Remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and Question And Answer Session at National Press Club

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Spokesman For Immediate
Release November 2, 2000 As Delivered

Remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and Question
And Answer Session at National Press Club

Washington, D.C.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Thank you very much, Jack, and good morning
to you all. I appreciate very much that all of you are here. I
expect that some of you may still be recovering from Halloween.
I know that I am, and I have never had so much fun. Of course, I
also have never walked around a neighborhood knocking on doors
costumed as Barry Schweid. (Laughter.) I had to do far fewer
tricks and got many more treats.

But now down to business. Today, I want to report to you - and,
through you, to the American people - regarding my recent trip
to the Democratic People,s Republic of Korea. This visit is part
of a historic process aimed at creating lasting stability on the
Korean Peninsula, the world,s most prominent remaining Cold War
frontier. This process is a key component of the Clinton
Administration,s strategy for promoting peace and for reducing
the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction. It embodies an
approach, developed with our close allies in Seoul and Tokyo, for
building, if we can, a new and mutually beneficial relationship
with Pyongyang.

I said on the day that I took office that I would do all I could
to explain clearly the who, what, how, and especially the why,s
of American foreign policy. That is especially vital on this
subject, because the process in which we are engaged is long
term. Even if all goes well, it will require sustained
congressional and public support to succeed. The next president
will have to choose whether to continue down the path we have
begun. Respectfully, I hope he will and believe he should,
because I am convinced it is the right path for America, our
allies, the people of Korea, and the world.

As you know, my trip to Pyongyang was the first ever by an
American Secretary of State. While there, I had a chance to
visit with North Korean children who are being fed through the
heroic efforts of the World Food Program. I had a series of
meetings with the DPRK,s top leaders, with whom I reviewed a wide
range of topics, including the Inter-Korean dialogue, economics,
terrorism, human rights and humanitarian issues.

I met at length during my stay with Chairman Kim Jong Il and made
substantial progress in key areas, including the security matters
that were our main focus. My impressions of Chairman Kim were far
different than the stories about his past might lead one to
expect. He was practical, decisive, and well prepared for our
discussions. As a result, our talks were pragmatic and
productive, which is very much to the good.

But having said that, let me be clear. I have studied communist
systems all my life, and I have no illusions about the nature of
such regimes. As Chairman Kim would be the first to acknowledge,
there is an abyss between his political ideology and ours. North
Korea is among the least free nations on earth. There is little,
if any, respect for global norms of human or civil rights. >From
the top down, the emphasis is on uniformity, order and
discipline. The result is indeed order, but at a heartbreaking
cost in human happiness, creativity and welfare. Chairman Kim
and I referred to our profound political differences in our
talks, but we did not allow them to obstruct progress.

America,s immediate interest is to make gains on core security
issues. There are, after all, few human rights imperatives more
meaningful than preventing war, and I hope that cooperation in
this area will improve the climate for broader discussions at a
later time.

Our approach was developed in close consultations with our allies
in Seoul. President Kim Dae Jung has said publicly that the best
way to move forward with Pyongyang is to focus on specific
security, economic and humanitarian issues. He has also made
clear that, given the DPRK,s authoritarian structure; progress
can only come through direct discussions with Chairman Kim Jong
Il and his closest advisors.

There are some in our country who think they know more about what
is right for Korea than Kim Dae Jung and the Korean people, and
they argue it is wrong for our leaders to meet with those of the
DPRK. These commentators are certainly entitled to their point
of view but, without dialogue, we are stuck with the status quo,
and I believe the risks of trying to work with North Korea are
less than the ongoing costs of confrontation.

The Korean Demilitarized Zone has often been described as the
world,s most dangerous place, and understandably so. For
decades, heavily armed forces on both sides have stood poised,
face to face, prepared for battle. North Korea especially has
filled the airwaves with propaganda and hate. Periodic incidents
and accidents have sometimes brought us to the threshold of
conflict, and we must never forget that 37,000 American troops
are among those at risk.

