A new report from the Congressional Research Service looks at the commercial prospects for the emerging drone industry.

“It has been estimated that, over the next 10 years, worldwide production of UAS for all types of applications could rise from $4 billion annually to $14 billion. However, the lack of a regulatory framework, which has delayed commercial deployment, may slow development of a domestic UAS manufacturing industry,” the report said. See Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS): Commercial Outlook for a New Industry, September 9, 2015.

In advance of the September 22 visit to the United States by Pope Francis, another new CRS report “provides Members of Congress with background information on Pope Francis and a summary of a few selected global issues of congressional interest that have figured prominently on his agenda.” See Pope Francis and Selected Global Issues: Background for Papal Address to Congress, September 8, 2015.

Another new report from CRS on encryption and law enforcement presents “an overview of the perennial issue involving technology outpacing law enforcement and discusses how policy makers and law enforcement officials have dealt with this issue in the past.” See Encryption and Evolving Technology: Implications for U.S. Law Enforcement, September 8, 2015.

Other new and newly updated publications from the Congressional Research Service include the following.

Syrian Refugee Admissions to the United States, CRS Insight, September 10, 2015

An Analysis of Efforts to Double Federal Funding for Physical Sciences and Engineering Research, updated September 8, 2015

Cybersecurity: Data, Statistics, and Glossaries, updated September 8, 2015

Cybersecurity: Legislation, Hearings, and Executive Branch Documents, updated September 8, 2015

The EMV Chip Card Transition: Background, Status, and Issues for Congress, updated September 8, 2015

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive, udpated September 10, 2015

Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations, updated September 8, 2015

Iran Nuclear Agreement, updated September 9, 2015

Statutory Qualifications for Executive Branch Positions, updated September 9, 2015

Federal Reserve: Emergency Lending, September 8, 2015

The Department of Defense plans to complete the establishment of a new Cyber Mission Force made up of 133 teams of more than 6000 “cyber operators” by 2018, and it’s already nearly halfway there.

From FY2014-2018, DoD intends to spend $1.878 billion dollars to pay for the Cyber Missions Force consisting of approximately 6100 individuals in the four military services, DoD said in response to a question for the record that was published in a congressional hearing volume last month.

“This effort began in October 2013 and today we have 3100 personnel assigned to 58 of the 133 teams,” or nearly 50% of the intended capacity, DoD wrote in response to a question from Rep. Rick Larsen (D-WA) of the House Armed Services Committee. The response was included in the published record of a February 26, 2015 Committee hearing (page 67).

The DoD Cyber Mission Force was described in an April 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy and in April 2015 testimony by Assistant Secretary of Defense Eric Rosenbach:

“The Department of Defense has three primary missions in cyberspace: (1) defend DoD information networks to assure DoD missions, (2) defend the United States against cyberattacks of significant consequence, and (3) provide full-spectrum cyber options to support contingency plans and military operations,” Mr. Rosenbach said.

“To carry out these missions, we are building the Cyber Mission Force and equipping it with the appropriate tools and infrastructure to operate in cyberspace. Once fully manned, trained, and equipped in Fiscal Year 2018, these 133 teams will execute USCYBERCOM’s three primary missions with nearly 6,200 military and civilian personnel,” Mr. Rosenbach said at an April 14 hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The new Cyber Mission Force will naturally have both defensive and offensive characteristics.

“Congressman, we are building these cyber teams… in order to, one, protect ourselves from cyber attacks,” said Adm. Cecil D. Haney, commander of U.S. Strategic Command. “We are being probed on a daily basis by a variety of different actors.”

“The protection side is one thing,” said Rep. Larsen at the February hearing of the House Armed Services Committee. “What about the other side?”

“The other aspect of it, we are distributing these forces out to the various combatant commands so that they can be integrated into our overall joint military force capability,” Adm. Haney replied.

*    *    *

“Worldwide Cyber Threats” was the subject of an open hearing of the House Intelligence Committee on Thursday.

The foreign intrusions suffered by U.S. government and private networks have yielded some useful lessons, said Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper.

