There are more than 1.2 million pieces of space debris larger than one centimeter in orbit today; under the right circumstances, any of them could cause catastrophic damage to a nation’s space economy, its communications technology, and even its nuclear command and control infrastructure. And yet, the amount of debris in space is increasing rapidly, while countries continue to scale up their space programs.  

An outsized amount of trackable space debris can be attributed to a relatively small number of low-frequency, yet extremely high-consequence events: instances of states shooting down their own satellites. These direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) tests, as they are known, have been conducted by the United States, Russia, China, and India, and are designed to test these countries’ abilities to destroy their adversaries’ satellites during wartime. Past tests have created space debris, increasing risks of collision and potential damage to other states’ satellites.  There is shared recognition of the risks posed by space debris and such debris-generating tests. Debates on debris-creating DA-ASAT tests were prominent in the most recent session of UN space security talks in July. While exchanges were relatively more constructive than previous sessions, long-standing divisions reigned over what types of capabilities to regulate, how to verify them, and where to start. Some continued to advocate for a ban on debris-creating (‘destructive’) DA-ASAT tests, even suggesting a legally-binding ban, while others argued that focus on testing was too narrow and did not cover development, deployment, and use, or other capabilities of concern such as space-based weapons.

States’ views on missile defense have largely contributed to these debates, posing significant challenges to concrete de-escalation measures on multilateral or bilateral bases. Given the strong degree of technological overlap between missile defenses and DA-ASAT, states may perceive any suggested regulation of the latter as inherently limiting the former.

These debates have not captured the limited military utility of such tests. This essay argues that despite technological overlap, there is scope to decouple missile defense from DA-ASAT technologies on the basis of the limited military utility of debris-creating tests. Accordingly, states should consider commitments to ban debris-creating tests.

Overlap between missile defense and DA-ASAT technologies

There is an immensely strong degree of overlap between the technologies underlying missile defense interceptors and DA-ASAT weapons. Both systems require the same elements–rocket motors, guidance, navigation, control systems, and a payload. In addition, the technical knowledge and industrial bases needed to build them are largely identical. As a result, a capability to develop one system constitutes a latent capability to develop the other.

Indeed, repurposing a missile defense system for a DA-ASAT strike against a satellite can be less technically challenging than a missile intercept, depending on the state’s capabilities. Two components are essential: first, that the missile defense system can deliver a sophisticated kill mechanism to a high enough altitude to reach its target. A missile capable of launching a payload to its maximum range can typically launch that same payload vertically to an altitude of about half that range. For instance, a missile carrying a kill vehicle to a maximum range of 2,000 km (1,243 miles) could potentially carry that same kill vehicle to an altitude of approximately 1,000 km (620 miles). Second, the state would require advanced space situational awareness capabilities to determine the precise orbital parameters of its target. Satellites travel on predictable, observable trajectories and have limited maneuverability, thereby making them relatively easier targets for DA-ASAT systems. In contrast, a missile intercept mission could take place at any time, and requires both a sufficient alert posture and a degree of nimbleness that are not required for a DA-ASAT mission.

Importantly, DA-ASAT missions also do not encounter discrimination challenges to nearly the same degree as missile defenses. Modern ICBMs may contain combinations of decoys (such as mylar balloons) or penetration aids (such as chaff) that are meant to confuse radars or help evade incoming interceptors. While there are certain combinations of active and passive defenses that could theoretically be built into a satellite architecture to enhance resilience against attacks, many of these concepts remain aspirational and have not yet been deployed at scale.

As a result, a state that already possesses sophisticated missile defense capabilities would be able to repurpose those same capabilities for DA-ASAT missions without significant difficulty. For states reliant on space for military and civilian missions, the rise in such capabilities and their testing poses major concerns.

Different systems for different targets

Whether a particular missile defense system can be adapted for a DA-ASAT mission depends to a large extent on the orbital band where the targeted satellites are located.

Most strategic early warning satellites are located in geostationary orbit (GEO)–at an altitude of 35,786 kilometres–and highly elliptical orbit (HEO), in which satellites spend the majority of their orbit at an apogee of similar altitude. In order to kinetically target satellites orbiting at that altitude, an interceptor would need to achieve a degree of delta-v that is simply not feasible for nearly all missile defense systems in existence today, although this will likely change as technologies evolve. Some states allege that others are pursuing DA-ASAT capabilities to target satellites in GEO, but no state has publicly acknowledged such capabilities, and there is no evidence of their operational status.

