Manufacturing (essentially the same as an NMF), modeled on the National Institutes of Health, that would consolidate existing programs and invest in translational R&D to fill the gaps in the innovation cycle. Other ideas are being discussed in Congress that could strengthen federal support for U.S. manufacturing.

Responses to Possible Criticisms

“Creating and funding a new agency is difficult in a tight budget climate”

Although a new agency would not fit within current budgetary constraints, the NMF should be considered a long-term investment in U.S. prosperity, not an additional cost burden. By defining the NMF budget as a percentage of the total R&D budget, funds would vary as Congress determines R&D appropriations. Perhaps a more important consideration is that the status quo is not sustainable. The nation’s R&D enterprise cannot continue to focus on basic science research with limited capabilities to engineer and manufacture results domestically. Eventually, political support for continued R&D spending could wane, leaving both the overall economy and the defense industry worse off.

“Government should not be picking winners and losers”

The argument that the government would be “picking winners and losers” by supporting domestic manufacturing is an argument that does not hold water. If anything, the opposite is true: without a robust domestic manufacturing sector, other countries have the power to pick our winners and losers by deciding which technologies developed here to mature and manufacture. The “picking winners and losers” argument also does not bear historical scrutiny. The United States has strongly favored specific industries in the past, through R&D spending, tax policy, and other policy levers. American leadership in industries such as aerospace, health care, oil and gas, and defense has depended on long-term government support. The fact that many advanced industries are now threatened by a weakening domestic production base and increasing dependence on imports indicates the need for a proactive role by government to restore American manufacturing. Furthermore, manufacturing ensures national security and provides greater employment opportunities for a larger number of people at higher wages than almost any other economic activity. Support for manufacturing will help boost percapita incomes, reduce income inequality, and restore the American Dream.

“There are so many manufacturing programs already. Why create a new one?”

The federal government has created a variety of manufacturing programs over the decades, and the DOD has long had internal programs to support defense manufacturers. Yet despite these programs, American manufacturing broadly has been declining three decades. None of the programs created to support manufacturing in the United States have had sufficient scale to make an impact beyond the edges. The 56 manufacturing programs across 11 federal agencies are not coordinated and are not motivated to do so. Unlike major foreign competitors such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea, the United States has never established a comprehensive set of programs and policies to nurture and support its manufacturing base and the innovation ecosystem. The United States cannot afford to continue a piecemeal approach to restoring its much-eroded industrial commons.

The NMF would also play an as-yet-unfilled role in ensuring that promising developments based on federally funded R&D are matured and ultimately produced at full scale in the United States. Too often, promising technologies emerging from basic research funding from one agency are sit idle instead of being commercialized. This may be because funding for continued development does not fit the mission of the original funding agency, other agencies that could fund further development are unaware of the new technologies, and the inventors do not know how to engage other agencies for continued funding. The NMF would be responsible for eliminating this situation through strategic coordination of S&T agencies.

Potential champions and advocates

The recommendation to create an NMF is the result of MForesight’s discussions (totaling more than 1,200 hours) around the country with nearly 200 industry leaders, academics, investors, and state and local economic developers. These discussions revealed an urgent desire for a coordinated, long-term, and well-funded national manufacturing initiative, led by the NMF, to compete with the ambitious plans and actions of international competitors, such as China 2025.39 Potential champions and advocates also include policymakers concerned about national security challenges, including the House and Senate Armed Services Committees; the DOD; the International Trade Administration; trade organizations including the National Defense Industries Association, the Association for Manufacturing Technology, and the National Association of Manufacturers; professional societies including the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and the Society of Manufacturing Engineers; and advocacy groups and think tanks including the Alliance for American Manufacturing, the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, the Brookings Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the Center for American Progress.

Opportunities for complementary action

Creating the NMF would clearly indicate that the government is ready to support manufacturing. But the weaknesses in the national industrial base are too widespread for the federal government to solve on its own. Rather, the federal government must recognize the unique part that other sectors can and must play to truly position the United States as a global leader in manufacturing. Private industry can attract matching funds, expertise, and commitments to maintain and build factories in the United States. The private financial sector—investment bankers, venture capitalists, and retail banks— can provide the financial capital needed to scale production at home. Universities can commit to channeling research results and IP to domestic producers, not foreign competitors. Universities can also ramp up efforts to recruit domestic engineering students, and can strengthen investments in engineering training and degree programs. OEMs can restore apprenticeships and internship programs to train the needed skilled workforce. State and local governments can provide matching funds, ramp up educational programs for skilled trades, and offer incentives to encourage development of manufacturing clusters. State and local governments can also work with the NMF to aggregate and accelerate place-based manufacturing initiatives for the benefit of the entire nation. The NMF provides a clear vehicle through which the federal government can work to ensure that all of these roles are filled.

Conclusion

The challenges facing American manufacturing have been building over decades as more and more industries have offshored production or been overwhelmed by imports. Dependence on imports matters relatively little for low-technology products.

But when that dependence encroaches on knowledge-intensive industries and defense production, the prospects for maintaining American defense superiority and a high-income, prosperous society come into question. Without a robust manufacturing sector, the United States cannot realize the full value—in terms of economic growth, job creation, national security, and capacity for continued innovation—of its investments in research and development.

Meanwhile, other countries are not standing still. China has set up a $21 billion national investment fund to promote the transformation and upgrading of its manufacturing industry. Japan, Germany, and South Korea all far outpace the United States when it comes to manufacturing investment and capabilities.

It is high time for the United States to restore its lost industrial commons and reposition itself as a global leader in product innovation, engineering, and commercialization. Establishing the National Manufacturing Foundation is a necessary and important step towards achieving this goal.

The next administration should establish a national initiative built around ambitious goals to accelerate development and deployment of dramatically improved energy-storage technologies. Developing such technologies would help establish a strategic new domestic manufacturing sector. Deploying such technologies would expand the range of low-carbon pathways available to fight climate change—especially those relying on variable renewable energy resources, like wind and solar power. Deploying such technologies would also improve the performance of smartphones, drones, and other vital electronic tools of the 21st century.

Challenge and Opportunity

Electricity systems, no matter how big or small, must instantaneously balance supply and demand, generation and load—or suffer blackouts. This imperative has long motivated scientists and technologists to seek the holy grail of affordable, reliable, durable, and safe energy storage. Yet, despite many decades of efforts, batteries remain expensive, fickle, short-lived, and dangerous for many applications. Other forms of energy storage, like thermal and compressed-air storage, suffer from major drawbacks as well. 

Radically improved energy-storage technologies would help the nation and the world solve some of their most pressing problems. Most urgently, improved energy storage would expand the range of low-carbon pathways to fight climate change and reduce dependence on fossil fuels by allowing the electricity grid to accommodate higher levels of renewable energy. Improved energy storage would allow electric vehicles (EVs) to better meet drivers’ expectations for value and performance, thereby speeding up EV adoption and further helping to address the climate challenge. Better batteries would also let people stop worrying about whether their electronic devices are charged, improving security and strengthening the economy in a world where these and other connected devices are ubiquitous.

Given the importance and magnitude of these opportunities, energy storage has become a critical industry of the future—one that nations around the world seek to capture. China and the European Union, for instance, are making significant strategic investments to build domestic capabilities for development and manufacturing of energy storage technologies. These and other international competitors are challenging the U.S. energy innovation ecosystem—our research universities, national laboratories, start-up companies, and established technology firms to invent, commercialize, and scale-up next-generation energy-storage technologies.