“Of late, unauthorized disclosures and foreign defensive improvements have cost us some technical accesses, but we are also deriving valuable new insight from cyber security investigations of incidents caused by foreign actors and new means of aggregating and processing big data. Those avenues will help offset some more traditional collection modes that are obsolescent,” he told the Committee.

Federal employees turned to the Office of Special Counsel in record numbers last year to file complaints of whistleblower retaliation, prohibited personnel practices, and other violations of law and policy.

The Office of Special Counsel (OSC) is an independent federal agency whose “primary mission is to safeguard the merit system by protecting federal employees and applicants from prohibited personnel practices, especially reprisal for whistleblowing.” It has been led by Special Counsel Carolyn N. Lerner since 2011.

“Fiscal year (FY) 2014 was a record-breaking year for the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC),” according to the FY 2014 OSC annual report that was transmitted to Congress last month.

“For the first time, OSC received over 5,000 cases, a 17 percent increase from the previous fiscal year. The number of prohibited personnel practice (PPP) complaints was also at an all-time high, 3,371, nearly a thousand more than just four years prior. We also received significantly more whistleblower disclosures in FY 2014 than in past years.”

OSC said it has effectively intervened in a growing number of cases, which tends to inspire even more complaints to be filed, perhaps to the point of unsustainability.

“The number of favorable outcomes for whistleblowers and other employees across the government continues to break all-time records,” the report said. “OSC secured 177 favorable outcomes in 2014 helping to restore the careers of courageous public servants who blew the whistle on fraud, waste and abuse, or encountered another form of prohibited conduct in the government. This total represents an increase of 185 percent over six years ago.”

“These victories for whistleblowers, the taxpayers, and the merit system showcase OSC’s effectiveness and increase awareness of the agency in the federal community. As a result, the number of employees seeking OSC’s assistance continues to grow, posing daunting challenges to the agency.”

“We anticipate receiving over 6,000 new cases in FY 2015, more than a 60 percent increase over the ten-year averaged annual case load level. OSC already faces the largest case backlog in agency history,” the OSC annual report said.

Although it is theoretically possible to do so, the Senate has never imposed changes to an arms control treaty as a condition of ratification, according to a new Congressional Research Service report.

“The Senate has never conditioned consent to an arms control treaty’s ratification on changes in the terms of the agreement,” CRS said.

“In most cases, the conditions adopted during the Senate review were attached to resolutions of ratification and affected only U.S. activities, programs, and policies.” See Arms Control Ratification: Opportunities for Modifying Agreements, CRS Insights, September 2, 2015.

Another new CRS publication looks at the history of renegotiating arms control agreements, in the context of congressional debate over the pending Iran nuclear agreement.

“In the past 60 years, the United States has signed around 20 arms control agreements that affected U.S. weapons programs or military activities. In this period, the Senate has voted against giving its advice and consent to ratification of a treaty only once,” i.e. in the case of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

“It has, on three other occasions, not voted on treaties when it likely would have rejected the treaty. In only one of these three cases did the United States return to the negotiating table and modify the agreement to address the Senate’s concerns.”

In the latter case, which involved the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, “the new negotiations delayed [the Treaty’s] entry into force by nearly 15 years.” See Renegotiating Arms Control Agreements: A Brief Review, CRS Insights, September 2, 2015.

*    *    *

Three emerging technologies for defense of U.S. Navy surface ships are reviewed in a new report from the Congressional Research Service: shipboard lasers, the electromagnetic railgun, and hypervelocity projectile weapons.

“Any one of these new weapon technologies, if successfully developed and deployed, might be regarded as a ‘game changer’ for defending Navy surface ships against enemy missiles.”

“If two or three of them are successfully developed and deployed, the result might be considered not just a game changer, but a revolution,” the CRS report said.

“Rarely has the Navy had so many potential new types of surface-ship missile-defense weapons simultaneously available for development and potential deployment.”

However, any or all of the technologies might still prove to be a dead-end, and each still faces significant development hurdles. “Overcoming these challenges will likely require years of additional development work, and ultimate success in overcoming them is not guaranteed.”

