Senior military leaders of the Russian Federation were profiled last December by the Russian publication “Rossiyskoye Voyennoye Obozreniye” and the resulting compilation was recently translated by the DNI Open Source Center (OSC).  The personal and professional backgrounds of some two dozen military leaders are summarized and accompanied by photographs, some of which are quite striking.

The OSC translation has not been approved for public release, but a copy was obtained by Secrecy News.  See “Russia: Biographies, Photos of RF Armed Forces Leadership,” Rossiyskoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, December 29, 2008, via the Open Source Center.

Between 1978 and 2004, the annual intelligence authorization bill was the principal vehicle for the congressional intelligence committees to assert their influence and control over U.S. intelligence agencies, by modifying agency statutory authorities and imposing reporting requirements.

So the failure of Congress to pass an intelligence authorization bill since December 2004 is a significant handicap to the oversight committees and inevitably constitutes a diminution of their own authority and influence.

But even so, the intelligence committees have remained at the center of momentous intelligence policy debates, sometimes intervening in Administration policy and sometimes acquiescing in it.

A new report from the Senate Intelligence Committee summarizes the Committee’s activities in the last Congress, in which it addressed a host of major and minor issues from the amendment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to the proposed expansion of the authorities of the Public Interest Declassification Board.

The 50-page report contains much that is familiar, along with some new details on staff study projects, “the poor status of IC financial management,” the Committee’s own difficulty in obtaining information from the Administration, and other topics.  See “Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, Covering the Period January 4, 2007 to January 2, 2009,” published March 2, 2009.

One qualitative change in intelligence oversight that is not mentioned in the new report is that the Committee no longer publishes intelligence agency answers to Questions for the Record that are submitted following the Committee’s annual intelligence threat hearing.

In the past, richly substantive agency answers to Committee questions would appear in the published hearing volume late in the year.  But now the intelligence agencies no longer provide, and the Committee no longer demands, unclassified answers to such questions.  The last time they were published was in the 2003 hearing volume on “Current and Projected Threats to the National Security of the United States” (pdf).

The significance of the continuing failure to pass an intelligence authorization bill was assessed in “Intelligence Authorization Legislation: Status and Challenges” (pdf), Congressional Research Service, February 24, 2009.

Secrecy News previously criticized the White House web site for failing, among other things, to provide a current roster of members of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board.  (“White House Web Site Off to a Slow Start,” Secrecy News, March 9.)

But it turns out that there are no current members, since the entire membership of the Board resigned at the end of the previous Administration.

A White House official told Ben Lando of Iraq Oil Report that the previous members resigned by mutual agreement during the presidential transition and that the Board is now vacant.

“It will not be a matter of months” until new PIAB members are appointed but “maybe a matter of weeks,” Iraq Oil Report quoted the official.  See “Texas oilman Ray Hunt is no longer serving as a presidential adviser on intelligence issues,” Iraq Oil Report, March 17 (at bottom of page).

The People’s Republic of China has significantly increased its foreign aid to Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia from less than $1 billion in 2002 to an estimated $25 billion in 2007, according to recent academic research.

The motivations, intentions and impact of this activity are examined in a new report from the Congressional Research Service that has not been made readily available to the public. See “China’s Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia” (pdf), February 25, 2009.

A 2008 Defense Department study of future national security trends seems to have escaped many of the conventional filters that normally limit the candor of such public documents.

As previously noted, the Joint Operational Environment 2008 (JOE 2008) study set off alarms in South Korea because of its discussion of North Korean nuclear weapons and it aggravated Mexican officials with its consideration of potential political instability in that country.  (“DoD Future Trend Study Provokes Foreign Reaction,” Secrecy News, March 5.)

But JOE 2008 also departed from the norm in U.S. Government documents by identifying Israel as a nuclear weapons state.