Instead, the majority of operational missile defense systems are most suited for targeting satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO), and to a lesser extent, medium Earth orbit (MEO). These orbits typically include satellites with applications for telecommunications, remote sensing, military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and navigation (including GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, and BeiDou),  among other capabilities. In most cases, a missile defense system that is designed to intercept in midcourse phase will be most appropriate for a DA-ASAT mission against satellites in these orbits, although some terminal systems may also be relevant depending on the target and context.

These systems carry kinetic kill vehicles (KKVs) that utilize hit-to-kill technology. After the missile booster reaches a high enough altitude, it releases a KKV equipped with sensors that home in on the target and destroy it using kinetic force. If the guidance systems are accurate enough, the high closing speeds of the KKVs can project significantly higher force than a blast-fragmentation warhead, rendering them unnecessary.

There are several states that possess DA-ASAT capabilities, with four having conducted destructive tests: China, India, Russia and the USA. Among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the five recognized nuclear-armed states under the NPT), Chinese, Russian and US missile defense systems with ASAT potential is evident.

China has multiple systems capable of targeting satellites in LEO. These include the mobile HQ-29 system, which according to a Chinese military magazine, can carry up to two interceptors and engage targets at an altitude of 2,000 kilometres–as well as the DN-3, the HQ-19, and the SC-19. The SC-19 is believed to be derived from the DF-21 MRBM, and has previously achieved intercepts at altitudes of approximately 250 kilometres (155 miles) and 865 kilometres (537 miles), the latter resulting in the destruction of an orbital target in 2007 that reportedly created over 3,500 pieces of trackable debris (see page 05-01).

Russia similarly operates several systems that could function as both upper-tier missile defense systems and anti-satellite weapons. These most notably include the Nudol, which the US Defense Intelligence Agency assesses was used to conduct a test against a defunct Russian satellite in November 2021. The US Space Command estimated the test created over 1,500 pieces of trackable space debris, while the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that debris from the test did not create any threat.

The United States operates both the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, which is designed to intercept strategic ballistic missiles while they are traveling in their midcourse phase of flight, as well as the SM-3––which was used to destroy a non-functioning reconnaissance satellite in 2008, that created approximately 175 pieces of trackable space debris.

The USA in 2025 also announced a major shift in missile defense policy, with ‘Iron Dome for America’ (later renamed ‘Golden Dome’), to defend the entire US homeland from all types of missiles from all adversaries. While this initiative aims to implement a layer of space-based interceptors, which are distinguished from DA-ASATs (as they would be space-based), it will also likely include enhancements to the ground-based interceptor force, including the SM-3. Following the announcement of Golden Dome, fears about possible tests for such systems have also been rekindled.

Notably, no state has ever used a DA-ASAT to attack another state’s satellite; this is unprecedented, would be considered a clear use of force under international law, and invite escalatory responses.

Governance and initiatives

There are currently no restraints on missile defense under bilateral or multilateral instruments. The 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty introduced certain limitations between the US and the Soviet Union, later succeeded by Russia in the treaty. Parties agreed to maintain only one strategic missile defense site with up to 100 launchers and 100 interceptor missiles, and committed not to develop, test or deploy sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile-landed ABM systems or components. However, the US withdrew from the agreement in 2002, a move that in part has driven the expansion of missile defenses and maneuverable missiles among competitors.

US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty had ramifications on space security talks, amplifying concerns about the US pursuing space-based missile defense systems that could undermine Chinese and Russian deterrents–concerns further fuelled by USA’s Golden Dome. Under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, placement of WMD in orbit is expressly prohibited, with no consensus on the regulation of other types of weapons. The issue of DA-ASAT testing has seen renewed interest following the rise in destructive testing. In 2022, the USA pledged to refrain from destructive DA-ASAT tests, referring to previous Chinese and Russian tests. The US commitment did not however, mention its own previous tests or India’s test in 2019. Several states made similar national pledges in the months that followed, culminating in a US-led resolution adopted by a wide majority by the UN General Assembly in 2022 to refrain from debris-creating DA-ASAT tests. Nine  states abstained from voting, including India, and nine  voted against, including China and Russia. The issue of DA-ASAT testing has since been raised in subsequent UN space security processes, including the July talks. These exchanges would benefit from more comprehensive inquiry into the utility of debris-creating tests.