The policy decision facing Congress today is therefore which if any of these approaches merits funding, and at what level. See Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Hypervelocity Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress, September 2, 2015.

 *    *    *

The United States currently offers safe haven, or “temporary protected status,” to 5,000 Syrian nationals who have sought refuge from the conflict in that country. Altogether, the U.S. offers similar temporary protection to over 300,000 foreign nationals from 12 countries, a newly updated CRS report said. See Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy and Issues, updated September 2, 2015.

 *    *    *

Other new or updated reports from the Congressional Research Service include the following.

Long Range Strike Bomber Begins to Emerge, CRS Insights, September 2, 2015

What Does the Latest Court Ruling on NSA Telephone Metadata Program Mean?, CRS Legal Sidebar, September 3, 2015

Is Global Growth Slowing?, CRS Insights, September 2, 2015

Essential Air Service (EAS), September 3, 2015

Across-the-Board Rescissions in Appropriations Acts: Overview and Recent Practices, updated September 2, 2015

Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress, updated September 2, 2015

A 2013 Intelligence Community Directive that was released this week “establishes the baseline for CI [counterintelligence] programs across the Intelligence Community (IC).”

Counterintelligence is defined as “Information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities.”

Counterintelligence Programs, Intelligence Community Directive 750, was signed by DNI James R. Clapper on July 5, 2013, and was released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in response to a Freedom of Information Act request.

CI programs within the Intelligence Community are directed to address CI analysis, awareness and education, risk assessments, and critical asset protection.

A critical asset is “Any asset (person, group, relationship, instrument, installation, process, or supply at the disposition of an organization for use in an operational or support role) whose loss or compromise would have a negative impact on the capability of a department or agency to carry out its mission; or may have a negative impact on the ability of another U.S. Government department or agency to conduct its mission; or could result in substantial economic loss; or which may have a negative impact on the national security of the U.S.”

By any reasonable definition, the Office of Personnel Management database of security clearance background investigations for federal employees and contractors that was recently compromised by a foreign adversary would appear to qualify as a “critical asset.” But since OPM is not a member or an element of the Intelligence Community, it appears to fall outside the scope of this directive.

The IC Directive includes only the briefest of references to the sensitive topic of offensive counterintelligence, which involves penetrating, diverting and redirecting foreign intelligence efforts targeted at the United States:

“Effective mitigation of FIE [Foreign Intelligence Entity] activities involves anticipating, detecting, understanding, and assessing threats to national security and also taking appropriate CI actions to defeat, counter, neutralize, or exploit the threat.”

    *    *    *

ODNI this week also released a 2012 instruction on the ORCON dissemination marking, referring to intelligence information whose distribution is “originator controlled.”

“The use of ORCON enables the originator to maintain knowledge, supervision, and control of the distribution of ORCON information beyond its original dissemination. Further dissemination of ORCON information requires advance permission from the originator.”

However, its use should be limited. “The ORCON marking shall be applied judiciously in accordance with this ICPG to ensure that classified national intelligence is disseminated appropriately without undue delay or restriction.”

“The decision to apply ORCON shall be made on a case-by-case basis using a risk-managed approach. It shall not be applied in a general or arbitrary manner.”

See Application of Dissemination Controls: Originator Control, ICPG 710.1, July 25, 2012.

The Department of Defense reportedly expects to increase its use of unmanned aerial systems (“drones”) by nearly 50% in the next few years. At the same time, however, the rate of DoD’s procurement of drones is projected to decline sharply from FY2016-2020.

The Congressional Research Service takes note of the seeming contradiction and proposes several possible explanations to resolve it. See How Many UAVs for DoD?, CRS Insights, August 27, 2015.

Other new and updated CRS publications that became public last week include the following.