Opportunities by sector

Electric power

The rapidly dropping cost of wind and solar power has opened major pathways to decarbonize electricity systems. But these power generation technologies are variable: that is, their output fluctuates by the hour, day, and season. As the renewable share of generation rises on a grid, such fluctuations make balancing supply and demand increasingly difficult, threatening brownouts and blackouts. Grid-scale energy storage has the potential to address this challenge. Although one energy-storage technology (lithium-ion batteries) has been improved to the point that it has begun to make a significant impact on the grid, major gaps remain. Fully solving the grid-storage problem requires technologies that are much cheaper and last much longer than current systems. Grid-storage technologies must be able to hold enough electricity to power a grid for a week or more at a cost of just a few cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh), while operating only a few times each year.

Transportation

Lithium-ion batteries are also kick-starting the electrification of transportation. Their declining cost is one of the key factors helping to bring EVs into the mainstream. EVs are cleaner than gasoline-powered cars if they are charged on low-carbon electricity grids. EVs are also easier to maintain and cheaper to operate. However, the ultimate triumph of EVs in the auto market is far from assured. Batteries that are safer, rely on more abundant materials, allow vehicles to go 500 miles or more on a charge, last for at least a decade, and are easily recharged and recycled would make the success of EVs more likely, with huge payoffs for the global climate.

Electronics

The suite of technologies sometimes lumped together as the “fourth industrial revolution” is another broad domain that would benefit from advances in energy storage. Robots, drones, sensors, and smartphones—and the systems by which they process and exchange information—have become essential tools in modern society.

Most of these electronics are more useful when they can operate without having to maintain a constant connection to the grid. Although batteries are becoming lighter and more efficient, the demands being placed on them are also rising, straining the limits of lithium-ion technology. An order-of-magnitude leap in the energy density of batteries— the amount of electricity stored in a given mass or volume—would unlock a diverse array of valuable new applications for a wide range of electronic devices. For instance, drones, whether they are being used by combat forces, farmers, or utility crews, would be able to stay aloft for days and carry more sophisticated payloads, such as weapons or sensors.

Domestic manufacturing

Paradigm-shifting improvements in energy storage technologies would also create opportunities to build domestic manufacturing capacity in a growing industry of the future. The supply chain for making lithium-ion batteries migrated to East Asia years ago. The largest battery factory for EVs in the United States, Tesla’s “giga-factory” in Reno, NV, is run by a joint venture with the Japanese-headquartered firm Panasonic. Tesla has been unable to fully master the finicky methods used to make battery cells. Other U.S.- based EV assembly plants rely on Asian-headquartered battery contractors as well. 

Nonetheless, the United States continues to generate new energy storage technologies, including some that could supplant the current generation of lithium-ion batteries. For example, Sila Nanotechnologies, founded in 2011 and based in the San Francisco Bay Area, raised $215 million in 2019 to scale up its manufacturing activity. A half-dozen other U.S.-based battery start-ups have also raised large funding rounds in the past year. Investors include not only venture-capital firms, but also big companies based in Europe and Asia as well as North America. It remains to be seen where the battery supply chain of the future will be located.

Plan of Action

The next administration, building on the Department of Energy’s (DOE) recently announced “Energy Storage Grand Challenge,” should establish a National Energy Storage Initiative (NESI) built around ambitious goals to accelerate development and deployment of dramatically improved energy-storage technologies. These goals should include widespread adoption of:

• Grid-scale systems that can provide at least 500 megawatts (MW) of power for a week at a cost of three cents per kWh or less.
• Vehicle-scale energy-storage systems with performance, safety, and cost characteristics as good as or better than internal-combustion systems (including lifespan and recharging speed).
• Batteries for small devices exhibiting energy density an order of magnitude greater than current lithium-ion batteries.

The NESI should also seek to achieve economic and international goals such as:

• A positive international trade balance in energy-storage technologies and components.
• Global adoption of energy-storage technologies invented and commercialized in the United States across major application domains.

The NESI will require deep collaboration among key federal agencies and with the private sector, academia, and states and localities. This initiative would galvanize the still-thriving energy-storage science and technology community in the United States, spurring the development of better energy-storage technologies and ensuring that the next generation of storage devices are built here. The case for the NESI is two-fold. First, expanded research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) funding is needed to address market failures in the energy-storage domain. Expanded funding would enable scientific and mission agencies to pursue a diverse array of promising opportunities that have gone un- or under-explored. The result would be new energy-storage materials and concepts, breaking through barriers that have limited current technologies. Second, federal resources and leadership—as well as deep engagement with the private industrial and financial sectors and with key states and localities—are crucial for domestic scale-up and manufacturing made possible by this expanded RD&D portfolio. International competition surrounding energy storage is already fierce. China, in particular, has made no secret of its plan to dominate the global battery and EV industries. The United States must assert leadership on energy storage or risk being left behind.

Implementation

The NESI should include four key components: (1) White House leadership and coordination, (2) a federal RD&D budget commitment, (3) increased agency participation and use of an array of policy tools, and (4) mobilization of non-federal actors to undertake aligned actions.

White House leadership and coordination

An Executive Order (EO) from the White House, implemented by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), would be the foundational action to launch the NESI. White House leadership and attention would catalyze implementing agencies to identify lead units and staff members for the interagency initiative and to undertake internal coordination among their component units (e.g., the science and applied energy offices within DOE). OSTP, NSTC, and agency staff would spearhead the initiative, driving its progress throughout the executive branch and mobilizing support in Congress, industry, science, and the public.

Budget

Delivering on the aforementioned goals would require, at a minimum, tripling current spending on energy storage RD&D programs over five years. The most comprehensive estimate of federal RD&D spending on energy storage comes from a 2015 OMB interagency “crosscut”: $300 million. Increasing spending to $900 million or more per year would allow participating agencies to take the following actions:

• Accelerate fundamental research on promising energy-storage materials and systems.
• Create and expand centers of excellence in RD&D on energy storage at universities and government laboratories.
• Build academic-government-industry partnerships to create energy-storage prototypes and pilot projects.
• Conduct large-scale energy-storage demonstration projects in collaboration with end users, such as urban and rural electricity systems and military bases.
• Establish regional manufacturing innovation centers that facilitate technology development, worker training, and small- and medium-enterprise (SME) engagement related to energy storage

Increased agency participation and use of other policy tools

In addition to DOE, the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Commerce (DOC), Defense (DOD), Health and Human Services (HHS), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Transportation (DOT) as well as the National Science Foundation (NSF) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) should be mobilized to accelerate innovation in energy storage. DOC, DOD, HHS, and NSF should collaborate with DOE in expanding the energy storage RD&D enterprise. The other agencies, along with DOE and DOD, should use policy tools such as procurement, regulation, and investment support (e.g., loan guarantees) to help “pull” nascent energy-storage technologies into markets and to assist in establishing domestic production capacity. Tax incentives, legislated by Congress and administered by executive agencies, may also be helpful to accelerate market growth and drive down costs for particular technologies.

Mobilization of non-federal actors

Academia and industry are critical to the success of energy-storage RD&D, manufacturing, and adoption. The vast scope of energy-storage applications amplifies the importance of engaging with a wide variety of end-user industries—especially power-system vendors, utilities, electronics manufacturers, and automakers—as well as producers of storage technology. States and localities, many of which have announced ambitious goals for grid-scale storage, should also be incorporated into the NESI. A few states could house federally supported manufacturing and innovation “clusters” for energy-storage solutions. All states could accelerate adoption of improved energystorage technologies by fostering receptive markets: for instance, by reforming electricity regulation.

