A new compilation (large pdf) of official records, news releases and other documentation provides a fairly comprehensive account of the Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX), an ambitious missile defense program intended to track warheads in flight and to cue ground-based interceptor missiles.

The SBX, constructed aboard a modified semi-submersible oil platform, departed Hawaii last month and arrived this week in the waters near Alaska’s Aleutian Island chain, according to a February 7 release from the Missile Defense Agency.

Hundreds of pages of background material on the program were assembled by independent researcher Allen Thomson.

“The SBX story has been an interesting one, in my opinion, and I think it might become even more interesting when the history of NMD/GMD is written,” Mr. Thomson told Secrecy News. “Right now, I’m waiting to see if the second CS-50 platform nearing completion at Severodvinsk is going to be bought by Boeing for SBX-2.”

See “Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX) Sourcebook” by Allen Thomson (19 MB PDF).

Related background is also available from the Congressional Research Service in “Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense — Background and Issues for Congress” (pdf), updated December 19, 2006.

Noteworthy new publications from the U.S. Army on military doctrine and regulation include these (all pdf).

“Intelligence Support to Capability Development,” Army Regulation AR 381-11, 26 January 2007.

“Army Field Support Brigade Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures,” Field Manual Interim FMI 4-93.41, February 2007.

“Mortuary Affairs Operations,” Field Manual FM 4-20.64, January 2007.

Recent reports of the Congressional Research Service that are not readily available in the public domain include the following (all pdf).

“Navy Aegis Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress,” February 1, 2007.

“FY2008 Appropriations for State and Local Homeland Security,” February 5, 2007.

“Military Airlift: C-17 Aircraft Program,” updated January 25, 2007.

The interagency Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) has formally decided to endorse the proposed Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) concept as the basis of the future U.S. nuclear arsenal, a new report (pdf) from the Congressional Research Service revealed today.

In November 2006, “the NWC determined that the RRW is to be adopted as the strategy for maintaining a long term safe, secure and reliable nuclear deterrent,” the CRS report stated, quoting from new Department of Energy budget documents released this week (at page CRS-26).

It is a momentous decision on which Congress might be expected to weigh in.

Not only that, but RRW development will be funded at the expense of existing nuclear weapons programs, budget documents say, “through reductions in resources required to support legacy weapons” (at page CRS-27).

Defunding work to extend the functional lifetime of existing weapons would tend to foreclose efforts to avoid new nuclear weapons development.

According to a CRS calculation (and subject to future adjustments), the projected budget for the RRW program from FY 2008-2012 would be $725.1 million, including NNSA and Navy funds.

The Congressional Research Service does not release its publications directly to the public. A copy of the new report was obtained by Secrecy News and posted on the Federation of American Scientists web site.

See “Nuclear Weapons: The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program,” updated February 8, 2007.

Some more noteworthy new reports from the Congressional Research Service that are not readily available in the public domain include these (all pdf).

“Freedom of Information Act Amendments: 110th Congress,” updated February 1, 2007.

“Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy and Implementation,” updated January 8, 2007.

“Earthquakes: Risk, Monitoring, Notification, and Research,” February 2, 2007.

It is the policy of the United States to develop medical countermeasures that could be used in response to an attack involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons, according to a new Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-18) issued by President Bush on Medical Countermeasures Against Weapons of Mass Destruction.

A bill introduced in the House of Representatives would “prohibit the use of funds to carry out any covert action for the purpose of causing regime change in Iran or to carry out any military action against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat….”

The U.S. Navy says that its declassification programs are on track to meet all current and future milestones, according to a January 24, 2007 briefing (pdf) to the Secretary of the Navy Declassification Oversight Committee.

The American Library Association is seeking nominations for its James Madison Award, presented to “individuals or groups that have championed, protected, and promoted public access to government information and the public’s right to know.”

Ulysses, a joint NASA-European Space Agency spacecraft launched in 1990, passed beneath the south pole of the Sun yesterday (at a distance of 200 million miles).

In an extraordinary internal challenge to the unruly Office of the Vice President (OVP), the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) has formally petitioned the Attorney General to direct the OVP to comply with a requirement that executive branch organizations disclose statistics on their classification and declassification activity to ISOO.

For the last three years, Vice President Cheney’s office has refused to divulge its classification statistics to ISOO, despite a seemingly explicit requirement that it do so. Prior to 2002, such information had routinely been transmitted and reported in ISOO’s annual reports to the President.

The disclosure requirement appears in ISOO Directive 1 (at section 2001.80): “Each agency that creates or handles classified information shall report annually to the Director of ISOO statistics related to its security classification program.”

Such ISOO directives “shall be binding upon the agencies,” President Bush wrote in Executive Order 13292 (section 5.1). Significantly, an “agency” here means not only a statutorily-defined executive branch agency (which would not include the OVP), but also refers to “any other entity within the executive branch that comes into the possession of classified information” (which would include the OVP).

Last May, the Federation of American Scientists urged ISOO to press for the Vice President’s compliance.