Low military utility of DA-ASAT tests

Much has been reported on harmful effects of debris from destructive DA-ASAT tests, which directly threatens space-based assets of all actors. Debris can even interfere with crewed missions, threatening human space exploration. Even tests conducted at lower altitudes still generate debris and increase risks of collision. LEO is considerably overcrowded with debris, as well as active ‘megaconstellations’ of satellites–such as SpaceX’s Starlink–indicating significant risk of collision already.

Yet, there is less emphasis on the low military utility of these tests, both in peacetime and in times of rising tensions preceding a conflict.

First, a destructive DA-ASAT test has permanent and indiscriminate effects. Debris from the test could undermine space-based assets that enable critical conventional weapons and operations for the executing state, which would be detrimental to its own interests. 

Moreover, such a test could transform adversary dynamics by affecting other actors, as there is no specific effect against a singular adversary. Even if a state is more risk-seeking and less reliant on space, it could alienate allies or strategic partners reliant on space and isolate itself politically.

Second, the attribution of such tests is also undisputed, making it clear who the executing party is, and subjecting them to political isolation. This also highlights the ineffectiveness of strategic or coercive signaling for a destructive test, because it is unlikely to influence a specific adversary’s cost-benefit calculation without also impacting other stakeholders.

Third, conducting such a test would not signal a new capability to an adversary. States are well aware of the missile defense capabilities at their adversaries’ disposal; there is thus no need for a debris-creating test to convey their effectiveness. Open-source assessments, the use of these systems in ongoing conventional combat scenarios, and public parades of missile defense systems are already creating this effect.

Fourth, kinetic tests are not needed to validate a state’s operational DA-ASAT capabilities. As already discussed, these missions are significantly easier than conducting realistic missile defense intercepts, given the predictable trajectories of satellites. As a result, states can validate their capabilities through other means, including missile defense intercept tests and simulation technologies. To put it another way, if the United States was not confident in its ability to disrupt the satellite operations of its adversaries during wartime, it almost certainly would not have issued its 2022 moratorium on destructive DA-ASAT tests. Destructive testing of these systems is not necessary.

Steps forward: Seeking bilateral and multilateral test-ban commitments

Space security talks have historically sought common understandings on DA-ASAT systems focusing on debris aspects. The low military utility of such tests should also be a factor. This would allow states to consider widening the scope of previous efforts on destructive DA-ASAT tests–possibly extending these to all debris-creating tests, including those involving co-orbital systems. This is especially relevant given US pursuit of Golden Dome and its space-based interceptor layer, which has co-orbital ASAT potential. In addition, proposals should uniformly acknowledge states that have conducted past tests. Selectively naming and shaming actors that have conducted DA-ASAT tests only further drives political agendas and reinforces divides already tangible in UN forums. A balanced approach to regulate capabilities would in turn help secure buy-in from states that are more wary of the narrow scope of previous proposals for a DA-ASAT test ban.

Given the strong degree of technological overlap between defensive interceptors and offensive DA-ASAT weapons, regulation of such systems is no small feat, particularly with arms control at a standstill. Eventually, states could consider pairing test-ban commitments with restrictions on interceptors in strategic stability talks. This could spark consideration of measures that extend to development, deployment and use. However, in the current environment of declining trust and magnifying strategic competition, banning debris-creating tests is a concrete step towards stability that favors interests of all states seeking to conduct space activities. Emphasizing the low military utility of such tests is essential for more constructive exchange.

Note: Conversions from kilometers to miles are approximate.

The Federation of American Scientists supports Congress’ ongoing bipartisan efforts to strengthen U.S. leadership with respect to outer space activities, including the Senate’s unanimous passage of the Orbital Sustainability (ORBITS) Act in 2023, and the introduction of the Dark and Quiet Skies Act in 2024 and the Space Exploration Research Act in 2025.

The Satellite and Telecommunications Streamlining Act (S. 3639) aims to address an important issue regarding the streamlining of approvals at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for satellite radiofrequency licensing, including expedited reviews for minor modifications and other special cases. However, we are concerned by the “deemed granted” language in S. 3639, particularly with respect to America’s ability to fulfill the authorization and continuing supervision requirements under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty.  The “deemed granted” provision would automatically approve a license if the review period passes without a decision, effectively allowing the FCC to grant radiofrequency licenses without taking action.

