The DNI Open Source Center has been redesignated the Open Source Enterprise and incorporated in CIA’s new Directorate of Digital Innovation.

The Open Source Center, established in 2005, was tasked to collect and analyze open source information of intelligence value across all media – – print, broadcast and online. The OSC was the successor to the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which gathered and translated world news coverage and other open source information for half a century.

“As part of the Agency modernization effort announced by Director Brennan earlier this year, the DNI Open Source Center (OSC) changed its name to the Open Source Enterprise (OSE) on October 1, 2015,” said CIA spokesperson Ryan Trapani. “OSE remains dedicated to collecting, analyzing, and disseminating publicly available information of intelligence value. The organization’s new name reflects the broad relevance and scope of the open source mission.”

“OSE retains its role as the Intelligence Community’s (IC) center of excellence for open source collection, analysis, and tradecraft,” he added. “Director Brennan also retains his role as the interagency Open Source Functional manager.”

As FBIS also did for several decades, the Open Source Center used to produce a publicly available line of products, including translations and open source analyses. But at the end of 2013, to the dismay of many longtime subscribers, CIA abruptly terminated that channel of public information, citing costs and the easy availability of alternate public sources.

“That decision was primarily due to the cost-prohibitive nature of updating the feed and in light of the broad accessibility of open source information on the Internet,” said Mr. Trapani. “Nevertheless, OSE remains committed to fulfilling its core mission of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating open source information. At this time, however, OSE has no plans to expand the scope of its services to include the regular release of unclassified, non-copyrighted materials to the public.”

That’s unfortunate.

While there is indeed a surfeit of “news” and “information” of all kinds, the open source analytical products generated in the intelligence community have the potential to add value to public discourse. A somewhat random cross-section of OSC products from several years ago that illustrates the range and quality of these analyses, obtained without authorization, is available here.

“If I were the DNI, I would… direct the OSC to release as much unclassified material as it could,” I suggested in a speech last year to a conference of intelligence community lawyers. But I’m not, and it didn’t.

However, the new ODNI transparency implementation plan may present an occasion to reconsider the CIA non-disclosure policy regarding unclassified open source products.

Though the Open Source Center is no more, its name and logo live on in various locations, like this official website.

“OSE’s portal along with other materials branded with the previous OSC seal and moniker, will be updated with new OSE labeling in the coming months,” Mr. Trapani said.

In 2006, the DNI issued Intelligence Community Directive 301 on the National Open Source Enterprise, but it was rescinded in 2012, according to an ODNI spokesman. “It was determined that ICD 113, Functional Managers, provided sufficient authorities and responsibilities for all functional managers, including D/CIA as the open source intelligence [manager].”

Procedures for electing a new Speaker of the House of Representatives are outlined in a new report from the Congressional Research Service. See Electing the Speaker of the House of Representatives: Frequently Asked Questions, October 23, 2015.

Other new and updated CRS products include the following.

Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage: Implications for Religious Objections, October 23, 2015

Sentencing Reform: Comparison of Selected Proposals, October 26, 2015

Another Foreign Bank Claims FinCEN’s “Death Sentence” Requires Better Procedures, CRS Legal Sidebar, October 26, 2015

Federal Court Rules That Bureau of Land Management Likely Lacks Authority to Promulgate Fracking Rule, CRS Legal Sidebar, October 26, 2015

Argentina’s 2015 Presidential Election, CRS Insight, updated October 26, 2015

Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy, updated October 26, 2015

Israel: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief, October 23, 2015

Classified U.S. intelligence information may be shared with foreign recipients when it is advantageous to the U.S. to do so and when it is not otherwise prohibited by law, according to a directive that was publicly released last week by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

“It is the policy of the U.S. Government to share intelligence with foreign governments whenever it is consistent with U.S. law and clearly in the national interest to do so, and when it is intended for a specific purpose and generally limited in duration,” states Intelligence Community Directive 403, Foreign Disclosure and Release of Classified National Intelligence, which was originally issued on March 13, 2013.