Policy Implications of the Internet of Things, CRS Insights, August 25, 2015

Health Insurance: Small is the New Large, CRS Insights, August 26, 2015

Gold King Mine Spill May Renew Interest in “Good Samaritan” Legislation, CRS Insights, August 27, 2015

Financial Regulatory Improvement Act Included in Senate Appropriations Bill, CRS Insights, August 27, 2015

Terrorism Victims Sue to Enjoin Sanctions Relief under the Iran Nuclear Agreement, CRS Legal Sidebar, August 27, 2015

District of Columbia: A Brief Review of Provisions in District of Columbia Appropriations Acts Restricting the Funding of Abortion Services, updated August 27, 2015

Drug Testing and Crime-Related Restrictions in TANF, SNAP, and Housing Assistance, updated August 28, 2015

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s Essential Health Benefits (EHB), August 27, 2015

Navy Ship Names: Background For Congress, updated August 26, 2015

Despite an explicit statutory requirement to keep Congress “fully and currently informed” about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the President may withhold proliferation-related information from Congress if he determines that doing so could harm the national security, according to a sweeping opinion from the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) that was prepared in 2003.

The opinion, written by then-OLC deputy John C. Yoo, was released this week under the Freedom of Information Act. See Presidential Authority to Protect National Security Information, January 27, 2003.

The OLC opinion takes an uncompromising view of presidential authority. It reviews multiple statutes that mandate disclosure of various types of information to Congress, including requirements to report on WMD proliferation and to keep the intelligence committees “fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities.” It then concludes that those statutes cannot override, modify or limit the President’s constitutional prerogatives.

“Despite Congress’s extensive powers under the Constitution, its authorities to legislative [sic] and appropriate cannot constitutionally be exercised in a manner that would usurp the President’s authority over foreign affairs and national security,” the OLC opinion said.

Even to a layman, the Yoo opinion seems muddled and poorly argued, in several respects.

*    Yoo claims that the statute requiring reporting of WMD proliferation was obviated by a signing statement issued by President Clinton in 1999. “In signing the legislation, President Clinton stated that section 1131 and similar provisions raised serious constitutional questions.” But upon examining the text of that 1999 signing statement, one finds that Clinton did not mention section 1131 at all, and the President’s comments there have no bearing on WMD proliferation or congressional reporting requirements.

*    Yoo uses the word “disclosure” throughout the opinion to refer to classified reporting to Congress, which excludes public release of the information. At no point does he try to explain how such reporting through classified channels “could harm the national security” if the information never became public.

*    Yoo does not acknowledge or mention the Supreme Court’s 1952 Youngstown decision which addressed Presidential authority in the face of contrary statutory imperatives: “When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.” To sustain his position, Yoo cannot admit the existence of any relevant constitutional powers of Congress, since those would diminish the President’s freedom of action.

*    Yoo does allow that “the President can disclose such information as a matter of inter-branch comity to members of Congress of his choosing when he judges it consistent with the national security.” But this is incoherent, even by Yoo’s own lights, since whenever disclosure is consistent with national security, the President’s authority to withhold it evaporates. Then disclosure to Congress would not be a matter of comity at all, but a binding requirement.

The six page OLC opinion does have some positive features.

*    It was prompted by an inquiry to OLC from then-White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales as to “whether the President has the constitutional authority to withhold sensitive national security information from Congress involving the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by other nations.” So the very fact of the inquiry is an indication that the authority to withhold was not self-evident even to the George W. Bush White House.

*    The opinion discloses the title of at least one previously unknown OLC opinion on Congressional Notification for Certain Special Operations (November 1, 2002).

It is unclear whether the 2003 Yoo OLC opinion has had any enduring impact or influence on executive branch policy.

The first known public reference to the opinion appeared in a declassified version of the 2009 Joint Inspector General report on the President’s Surveillance Program (Stellar Wind) that was obtained by the New York Times this year in response to a FOIA lawsuit.

Footnote 192 on page 167 of the DOJ volume of the Joint Report (p. 504 in the NYT PDF) reads in part: “Citing… a 2003 OLC opinion, Gonzales’s letter stated that the President has the constitutional authority to define and control access to the nation’s secrets, ‘including authority to determine the extent to which disclosure may be made outside the Executive Branch’.”

The reference to the 2003 OLC opinion was first noticed by Marcy Wheeler last May.