The nature of the outer space environment means that space-based systems are capable of causing significant issues with respect to terrestrial activities, from increased cellular interference to degraded weather forecasting capability and impacts to astronomical research. We believe that more responsible measures, like ensuring adequate staffing and performance management at the FCC would achieve a similar objective. We have recently proposed a slate of recommendations in “ASTRA: An American Space Transformation Regulatory Act”, which include consolidating multiple approval processes under a single space regulatory and promotion agency. It also recommended preserving the FCC’s regulatory authority over spectrum issues “(g)iven the significant terrestrial impact of spectrum issues related to space.” We maintain that a streamlined mission authorization process should be the highest priority for commercial space regulatory simplification.

Licensing processes that do not provide sufficient oversight and have significant terrestrial impact are likely to increase the willingness of international partners to deploy additional extraterritorial regulatory requirements, as has happened in other high-tech sectors. Such regulatory regimes have a tendency to dramatically increase the burden on U.S. companies by introducing duplicative or conflicting licensing requirements, making it more difficult for American companies to compete in international markets. As the commercial space sector depends on international market access for profitability, such an outcome must be avoided. 

More broadly, the Federation of American Scientists urges more concerted efforts to establish a clear and simplified pathway for space mission authorization and supervision, consistent with the Outer Space Treaty, that maintains the reputation of the United States government and American companies as responsible actors in the outer space environment.

From helping farmers maximize crop yields to creating new and exotic pathways for manufacturing, the space economy has the potential to triple over the next decade. Unlocking abundance in the space economy will require lowering the barriers for new space actors, aligning with international partners, and supporting traditional measures of risk assessment (like insurance) to facilitate space investment.  

Unlike countries with newer space programs that can benefit from older programs’ experience, exploration, and accidents, the United States has organically developed a patchwork regime to manage human and non-human space flight.  While this approach serves and supports the interests of government agencies and their mission-specific requirements, it hinders the deployment of new and novel technologies and gives other countries motive to deploy extraterritorial regulatory regimes, further complicating the outlook for new space actors.  There is an urgent need for rationalization, as well as for a clear and logical pathway for the deployment of new technologies, and to facilitate responsible activities in orbit so that space resources need not be governed by scarcity.

As the impacts of human space activities become more clear, there is also a growing need to address the sustainability of human space operations and their capacity to restrain a more abundant human future.  While the recent space commercialization executive order attempts to rationalize some of this work, it also preserves some of the regulatory disharmony that exists in the current system while taking actions that are likely to create additional conflicts with impacted communities. The United States should re-take the lead; among the examples set by New Zealand, the European Union, and other emerging space actors; in providing a comprehensive space regulatory framework that ensures the safe, sustainable, and responsible growth of the space industry.

Challenge and Opportunity

The Outer Space Treaty creates a set of core responsibilities that must be followed by any country wishing to operate a space program, including (but not limited to) international responsibility for national activities, authorization and supervision of space activities carried out by non-governmental entities, and liability for damage caused to other countries.  In the United States, individual government agencies have adopted responsibilities over individual elements of human activity in space, including (but again, not limited to) the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) over launch and reentry, the Department of Commerce (DOC) over remote sensing, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and DOC over spectrum management, and the State Department and DOC over space-related export controls.  The FCC has also asserted its regulatory authority over space into other domains, in particular the risk of in-space collision and space debris. If a company wishes to launch a satellite with remote sensing capabilities, they need to participate in every single one of these regulatory permitting processes.

Staffing and statutory authority create significant challenges for American space regulators at a time when other countries are getting their respective regulatory houses in order. The offices that manage these programs are relatively small – the Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs (CRSRA) division of the Office of Space Commerce (OSC) currently staffed by two full time government employees while the FAA has only five handling space flight authorizations. CRSRA was briefly hamstrung earlier this year when its director was released (and then immediately rehired) as part of the Trump Administration’s firing of probationary employees at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration–likely collateral damage in the Administration’s attempts to target programs that interact with climate change.

The lack of personnel capacity creates particular challenges for the FAA, which has struggled to keep pace with launch approvals under its Part 450 launch authorization process, among a record-breaking number of mishap investigations, novel space applications, and application revisions in 2023.  Last year, FAA officials testified that the increase in SpaceX launches, alone, has led to hundreds of hours of monthly overtime logged, constituting over 80% of staff overtime paid for by the American taxpayer. Other companies have described that accidents from SpaceX-related launches create shifting goalposts for their companies, pushing FAA officials to avoid confirming receipt of necessary launch documents to avoid starting Part 450’s 180 day review deadline. The shifting goalposts and prior approvals also means that certain launch vehicles are subject to different requirements, creating incentives for companies to focus their efforts on non-commercial and defense-related missions.