For many years, the United States has worked to create a stable
environment in Korea and throughout East Asia. Our goal is a
region where no nation seeks to dominate others, and all nations
cooperate for prosperity and peace. A fundamental question has
been whether the DPRK would ever find its place within such a
vision.

When President Clinton took office, the outlook was not good.
The new Administration learned that Pyongyang was violating its
obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, and
was actively engaged in developing nuclear weapons. In March
1993, instead of answering the IAEA,s questions, the DPRK
announced plans to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty. I was representing the United States at the UN then and
remember thanking the DPRK representative for his speech. ,You
have made me feel 40 years younger,0/00 I said, ,with your
rhetoric from the deepest depths of the Cold War.0/00

Tensions were rising quickly, and the chances for miscalculation
were high. President Clinton responded with vigorous diplomacy,
backed by America,s ongoing security presence. Administration
officials, including then Assistant Secretary of State Robert
Gallucci, and with important help from former President Jimmy
Carter, raised our concerns directly with the DPRK and received a
measured response. This led to the 1994 Agreed Framework, which
froze plutonium production at Yongbyon and Taechon, blocked North
Korea,s surest and quickest path to building nuclear weapons, and
later helped make possible visits to suspect underground sites at
Kumchang-ni.

As the decade wore on, another security concern arose. In 1998,
the DPRK launched a Taepo Dong missile in a failed attempt to
orbit a small satellite. This raised alarms throughout the region
and in our own country, because a North Korean long-range missile
capability could undermine security and heighten tensions well
beyond the 38th parallel. It could also spark a regional arms
race and harm the global nonproliferation regime.

Moreover, Pyongyang,s practice of peddling its missiles and
missile technology abroad could endanger stability in other key
regions, including the Middle East. With backing from concerned
leaders in Congress, President Clinton and I asked former Defense
Secretary William Perry to conduct an extensive review of our
policy towards the DPRK. Working with an inter-agency group
headed by the State Department Counselor, Ambassador Wendy
Sherman, this review was global in scope. Secretary Perry
consulted repeatedly with our allies in Seoul and Tokyo, spoke
with officials in China, Russia and Europe, and listened to
advice from academic experts and NGOs.

Dr. Perry,s team placed special emphasis on a two-way exchange
with members from both parties on Capitol Hill. And as I said
earlier, our goal was to develop a policy that would be effective
in the region but also have bipartisan support at home so that it
would continue regardless of the outcome of next Tuesday,s
elections.

Dr. Perry,s recommendations were accepted by President Clinton
and published a little more than one year ago. And they continue
to guide us today. These recommendations begin by making the
fundamental choice to engage with North Korea directly and now.
They combine diplomacy and deterrence for the purpose of ending
the DPRK,s destabilizing weapons activities, and they envision
the possibility of better and normal relations as our concerns
are met.

Following months of negotiation led by Special Envoy Chuck
Kartman, and soon after the Perry report was released, President
Clinton announced the easing of US economic and trade sanctions
against North Korea. Shortly thereafter, Pyongyang pledged to
observe a moratorium on flight-testing of long-range missiles of
any kind for the duration of our bilateral talks.

More recently, the North Koreans hinted that they might agree to
permanent missile restraints if arrangements could be made for
others to launch their satellites into orbit. We discussed this
possibility with representatives from Pyongyang on several
occasions, but we didn,t know for sure prior to my trip whether
North Korea was truly serious about such an approach.

Not surprisingly, this was a major topic in my discussions with
Chairman Kim Jong Il, and we made a good start on an array of
long-range missile issues, both indigenous programs and exports.
We also agreed that further expert level talks should be
conducted, and that is why Assistant Secretary of State Bob
Einhorn and his team are in Kuala Lumpur this week meeting with
counterparts from the DPRK.