Precedents

The proposed NESI is similar to successful efforts such as the Clinton administration’s nanotechnology initiative and the Obama administration’s advanced manufacturing initiative. Such initiatives mobilize and coordinate multiple agencies in pursuit of technological capabilities that will contribute significantly to a set of broadly agreed national goals. Success depends on strong presidential commitment at the start and cultivation of stakeholders across partisan, regional, and sectoral lines over time. Effective technology initiatives have major on-the-ground impacts and ultimately become self-sustaining. Two keys to success are (1) White House leadership and attention to foster interagency cooperation, and (2) increased agency budgets to limit resistance from incumbent programs.

Federal funding for energy-storage science and technology has a long track record, particularly with regard to basic research. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) expanded federal energy-storage funding considerably in the 2010s. ARRA funding supported establishment of the Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E), which has become a major source of funding for applied research and prototype development in energy storage. ARRA funding also supported the Joint Center for Energy Storage Research (JCESR) at Argonne National Laboratory; a collaborative demonstration program within DOE’s Office of Electricity that worked with utilities, states, and local governments; and loan guarantees for battery manufacturing and grid-scale storage projects. 

Many of these investments have paid off handsomely. For instance, an evaluation by the National Academies found that ARPA-E’s funding of energy-storage technology has been “highly productive with respect to accelerating commercialization” and led to the formation of at least six new companies in the field. JCESR was renewed for an additional five years in 2018. However, the demonstration and manufacturing elements of the ARRA-funded push were not sustained, primarily due to ideological objections by the Congressional majority that came in after the 2010 midterm elections. 

The Department of Energy announced an Energy Storage Grand Challenge on January 8, 2020. This initiative is a welcome step toward the broader initiative outlined in this paper. It seeks ambitious advances in technology, rapid commercialization, and the creation of a domestic manufacturing supply chain. But it does not extend beyond DOE, and whether it will be implemented with the appropriate resources and presidential support is uncertain.

International context

Many countries have made energy storage a priority. The European Union has embarked on a multi-billion-dollar battery initiative that led to the establishment of Northvolt, a European-owned battery cell manufacturing start-up. Volkswagen bought 20% of Northvolt and is working with it to build a second cell factory. Energy storage and EVs are among the sectors targeted by China in its Made in China 2025 program. Massive subsidies from all levels of the Chinese government have flowed through a variety of channels to energy storage projects and companies to fulfill this program, helping China become the world’s largest EV market (with more than 50% market share). Korea, Japan, and India are among the other countries undertaking national energy storage initiatives.

Although the global race to advance energy-storage technology is intense, the United States possesses many strengths that would allow a domestic energy-storage effort to succeed. These strengths include outstanding research capabilities at universities and national laboratories, a vibrant start-up ecosystem, and a strong industrial sector. The NESI would provide the leadership, funding, and coordination needed to realize the full potential of these assets. It is also important for the United States to foster international cooperation around science underlying energy-storage technology. Scientific knowledge is a global public good that will be under-provided without the leadership of the world’s top scientific nation.

Stakeholder support

The NESI has a wide range of potential champions and advocates on both sides of the aisle. Congressional Republicans have expressed their support for energy storage through expanded RD&D funding and more ambitious authorizations. The administration’s new grand challenge taps into this legislative support. Environmental advocates on the left of the political spectrum are also supportive, perceiving limited energy storage as the biggest technological barrier to expanded deployment of renewables. Similar enthusiasm may be expected from the research community and investors, as well as from states seeking to build a domestic energy-storage industry. These interests have been frustrated by the “invent here, produce there” outcomes of past breakthroughs, such as lithium-ion batteries.

Technology end users may be less enthusiastic or indifferent. Low prices in the short term may be more important to them than innovation in the long run. They may also see the location and ownership of production facilities as irrelevant or argue that the current global division of labor, in which Asian factories built with cheap public-investment capital supply U.S. needs, is favorable for the United States. Other skeptics may argue that when it comes to supporting expanded deployment of renewables, investing in demand response, larger grids, or other forms of low-carbon electricity generation, such as nuclear power or natural gas plants with carbon capture systems, are better options than energy storage.

Goals and metrics

The overarching (e.g., within 10 years) goal of NESI is to make the United States a major center for energy storage innovation and production. 

One essential short-term step towards achieving this goal is establishing key organizational components of the NESI, such as an interagency working group and a mechanism to engage with non-federal stakeholders, including industry, academia, and states. A second critical step is expanding budgets for relevant federal agencies to put them on a pathway to triple federal funding for energy-storage RD&D. 

In the medium term, metrics such as growth in scientific publications and patents, formation of new energy-storage companies, equity and project investment, product introduction, and manufacturing-cost reduction will provide insights on progress. 

In the long term, success of the NESI should be assessed by the level of market penetration of new energy-storage storage products across application domains including electric power, transportation, and electronics in the context of a growing overall storage market. Success of the NESI should also be assessed through consideration of the international trade balance related to energy storage and adoption of U.S.-developed energy-storage technologies.

Proposed initial steps

The next president should sign an EO establishing the NESI and directing the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy to convene a federal interagency task force. The task force should prepare a strategic plan and develop a budget for the initiative in consultation with key stakeholders. The plan should identify technological needs and opportunities and set specific objectives, taking into account global competition and cooperation with respect to energy storage. Congress should support the NESI by appropriating funding needed to implement the strategic plan, and by providing additional authorization as required.

Implementing agencies should pursue energy-storage RD&D as it relates to their respective missions, while collaborating to manage overlaps and avoid gaps. RD&D activities should strengthen the intramural and extramural research and industrial communities. As innovative storage technologies reach maturity, DOC, DOD, and DOE should work with states and regional economic-development agencies to foster markets and develop manufacturing capabilities. Congress should provide tax incentives that help to pull these technologies into the market, thereby driving down cost and expanding deployment.

Conclusion

Energy-storage technologies in widespread use today are not good enough to meet fundamental 21st-century challenges, including climate change, economic growth, and international security. A national initiative to accelerate domestic development and deployment of dramatically improved energy-storage technologies would position the United States to lead the world in addressing these challenges while building its economy. Although global competition in energy storage is fierce, our nation has strong capabilities that—if used strategically—position the United States to catch up with and ultimately surpass its rivals in this vital emerging industry. The NESI provides a pathway for the next president to translate this vision into reality.

The next administration should establish a national initiative to accelerate the implementation of rigorous computer science (CS) education for preschool through 12th grade (P–12) students in the United States. The initiative should include investments in evidence-based education pathways that incorporate computational thinking, computer programming (coding), cybersecurity, data science, social impacts of computing, and ethics. CS curricula should prepare students for future careers working with technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, virtual/augmented reality, autonomous vehicles, automation, cybersecurity, and other emerging and future technologies. This initiative will enhance the United States’ global competitiveness, economic growth, and technological innovation, and will better prepare the nation to address pressing challenges such as healthcare, social mobility, climate change, and national security in an increasingly technology-driven and innovation-based world.

Why computer science education?