There are some nuances, however.

For example, intelligence will ordinarily be shared with] foreign governments or their components, coalitions of governments, or international organizations. But individual foreign nationals and independent contractors “do not constitute foreign entities for purposes of foreign disclosure or release except as designated by the DNI.”

(“Disclosure” here means communicating the intelligence without transfering a copy of it for retention. “Release” means providing a copy that the recipient can keep.)

The release last week of Intelligence Community Directive 403, which had been sought through a Freedom of Information Act request, itself represents a novel act of transparency. The prior guidance governing Intelligence Disclosure Policy under DCI Directive 6/7 had not been publicly disclosed, as far as is known. The topic of intelligence liaison relationships, which is distinct but related to foreign disclosure, is among the most sensitive and least publicly documented areas of U.S. intelligence policy.

The current foreign disclosure policy was elaborated in several guidance documents that were also released by ODNI last week:

Criteria for Foreign Disclosure and Release of Classified National Intelligence, Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG) 403.1, March 13, 2013

Procedures for Foreign Disclosure and Release Requiring Interagency Coordination, Notification, and DNI Approval, Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG) 403.2, August 8, 2014

Criteria and Conditions for Emergency Foreign Disclosure and Release, Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG) 403.3, April 29, 2014

Procedures for Interagency Coordination Prior to Foreign Disclosure and Release to Senior Foreign Officials, Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG) 403.4, October 25, 2014

ICPG 403.1 specifies several categories of intelligence information that may not be shared with a foreign government.

These include intelligence which is protected against disclosure by law or treaty; intelligence on a U.S. person that is not publicly available; intelligence derived from Grand Jury information; and intelligence obtained through a liaison relationship with another government, among other categories.

Intelligence community officials are instructed to anticipate the purposes for which the shared intelligence might be used.

“Disclosures and releases that would support or facilitate lethal action require special consideration and authorization, including referral to the NSC and compliance with NSC direction as appropriate,” according to ICPG 403.1.

The ability of Congressional Research Service analysts to support congressional deliberations is substantially enabled by (if not entirely predicated on) the confidentiality with which requests from individual Members of Congress and the CRS responses to those requests are handled.

Confidentiality permits congressional offices to consider politically sensitive or unpopular topics, and to evaluate new perspectives dispassionately without being prematurely locked into an ideologically-determined position.

A new CRS policy statement embraces the “fundamental core value” of confidentiality. But then CRS ratchets it up to the point of absurdity.

“[CRS] staff must maintain a confidential relationship with congressional clients at all times. Each and every inquiry CRS receives is part of a confidential relationship,” the CRS policy affirms. So far, so good.

“Confidentiality requires that CRS staff members never acknowledge to another congressional client, government entity or official, or to the public or media, work that has been done for a specific Member or committee.” Okay. But then CRS goes over the edge.

“Even in instances when a Member or committee publicly releases a confidential memorandum that CRS has prepared, staff may not provide copies of the memorandum to other congressional clients.” That’s overkill.

“You should answer any questions that [other] congressional clients have about the issue by preparing a new memorandum or other form of response […], but you must do so in a way that neither confirms nor denies that CRS did the work that has been made publicly available [by the Member or committee].” Instead of confidentiality serving as a valuable means to an end, the new policy here elevates confidentiality into an end in itself, and in doing so casts doubt on the good sense of CRS management.

Attempts to elicit comment from CRS on this issue last week by telephone and email were not successful.

See Policy on Confidentiality, Congressional Research Service, September 22, 2015, with accompanying Frequently Asked Questions.

All of that pertains to confidential memoranda that are prepared for individual Members or committees. By contrast, CRS Reports are produced for the Congress as a whole. As such, they are “accorded a less restrictive level of confidentiality than other types of CRS work,” the new policy states. But others would say the reports are not confidential at all, and should not be, particularly since they do not implicate the views of any individual Member of Congress.

