Pentagon Says It Does Not Conduct Surveillance of Journalists
“The Department of Defense does not conduct electronic or physical surveillance of journalists” as a way of preventing leaks of classified information, Pentagon press spokesman George E. Little wrote last week.
But Department officials do “review media reports for possible unauthorized disclosure of classified information,” he said.
Mr. Little was responding to a July 20 letter from leaders of the Pentagon Press Association, who questioned the nature of DoD’s intention to “monitor all major, national level reporting” for evidence of leaks. (“Reporters Seek Clarification of Pentagon Anti-Leak Policy,” Secrecy News, July 23, 2012)
“The Secretary and Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs] both believe strongly in freedom of the press and encourage good relations between the Department and the press corps,” Mr. Little wrote in his letter, which was first reported in Politico. “Their efforts to stop the unauthorized disclosures of classified information do not involve restricting press access to DoD officials.”
The Purple Heart, and More from CRS
New reports from the Congressional Research Service that have not been made publicly available include the following.
The Purple Heart: Background and Issues for Congress, September 7, 2012
The National Labor Relations Act: Background and Selected Topics, September 7, 2012
Federal Public Transportation Program: An Overview, September 6, 2012
Unemployment Compensation (UC): Eligibility for Students Under State and Federal Laws, September 7, 2012
The Senior Executive Service: Background and Options for Reform, updated September 6, 2012
Records of 1940 Katyn Massacre Declassified
The National Archives announced that it has declassified over a thousand pages of records pertaining to the 1940 massacre of thousands of Polish Army officers and intellectuals in the Katyn Forest in the Soviet Union.
The Katyn massacre has been a subject of intense interest and controversy in Poland, as well as a perennial irritant in Polish-Russian relations. The question of US knowledge of the massacre, and the possibility of a US coverup designed to protect the World War II alliance with the Soviet Union, has been a topic of speculation in the Polish press which some Polish observers hoped might be confirmed by the newly declassified records.
Drones in Domestic Surveillance Operations, and More from CRS
“The prospect of drone use inside the United States raises far-reaching issues concerning the extent of government surveillance authority, the value of privacy in the digital age, and the role of Congress in reconciling these issues,” says a new report on the subject from the Congressional Research Service.
“This report assesses the use of drones under the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. A reviewing court’s determination of the reasonableness of drone surveillance would likely be informed by location of the search, the sophistication of the technology used, and society’s conception of privacy in an age of rapid technological advancement.”
“While individuals can expect substantial protections against warrantless government intrusions into their homes, the Fourth Amendment offers less robust restrictions upon government surveillance occurring in public places and perhaps even less in areas immediately outside the home, such as in driveways or backyards. Concomitantly, as technology advances, the contours of what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment may adjust as people’s expectations of privacy evolve.”
The new report reviews the relevant Fourth Amendment landscape, the current status of drone technology and applications, and pending legislation on the subject. A copy was obtained by Secrecy News. See Drones in Domestic Surveillance Operations: Fourth Amendment Implications and Legislative Responses, September 6, 2012.
Other noteworthy new CRS reports that Congress has declined to make publicly available include the following.
The “Fiscal Cliff”: Macroeconomic Consequences of Tax Increases and Spending Cuts, September 5, 2012
The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty-Eight Years, September 5, 2012
Stafford Act Declarations 1953-2011: Trends and Analyses, and Implications for Congress, August 31, 2012
NFIB v. Sebelius: Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate, September 3, 2012
Search and Seizure Cases in the October 2012 Term of the Supreme Court, September 4, 2012
Greater Autonomy for Unmanned Military Systems Urged
The Department of Defense should focus on increasing the autonomy of drones and other unmanned military systems, a new report from the Defense Science Board said.
DoD should “more aggressively use autonomy in military missions,” the Board report said, because currently “autonomy technology is being underutilized.” See “The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems,” Defense Science Board, dated July 2012 and released last week.
“Autonomy” in this context does not mean “computers making independent decisions and taking uncontrolled action.” The Board is not calling for the immediate development of Skynet at this time. Rather, autonomy refers to the automation of a particular function within programmed limits. “It should be made clear that all autonomous systems are supervised by human operators at some level,” the report stressed.
Increased autonomy for unmanned military systems “can enable humans to delegate those tasks that are more effectively done by computer… thus freeing humans to focus on more complex decision making.”
“However, the true value of these systems is not to provide a direct human replacement, but rather to extend and complement human capability by providing potentially unlimited persistent capabilities, reducing human exposure to life threatening tasks, and with proper design, reducing the high cognitive load currently placed on operators/supervisors.”
But all of that is easier said than done.
“Current designs of autonomous systems, and current design methods for increasing autonomy, can create brittle platforms” that are subject to irreversible error. There are also “new failure paths associated with more autonomous platforms, which has been seen in friendly fire fatalities…. This brittleness, which is resident in many current designs, has severely retarded the potential benefits that could be obtained by using advances in autonomy.”