I returned from Pyongyang convinced that the possibilities for
mutually acceptable arrangements on missiles are real and that
this could enhance the safety of the American people, our allies
in East Asia, and friends around the table. But we have to make
sure. Twenty years ago, we used the prescription, ,Trust, but
verify.0/00 Our message to North Korea now is, ,Don,t test.
That will verify the possibility of a new era of confidence
between our two countries.0/00

I can make no predictions about the outcome, nor can I speculate
about how an understanding on missiles might relate to progress
on other matters such as economic cooperation and diplomatic
relations. But the bottom line is this: We are in no hurry. The
substance of an agreement matters far more than the timing. But
if prospects for further progress develop, we will pursue them.
We would be irresponsible if we didn,t take advantage of a
historic opportunity to move beyond 50 years of Cold War division
and reduce the danger that the North Korean missiles pose to us
and others around the globe.

The same thinking applies to the possibility of a meeting between
President Clinton and Chairman Kim. I have reported to the
President on my trip, and he will decide soon whether a meeting
would contribute to our goals of security and reconciliation.

Throughout the past year, the DPRK has shown a willingness to
discuss our concerns in a serious and straightforward way. Some
may ask why this is true now when it has so often not been the
case in the past, and we cannot be sure of the answer. But we do
know that North Korea,s economic problems multiplied after the
Cold War ended and support from the Soviet Union and Central
Europe evaporated.

Today, North Korea is plagued by shortages of food, water,
medicine, power, fertilizer and other essentials. The incentives
for adopting a more open approach to the world are therefore
strong. Moreover, the DPRK has long professed reunification with
the South to be its ultimate goal. President Kim Dae Jung,s
sunshine policy - and Chairman Kim,s response to it - have
altered the political dynamics of the entire region.

Their summit in Pyongyang was surprising in its warmth and
stunning in its promise. It has been heartening since to see
Korean families reunited after decades of forced separation, a
process we hope will continue. It has been encouraging to see
ministers from the two Korean governments meet, and athletes from
the South and North march into the Olympic Stadium together.

It was also extremely gratifying to see President Kim Dae Jung
awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace. This is an apt honor for one
of our era,s most courageous advocates of democracy and human
rights. It also shows the depth of world support for Korean
reconciliation.

Ironically, some suggest that the Inter-Korean dialogue will be
harmed as US- DPRK relations improve. As evidence, they point to
past efforts by Pyongyang to drive a wedge between Washington and
Seoul. But such concerns overlook the fact that relations
between the United States and South Korea have become 100 percent
wedge-proof.

As I made clear during my trip, Seoul,s agenda with Pyongyang is
an inseparable part of our agenda as well, and progress toward
reconciliation between South and North is both central to this
entire process and essential if ties between US and the DPRK are
to improve. After all, I would never have been able to go to
Pyongyang if President Kim had not gone there first. Moreover,
the North should find it easier to address concerns about the
size of its military and the status of its weapons programs if
tensions with Seoul relax and fears about its own security
diminish.

I would also like to stress Japan,s role in the effort to achieve
lasting stability on the Korean Peninsula. Prior to my trip, I
consulted by phone with Japanese Foreign Minister Kono about our
intentions and expectations. The day after the trip, I met
jointly and separately with South Korean and Japanese leaders in
Seoul. These consultations are part of a process of trilateral
coordination that is at the heart of our Korean policy. It
reflects our alliance with Japan, our friendship with the
Japanese people, and our understanding of Japan,s strategic
political and humanitarian interests in Korean events.

The United States strongly supports efforts by Tokyo and
Pyongyang to resolve the difficult bilateral issues that divide
them, and all of East Asia will benefit if Japan and the DPRK
find the path to cooperation. China, too, can contribute in
important ways to the process of reconciliation. Because the
security of the Korean Peninsula is threatened not only the
presence of advanced weapons, but also by the absence of peace.

As President Kim said recently, as relations with Pyongyang
improve, conditions conducive to the Four Party talks will ripen.
He went on to say that through the Four Party talks, the two
Koreas will be able to replace the old armistice with a new peace
agreement, and that with US and Chinese backing, peace will
become institutionalized.

Like Seoul, the United States recognizes and welcomes China,s
constructive role in Korea, and that of Russia, the European
Union and others as well. The broader the backing for peace, the
more likely it is that peace will be achieved. By any measure,
the past year has been an astonishing one on the Korean
Peninsula. We have seen the first-ever summit between Seoul and
Pyongyang, the first visit by a high-ranking North Korean
official to Washington, and the first trip by an American Cabinet
member to the DPRK.