New and updated CRS publications of the latter sort that were issued in the past week include the following.

Is This the First Step in Undoing Mass Incarceration? 6,000 Federal Drug Offenders Set to be Released, CRS Insight, October 22, 2015

Legal Obligation of U.S. Armed Forces to Intervene in Acts of Bacha Bazi in Afghanistan, CRS Legal Sidebar, October 22, 2015

Escalating Violence in El Salvador, CRS Insight, October 22, 2015

China’s Recent Stock Market Volatility: What Are the Implications?, CRS Insight, updated October 21, 2015

Oil to Spare: The House Passes a Repeal of Crude Oil Export Restrictions, CRS Legal Sidebar, October 23, 2015

The Effect of Base-Broadening Measures on Labor Supply and Investment: Considerations for Tax Reform, October 22, 2015

Department of Veterans Affairs FY2016 Appropriations: In Brief, October 22, 2015

Vulnerable Youth: Federal Mentoring Programs and Issues, October 22, 2015

Legislative Actions to Repeal, Defund, or Delay the Affordable Care Act, October 22, 2015

Financial Transactions Taxes: In Brief, October 22, 2015

U.S. Postal Service Workforce Size and Employment Categories, FY1995-FY2014, October 21, 2015

Potential Policy Implications of the House Reconciliation Bill (H.R. 3762), October 21, 2015

Why Are Over-Income Tenants Living in Public Housing?, CRS Insight, October 22, 2015

Since 2010, the U.S. Army has cut 80,000 soldiers from its ranks. It plans to complete a further reduction of 40,000 more by the end of fiscal year 2017, for an overall 21 percent reduction of Army active forces down to 450,000 soldiers.

The reductions in force were described in a July 2015 report to Congress that was released last week under the Freedom of Information Act. See Department of the Army, Notification to Congress on the Permanent Reduction of Sizable Numbers of Members of the Armed Forces, 10 July 2015.

“Nearly every Army installation will experience reductions of some size,” the report indicated. Six installations will be reduced by more than 1,000 Soldiers: Fort Benning (Georgia), Fort Bliss (Texas), Fort Hood (Texas), Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (Alaska), Joint Base Lewis-McChord (Washington), and Schofield Barracks (Hawaii).

The report “includes an evaluation of the local economic, strategic, and operational consequences of the reductions at these six installations.”

Additional reductions in the civilian Army workforce are expected to total around 17,000 by FY 2019.

“The Army will continue to be a force that can deploy and sustain capabilities across the range of military operations anywhere in the world on short notice,” the report said.

However, “force structure reductions and the resulting impacts on installation populations could be significant to both military communities and to the defense posture of our nation,” it concluded.

The newly-released Army report was also discussed in “Army Bases Bleed, Then BRAC Comes” by Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Breaking Defense, October 21.

The history, status and possible future of current Army combat vehicles were examined in a new report from the Congressional Research Service. See The Army’s M-1 Abrams, M-2/M-3 Bradley, and M-1126 Stryker: Background and Issues for Congress, October 15, 2015.

New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service include the following.

Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Supplements Journalist Privilege, CRS Legal Sidebar, October 20, 2015

Supreme Court Appointment Process: President’s Selection of a Nominee, October 19, 2015

Supreme Court Appointment Process: Consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee, October 19, 2015

Supreme Court Appointment Process: Senate Debate and Confirmation Vote, October 19, 2015

Points of Order in the Congressional Budget Process, updated October 20, 2015

Creating a Federal Advisory Committee in the Executive Branch, October 19, 2015

Legislative Branch Agency Appointments: History, Processes, and Recent Actions, updated October 19, 2015

Federal Aid for Reconstruction of Houses of Worship: A Legal Analysis, October 19, 2015

Sanctuary Jurisdictions and Criminal Aliens: In Brief, October 20, 2015

Elections in Haiti, CRS Insight, October 20, 2015

Argentina’s 2015 Presidential Election, CRS Insight, October 20, 2015

U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation Following “El Chapo” Guzmán’s Escape, CRS Insights, updated October 20, 2015

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, updated October 19, 2015

U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2016 Request, October 19, 2015

*    *    *

The ready availability of most CRS reports online in recent years has demonstrated at least a couple of things.