In its response to a Freedom of Information Act request, the Office of Legal Counsel said that the 2003 Yoo opinion “is protected by the deliberative process and attorney-client privileges and [is] exempt from mandatory disclosure pursuant to FOIA Exemption Five.”

Nevertheless, wrote OLC Special Counsel Paul P. Colborn, “we are releasing it to you as a matter of discretion.”

Through its international security assistance programs, the United States advances its foreign policy agenda, exercises influence, sometimes wreaks havoc or abets abusive conduct, and now and then does good things.

Security assistance refers to a variety of programs involving arms sales abroad, military training of foreign security services, and other defense-related activities.

A new non-profit website called Security Assistance Monitor presents “all publicly available data on U.S. foreign security assistance programs worldwide from 2000 to the present.”

It is a project of the Center for International Policy, with the Friends Committee on National Legislation, Latin America Working Group Education Fund, Project on Middle East Democracy, and Washington Office of Latin America.

Richly documented and handsomely presented, it is an impressive new resource for journalists and students of international security policy.

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is a related but distinct concept. Both involve support to foreign governments, but unlike security assistance, FID may include U.S. military operations as well as other forms of non-military aid.

FID “involves application of the instruments of U.S. national power in support of a foreign nation confronted by threats,” according to a new U.S. Army manual that explores the issue in depth. See Foreign Internal Defense, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-05.2, August 19, 2015.

“FID may include financial, intelligence, and law enforcement assistance” as well as military support in some cases. “The fundamental goal is to prevent a downward spiral of instability by forestalling and defeating threats and by working to correct conditions that may prompt violence.”

Several new reports from the Congressional Research Service examine the implications of the 40% excise tax on high-cost employer-sponsored health care coverage, known as the “Cadillac tax,” that will take effect in 2018.

Excise Tax on High-Cost Employer-Sponsored Health Coverage: In Brief, August 14, 2015

The Excise Tax on High-Cost Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance: Estimated Economic and Market Effects, August 20, 2015

The Excise Tax on High-Cost Employer-Sponsored Health Coverage: Background and Economic Analysis, August 20, 2015

Other newly-updated CRS reports introduce the basic legislative functions of Congress, perhaps for novice Members and staff.

Resolving Legislative Differences in Congress: Conference Committees and Amendments Between the Houses, August 3, 2015

House Committee Hearings: Preparation, August 25, 2015

House Committee Hearings: Arranging Witnesses, August 25, 2015

House Committee Hearings: Scheduling and Notification, August 25, 2015

Calendars of the House of Representatives, August 25, 2015

Pairing in Congressional Voting: The House, August 25, 2015

Quorum Requirements in the House: Committee and Chamber, August 25, 2015

Amendments in the Senate: Types and Forms, August 25, 2015

Amendments in the House: Types and Forms, August 21, 2015

How Measures Are Brought to the Senate Floor: A Brief Introduction, August 5, 2015

Introducing a House Bill or Resolution, August 6, 2015

House Committee Hearings: Witness Testimony, August 10, 2015

Types of Committee Hearings, August 10, 2015

Delegates to the U.S. Congress: History and Current Status, August 25, 2015

Intelligence agencies that discover a threat to a person’s life or safety are obliged to alert the intended target in most cases as long as they can do so without compromising intelligence sources and methods, a new intelligence community directive instructs.

A U.S. intelligence agency “that collects or acquires credible and specific information indicating an impending threat of intentional killing, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping directed at a person or group of people shall have a duty to warn the intended victim or those responsible for protecting the intended victim, as appropriate,” the new directive states. “This includes threats where the target is an institution, place of business, structure, or location.”

Remarkably, “the term intended victim includes both U.S. persons… and non-U.S. persons.”

The “duty to warn” obligation, which in principle dates back at least several decades, was formally established last month by Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper in Intelligence Community Directive 191, July 21, 2015.

It is not binding in all circumstances, however. Notification of the target would be waived if it “would unduly endanger U.S. government personnel, sources, methods, intelligence operations, or defense operations.”