Without updates to the law, the statutory justification for increasingly important regulatory responsibilities is also unsound, particularly those that pertain to orbital debris. After the Supreme Court’s Loper Bright ruling, it is unlikely that the theory of law underpinning FCC’s regulation of space debris could withstand court challenges. This creates a particularly dangerous situation given the long-term impact that the breakup of even small objects can have on the orbital environment, and is likely the reason that space companies have yet to openly challenge the FCC’s assertion of regulatory authority in this space. This also challenges the insurance industry, which has suffered significant financial losses over the past few years and caused certain companies to pull out of the market entirely.

As human space activities increase, the demands created by the Outer Space Treaty’s requirement for supervision and liability are likely to also see corresponding increases.  Some countries hosting astronomical observatories that are significantly impaired by light, radio, and other electromagnetic pollution from commercial spacecraft have enacted laws relating to satellite brightness and interference. The number of high-profile debris strikes on property – like when a metal component from the international space station crashed into a Florida family’s occupied home – will also increase as second stages of rockets and larger satellites return to earth.  The Mexican government is exploring options to sue SpaceX over environmental contamination and debris near its Starbase Texas launch site.

The unique properties of interstellar space and other planetary surfaces demand other considerations we take for granted on Earth.  On Earth, we consider the flexibility of nature to “heal itself” and revert to “natural” states of being, regrowth, and regeneration of destructive resource extraction. Instead, planetary surfaces with little to no atmosphere or wind, such as the moon, will preserve footprints and individual tire tracks for decades to thousands of years, altering the geological features. Flecks of paint and bacteria from rovers can create artificial signatures in spectroscopy and biology, contaminating science in undocumented ways that are likely to interrupt astrobiology and geology for generations to come. We risk rendering an advanced human civilization unable to unlock discoveries resulting from pristine science or explore the existence of extraterrestrial life. 

Significant safety concerns resulting from increased human space activities could create additional regulatory molasses if unaddressed.  An increasing and under-characterized population of debris increases risk to multi-million dollar instruments and continued operations in the event of a collision cascade.  Current studies – both conservative and optimistic – point to the fact we are already in the regime of “unstable” debris growth in orbit, complicating the mass-deployment of large constellations. 

Unfortunately, current international law creates challenges for the mass-removal of orbital debris.  Article 8 of the Outer Space Treaty establishes that ownership of objects in space does not change by virtue of being in space.  This is done to make the seizure of other countries’ objects illegal, and it isn’t difficult to imagine weaponizing satellite removal capabilities (seen in the James Bond film “You Only Live Twice”).  If it is not financially advantageous to mitigate space debris, or export control concerns prevent countries from allowing debris removal, then the most-likely long term results are either unchecked debris growth, likely leading to increasingly draconian regulatory requirements. None of this is good for industry. 

Absent a streamlined data-sharing platform of satellite location and telemetry, which could be decimated by federal cuts to the Traffic Coordination System for Space (TraCSS), the cost and responsibility of satellite collision and debris avoidance will encourage many commercial space operators to fly blind. The underutilized space insurance industry, already reeling from massive losses in recent years, would face another source of pressure.  If the barriers to satellite servicing and recovery satellites remain high, it is probable that the only market for such capabilities will be military missions, inherently inhibiting the ability of these systems to attend to the orbital environment.

While abundance speaks to increasing available resources, chemistry and the law of conservation of matter remind us that our atmosphere and the oxygen we breathe is finite, fragile, and potentially highly reactive to elements commonly found in spacecraft.  We are only starting to understand the impact of spacecraft reentry on the upper atmosphere, though there is already significant cause for concern. Nitrous oxide (NOx), a common compound used in spacecraft propulsion, is known to deplete ozone. Aluminum, one of the most common elements in spacecraft, bonds easily with ozone. Black carbon from launches increases stratospheric temperature, changing circulation patterns.  When large rockets explode, the aftermath can create enormous impacts for aviation and rain debris on beaches and critical areas. To top it all off, the reliance of space companies on the defense sector for financing means that many of these assets and constellations are often inherently tied to defense activities, increasing the probability that they will be actively targeted or compromised as a result of foreign policy actions or fast-tracked due to regulatory streamlining that circumvents public comment periods from raising valid safety concerns.