First, they are actually useful.  And they are used — by reporters, researchers and members of the general public. Every day, news stories and editorials cite to CRS publications as authoritative sources of non-partisan information.

Second, their broad public dissemination online has generated no adverse effects on CRS as an institution. In particular, it has not interfered with analysts’ productivity or candor, or with the conduct of congressional operations.

But authorized disclosure of CRS reports would be greatly preferable to the existing practice of unauthorized disclosure. The unauthorized route involves time-consuming collection and processing activity by people whose efforts could perhaps be applied more productively in other ways. And while the public archive of current CRS reports is probably more than 80% complete, it is not 100% complete.

A new initiative to gain authorized public access to CRS reports is now getting some traction. The issue is being addressed today on Capitol Hill at a meeting of the Congressional Transparency Caucus.

Numerous former CRS experts and analysts have written to congressional leaders to express their support for public access.

And a bipartisan resolution in favor of public access has been introduced in the House by Reps. Mike Quigley (D-IL) and Leonard Lance (R-NJ).

It may yet happen.

The United States has used its armed forces hundreds of times in conflicts abroad, even though it has only engaged in eleven declared wars throughout its history.

A newly updated tabulation of U.S. military actions has been prepared by the Congressional Research Service, up to and including the October 14, 2015 deployment of 90 U.S. troops to Cameroon. The CRS listing does not include covert actions, disaster relief operations or training exercises. See  Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2015, October 15, 2015.

Other new or newly updated CRS products include the following.

U.S. Natural Gas Exports and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement, CRS Insight, October 15, 2015

International Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Response Mechanisms, updated October 16, 2015

State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2016 Budget and Appropriations, updated October 13, 2015

Less-than-Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement Signed in Burma, CRS Insight, October 15, 2015

U.S.-China Cyber Agreement, CRS Insight, October 16, 2015

Greenhouse Gas Pledges by Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, updated October 19, 2015

Alternative Inflation Measures for the Social Security Cost-of-Living Adjustment (COLA), updated October 15, 2015

Federal Public Transportation Program: In Brief, updated October 15, 2015

Number of Hispanic U.S. Circuit and District Court Judges: Overview and Analysis, CRS Insight, October 15, 2015

A U.S. Patent Box: Issues, CRS Insight, October 15, 2015

Cost-of-Living Adjustments for Federal Civil Service Annuities, updated October 15, 2015

Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, updated October 15, 2015

Updated below

The Government Accountability Office this week quietly published a list of titles of its restricted reports that have not been publicly released because they contain classified information or controlled unclassified information.  A new link to “Restricted Reports” appears at the bottom of the GAO homepage.

“This list is intended to keep Congress, federal agencies, and the public informed of the existence of these products. The list consists of all such classified or controlled products issued since September 30, 2014 and will be updated each time a new report is issued,” the GAO webpage says.

“We did not issue a statement or announcement” concerning the new listing, said Timothy L. Minelli of GAO Congressional Relations.

A congressional staffer said the move was prompted by concerns expressed by some Members of Congress and staff that they were unaware of the restricted reports, since they had not been indexed or archived by GAO.

Publication of the titles of restricted GAO reports “was not necessarily universally desired by everyone in Congress,” the staffer said, and “it took about a year” to resolve the issue. But “GAO deserves a lot of credit. They decided it was the right thing to do, and they did it.”