The United States is facing a talent crisis in computing and information technology (IT). There are currently tens of thousands of open positions—in both the public and private sectors—related to information technology (IT), computing, and cybersecurity, but not enough workers with the skills to fill them. The (ISC), a cybersecurity professional organization, estimates that there is currently a shortage of 500,000 cybersecurity workers in the United States and a shortage of almost 3 million globally. Such gaps are likely to increase. The U.S. Department of Labor projects that there will be 3.5 million computing-related jobs in the United States by 2026. Yet our country’s current educational system will only prepare enough trained CS professionals to meet 19% of the demand. While 67% of projected STEM jobs are related to computing, only 10% of STEM degrees earned by U.S. students are in computing fields. In 2015, international students earned the majority of graduate degrees in mathematics and CS at U.S. universities.¹

Preparing students in CS and related subjects is vital for the future of the United States workforce and economy. CS has applications in virtually all industries, including transportation, healthcare, education, entertainment, manufacturing, and financial services. There is also rapidly increasing demand for CS skills in growing areas such as cybersecurity, advanced defense technologies, and machine learning and AI. As such, recent years have seen parents, teachers, states, districts, and the private sector lead a growing movement to expand P–12 CS education. The Obama administration responded in 2016 by launching Computer Science for All (CSforAll), a national effort to increase student access to CS both in and out of school. CSforAll included investment of more than $135 million of existing federal funds into CS education, as well as a fiscal year (FY) 2017 budget request to Congress for more than $4 billion for states and school districts to build on federal investments at the sub-national level.

Yet while CS education enjoys broad bipartisan support and aligns with national goals for economic growth and workforce development, federal leadership, investment, and accountability on this front are still insufficient. Congress has not appropriated adequate funding to support development and implementation of rigorous and equitable CS education for P–12 students nationwide. As a result, access to quality CS education is often limited to affluent schools and students. This places low-income, minority, and rural communities at risk of being left behind. It also means that we as a nation are realizing neither the full potential of all students in the U.S. talent pool nor the global competitive advantage that the diversity of the U.S. population can contribute to technology and innovation. The next administration should address this issue by championing an ambitious, evidence-based, comprehensive, and inclusive CS education initiative. Such an initiative would rapidly and significantly upskill and grow the U.S. technical workforce, increase equity of opportunity and career readiness for millions of youth and their communities, and contribute to a computationally literate and cybersecurity-aware populace.

Challenges in Computer Science Education

There has been a sustained national effort over the last four decades to increase access to and participation in STEM disciplines. Yet opportunities for sequenced, rigorous CS education are limited, and compulsory CS classes remain rare in U.S. formal education. In 2019, just 18% of the Department of Education (ED)’s discretionary and research grants in STEM were awarded to CS-focused programs. While this represents a nontrivial dollar amount ($100 million out of $540 million total), it is important to note that ED has only recently begun to invest in P–12 CS education specifically. Compared to the decades of investments that have focused on developing P–12 pedagogy for other STEM disciplines like math, biology, physics and chemistry, investments in CS education are nascent at best.

Moreover, CS has historically been omitted from ED’s data-collection efforts, list of core STEM subjects, state educational standards, and teacher certification pathways. This inevitably pushes CS to the bottom of the priority list, especially for resource-constrained schools and districts. Less than half of U.S. high schools offered any CS classes in 2019.² Only about 5,000 U.S. high schools offered Advanced Placement (AP) CS, compared to more than 14,000 schools offering AP Calculus and more than 11,500 offering AP Biology. And even in schools that offer CS, participation and success varies widely by demographic group. Of the 166,000 students who took an AP CS exam during the 2018– 2019 school year, only 29% were girls and only 22% were African-American or Hispanic. While AP CS scores for White and Asian students averaged 3.20 and 3.50 (out of 5.0) respectively, African American students averaged scores of 2.13, Hispanic students 2.45, and Native American/Alaskan Native students 2.38.

These data are especially troubling given that U.S. public schools have shifted to a majority minority (50.3% in 2019) and majority low-income (52.1% in 2016) student population, and women earn 57% of bachelor’s degrees in the U.S. Despite these demographic shifts in the talent pool, and affirmation by multiple research studies that diverse teams improve innovation, problem solving, and productivity,³ the U.S. tech workforce has remained majority White and Asian, and overwhelmingly male. This failure to include all students and capitalize on the competitive advantage that the unique diversity of the U.S. population adversely affects our nation as a whole. Affluent communities are disproportionately able to build robust tech-based local ecosystems— while low-income populations, women, minorities, people with disabilities, and those living in rural areas are excluded from opportunities in technology and innovation and remain sidelined in the global, technology-driven economy. There is a clear need for new approaches to CS education that better serve all populations.

One of the most significant barriers to universal access to P–12 CS education is a lack of qualified CS teachers, especially in rural and tribal schools. To date, most efforts to address the CS teacher shortage have focused on enlisting in-service teachers (often teachers of other STEM subjects like math or science) by providing professional development in CS curricula. This approach is incomplete. Addressing the CS teacher shortage by recruiting existing teachers creates new shortages in other high-need subjects, shortages that are exacerbated by overall attrition of teachers to school administration and to other fields. A comprehensive approach must include preparing a new CS teachers “from the ground up”. Yet the number of new CS teachers graduating from teacher-education programs is woefully low, largely due to the fact that teacher certifications in CS remain novel and preparation programs small. As of 2019, 38 states offered a state teacher certification in CS but just 19 states offer state-approved preservice teacher preparation at their institutions of higher education. From 2015– 2016, only 36 pre-service teachers in the entire United States were prepared to teach CS. More than 11,000 pre-service teachers were prepared to teach mathematics and science in the same year.⁴

Opportunity

Since the Obama administration’s launch of CSforAll in 2016, the community-led movement for P–12 CS education movement has made significant progress in raising awareness of the need for CS education, establishing educational standards for CS, developing CS courses and curricula, and implementing CS education policies at the state level.⁵ The number of states that count CS towards high-school graduation has grown from 28 to 48 (plus the District of Columbia), and 34 states have adopted CS standards.

The next administration can and should build on this work. The time is ripe for a “second wave” of CS education—one that expands CS education beyond the circle of early adopters and entrenches CS education as a fundamental component of P–12 education nationwide. Making rigorous, inclusive, universal, and comprehensive P–12 CS education a top priority in the next administration will prepare Americans to succeed in an increasingly automated and digital economy, help build a technology-literate society, increase economic mobility and social equity, and contribute to the talent pool needed to support U.S. cybersecurity and national defense.

Achieving these goals will require the next administration to provide visibility, funding, and resources for CS education. Specifically, the next administration should focus on expanding formal and informal CS learning pathways for all students; training and supporting a robust pool of skilled and highly valued CS educators; and emphasizing ongoing development innovative, evidence-based pedagogy for P–12 CS education. The result will be a world where we don’t need population-specific outreach programs to expand opportunities in CS because CS education and achievement will be an expected norm for all students, from all walks of life.

Proposed Action

A national P–12 CS education initiative should include four key components: (1) White House leadership and coordination, (2) federal budget commitments, (3) increased agency participation and use of diverse policy tools, and (4) mobilization of non-federal actors to undertake complementary actions. The following section expands on each.

White House leadership and coordination

The next administration should work through the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to oversee and strengthen federal support for universal P–12 CS education in the United States. An OSTP-led Interagency Working Group (IWG) should be established to coordinate relevant federal activities, develop a national strategic action plan, and convene non-federal stakeholders who can contribute through public-private partnerships. Agencies represented on the IWG would help identify offices and programs essential to the success of a national P–12 CS education initiative, and would ensure that federal activities are complementary rather than redundant.