The Defense Science Board report discusses the institutional challenges confronting a move toward increasing autonomy, including the obstacles posed by proprietary software. It offers an extended discussion of conflict scenarios in which the enemy employs its own autonomous systems against U.S. forces. The authors describe China’s “alarming” investment in unmanned systems, and encourage particular attention to the relatively neglected topic of the vulnerability of unmanned systems.
The report includes some intriguing citations, such as a volume on “Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots,” and presents numerous incidental observations of interest. For example:
“Big data has evolved as a major problem at the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA). Over 25 million minutes of full motion video are stored at NGA.”
But new sensors will produce “exponentially more data” than full motion video, and will overwhelm current analytical capabilities.
“Today nineteen analysts are required per UAV orbit [i.e. per 24 hour operational cycle]. With the advent of Gorgon Stare, ARGUS, and other Broad Area Sensors, up to 2,000 analysts will be required per orbit.”
The government “can’t hire enough analysts or buy enough equipment to close these gaps.”
New Army Doctrinal Publications on Intelligence, Special Ops
The U.S. Army has recently begun publishing two new series of Army Doctrine Publications (ADP) and Army Doctrine Reference Publications (ADRP).
These publications generally offer a digest of existing doctrine in introductory form for broad consumption, with limited modifications and a few updates. Last week, the Army issued new unclassified publications on intelligence and special operations, among other topics.
Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations, and More from CRS
New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that Congress has chosen not to make available to the public include the following.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress, September 5, 2012
Weather-Related Power Outages and Electric System Resiliency, August 28, 2012
SBA Veterans Assistance Programs: An Analysis of Contemporary Issues, September 4, 2012
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, September 4, 2012
Immigration Detainers: Legal Issues, August 31, 2012
Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, updated August 31, 2012
Defense: FY2013 Authorization and Appropriations, updated September 5, 2012
US-Israel Military Exercises Spawn Mixed Messages
Updated below
Throughout much of this year, the U.S. military has been conducting joint military exercises with Israel or planning such exercises. A descriptive listing of 2012 U.S. exercises with Israel bearing codenames like NOBLE MELINDA and RELIANT MERMAID was recently published in a House Armed Services Committee hearing volume on the FY2013 budget request for U.S. European Command (EUCOM). The listing was current as of March 2012; the schedule has shifted somewhat since then.
Whatever their intrinsic military value may be, the exercises also serve a messaging function. They constitute signals to internal and external audiences concerning the state of the U.S.-Israel alliance.
The “robust bilateral and multilateral military exercise program offers the Israel Defense Forces strong reassurances of the United States’ strong commitment to the security of Israel,” said Adm. James G. Stavridis, the EUCOM Commander.
However, the specific content of the messages being sent by the exercises is sometimes ambiguous and subject to contrasting, divergent interpretations.
Time Magazine reported on Friday that the pending exercise known as AUSTERE CHALLENGE was going to be reduced in scale. The downsizing of the exercise was perceived by some as an effort to discourage any unilateral Israeli attack on Iran as well as a signal of a U.S. loss of confidence in Israel. “Basically what the Americans are saying is, ‘We don’t trust you’,” an Israeli official told Time. (“U.S. Scales-Back Military Exercise with Israel, Affecting Potential Iran Strike” by Karl Vick and Aaron J. Klein, August 31.)
But the New York Times reported Sunday that pending military exercises were meant to reassure Israel, to strengthen military pressure against Iran and to reduce incentives for unilateral action. (“To Calm Israel, U.S. Offers Ways to Restrain Iran” by David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, September 2.)
In the newly published responses to questions for the record from the House Armed Services Committee, US EUCOM Commander Adm. Stavridis disputed the assertion by Rep. Robert J. Wittman (R-VA) that threats to Israel had “increased in the last year.”
“While Israel is certainly in a volatile region of the world, I would argue that the threats to Israel have not increased in the last year,” Adm. Stavridis wrote.
“If you take the broad view of the history of the modern state of Israel, it is certainly more secure now that it was in 1948, 1967, 1973, or even during the First or Second Intifadas. Israel currently has signed peace treaties with two of its four neighbors. A third neighbor, Syria, is currently undergoing a period of serious internal unrest and is in no position to threaten Israel militarily. The terrorist threat posed by Lebanese Hezbollah from within the fourth neighbor has been deterred from overt attacks since the war in 2006. Moreover, the Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas has renounced violence. Unrest in the West Bank has subsided significantly over the last few years,” Adm. Stavridis wrote.
Update: The Department of Defense responded to the Time Magazine story about AUSTERE CHALLENGE at a September 4 news briefing:
“Austere Challenge 12 is a bilateral ballistic missile defense exercise between the United States and Israel that provides important training for the defense of both nations. The exercise was originally scheduled for May. However, at the request of the Israeli Ministry of Defense and Israeli Defense Forces, the exercise was moved — was moved to late fall of this year. That decision was addressed by Secretary Panetta from this podium in January, as well as others, including me, in subsequent media briefings.”