We are quickly approaching a day when the United States government may no longer be the primary regulator of our own industry.  The European Union in May 2025 introduced its own Space Act with extraterritorial requirements for companies wishing to participate in the European market.  Many of these provisions are well-considered and justified, though the uncertainty and extra layer of compliance that they create for American companies is likely to increase the cost of business further.  The EU has created a process for recognizing equivalent regimes in other countries. Under current rules, and especially under the Administration’s new commercial space executive order, the United States regulatory regime is unlikely to be judged as “equivalent.”  Given the concerns from EU member states and companies alike about the actions of U.S. space companies, it is more likely than not that the EU will seek to rein in the U.S. space industry in ways that could limit our ability to remain internationally competitive.

Plan of Action

Recommendation 1. Congress should devote resources to study that which threatens the abundance of space, such as the impacts of human space exploration, damage to the ozone layer; inadvertent geoengineering as a result of orbital reentry and fuel deposition.

This should include the impact of satellite interference on space situational awareness capabilities and space weather forecasting, which are critical to stabilizing the space economy.

While the regulatory environment for space should be rationalized to unleash the potential of the space economy, research is also needed to better understand the impacts of space activities and exploration given that we are already beginning to feel the impacts of space activities terrestrially.  Having an abundant space economy is meaningless if the continual reentry of satellites destroys the ozone layer and renders the planet uninhabitable. Congress should continue to fund research on the upper atmosphere and protect research done by the NOAA Chemical Sciences Laboratory to understand the upper atmospheric impacts from human space activities.

The astronomy community has also voiced significant concerns about the impact of satellites on their observations.  Satellites show up as bright streaks in the sky when taking pictures and can cause significant disruption to radio telescopes and weather forecasting sensors, alike. This impact is not only felt by ground-based telescopes and sensors, but also those in orbit like the Hubble. This could have consequences for tracking other interstellar phenomena, including (but not limited to) space debris, space weather, cislunar space domain awareness, and planetary defense.  Further, light pollution inhibits our ability to discover new physics through astronomical observations–the Hubble Tension, neutrino mass problem, quantum gravity, and matter-antimatter imbalance all suggest that there are major discoveries waiting for us on the horizon. Failure to preserve the sky could inadvertently restrain our ability to unleash a technological revolution akin to the one that produced Einstein’s theory of relativity and the nuclear age.  

There is still much more work to be done to understand these topics and to develop workable solutions that can be adopted by new space actors. The bipartisan Dark and Quiet Skies Act, introduced in 2024, narrowly addresses but one of these needs; sustained support for NASA, NOAA, and NSF science are all necessary given the technology required for taking measurements in the stratosphere and advanced metrology.

Recommendation 2. Congress should create an independent Space Promotion and Regulatory Agency.

Ideally, Congress should create a new and independent space promotion and regulatory agency whose activities would include both the promotion of civil and commercial space activities and provide for authorization and supervision of all U.S.-based commercial space organizations.  This body, whose activities should be oriented to fulfilling U.S. obligations under the Outer Space Treaty, should be explicitly empowered to also engage in space traffic coordination or management, to manage liability for U.S. space organizations, and to rationalize all existing permitting processes under one organization. Staff from existing agencies (which is typically 2–25 people) should be relocated from existing departments and agencies to this new body to provide for continuity of operations and institutional knowledge.

Congress should seek to maintain a credible firewall between the promotion and regulatory elements of the organization.  The promotion element could be responsible for providing assistance to companies (including through loans and grants for technology and product development like the DOE Loan Programs Office, and also general advocacy). The regulatory element should be responsible for domestic licensing space activities, operating the Traffic Coordination System for Space (TraCSS), and any other supervision activities that may become necessary. This would be distinct from the existing Office of Space Commerce function in that the organization would be independent, have the ability to regulate space commerce, and ideally have resources to fulfill the advocacy and promotion elements of the mission.

In an ideal world, the Office of Space Commerce (OSC) would be able to fulfill this mission with an expanded mission mandate, regulatory authority, and actual resources to promote commercial space development. In practice, recent events under both administrations have pointed toward the office being isolated within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration under the Biden Administration while running into similar bottlenecks with the Secretary of Commerce in the second Trump Administration.  Independent authority and resourcing would not only give the director greater plenary authority, but also allow them to better balance the views of interagency partners (and hopefully shedding some of the baggage that comes from broader relationships between government departments with broad mandates).  