The notification requirement also does not apply in cases where the threat emanates from the U.S. government itself, whether in combat operations or in “covert” targeted killing programs. Thus, the directive states that the requirement would be appropriately waived when “There is a reasonable basis for believing that the intended victim is a terrorist, a direct supporter of terrorists, an assassin, a drug trafficker, or involved in violent crimes.”

Likewise, no notification would be required in cases where “The intended victim is at risk only as a result of the intended victim’s participation in an insurgency, insurrection, or other armed conflict.” Nor is notice needed when the intended victim “is already aware of the specific threat.”

The “duty to warn” requirement seems to be an obligation that has been voluntarily assumed by the U.S. intelligence community, perhaps for moral or prudential reasons. In other contexts where there are similar requirements for professionals to breach confidentiality and to warn of credible threats (most notably mental health care), they are rooted in case law. But no comparable legal precedent or statutory requirement appears to exist in the intelligence context that would compel agencies to act in this way. The legal authorities cited in the new DNI directive — the National Security Act and executive order 12333 — do not specifically mention the duty to warn.

If necessary to protect sources and methods, “communication of threat information to the intended victim may be delivered anonymously,” the new DNI directive says.

Former U.S. intelligence officer Rick Francona recalled being part of a CIA covert action team in northern Iraq in 1995 that was tasked one day to warn an American living there that he had been targeted for death by Iranian Revolutionary Guards because of his Christian missionary activity.

Francona and his heavily armed CIA team knocked on the incredulous American’s door and introduced themselves: “We’re from the State Department.”

Effective oversight of intelligence community contractors is a particularly difficult exercise since the reliability of official data on contractor activities is uncertain and most of it is classified and inaccessible to outsiders, a new report from the Congressional Research Service explains.

“Contractors have been and are an integral part of the intelligence community’s (IC’s) total workforce (which also includes federal employees and military personnel). Yet questions have been raised regarding how they are used, and the size and cost of the contractor component.”

The new CRS report “describes several initiatives designed, or used, to track contractors or contractor employees. [It also] addresses the questions of whether IC contractor personnel are performing inherently governmental functions and whether the IC’s acquisition workforce is equipped to monitor contractors performing critical functions….”

The CRS report itself was prepared without access to classified data on the role of contractors, so it sheds no new factual light on the subject. Instead, it summarizes the recent literature on internal IC contractor management and congressional oversight of IC contractors.  See The Intelligence Community and Its Use of Contractors: Congressional Oversight Issues, August 18, 2015.

Dozens of other new and updated CRS reports were obtained and posted online last week, including these:

The Greek Debt Crisis: Overview and Implications for the United States, August 19, 2015

China’s Currency Devaluation, CRS Insights, August 17, 2015

Powering Africa: Challenges of and U.S. Aid for Electrification in Africa, August 17, 2015

Unaccompanied Alien Children: An Overview, updated August 18, 2015

Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Federal Aggravated Identity Theft, updated August 20, 2015

Medal of Honor: History and Issues, updated August 18, 2015

Sentence for Killing a Bald Eagle Found Too Severe and Unauthorized, CRS Legal Sidebar, August 18, 2015

Biopower: Background and Federal Support, updated August 14, 2015

California Drought: Hydrological and Regulatory Water Supply Issues, updated August 14, 2015

Automatic Continuing Resolutions: Background and Overview of Recent Proposals, August 20, 2015

“Who is a Veteran?” — Basic Eligibility for Veterans’ Benefits, updated August 19, 2015

Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, updated August 17, 2015

Women in Combat: Issues for Congress, updated August 18, 2015

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments, updated August 14, 2015

Not new, but of renewed current interest is Birthright Citizenship Under the 14th Amendment of Persons Born in the United States to Alien Parents, January 10, 2012.

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The long-term vitality of the Congressional Research Service is threatened by Congress’s repeated refusals to appropriate the modest budget increases ($5 million in FY2016) that the agency has requested in recent years. Reductions in the quality of CRS publications and in the depth of staff expertise are foreseeable.

Other congressional support agencies and professional staff face similar curbs on funding, to the detriment of the legislative process.