“When the exercise was moved, the United States notified Israel that, due to concurrent operations, the United States would provide a smaller number of personnel than originally planned, and Israel reiterated its request to postpone the exercise until late fall. The fact of the matter is that this exercise remains the largest ever ballistic missile defense exercise between our nations and a significant increase from the previous exercise a few years ago. The exercise has not changed in scope and will include the same types of systems as planned. All deployed systems will be fully operational with their associated operators, including the missile interceptors.”
“As Minister of Defense Ehud Barak has repeatedly said, the U.S.-Israel defense relationship is stronger than it has ever been, and we couldn’t agree more. This exercise is a tangible sign of our mutual trust and our shared commitment to the defense of our two nations.”
DoD Security Policy is Incoherent and Unmanageable, IG Says
“DoD security policy is fragmented, redundant, and inconsistent,” according to a new report from the Department of Defense Inspector General. This is not a new development, the report noted, but one that has persisted despite decades of criticism.
There are at least 43 distinct DoD security policies “covering the functional areas of information security, industrial security, operations security, research and technology protection, personnel security, physical security, and special access programs,” the Inspector General report noted.
“The sheer volume of security policies that are not coordinated or integrated makes it difficult for those at the field level to ensure consistent and comprehensive policy implementation.”
The solution to this fragmentation and incoherence is the development of a comprehensive and integrated security policy, the IG report said.
Lacking an integrated framework and an “overarching security policy…, [the] resulting policy can be stove-piped, overlapping and contradictory.”
The issuance of such an overarching security policy, described as “the necessary first step,” is expected later this year.
See “Assessment of Security Within the Department of Defense — Security Policy,” DoD Inspector General report DoDIG-2012-114, July 27, 2012.
Promoting Global Internet Freedom, and More from CRS
Newly updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that have not been made publicly available include the following.
Promoting Global Internet Freedom: Policy and Technology, updated August 30, 2012
Vulnerable Youth: Background and Policies, updated August 29, 2012
Researching Current Federal Legislation and Regulations: A Guide to Resources for Congressional Staff, updated August 31, 2012
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress, updated August 27, 2012
War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance, updated August 30, 2012
Venezuela: Issues for Congress, updated August 30, 2012
Fundamental Review Leads to Some Reductions in Secrecy
The classification guides that function as the framework for national security secrecy underwent a substantial overhaul during the past two years. As a result of the Fundamental Classification Guidance Review, a large fraction of existing classification guidance has been eliminated, and at least some existing categories of classified information have been declassified.
Out of 3,103 classification guides, or compilations of classification instructions, that were reviewed by national security agencies, 869 were either cancelled or consolidated, the National Archives announced in a news release today.
The purpose of the Fundamental Classification Guidance Review, mandated by President Obama’s executive order 13526 (section 1.9), was “to ensure the guidance reflects current circumstances and to identify classified information that no longer requires protection and can be declassified.”
The newly revised guidance should provide increased clarity and specificity about what is to be classified, along with greater traceability in identifying the justification for classification.
But it is less clear that the Review will result in a diminished volume of classified information.
John Fitzpatrick, the director of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), had asked agencies to address “how much information that was classified is no longer classified as a result of the Review.”
Despite his instruction, most agencies did not discuss this central issue in their reports to ISOO. But a few of them did.
The Department of Homeland Security indicated that 157 previously classified subtopics “were determined to no longer require classification.”
The Central Intelligence Agency reported that “some previously classified information [is] now listed as ‘unclassified'” following the Fundamental Review.
“Several categories of telecommunications information previously classified will no longer be classified,” the State Department said in its report.
Although the Fundamental Review was supposed to incorporate the “broadest possible range of perspectives” (according to the 2010 ISOO implementing directive), most agencies did not consult persons outside their agency, and none of them provided for public input, as far as is known. (By contrast, the Department of Energy’s 1995 Fundamental Classification Policy Review, which served as a prototype for the present Review, invited public comment at the beginning and the end of the process.)
It is a demonstrable fact that agencies left to their own devices will overclassify information or classify it unnecessarily. Whenever outside review is permitted, even if it is just within the executive branch, agency classification decisions are regularly overturned, as the record of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel consistently shows.
It follows that by limiting the scope of external review, and excluding public input altogether, the impact of the Fundamental Classification Guidance Review on curbing overclassification was more muted than it could have been.
Internet Firearm Sales, and More from CRS
New reports from the Congressional Research Service that Congress has declined to make publicly available include the following.
Internet Firearm and Ammunition Sales, August 28, 2012
Political Ads: Issue Advocacy or Campaign Activity Under the Tax Code?, August 29, 2012
U.S. Foreign-Trade Zones: Background and Issues for Congress, August 28, 2012
Critical Infrastructure Resilience: The Evolution of Policy and Programs and Issues for Congress, August 23, 2012
Stealing Trade Secrets and Economic Espionage: An Overview of U.S.C. 1831 and 1832, August 28, 2012