The Public Interest Declassification Board, a White House advisory body, was asked by President Obama to develop recommendations for a “fundamental transformation” of the national security classification system. The Board developed several proposals of its own and solicited others from interested members of the public. All of those, including one from the Federation of American Scientists, have now been posted online for public comment.
The Board will hold a public meeting on May 26 at the National Archives to discuss the proposals.
While well-intentioned, the process suffers from several limitations. First, the President did not specify what manner of “transformation” he had in mind. This is problematic because the path selected for transformation naturally depends on the desired goal. Second, the Board has no particular influence or leverage that it can exert to advance its ultimate recommendations. Even at the White House, most relevant national security personnel seem to be unaware of or uninterested in the Board’s deliberations. Finally, there is no internal incentive to drive transformation and no visible leadership to compel it.
In truth, the classification system is undergoing transformation at every moment, but mostly in undesirable ways. Thus, during President Obama’s first full year in office, the number of “original classification decisions,” or new secrets, grew by 22.6 percent, according to the latest annual report (pdf) from the Information Security Oversight Office.
DNA synthesis and export controls remain the primary regulatory safeguards against de novo production of harmful biological agents, yet governance frameworks lack the situational awareness and enforcement capacity to keep pace with rapidly falling technical barriers.
Called today to speak on behalf of U.S. science and technology, Dr. Jedidah Isler, astrophysicist, educator, strategist, policy-maker, and science communicator, will provide constructive, nonpartisan feedback to the House Committee’s hearing “American Global Competitiveness at 250: Legislative Proposals to Secure U.S. Technology Leadership.”
“Federal data and access to it is not a partisan issue. It is a people issue. Our country cannot achieve greatness without access to the data that measure what we value, who we are, and where we’re heading.”
The United States’ biosecurity governance system is structurally incapable of detecting and responding to certain classes of threats. U.S. biosecurity tools have not kept pace with technological advancements or a changing threat landscape.