The result is the most contact between the South and North Korea
in 50 years, and a chance to fundamentally transform relations
between the United States and the DPRK. The latter point is
evidenced not only in our progress on missiles, but also in our
discussions and joint statement opposing terrorism and in the
mutual commitments made in last month,s Washington communique.

We have also worked together well on humanitarian issues,
including efforts to account for Americans still missing from the
Korean War. Any assessment of the Clinton Administration,s
approach to North Korea must take into account not only what has
happened in the region, but also what has not. Without the
Agreed Framework, the DPRK could have enough fissile material for
a significant number of nuclear weapons, not only from the small
reactor that was operating in 1994, but also from much larger
reactors that had been nearing completion at that time. Without
our dialogue, the DPRK would likely have conducted a whole series
of long-range missile tests. Without our engagement, tensions
within the region would have risen steadily; a dangerous arms
race would be underway; and, instead of moving in the direction
of openness, North Korea,s isolation would be increasing.

The result would be a more dangerous world for our allies and for
us, and even greater hardships for the North Korean people. We
recognize, as do our counterparts in Seoul and Pyongyang, that
the divisions and disagreements accumulated over more than half a
century cannot be erased overnight. We have made a start, but
only a start, toward a new kind of relationship in which
attitudes of confrontation are supplanted by habits of
cooperation and even the most basic differences of philosophy can
be frankly discussed.

Leadership in international affairs requires a willingness to
take calculated risks and explore the possibilities for creating
a future that does more than mirror the past. In years gone by,
we have all heard - and some of us have made - predictions that
the Cold War would never end, apartheid would never be defeated,
Northern Ireland would never know peace, and the Balkans would
never embrace democracy.

Today, in Korea, it is possible to envision a future in which the
38th parallel becomes just another line of latitude, in which
North-South contacts increase while tensions decrease, and in
which visits to and from Pyongyang no longer warrant the
attention of the world. That time, if it comes at all, will be
long after my time as Secretary of State, but it is a prospect
well worth pursuing and a day that now appears far closer than
any of us could have anticipated just a few years ago.

Thank you very much, and I will now be very happy to respond to
whatever questions you might have.

(Applause.)

QUESTION: Amnesty International has just found that Israel may
well be guilty of war crimes. Israel refuses to comply with UN
Security Council resolutions, yet you refuse to even condemn
Israel,s actions, much less cut off US arms flow to Israel. Why?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: First of all, let me say that we obviously
have spoken many times about the importance of reducing the
violence, and we have all regretted terribly the tragedies of the
people being killed, and especially the children. I think that
it is very important that everything be done now to fulfill the
terms of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreements that were made.

I spoke earlier this morning with Israel,s Foreign Minister
Shlomo Ben-Ami, who explained how the two sides are in fact now
working themselves to fulfill those various commitments. I think
that the role of the United States and of other countries is to
do everything we can to speak about the importance of ending the
violence, helping them work out the arrangements to be able to
get back to the peace process. That, I think, is the most
important thing to do.

QUESTION: You mentioned children. UN estimates are that 5,000
children are dying in Iraq, yet you continue the economic
sanctions without any delineation of how they might be lifted.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Do you get two questions?

QUESTION: If I can.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Sure, if your colleagues don,t mind.

QUESTION: Why do you continue the UN sanctions without saying
how they can be lifted?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Let me say this, and I am always very glad
to be able to answer questions about Iraq in order to be able to
clarify. We didn,t invent Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein
invaded another country, and he pillaged it and he took
prisoners, and he took a lot of their property and trashed the
place.

The United Nations Security Council imposed some sanctions and
wanted to make sure that Saddam Hussein would live up to them.
That sanctions regime is very much supported by the countries of
the United Nations, and continues to be in place. There have
been - you,re shaking your head. We,re not going to have a
debate, let me just --

QUESTION: Well, I - you know --

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Can I finish? So we were more concerned, I
think, than anyone about the tragic situation for the people of
Iraq. When I was Ambassador at the United Nations, we helped to
write the Oil-for-Food program. It now is worth $20 billion.
They are able to pump as much oil as they can, and the United
Nations is distributing the food.