“In effect, there is a growing arc of nuclear powers running from Israel in the west through an emerging Iran to Pakistan, India, and on to China, North Korea, and Russia in the east,” JOE 2008 stated (pdf, at page 37) in a discussion of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The unusual reference to Israel’s nuclear status was noticed by Amir Oren in Ha’aretz, who explained that “Israel’s nuclear program is rarely, if ever, explicitly mentioned in public, unclassified U.S. official documents.”  See “U.S. Army document describes Israel as ‘a nuclear power’,” Ha’aretz, March 8.

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) is a “front company” that seeks “to expose national security information,” according to a new briefing on classification policy prepared by a U.S. Marine Corps official.  See “Derivative Classification Requirements 2009” (pdf), U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific.

The 13 page briefing, which pedantically explains the proper marking of derivatively classified records, suddenly veers off at page 10 into a factually mistaken claim that “all classified material is being challenged with a view to declassification.”

Out of nowhere, the anonymous briefer asserts that “The Federation of American Scientists is a good example of a front company trying to expose National Security Information under the pretense [probably should be: pretext] of ‘World Peace’.”

“‘No secrets in government’ is their mantra,” the briefing states.

That’s close, but the correct mantra is “No stupidity in government.”

The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) that was established by classified presidential directive (NSPD 54 and HSPD 23) in January 2008 is deliberately opaque, and there is little specific information in the public domain about its conduct or performance to date.

“Much remains unknown about the CNCI due to the classified nature of the presidential directives and supporting implementation documents,” says a new report (pdf) from the Congressional Research Service.

But the CRS report summarizes what has been disclosed, and illuminates many of the ensuing questions raised by the Initiative.  These include the extent of its underlying legal authority; the respective roles of the executive and legislative branches on cybersecurity; the involvement of the private sector; the impact of privacy considerations; and even the possibility that offensive or defensive cybersecurity activities would fall into the category of “covert action.”

See “Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative: Legal Authorities and Policy Considerations,” March 10, 2009.

“A chief concern” about the Initiative, the Senate Armed Services Committee declared last year, “is that virtually everything about [it] is highly classified, and most of the information that is not classified is categorized as `For Official Use Only’.”

“These restrictions preclude public education, awareness, and debate about the policy and legal issues, real or imagined, that the initiative poses in the areas of privacy and civil liberties. Without such debate and awareness in such important and sensitive areas, it is likely that the initiative will make slow or modest progress. The committee strongly urges the administration to reconsider the necessity and wisdom of the blanket, indiscriminate classification levels established for the initiative.” (“Cyber Security Initiative is Too Secret, SASC Says,” Secrecy News, May 15, 2008.)

On February 9, 2009 President Obama ordered a 60-day review of cybersecurity policy.

One way “to enhance citizen access to Government information,” a new Senate bill proposes, would be to require that Government documents “must be written clearly.”

By insisting on plain language in official documents, the bill “promotes transparency and accountability,” said lead sponsor Sen. Daniel Akaka.  “It is very difficult to hold the Federal Government accountable for its actions if only lawyers can understand Government writing. As we face an economic crisis and unprecedented budget deficits, the American people need clear explanations of Government actions.”

See “Introduction of the Plain Writing Act of 2009,” March 11.  A similar bill (HR 946) was introduced in the House last month.

Another Senate bill tackles the problem of judicial secrecy orders and confidential court settlements that deprive the public of significant health or safety information.

“The Sunshine in Litigation Act is a modest proposal that would require federal judges to perform a simple balancing test to ensure that in any proposed secrecy order, the defendant’s interest in secrecy truly outweighs the public interest in information related to public health and safety,” said Sen. Herb Kohl.

“Specifically, prior to making any portion of a case confidential or sealed, a judge would have to determine–by making a particularized finding of fact–that doing so would not restrict the disclosure of information relevant to public health and safety,” he said.

Speaking of sunshine, next week (March 15-21) is “Sunshine Week,” a national campaign to promote values of open government and freedom of information.  Background information and a calendar of events can be found here.

Noteworthy new reports from the Congressional Research Service obtained by Secrecy News include the following (all pdf).