Federal budget commitments

Federal spending on CS education to date has largely been limited to CS as a component of STEM. This includes research funding through the National Science Foundation (NSF) and ED’s Education Innovation and Research (EIR) grant program; discretionary grants from ED that include CS within the STEM designation; and investment by the Department of Defense (DOD) in military-impacted schools through the National Math and Science Initiative (NMSI) College Readiness Program for Military Families, DOD Education Activity (DODEA) schools, and the recently formed Defense STEM Education Consortium (DSEC).

But it has become apparent that CS often suffers when lumped in with the other STEM disciplines. Because CS is newer than many STEM disciplines, CS proposals often fail to qualify for funding from federal or state STEM programs. The rapidly evolving state of CS means that many CS programs—and the technologies they teach—are too new to qualify for strongly evidence-based programs such as ED’s What Works Clearinghouse. Additionally, there is a shortage of professionals with CS backgrounds working in federal funding agencies or serving on funding committees. Further, schools and districts without the resources to start a CS program from scratch are often at a disadvantage in applying for awards from funders that require applicants to meet high baseline requirements (e.g., specific teacher qualifications and certifications, established program history, etc.).

To be successful and equitable, a national P–12 CS education initiative must include dedicated funding for CS education distinct from STEM education. Achieving meaningful change would require Congress to invest approximately $4 billion over four years, including funding for:

• P–12 CS education efforts at the sub-national level. $2 billion in grants directly to states and $400 million in funding directly to school districts, with priority placed on districts serving youth underrepresented in technology fields.
• Building the pre-service CS education infrastructure. $350 million to miscellaneous efforts on this front.
• Evidence-based approaches to P–12 CS education. $500 million to the National Science Foundation for relevant research and development projects, with awards emphasizing the importance of pedagogy that keeps pace with new and emerging technologies.
• Assorted federal activities. $750 million to support assorted relevant federal activities such as those described in Section 6.

Increased agency participation

The two agencies most important to a national P–12 CS education initiative are ED and NSF. However, many other federal agencies, offices, and programs could contribute to such an initiative as well. The next administration should make full use of the federal authorities and policy tools at its disposal. Federal efforts that could be leveraged to support CS education nationwide include:

• Programs that serve and/or impact youth and educators, e.g.:
  • The Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS)’s educator programs.
  • Community education programs in public housing, funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
  • The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)’s Head Start program.
  • Youth programs funded by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)’s Extension Services, as well as USDA-affiliated youth programs like 4-H.
• A suite of DOD activities, including:
  • DOD programs for children of military personnel.
  • Youth-serving programs like the Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (JROTC), Youth Challenge, and STARBASE.
  • Assorted DOD investments in STEM education and outreach.
• The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL)’s youth employment programs (e.g., Job Corps).
• The U.S. Patent and Trade Office (USPTO)’s teacher-education programs.
• STEM outreach supported by the Institute of Museum and Library Sciences (IMLS) and the Smithsonian Institute.
• The GENCyber program, supported by NSF and the National Security Agency (NSA).
• Assorted activities by federal agencies with a science and technology (S&T) focus and/or a significant technical workforce (e.g., the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and intelligence agencies such as the NSA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)).

Mobilization of non-federal actors

Engaging non-federal actors is critical to a successful national P–12 CS education initiative. The White House and participating agencies should convene and collaborate with non-federal actors to amplify the impact of such an initiative through public-private partnerships, collaborative campaigns, and co-investments. Key community champions include:

• Nonprofit organizations like the Association for Computing Machinery’s Special Interest Group on Computer Science Education (ACM SIGCSE), the Afterschool Alliance, CSforALL, Code.org, the Computer Science Teachers Association (CSTA), CS for All Teachers, Girls Who Code, the International Society for Technology in Education (ISTE), National Center for Women & Information Technology (NCWIT), the National Girls Collaborative Project (NGCP), the College Board, the Computing Research Association (CRA), and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).
• Industry partners like Amazon, Apple, Google, Microsoft, Salesforce, Intel, Raytheon and Oracle, among others.
• Post-secondary institutions focusing on both pre-service education and CS education research.
• Philanthropic organizations like the Siegel Family Endowment, Pivotal Ventures, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Moore Foundation, Schmidt Futures, the Infosys Foundation, and the CS Mott Foundation.

Precedents

A national P–12 CS education initiative would expand on the Obama administration’s comprehensive CS4All initiative launched in 2016, and would also extend efforts by the Trump Administration to direct ED funding towards STEM and CS. Such an initiative would align with the National Science & Technology Council (NSTC)’s STEM Strategic Plan⁶ of 2018, President Trump’s 2019 Executive Order on Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence,⁷ and DOD’s science and technology priority areas. Such an initiative also complements established efforts to improve the efficiency of the federal government through technology, efforts such as the Presidential Innovation Fellows and the U.S. Digital Service.

Implementation

This section outlines recommended federal actions that should be taken under the next administration to achieve rigorous, inclusive, universal, and comprehensive P–12 CS education in the United States.

The White House

The next president should sign an executive order launching a national P–12 CS education initiative led by OSTP. OSTP should establish an IWG comprised of federal agency representatives to oversee and coordinate this initiative, including by (1) convening non-federal stakeholders who can contribute through public-private partnerships and (2) developing a strategic national action plan that includes metrics to monitor the initiative’s success. The IWG should report regularly to the Executive Office of the President on the initiative’s progress.

Department of Education

The U.S. Department of Education (ED) should:

• Issue a “Dear Colleague” letter affirming that CS is a critical, under-resourced STEM skill that should be prioritized in state funding requests.
• Clarify the importance of CS throughout ED communications, rules, and resources. This includes actively raising awareness of funding opportunities for states, districts, and other actors to implement CS programs.
• Using existing data-collection tools such as the Civil Rights Data Collection survey, investigate and report on the availability of P–12 CS across the United States. ED should also conduct a new study of high-school transcripts study to assess how many students are taking CS courses outside of AP exams.
• Include a question in Title 2 reporting to indicate what programs of study in teacher-preparation programs include CS coursework, and create a special report summarizing the findings.
• Build a pipeline of qualified CS teachers by:
  • Designating CS as a federally recognized teacher-shortage area, thereby allowing teachers certified to teach CS to take advantage of federal and state programs for tuition reimbursement and other benefits.
  • Amending or implementing policies to achieve wider recognition of CS as a high-need area for teachers.
  • Providing incentives for teachers to seek preparation and certification in CS.
  • Developing fast-track pathways to CS teacher certification for ex-military personnel and retiring technical professionals.
• Allocate dedicated funds for the implementation of CS by states and districts, with priority for rural and low-income communities.
• Fund pre-service centers of excellence for CS education at colleges of education to ensure sufficient faculty to prepare pre-service teachers in CS.
• Allocate dedicated funds for and otherwise incentivize CS education in extracurricular programming (e.g., the 21st Century Community Learning Centers program).

National Science Foundation

The National Science Foundation (NSF) should:

• Dedicate funding to the research and development of evidence-based P–12 CS education practices, tools, and curricula.
• Support investigation of rigorous CS education approaches in varying contexts such as in rural and low-income communities, among English language learners, and among students with disabilities and learning differences.
• Support projects that contribute to the integration and alignment of CS and related subjects (e.g., data science, cybersecurity, machine learning, artificial intelligence, artificial/virtual reality, gaming).
• Invest in improved pre-service CS preparation within schools of education.
• Provide scholarships for graduate students in P–12 CS education research.