And where the United Nations is able to distribute the food, the
children and the other people have better nutrition than in the
areas where it cannot. We are not responsible for the tragedy of
the people of Iraq. Saddam Hussein is. I refuse to have the
United States blamed for Saddam Hussein,s invasion of another
country and for having him be the one that had weapons of mass
destruction.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, my question is on Latin America.
There is an editorial today in The Washington Post comparing the
President of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, to Fidel Castro, and trying
to advise the next President of this country to be aware of this
threat to Latin America, and tell them to engage more in the
region.

My question is why this Administration has been so friendly with
Chavez at the beginning, and now you are having a lot of troubles
with him? And what could be the legacy of this Administration to
Latin America? Only two photo ops? The Summit of the Americas --
one in Miami and the other in Chile?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: First of all, I think that this
Administration has spent more time working with a variety of
Latin American countries than any previous one. The President
and I have taken more trips there. We have spoken at length
about the rising tide of democracy in Latin America and some
concerns, I think, that everybody has about some of the
difficulties of the second round of reforms in Latin America,
which would in fact give the people in those countries a greater
share of the fruits of democracy.

Clearly, there continue to be areas that are very difficult.
Colombia is obviously one that is receiving our greatest
attention at this moment because of how it is undermined
--Colombia itself - the threat of drugs, narco- trafficking for
the region, as well as for the United States and the world; and
the spillover within the region of the problems of Colombia.

I think our legacy in Latin America is of the greatest support
for democracy that has ever been seen for that hemisphere. I
have - the most radical thing that I did at the State
Department, I think, was actually to move Canada into the Western
Hemisphere. For those of you that don,t know about the structure
of the State Department, it used to be in Western Europe. And by
that way, trying to show the solidarity of the hemisphere and all
the things that we have in common.

On the issue of President Chavez, he was elected by the people of
Venezuela. We have been concerned by some of the methods that he
has adopted, and some of our concerns have to do with his OPEC
oil policy, but we have not compared him to Mr. Castro.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, in your discussions with Chairman
Kim, did he give you an idea of what he expects from the United
States economically in return for curbs on his missile program?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: You know, interestingly enough, he did not.
Obviously he has serious economic problems, and we talked about
that. We talked about this on the trip - that basically he sees
that his economic problems are serious. He blames them on a
variety of things, including and primarily the weather.

We have been great supporters of the World Food Program. In
fact, when those requests come out, we are the ones that give the
greatest amount. I was very glad at this kindergarten where I
went to be able to see the children that were benefiting from the
American food that was coming in from the World Food Program.

He has talked about this possibility of an exchange that we would
help undertake missile launches of peaceful satellites, and that
would be done under the technological safeguards that are
necessary for that.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, there is a group called Peace
Action. It describes itself as the nation,s largest grassroots
peace group, and it has put out last week its presidential voter
guide comparing the candidates, showing that Vice President Gore
and Governor Bush agree on five major issues that concerns them.
They agree on increasing Pentagon spending, spending $60 billion
or more on Star Wars anti-missile, giving aid to Colombia army
guilty of human rights violation. They both say we should not
end sanctions against Iraq and they both say we should not
require labor and environmental protections in all trade
agreements.

Given this record - and they also point out that the Green Party
candidate, Ralph Nader, disagrees with Gore and Bush on all those
issues.

Given this record, why should American citizens concerned about
peace and justice not vote for the Green Party candidate?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I should have stopped you right off because
-- I have said this many times, that when I became Secretary of
State I had all my political and partisan instincts surgically
removed. I have said at times that I need to go back and see the
surgeon, but I do think that it is very important to look at the
record of the Clinton-Gore Administration. We have spent more
energy in terms of trying to work on getting peace in a variety
of areas regionally. I think President Clinton and Vice
President Gore can take great pride in what has happened in the
Balkans, where I don,t think anybody ever thought - we all heard
these stories about that it was absolutely impossible for there
ever to be peace in the Balkans. They have just had elections in
Kosovo, and they are about to have elections in Bosnia.