“North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons,” February 12, 2009.

“Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests,” February 19, 2009.

“The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation,” March 10, 2009.

In an awkward and disturbing irony, the most significant bioterrorism incident in the U.S. to date — i.e., the 2001 anthrax attacks — apparently originated in a U.S. military laboratory that was engaged in biological defense research.  Yet the pursuit of such research, and perhaps the associated threat, has continued to expand.

“No one in the Federal Government even knows for sure how many of these labs there are in the United States, much less what research they are doing or whether they are safe and secure,” said Rep. Bart Stupak at a 2007 congressional hearing, the record of which has recently been published.  “What we do know is that the Federal Government has been funding the proliferation of these labs on an unprecedented scale.”

See “Germs, Viruses, and Secrets: The Silent Proliferation of Bio-Laboratories in the United States” (pdf), House Committee on Energy and Commerce, October 4, 2007 (published December 2008).

“High-containment laboratories play a critical role in the biodefense effort, offering the hope of better responses to an attack and a better understanding of the threat posed by bioterrorism,” according to a new report (pdf) from the Congressional Research Service. “However, they also could increase the risk of a biological attack by serving as a potential source of materials or training.”

One approach to mitigating that risk would be to curtail such research.  Another approach, which is explored in the new CRS report, is to expand oversight of biodefense research facilities.  A copy of the new report was obtained by Secrecy News.  See “Oversight of High-Containment Biological Laboratories: Issues for Congress,” March 5, 2009.

“If scientific and technological information is developed and used by the Federal Government, it should ordinarily be made available to the public,” according to a new memorandum on “Scientific Integrity” that was issued by President Obama on March 9.

Another presidential memorandum promises to limit the use of “presidential signing statements” that raise constitutional objections to provisions of enacted legislation.  President Obama said that whenever he issues such a signing statement, he will “make clear the nature and basis of the constitutional objection.”  By contrast, many signing statements that were produced by the Bush White House employed broad, formulaic objections whose scope and precise application were unclear.

Chinese ships harassed a U.S. ship last Sunday in the South China Sea, prompting a formal U.S. government protest.  The Chinese actions were “dangerous” and “unprofessional,” according to the Pentagon.

But a Chinese government spokesman rejected the complaint.  “The U.S. claims are gravely in contravention of the facts and confuse black and white, and they are totally unacceptable to China,” said Ma Zhaoxu of the Foreign Ministry, as reported in the Los Angeles Times.

“The time is long overdue for an agreement to regulate military operations” between the two countries, writes my FAS colleague Hans Kristensen in an illuminating blog post that explains the background to the confrontation, including information about the surveillance mission of the U.S. vessel.  See “US-Chinese Anti-Submarine Cat and Mouse Game in South China Sea,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, March 9.

In fact, there is a 1998 agreement between the U.S. and China that established a “consultation mechanism to strengthen military maritime safety.”  But it was evidently inadequate to meet the needs of this latest dispute.

If anything good could come out of this episode, it would be to provide a foundation for a negotiated agreement between the United States and China on “Incidents at Sea” like the one between the U.S. and the Russian Federation.

The origins of that 1972 Agreement date back forty years.  Prior to 1968, a recent Navy Instruction (pdf) recalled, “numerous [incidents at sea] involving harassment or interference occurred between units of the Soviet and United States Naval surface and air forces.”  But the subsequent Agreement, which provided procedures for orderly contact and dispute resolution, “greatly reduced friction between the U.S. and Soviet/Russian Navies.”  See “United States/Russian Federation Incidents at Sea and Dangerous Military Activities Agreements,” OPNAV Instruction 5711.96C, November 10, 2008.

The new Instruction provides a table of standard communication signals for use in navy-to-navy contacts.  Thus “TX2” means “I am engaged in monitoring sea pollution” while “UY2” means “I am preparing to conduct missile exercises.”

“ZL3” means “your signal has been received but not understood.”