Department of Defense

The Department of Defense (DOD) should:

• Prioritize CS education within its multiple STEM outreach programs.
• Prioritize evidence-based CS education (including teacher preparation) within existing programs that serve P–12 students, including the DODEA schools and other schools serving children of military personnel.
• Incorporate CS and cybersecurity education into JROTC program requirements. Support establishment of rigorous CS education programs within JROTC high schools (3,400 schools serving 500,000 students).
• Incorporate CS and cybersecurity education into other DOD youth programs such as STARBASE, Youth Challenge, and branch-led STEM initiatives.

Department of Labor

The Department of Labor (DOL) should:

• Leverage its Job Corps program and associated 125 training centers to provide job-ready preparation in computer programming and coding for Job Corpseligible students. This may include:
  • Providing professional development in CS and programming for Job Corps Information Technology (IT) instructors.
  • Adding a computer programming module to the existing career training program for Job Corps IT instructors.
  • Partnering with existing, proven providers of coding “boot camps” to offer intensive training and career-preparation tracks for Job Corps students in software engineering.
• Launch an information campaign through the federal One-Stop employment centers to share up-to-date information on CS-related career preparation and opportunities with communities.
• Modernize the O’NET career exploration database with more accurate descriptions of computing and technology careers. Implement a process to update the database more frequently for fast-moving technology industries.

Other agencies

Many other agencies can contribute to a national P–12 CS education initiative. For instance:

• The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) should accelerate efforts— including through industry partnerships—to provide access to broadband internet for all U.S. communities and underserved populations, with a focus on rural and tribal communities and schools.
• CNCS should provide AmeriCorps service grants for teachers and educators— including those working in extracurricular programs—who pursue CS professional development and bring CS education to underserved schools and communities.
• HUD should prioritize CS in HUD-funded afterschool and summer-enrichment opportunities, as well as in workforce readiness programs for those living in public housing.
• The Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) should invest in public media and community programs that promote computational thinking, creative problemsolving, and CS exploration for young children, adolescents, and families; accurately portray careers in computing and celebrate the diversity of the people who have them; and highlight the power of computing to understand and improve the world around us.
• HHS should leverage its Head Start program to help teach computational thinking (CT) and CS to low-income pre-kindergarten (Pre-K) youth. This would involve adapting evidence-based Pre-K CT/CS curricula for the Head Start model and providing professional development for Head Start educators.
• USPTO should incorporate CS into its teacher-education and -outreach programs. The office should launch a public outreach campaign that identifies and highlights a diverse set of computing-reliant inventions and inventors.
• IMLS should prioritize grant funding to (1) support innovative initiatives within museums and libraries that engage youth and communities in CS education, and (2) provide resources for creating, exploring, and making with technology.
• USDA should collaborate with 4-H and Future Farmers of America (FFA) on bringing rigorous CS education to youth participants in these programs. USDA should also leverage its summer free lunch program to bring CS education activities to low-income youth such as low/no cost programs such as csunplugged.org and through partnerships with local CS education providers.
• NASA, NOAA, DOE, DHS, the intelligence agencies (e.g., FBI, CIA, NSA), and all other agencies with a significant technical workforce should collaborate with ED, NSF, and other agencies as appropriate to engage federal technical employees in CS-related outreach and volunteerism.

Goals and targets

The initiative described herein will be a success when:

• CS is a normalized, fundamental component of education for all Americans.
• Issues of gender, racial, disability and economic inequity are a thing of the past.
• 100% of publicly funded schools are equipped with the prepared educators and tools needed provide a rigorous P–12 CS education experience for all students.
• CS education is an established and valued part of extracurricular educational experiences.
• Computational thinking and computing are standard aspects of pre-service teacher education.

Quantitative targets that can be used to assess progress towards these goals include:

• Increasing participation in AP CS courses by 400%, thereby matching participation in other AP STEM subjects (e.g., biology and calculus).
• Grow the pool of qualified high-school CS teachers to 50,000, thereby matching the numbers of high-school teachers trained in other STEM disciplines (e.g., physics and math).
• Improve the diversity of post-secondary students in computing to reflect the relative population demographics of U.S. students.

Conclusion

The next administration should build on community-led momentum around CS education by launching a national initiative to establish rigorous, inclusive, and comprehensive CS learning as a standard component of P–12 education in and out of school. CS education enjoys broad bipartisan support, supports federal economic development and workforce goals, and contributes to an educated digital citizenry. Advancing inclusive CS education will increase employability, economic opportunity, and equity for American youth. At the same time, improved CS education will bolster cybersecurity and national defense by preparing Americans to fill critical technical roles in both government and industry, and will foster innovation by the diversifying the technology workforce. Overall, a national P–12 CS education initiative will better prepare our country and our society to address pressing challenges such as healthcare, social mobility, and climate change in an increasingly technology-driven and innovation-based world.

Summary

Closing critical gaps across the interconnected ecosystem that supports discoveries in science and technology (S&T), developing discoveries into promising inventions, and commercializing inventions into thriving businesses should be of top priority for federal policymakers. In brief,  intentional focus and dedicating resources to discovery and commercialization of inventions ensures that the United States maintains and expands its economic vitality, its global leadership in S&T innovation, and its strategic entrepreneurial advantages. This proposal presents a rationale and vision for the launch and deployment of a national plan—called Innovate the Future: The American Inventors Initiative—to provide comprehensive support and acceleration paths for postdoctoral researchers, early-stage entrepreneurs, and S&T investors, in order to advance domestic economic growth.

Summary

The federal government can directly address the massive market failures at the center of our healthcare enterprise by establishing a new Health Advanced Research Projects Agency (HARPA)¹ modeled after the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)—the agency the Department of Defense uses to build new capabilities for national defense.

The need for HARPA is twofold. First, developing treatments for disease is difficult and time consuming. HARPA will provide the sustained drive needed to push through challenges and achieve medical breakthroughs by building new platform technologies. Second, the U.S. healthcare system largely relies on the private sector to leverage national investments in basic research and develop commercially available treatments and cures. This model means that diseases for which investments are risky or downstream profit potential is low are often ignored. HARPA will step in where private companies do not, addressing market failures with direct investments that ensure that all patients have hope for a brighter future.

HARPA will leverage existing basic science research programs supported by taxpayer dollars, as well as the efforts of the private sector, to develop new capabilities for disease prevention, detection, and treatment and overcome the bottlenecks that have historically limited progress. To do this, we have to think and act differently about how we address human health challenges. HARPA would support research that directly affirms, refutes, or otherwise changes current clinical practice. It would do this using milestone-driven, time-limited contracts as the central mechanism for driving innovation. This will ensure efficiency, transparency, and optimize success.

Challenge and Opportunity

Every year, the United States spends more than $3.4 trillion on healthcare and tens of billions of dollars on biomedical research. Yet we only have treatments for around 500 of the approximately 10,000 known human diseases.² 30 million people in the United States—half of whom are children—suffer from a rare disease for which no treatment has yet been developed.³ There are no ongoing efforts to develop treatments or cures for the overwhelming majority of these diseases. That massive market failure is the big secret of the biomedical research enterprise and is simply unacceptable. We need bold action to correct this massive market failure and revolutionize how we attack disease.