We have also spent a lot of time on the Middle East peace, and
tragically at this stage there is violence, but both parties talk
about the necessity of returning to the peace process.

I think we have also done more in terms of trying to deal with
tragedies around the world that are of a humanitarian nature than
previously. I think one of the important questions that foreign
policy makers and students of foreign policy and commentators
have to think about is the value of humanitarian intervention and
nation-building, which is actually something that is positive, of
trying to develop democracies around the world.

So I am very proud to have been a part of the Clinton-Gore
Administration in developing peace and mutually better relations.
And my speech on Korea would indicate that this Administration
has been willing to test and push and take calculated risks in
order to see whether we can change a place on the earth which has
been the most dangerous, with armies of great force facing each
other, in order to try to change the dynamics there. And so I am
very pleased with that.

QUESTION: We are curious about the satellite. Did they give you
any details of what they would like? What kind of satellite
would it be? And is this remote-sensing, and where would they
like to launch it from? And if it,s from North Korea, how can you
be assured that they wouldn't turn around and take knowledge
gained from that and use it for their ballistic missile program?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: First of all, we have not yet had those
kinds of detailed discussions, but we have made quite clear that
were we to engage in this it would all be done in a way that
dealt with all those issues that you have raised and would, in
fact, be done with the proper kinds of safeguards that are
necessary for that; that, in fact, a launch service would be
under the safeguards. But we haven,t gotten into those kinds of
details at all yet.

But I think you need to consider the fact that if they want to
launch peaceful satellites, they are going to do it, and we might
as well have it in a way that we have some control over it
through our technology safeguards.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, shortly after the Israelis and
Palestinians today announced a cease-fire, there was an explosion
in Jerusalem and the violence continues. Can you comment on that
and the challenge posed by groups who are opposed to any kind of
cease-fire and will launch attacks to undermine it? And can you
also comment on the ongoing questions of just how much control
both Barak and Arafat have over their respective groups?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: First of all, I think it is absolutely
essentially that we all condemn all acts of terrorism. I think
that they are launched by those who are the enemies of peace in
order to disrupt whatever processes exist. We keep making that
very clear.

I think that we have to now see the extent to which this
agreement that was worked out during the night - former Prime
Minister Shimon Peres and Chairman Arafat had worked out - how
it is going to be carried out. But I think it is of significance
that they actually have worked this out together. It is in
fulfillment of what President Clinton worked on at Sharm
el-Sheikh, but they did do it together, and I think that,s a very
important sign.

I think what also now has to happen is that we see how these
commitments are fulfilled, and then move to the peace process. I
do believe that it is essential for Chairman Arafat to do
everything to control the violence, and I believe that he can and
that he should.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, it appears that the pattern of US
policy with North Korea is to engage them as they become more
dangerous or make more threats. How does American policy towards
North Korea, how will it not encourage other autocrats around the
world to pursue weapons of mass destruction, given that we seem
to have been engaging them as they become, or appear to be, more
dangerous?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I wouldn,t characterize it that way.
I think that they clearly have been a danger, and we have made --
nobody has made any bones about that. As I said in my speech,
the opportunities for engaging them came about as a result of
President Kim Dae Jung,s trip.

Let me go back to a couple of years ago, because we were so
concerned about what was happening. It is why the President and
I asked Bill Perry to undertake this review. He basically was
able to lay out some recommendations in terms of whether we would
follow one path or another, one that led to - if they were not
willing to give us some answers and engage - that would lead to
a situation where we would remain in a status quo,
confrontational policy. But because of what Kim Dae Jung did,
and because of some of the overtures that I mentioned in my
speech, I think that it is worth pursuing and testing and trying
to figure out if there are openings.

As far as the larger question is concerned, I think that one of
the highest priorities of this Administration has been our policy
of dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
which is why I think it is so important to maintain our sanctions
on Iraq and to make very clear that where we see problems, that
we will point them out and that we will try to take steps where
we can with others to lessen that danger.