This recommendation explicitly does not suggest eliminating the FAA or OSC’s functions, but rather merging the two, preserving current staff and institutional knowledge, and allowing them to work in the same (and independent) organization to make it easier to share knowledge and information.  Creating a new regulatory agency on top of the FAA or OSC is not recommended; the purpose is to streamline.  Preference would be given toward assigning all of the functions to one actor or another rather than creating a new and duplicative function on top of the existing structures in Commerce and FAA.  

Given the significant terrestrial impact of spectrum issues related to space, delegating those functions to the FCC and NTIA probably still makes sense, so long as orbital debris and other space regulatory functions are consolidated into a new body that is clearly given such regulatory authority by Congress.

Recommendation 3. Congress should consider requiring that insurance be purchased for all space activities to address the Outer Space Treaty’s liability requirements.

Insurance ensures that nascent areas of growth are minimally disruptive to other interests, i.e. damaging critical infrastructures such as spraying GPS satellites with debris shrapnel, or harming the general public when skyscraper-sized pressurized fuel tanks explode on the ground. Insurance is broadly recognized for its ability to help create the type of market stability that is necessary for large capital investments and promote long-term infrastructure improvements.  

The participation of insurance markets is also more likely to encourage venture capital and financial industry participation in commercial space activities, moving the market from dependency on government funding toward self-sustaining commercial enterprise. Despite this, out of 13,000 active satellites, only about 300 are insured. The satellite insurance industry’s losses have been staggering over the last two years, making the pricing of risk difficult for new space actors and investors alike.  Correct pricing of risk is essential for investors to be able to make informed decisions about which companies or enterprises to invest in.

Current insurance covers $500 million in damages to third parties – any costs beyond this are drawn from the reservoir of the American taxpayer (unless damages exceed a ceiling cap for the government of about $3.1 billion). The current incentive structure favors the deployment of cheap, mass produced satellites over more sophisticated vehicles that drive technological leadership and progress.  The failure or loss of control over such assets can create a permanent hazard to the orbital environment and increase the risk of a collision cascade over the lifetime of the object.  Increasing the number of covered satellites should help more correctly price overall market risk, making space investments more accessible and attractive for companies looking to deploy commercial space stations; in space servicing, assembly, and manufacturing satellites; and other similarly sophisticated investments.  These types of technologies are more likely to contribute to abundance in the broader market, as opposed to a temporary, mass-produced investment that does only one thing and ends in a loss of everyone’s long-term access to specific orbits.

The Outer Space Treaty’s liability provisions make a healthy and risk-based insurance market particularly important. If a country or company invests in a small satellite swarm, and some percentage of that swarm goes defunct and produces a collision cascade and/or damages on-the ground assets, then U.S. entities (including the government) could be on the hook for potentially unlimited liabilities in a global multi-trillion dollar space economy.  It is almost certain that the United States government has not adequately accounted for such an event and that risk is not currently priced into the market.

A thriving insurance market can also help facilitate other forms of investment, which may become more confident in their investments and tolerant of other risks associated with investment. It would also serve as an important signal to international partners that the United States is willing to act responsibly in the orbital environment and has the capacity to create the financial incentive schemes to honor its commitments. By requiring insurance, Congress can use the prescriptive power of law to ensure transparency for both investors and the general public. 

Recommendation 4. The United States should create an inventory of abandoned objects and establish rules governing the abandonment of objects to enable commercial orbital salvage operations.

Given that Article 8 of the Outer Space Treaty could serve as an impediment to orbital debris removal, countries could establish rules or lists of objects that have reached end of life and are now effectively abandoned. The Treaty does not necessarily prevent State Parties from creating rules governing the authorization and supervision of objects, including transfer of ownership at the end of a mission. An inventory of abandoned objects that are “OK for recovery” could help manage concerns related to export controls, intellectual property, or other issues associated with one country recovering another country’s objects. Likewise, countries could also explore the creation of salvage rights or rules to incentivize orbital debris removal missions.

Recommendation 5. The State Department should seek equivalency for the United States under the EU Space Act as soon as possible, and seek to engage the EU in productive discussions to limit the probability of regulatory divergence, probably more than doubling the regulatory burden placed on U.S. companies.

With the introduction of the EU Space Act, the primary regulator for U.S. space companies with an international presence is likely to be the European Union. The U.S. Department of State should continue to pursue constructive engagement with the European Commission, Parliament, and Council to limit the risk of regulatory divergence and to ensure that the United States provides adequate safeguards to quickly achieve equivalency, obviating the need for U.S. space companies to worry about compliance with more than one country’s framework. This would ultimately result in lower regulatory burden for the United States, particularly if measures are taken to consolidate the existing U.S. space regulatory environment as described in Recommendation 2.