“Since the Office of the Vice President has publicly staked out a position that openly defies the plain language of the executive order, ISOO now has a responsibility to clarify the matter,” we wrote (pdf) at that time. “Otherwise, every agency will feel free to re-interpret the order in idiosyncratic and self-serving ways.”

This week ISOO indicated that it was actively pursuing the matter.

“With respect to the question you raised, I was unsuccessful in achieving a common understanding with OVP,” wrote ISOO director J. William Leonard in a February 5 email message.

“Accordingly, in early January, pursuant to section 6.2(b), Executive Order 12958, as amended, I wrote the Attorney General requesting that he render an interpretation on the issue,” he wrote.

(Section 6.2(b) of the executive order states that “The Attorney General, upon request by the head of an agency or the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, shall render an interpretation of this order with respect to any question arising in the course of its administration.”)

“I have not received a reply to this request as of yet,” Mr. Leonard wrote.

He declined to provide a copy of his January letter to the Attorney General, explaining that it is pre-decisional.

The Justice Department has been asked at least once before to resolve a dispute over implementation of the executive order on classification.

In 1999, the Central Intelligence Agency refused to accept the jurisdiction of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel over Agency classification activity. But the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel issued a ruling in October 1999 that the CIA classification decisions were indeed subject to ISCAP review. That state of affairs was modified by President Bush in 2003, when he effectively gave the Director of Central Intelligence a veto over ISCAP decisions.

A U.S. Army manual on psychological operations (pdf) elaborates upon the role of PSYOP in military activities.

“The employment of any element of national power, particularly the military element, has always had a psychological dimension. Foreign perceptions of U.S. military capabilities are fundamental to strategic deterrence. The effectiveness of deterrence hinges on U.S. ability to influence the perceptions of others.”

“The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to U.S. national objectives… When properly employed, PSYOP can save lives of friendly and adversary forces by reducing the adversaries’ will to fight. By lowering adversary morale and reducing their efficiency, PSYOP can also discourage aggressive actions and create dissidence and disaffection within their ranks, ultimately inducing surrender.”

The 179 page manual has not been approved for public release, but a copy was obtained by Secrecy News.

See “Psychological Operations,” Field Manual FM 3-05.30, April 2005.

Secrecy News was sad to learn that Lee S. Strickland, a former Central Intelligence Agency official, died on January 23.

We first encountered him perhaps 15 years ago when he was the head of the CIA Freedom of Information office, where he used to reliably deny our FOIA requests. Over the years he seemed to enlarge his horizons and to admit the possibility of contrasting views. He taught his students at the University of Maryland that information policy could be exciting as well as important. And he was a nice guy.

See this obituary for Lee Strickland from the University of Maryland College of Information Studies.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) “continues to receive information on terrorist threats to the U.S. aviation industry and to the Western aviation industry worldwide,” according to a May 2006 DHS threat assessment (pdf) that was partially released last week.

Yet “an independent assault at the Los Angeles International Airport in July 2002 that left two dead and four wounded near the El Al ticket counter remains the sole successful aviation-related terrorist attack within the United States since 11 September 2001,” the document noted.

Approximately two-thirds of the unclassified DHS aviation threat assessment was withheld from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. But all of the endnotes were disclosed, including open source references to remotely piloted vehicles, lasers, parachutes and shoulder-fired missiles.

See “Strategic Sector Assessment: U.S. Aviation,” DHS Homeland Infrastructure Threat & Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC), 18 May 2006 (redacted for public release).

The U.S. Navy has issued updated instructions on the use of nicknames to refer to Navy activities, events and other information.

“A nickname is a combination of two separate unclassified words, assigned an unclassified meaning that is employed for unclassified, administrative, morale, or public information purposes. Nicknames may be assigned to actual, real-world events, projects, movement of forces, or other non-exercise activities,” the new policy states.

“Nicknames should not be confused with code words. A code word is a single word assigned a classified meaning by appropriate authority to ensure proper security concerning intentions and to safeguard information pertaining to actual, real-world military plans or operations classified as CONFIDENTIAL or higher once activated.”

The choice of nicknames should not “express a degree of aggression inconsistent with traditional American ideals or current foreign policy.” Nor should it “convey anything offensive to good taste or derogatory to a particular group, sect, or creed.”

See “Code Word, Nicknames, and Exercise Terminology System” (pdf), OPNAVINST 5511.37D, January 30, 2007.

A dictionary of thousands of code words, nicknames and related terms was compiled by Bill Arkin in Code Names, published in 2005.

Noncombatant evacuation operations are addressed in a new doctrinal publication (pdf) from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

“Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are conducted to assist the Department of State (DOS) in evacuating US citizens, Department of Defense (DOD) civilian personnel, and designated host nation (HN) and third country nationals whose lives are in danger from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven.”

As generic doctrine, the 169-page document contains but a single passing reference to Iraq, and does not address the question of U.S. obligations toward Iraqi non-combatants.

See “Noncombatant Evacuation Operations,” Joint Publication 3-68, January 22, 2007.