But to me, the lesson is not the one that you state, but rather
the one that if there are possibilities for moving forward - and
there,s no replica of somebody like Kim Dae Jung anywhere else --
but if there really are ways to try to devolve what is the most
dangerous situation, it would be irresponsible of us not to take
this opportunity.

And believe me, I,ve thought about this a lot. It isn,t every
day that I take a trip like this last one. And I thought about
the risks involved, but I really think that I come down on the
side that it would be truly, truly irresponsible for an American
Secretary of State not to follow up on this opportunity with - I
don,t have my glasses on; I have contact lenses today, but
they,re not rose-colored either - and I know what we,re looking
at. I think we just have to do it very systematically, and test
and probe, and see if there is anything there.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, we understand North Korea is asking
for compensation for their giving up missile program. Will the
compensation fund be provided by the United States alone, or a
consortium formed like KEDO case?

I have another question for you. What is the present status of
human rights in North Korea? How bad is it?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: First of all, I think that you are several
steps ahead of where we are, where first we have to see what --
this is what some of the various technical aspects of the missile
talks are going on now in Kuala Lumpur and, so far, all that has
been discussed was the question of exchanges for the satellite
launches. I think that we will see as we move forward, but I
think that I don,t want to get ahead of ourselves here.

On the human rights issue, the State Department put out a human
rights report on every country, and the North Korean one is not
good, not good at all - bad, in fact - in terms of people,s
basic human rights, what happens to labor, religious freedom. We
make no bones about it. When I met with Foreign Minister Paek in
Bangkok, I made very clear that the discussion of human rights
would be a constant theme in whatever relationship we established
because it is essential to the United States.

But, as I said in my speech, I think it is very important for us
to understand what we are doing and what steps we are involved
in. And, at this stage, we are focusing ourselves on the
security issue, never leaving the human rights and terrorism
issues out of the picture, or questions about the POW-MIAs or the
economic issues, but I think that we are embarked on a long road
here. I have said that we are closer to the beginning of it than
even the middle or the end, and we are very much aware of the
human rights situation. I know that I didn,t see anything in
North Korea beyond what I was supposed to see, and I saw an empty
city, and I saw a perfectly orchestrated totalitarian performance
of people all dancing in step. Only a dictator can manage to get
100,000 people to dance in step.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, I,d like to follow up, if I may, on
what you said about the Middle East. We had this large explosion
in Jerusalem today in a very busy area, obviously meant to
inflict major casualties, this all in the light of the agreement
between Yasser Arafat and Shimon Peres.

In your own conversations yesterday with Acting Foreign Minister
Shlomo Ben- Ami, I was wondering if you could talk a little bit
about how you reconcile all these intensive diplomatic efforts,
and at least the public commitment by the leaders to do what they
can, and how these agreements aren,t reaching the street, and how
these diplomatic efforts can, and if at all --

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, we have been in very
close touch. As I said - and I think he has actually now been
named Foreign Minister for real. I talked to him a little while
ago. Saeb Erakat is coming to Washington tomorrow.

This agreement was, in fact, reached during the night, and there
were a series of steps that they are supposed to follow through
today. I think that we have to, again, watch the extent to which
they are following through on these commitments that they made to
each other. And I really do stress the fact that they were the
ones that did this agreement without anybody else involved in it,
in fulfillment of what they said to President Clinton. But they
did, in fact, agree to this between themselves.

And I do think that there have been - and, unfortunately, always
will continue to be --enemies of peace who act through terrorist
methods. Bombs and explosions of that kind have to be controlled.
We call on the party - on Chairman Arafat to do everything
within his power to control these things.

But I do think you ask a very hard question of how agreements
that are made at one level get to the street. What has to happen
is that the leaders have to make public statements in which they
condemn these kinds of actions and the loss of life.

And we,re going to keep working it. It is the hardest issue, a
tragic one, that has bedeviled the world for many years, and we
will continue to work on it and hope that the parties between
themselves can continue working. And we want to get back to the
peace process. Having the Foreign Minister here has been useful,
having Saeb Erakat will be useful, and we have said in the past
that both the leaders would be expected to come to Washington at
some point.

Thank you very much. (# # #)