The failure of the U.S. to get its own house in order is likely to motivate other countries to take similar measures, increasing compliance costs for American companies while foreign operators may only need to rely on their domestic frameworks. Without equivalency, U.S. operators are likely to have to deal with multiple competing regulatory regimes, especially given the past history of other countries outside the EU adopting EU regulatory frameworks in order to secure market access (the Brussels Effect).

There is a foreign policy need for the U.S. and EU to get on the same page (and fast).  Given that companies from the United States are more likely to seek access to European markets than those in the PRC, an asymmetric space policy environment opens a new sphere for contentious policy negotiations between the U.S. and EU. Transatlantic alignment is likely to produce greater leverage in negotiations with the PRC while creating a more stable market where U.S. and European industry can both thrive. Similarly, an antagonistic relationship is more likely to push the European Union toward greater strategic autonomy. Fear of dependence on U.S. companies is already creating new barriers for the United States in other areas, and space has been specifically called out as a key area of concern.

Further, space actors are less familiar with the extent to which trade negotiations can result in asymmetric concessions that could disadvantage one industry to gain benefits in another. To put it bluntly, it is unlikely that President Trump will go to bat for SpaceX (especially given his current relationship with its owner) if it means giving up opportunities to sell American farm exports. One need only look at the recent semiconductor export controls decision, allegedly done to facilitate a bilateral meeting between the two presidents in Beijing.

Conclusion

Unlocking the abundance of the space economy, and doing so responsibly, will require the development of a stable and trustworthy regulatory environment, repairing frameworks that enable monopolistic behavior, and correct pricing of risk in order to facilitate sustainable investment in the outer space environment. Abundance in one realm at the expense of all others (like when a new spacecraft pauses all air traffic in the Caribbean after exploding) is no longer “abundance.” If the United States does not act soon, the deployment of more modern regulatory frameworks by other countries offering a more agile environment for new technology deployment is likely to accelerate the growth of their advantages in orbit. 

If space is there, and if we are going to climb it, then regulatory reform must be a challenge that we are willing to accept, something that we are unwilling to postpone, for a competition that we intend to win.

Washington, D.C. – March 7, 2025 – The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) is pleased to welcome Dr. Yong-Bee Lim as the new Associate Director of Global Risk. In this role, Dr. Lim will help develop, organize, and implement FAS’s growing contribution in the area of catastrophic risk prevention, including on core areas of nuclear weapons, AI and national security, space and other emerging technologies.  

“The role of informed, credible and engaging organizations in support of sound public policy is more important than ever” said Jon Wolfsthal, FAS Director of Global Risk. “Yong-Bee embodies what it means to be an effective policy entrepreneur and to make meaningful contributions to US and global security. We are really excited that he is now part of the FAS team.”

Dr. Lim is a recognized expert in biosecurity, emerging technologies, and converging risks through his former roles as Deputy Director of both the the Converging Risks Lab and the Janne E. Nolan Center at the Council on Strategic Risks, his research and leadership roles in academia, and through his work at key agencies (DoD, HHS/ASPR, and DoE) in the United States. He completed his Ph.D. in Biodefense from George Mason University’s Biodefense program, where he conducted critical work on understanding the safety, security, and cultural dimensions of the U.S.-based Do-It-Yourself Biology (DIYBio) community. His recent accolades include being in the inaugural fellowship class of the Editorial Fellows program at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and his selection and involvement in the Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity Initiative hosted by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security. 

“As emerging capabilities change the very contours of safety, security, and innovation, FAS has positioned itself to both highlight the global opportunities we must seize and address the global risks we must mitigate,” Lim said. “Founded in 1945, FAS continues to display thought leadership and impact because it has not forgotten its core mission: to ensure that scientific and technical expertise continue to have a seat at the policymaking table. I am honored to be part of an organization with a legacy and mission like FAS.”

ABOUT FAS

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) works to advance progress on a broad suite of issues where science, technology, and innovation policy can deliver transformative impact, and seeks to ensure that scientific and technical expertise have a seat at the policymaking table. Established in 1945 by scientists in response to the atomic bomb, FAS continues to bring scientific rigor and analysis to address contemporary challenges. More information about FAS work at fas.org and Global Risk, here.