In 1958, the United States created the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) at the Department of Defense. This new government agency was designed to make pivotal investments in breakthrough technologies for national security and directly address market failures that were impeding innovation. The establishment of DARPA launched a new era in defense innovation that led to countless innovations, including the Internet, stealth aircraft, GPS-based precision navigation, night vision, autonomous vehicles, speech recognition, and robotic prostheses.

We need to take the same aggressive entrepreneurial approach to health innovation as we have in protecting our nation from foreign threats. Creating a new Health Advanced Research Projects Agency (HARPA) would fundamentally transform the way the United States approaches treating the majority of human diseases, and would directly address many of the shortcomings of our healthcare and biomedical research systems.

Imagine being able to predict and intervene before someone has a mental health crisis; diagnose cancers at their earliest stages when treatments are most effective; end deaths from antibiotic-resistant bacterial infections; and provide treatments for rare genetic diseases. That is the promise of HARPA.

By applying the same tools that DARPA uses to develop new capabilities for defense (Section 3), HARPA would be engineered to close the gap between basic research and real-world needs. HARPA initiatives would target the diseases that affect millions of Americans but are going unaddressed because of risk aversion and short-term, perverse incentives in academia and the private sector. These initiatives would be funded through large milestone-driven timeline limited contracts needed to take on transformational projects, and would be led by top experts recruited for focused stints at the agency. The result will be an institution designed from the ground up to finally solve the most pressing healthcare issues of our time: skyrocketing drug prices, the tragic shortcomings of our mental-health support systems, the opioid crisis, unconscionable waiting lists for organ donations, medical errors, and many more. DARPA enabled the United States to lead the world when it comes to defense innovation. HARPA will do the same for healthcare.

Function

Federal funding for medical research is primarily allocated though the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Through its $41 billion annual budget, NIH funds basic science and clinical research through grants. Grants are typically awarded to individual projects at academic institutions. Collectively, these projects form the bedrock of our knowledge about biology, health, medicine, and disease.

Importantly, NIH is not designed to develop marketable disease treatments or cures or to develop new platform technologies that are intended to revolutionize medicine. NIH funding is used to support therapeutic and technology development, but not in a way that prioritizes quick, efficient commercialization of new discoveries. Moreover, NIH does not include a mechanism for ensuring commercialization. SBIR grants flail at the challenge of commercializing innovations with woefully inadequate funding. Simply put, the current path from NIH-funded basic science to applied research to viable commercial product is too slow, and it does not address massive market failures that define health research and development today, leaving many human diseases without dedicated efforts to uncover solutions. Funds for basic science and clinical research through grants—awarded to academic institutions that pursue particular, individual interests in discovery—are great for uncovering truths about biology, but are an extremely inefficient way to drive toward therapies that make their way into the clinic.

Private companies, on the other hand, only scale up and market economically viable therapies. Therapies that are potentially effective but have a limited market remain inaccessible to the public at large or come with astronomical price tags that patients simply cannot afford.

Effectively bringing new innovations to the market requires alternative approaches to the bottom-up grant funding common to NIH programs. Again, this is not to say that the NIH dollars are poorly spent. The dollars spent on research are essential to understanding health and disease. But an alternative model is needed to advance research toward the development of necessary technologies and treatments to cure disease.

HARPA would close these gaps. Just as NIH brings federal resources to bear on basic science and early-stage research, HARPA would bring federal resources to bear on applied science and later-stage development and deployment. HARPA would have three guiding functions:

1. Launch and manage large-scale health-research initiatives. Although multiple federal entities⁴ work on health research, there is little coordination among these entities regarding research priorities, activities, or progress. HARPA would work with these entities—as well as with the private sector, academia, and states and localities—to launch and carry out targeted, multi-stakeholder research initiatives aimed at our most pressing underserved health challenges. Using milestone driven and timeline limited funding contracts, HARPA will be able to ensure rapid continuous progress. These initiatives would integrate the diverse capabilities of participating institutions to make real progress on persistent and pressing health problems.
2. Invest in transformational platform technologies. HARPA’s focus will be on projects that have direct impact on clinical care. Basic science tends to advance methodologically and incrementally. This partly reflects the nature of the field (one set of experiments informs the next) and partly reflects the nature of incentives in academia (moving too far and too fast away from an established knowledge base decreases the likelihood of publishable findings). By contrast, HARPA will only support transformative research that will substantially improve clinical practice and this is how potential impacts will be evaluated. Pushing for such platform technology breakthroughs is a high-risk, high-reward enterprise. HARPA will focus on the uncertain but potentially transformational medical technologies and therapies that tend to go underfunded today.
3. Support development of treatments and cures for all diseases. All taxpayers contribute to federally funded medical research. But not all taxpayers reap the benefits. Relying on the private sector to bridge the gap between basic research and commercially available products means that those with rare or difficult-to- treat diseases are often ignored. HARPA will correct this market failure by supporting development of treatments and cures for all diseases—especially those that are being neglected by the existing healthcare ecosystem.

Structure

HARPA would be modeled on DARPA. DARPA is considered the “gold standard” for innovation and accountability within the federal government. DARPA is also distinct from other federal agencies that fund research and development in that it is focused on building capabilities rather than simply advancing knowledge. This unique mission requires DARPA to have a unique set of attributes and operating principles, including the following:

• Contracts large enough to provide a critical mass of funding. While most federal grants for academic research are on the order of tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars annually, DARPA funds projects at $1–$5 million per year. These large contracts enable DARPA affiliates to pursue goals that would simply be out of reach at lower funding levels.
• Minimal bureaucracy. DARPA’s entire staff consists of about 220 government employees. This includes DARPA’s ~100 program managers (PMs), who collectively oversee about 250 research & development projects funded at total of about $3 billion per year. All actual research and development activities are conducted by public, private, and academic affiliates. DARPA’s small staff size and flat organizational hierarchy makes the agency effective and nimble, able to move quickly on priority issues in a limited amount of time. Moreover, the fact that DARPA is not organized around disciplines allows PMs to pursue unconventional but productive cross-disciplinary collaborations.
• No entitled constituencies. While funding from other federal grant programs may only be accessible to certain recipient classes (e.g., academic institutions), DARPA does not predetermine which types of institutions are eligible for funding. Funding projects at a wide variety of institutions—including universities, national labs, public and private companies, state and local government agencies— enables DARPA to access the full breadth of talent, expertise, ideas, and resources that the nation has to offer. For example, DARPA funding in the start- up community has yielded advances that may have been difficult or impossible to achieve in other sectors. DARPA uses flexible procurement tools like “Other Transaction Authority” to make it easy for small businesses and nontraditional defense contractors to participate in the agency’s initiatives.
• “Portfolio approach” to high-risk, high-reward efforts. DARPA understands and accepts that frequent failure is the price of success when it comes to achieving transformational breakthroughs. DARPA PMs have the resources and authority to invest in multiple approaches to a given goal. DARPA proposals are openly competed, but PMs can strategically select the winners in a way that creates a diversified, risk-mitigating project portfolio.
• Government control of contracts. DARPA negotiates contracts that enable control over performance. Contracts specify milestones and “go/no-go” decision points to ensure that scientific progress is made in an efficient and timely manner. This enables PMs to better manage funded projects and to cut funding if a project is not yielding desired results.
• Top-notch talent. DARPA attracts world-class PMs recruited from academia, industry, and government agencies. DARPA benefits from expedited direct hiring authority for science and engineering experts.
• High turnover. PMs are hired for limited stints (generally 3–5 years), and there are no career PMs. This approach keeps DARPA talent fresh—ensuring that the agency is scientifically current and flexible to new avenues of investigation—and fuels an urgency for PMs to “achieve success in less time than might be considered reasonable in a conventional setting.”⁵

Many, if not all, of these characteristics could be carried over to HARPA. HARPA could also adopt DARPA’s funding-management model. Under this model, all funding allocations would be left to the discretion of the HARPA Director while all funding oversight would be entrusted to HARPA PMs. Funds would be awarded as milestone- driven contracts that give PMs the capacity for early termination if a particular project is not yielding desired results. This almost never happens with traditional federal grants for research and development.