“Why would Congress cannibalize its own legislative and creative capacity?” ask political science professors Anthony Madonna and Ian Ostrander. See “If Congress keeps cutting its staff, who is writing your laws? You won’t like the answer,” Washington Post, August 20.

Some 60 nations and partner organizations have made commitments to help counter the Islamic State with military forces or resources, according to a new report from the Congressional Research Service.

But coalition efforts suffer from a lack of coherence, CRS said. “Without a single authority responsible for prioritizing and adjudicating between different multinational civilian and military lines of effort, different actors often work at cross-purposes without intending to do so.”

CRS tabulated the contributions of each of the coalition partners by country and capability. “Each nation is contributing to the coalition in a manner commensurate with its national interests and comparative advantage, although reporting on nonmilitary contributions tends to be sporadic,” the report said.

“Some illustrative examples of the kinds of counter-IS assistance countries provided as the coalition was being formed in September 2014 include: Switzerland’s donation $9 million in aid to Iraq, Belgium’s contribution of 13 tons of aid to Iraq generally, Italy’s contribution of $2.5 million of weaponry (including machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and a million rounds of ammunition), and Japan’s granting of $6 million in emergency aid to specifically help displaced people in Northern Iraq.” See Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State, August 4, 2015.

*

The history and legal status of the U.S. military base in Guantanamo Bay were reviewed in another new CRS report.

“The origins of the U.S. military installation at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, lie in the execution of military operations during the Spanish-American War of April-August of 1898,” the report explained. Subsequent lease agreements signed in 1903 and 1934 “acknowledged Cuban sovereignty” over the site of the military base “but granted to the United States ‘complete jurisdiction and control over’ the property as long as it remained occupied.”

The existing leases “can only be modified or abrogated pursuant to an agreement between the United States and Cuba. The territorial limits of the naval station remain as they were in 1934 unless the United States abandons Guantanamo Bay or the two governments reach an agreement to modify its boundaries. While there appears to be no consensus on whether the President can modify the agreement alone, Congress is empowered to alter by statute the effect of the underlying 1934 treaty. There is no current law that would expressly prohibit the negotiation of lease modifications with the existing government of Cuba.”

However, “Congress has imposed practical impediments to closing the naval station by, for example, restricting the transfer of detainees from Guantanamo Bay to foreign countries.” See Naval Station Guantanamo Bay: History and Legal Issues Regarding Its Lease Agreements, August 4, 2015.

*

Many of the issues raised by the pending Iran nuclear agreement that Congress is likely to consider were itemized and described in another new CRS report obtained by Secrecy News.

“These issues include those related to monitoring and enforcing the agreement itself, how the sanctions relief provided by the agreement would affect Iran’s regional and domestic policies, the implications for regional security, and the potential for the agreement to change the course of U.S.-Iran relations,” the report said.

See Iran Nuclear Agreement: Selected Issues for Congress, August 6, 2015.

*

Other new and updated CRS reports that Congress has declined to make publicly available online include the following.

Procedures for Congressional Action in Relation to a Nuclear Agreement with Iran: In Brief, updated August 5, 2015

Iran Sanctions, updated August 4, 2015

History of the Navy UCLASS (Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike aircraft) Program Requirements: In Brief, August 3, 2015

Federal Support for Reproductive Health Services: Frequently Asked Questions, August 4, 2015

Fetal Tissue Research: Frequently Asked Questions, July 31, 2015

The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), updated August 6, 2015

Specialty Drugs: Background and Policy Concerns, August 3, 2015

Social Security: The Trust Funds, updated August 5, 2015

Medicare Financial Status: In Brief, updated August 10, 2015

Presidential Permit Review for Cross-Border Pipelines and Electric Transmission, August 6, 2015

EPA’s Clean Power Plan: Highlights of the Final Rule, August 14, 2015

Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy, updated August 3, 2015

U.S. Trade Concepts, Performance, and Policy: Frequently Asked Questions, updated August 3, 2015

National Security Letters in Foreign Intelligence Investigations: A Glimpse at the Legal Background, updated July 31, 2015

Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, updated August 5, 2015