Because HARPA will differ in structure and function from traditional research-funding agencies, it is sensible for HARPA to have a reporting chain of command separate from NIH. We believe that HARPA would be best situated directly under the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) or under the HHS Assistant Secretary for Health. The Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) provides precedent for placement directly under the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response.⁶

Path to Establishment

HARPA could be established under existing authorities, but, ideally, would be established through authorizing legislation and new appropriations. There are several steps the federal policymakers could take to kick-start the establishment process. First, the president could issue a Memorandum or Executive Order directing the HHS Secretary to develop a blueprint for HARPA’s establishment as well as a strategic plan for HARPA’s activities. These documents would include identification of priorities and goals; analysis of global markets, policies and production capabilities; structure and accountability; and initial funding recommendations. Ideally, they would be developed by a short-term Federal Advisory Committee (FAC)—comprised of top physicians, health researchers, and innovative thought leaders. It is important that the FAC include avenues for external input, including providing and promoting a public comments period and convening stakeholder for a across the country. After these documents are developed, the president could urge Congress to deliver a bill establishing HARPA.

Alternatively, the President could include funds for HARPA in an annual budget proposal under the Assistant Secretary for Health or Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response. (If Congress appropriates those dollars, HARPA could be established without authorizing legislation.⁷) We believe that a minimum budget of $100 million for HARPA in its first year and $300 million in its second year would be sufficient to get the agency started and to establish high-impact programs, but to be truly transformational, the agency should ramp up to several billion in research expenditures annually. Throughout this process, the president should use high-profile speeches and events to publicly explain the need for HARPA, and to advocate for its creation.

Vision

With a DARPA-inspired structure, HARPA would achieve rapid translation of biomedical discoveries into patient-care capabilities. HARPA’s mission and activities would be synergistic—not duplicative or competitive—with existing federal research efforts. In particular, HARPA would use fundamental scientific understanding developed with NIH support as a foundation for developing breakthrough medical advances.

HARPA would operate in a health ecosystem that includes biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and healthcare companies, venture capital and philanthropy, academic institutions, and government and regulatory agencies. HARPA would address two of the most prominent shortcomings of this ecosystem: (1) the aversion to failure that limits the willingness of academics and the private sector to pursue high-risk, high-reward projects, and (2) profit incentives that limit the willingness of the private sector to develop therapies for rare or difficult-to-treat diseases. HARPA would provide the capital and supportive, focused research environment needed for experts from all sectors to demonstrate “proof of principle” for various medical innovations. In doing so, HARPA will drive explosive growth in the number of technologies, treatments, and cures that cross the so-called “valley of death” separating lab-scale insights from commercially available products.

HARPA would focus on developing transformational technologies that fundamentally change the way we do health research and deliver care. By focusing on the development of tools and technologies to transform the way we approach diseases, HARPA can establish mechanisms that ensure wellness and curing disease are prioritized, while correcting the perverse incentives in the market that limit the country’s ability to receive treatment.

There is a rich history of under-funding the development of such technologies even though they are often quickly engrained into the healthcare enterprise, making it difficult to imagine life without them. They enable breakthroughs that even inventors did not anticipate, create entire new fields of research, and often result in Nobel Prizes. They establish jumping-off points and serve as accelerants for progress. Such work is typically high-risk, high-reward and aims to build transformative capabilities rather than incremental discovery-based research that is commonly funded by the NIH. While NIH does a tremendous job of funding basic science and clinical research, HARPA will build new capabilities on the foundation that agencies like NIH and the Department of Veterans Affairs establish through their funding.

For instance, HARPA could drive the following:

• Technologies that allow clinicians to identify and quantify every protein in a drop of blood, completely transforming disease diagnosis, health monitoring, and care.
• A next-generation diagnostic imaging machine that makes it possible to detect a myriad of diseases at much earlier stages that is substantially cheaper, higher-resolution, and more portable than current MRI machines enabling broader use.
• A cortical eye prosthesis that communicates directly with the brain, making it possible to restore sight to the 7 million individuals (including 160,000 veterans)living with a visual disability in the United States.
• New classes of antibiotics to fight the enormous international public-health andeconomic threat posed by antibiotic-resistant bacteria.
• A series of clinical trials for the most expensive marketed drugs, aimed atdeveloping alternative treatment regimens to improve outcomes by reducing toxicities while dramatically reducing treatment costs. Such de-escalation studies of marketed oncology drugs have been shown to improve outcomes and dramatically reduce costs to save billions of dollars.
• A massive effort to repurpose already approved drugs for new applications. There have only been about 2,400 drugs ever been approved for use in humans. Exploring new applications of drugs that are already known to be safe and effective—instead of only focusing on creation of new drugs—could save billions of dollars on research and development and uncover novel uses for drugs that are already known to be safe and effective for other indications.

Beyond Health

It has not escaped our notice that the same market and institutional failures that created the valley of death and need for DARPA and HARPA exist in other areas of research and development. Our nation is facing unprecedented challenges associated with climate change and the need to provide a better world for all. We feel strongly that the federal government should establish additional Advanced Research Projects Agencies (ARPAs) to complement the efforts of other federal agencies and the private sector. Doing so would enable the government to take a leadership position in tackling monumental challenges.

We believe that, in addition to HARPA, the nation needs to establish capabilities in agriculture (AgARPA), the environment (EnARPA), and transportation/infrastructure (TARPA). Fleshing out the details for establishing each of these entities should fall upon the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), and the leadership of the appropriate federal agencies. Creating these new capabilities will kickstart new industries, create the jobs of the future, and improve our ability to be better stewards of the Earth. Without them, the nation risks continuing its piecemeal approach to addressing our most pressing challenges, while slipping further behind other nations investing heavily in innovations aimed at solving these global challenges. Establishing ARPA capabilities across the federal government would create a network of forward-thinking agencies prepared to address intractable challenges, while building an extraordinary, lasting legacy.

Summary

Internet-based disinformation operations have infiltrated the universe of political communications in the United States. American politics and elections carry major implications for the national and global economy, as well as for diplomatic relations conducted by and with the United States. As a result, the United States is a major target for politically charged propaganda promulgated by both foreign and domestic actors. This paper presents a two-part approach to countering internet-based disinformation.

Summary

Mass digitization of U.S. biodiversity collections would position the nation to achieve massive advances in the life sciences—a leap forward on par with the way that DNA technology transformed genomics at the start of the 21st century. This heritage consists of hundreds of millions of dry, wet, and otherwise preserved specimens in U.S. museums and other collections, including plant germplasm, microbial cultures, non-human biomedical samples (e.g., parasites), fossils, and other plant and animal samples. This proposal presents actions for the Biden-Harris Administration to take to catalyze this advance to pave the way for a sustained, coordinated effort to mass digitize the physical specimens in U.S. biodiversity collections (and their associated metadata).