Although primarily aimed at congressional consumers, the new webpage also serves to inform the public. GAO is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act, but will usually entertain requests for records anyway. However, GAO is not authorized to release information that has been classified or controlled by an executive branch agency.

There are several limitations to the new disclosure policy. It does not reflect restricted GAO reports that were generated prior to 2014. It will not cite titles that are themselves classified. And it will not include reports that focus on an individual intelligence agency.

“We excluded titles of products primarily focused on an element of the intelligence community to be consistent with the general practices of the IG [Inspector General] Offices within that IC community, who generally don’t post these titles,” said Mr. Minelli of GAO. “Only titles of products that that are primarily focused on an element of the IC won’t be listed, which we believe will be a very small number, likely less than a handful per year.”

“More common are GAO products that address activities/operations of IC elements in the context of a broader set of questions we are answering, and the titles of these products are being posted,” he said.

“Finally, in a number of cases and pending the classification and sensitivity reviews conducted by the appropriate agencies, GAO will follow its usual practice of trying to issue public versions of classified and sensitive-but-unclassified  products that have had classified and SBU material removed.  These reports are posted on our website and publicly available,” he said.

Update: A listing of GAO restricted report titles from 1971-2011 was obtained and published by GovernmentAttic.org, which also obtained copies of the first page of each GAO report issued prior to 1972 that remains classified.

New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service include the following.

The Internet of Things: Frequently Asked Questions, October 13, 2015

Colombian Peace Talks Breakthrough: A Possible End-Game?, CRS Insight, October 13, 2015

Officers May Be Liable for Assuming an Automatic Hot Pursuit No Knock Exception, CRS Legal Sidebar, October 15, 2015

Sentence Reform Acts: S.2123 and H.R. 3713, October 14, 2015

Family Violence Prevention and Services Act (FVPSA): Background and Funding, October 14, 2015

Enrollment of Legislation: Relevant Congressional Procedures, October 14, 2015

Potential Impact of No Social Security COLA on Medicare Part B Premiums in 2016, October 13, 2015

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress, October 14, 2015

Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, September 29, 2015

Ideally, arms control agreements that are well-conceived and faithfully implemented will foster international stability and build confidence between nations. But things don’t always work out that way, and arms control itself can become a cause for suspicion and conflict.

“Can you say anything about how Russia, in this venue, is using their Open Skies flights over the United States?,” Rep. Mike Rogers (R-AL) asked Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) director Lt.Gen. Vincent R. Stewart at a February 3 hearing of the House Armed Services Committee (at page 13).

“The Open Skies construct was designed for a different era,” Lt.Gen. Stewart replied. “I am very concerned about how it is applied today. And I would love to talk about that in closed hearing,” he added mysteriously.

The Open Skies Treaty, to which the United States and Russia are parties, entered into force in 2002. It allows member states to conduct overflights of other members’ territories in order to monitor their military forces and activities.

It is unclear exactly what prompted DIA director Stewart’s concern about Russian overflights of the United States, and his perspective does not appear to be shared by some other senior Defense Department officials.

The most recent State Department annual report on arms control compliance identified several obstacles to U.S. overflights of Russia that it said were objectionable. The only issue relating to Russian overflights of the U.S. was that “Russia continued not to provide first generation duplicate negative film copies of imagery collected during Open Skies flights over the United States.”

But there seems to be more to the concerns about Russian overflights than that.

“Is it true that the Commander of U.S. European Command non-concurred last year when OSD-P asked for his input on approving Russian Federation requests under the Open Skies treaty?,” Rep. Rogers asked at another hearing on February 26 (at page 72).

That “was part of the deliberative process and was used to inform DOD and U.S. Government decision-making,” replied Brian McKeon of the Department of Defense. “As we worked with other U.S. departments and agencies, we determined that the specific concerns would be ameliorated by some important, separate components of the policy.” Both the specific concerns and the steps to ameliorate them were described in a classified letter that is not publicly available.

“USSTRATCOM’s capabilities are not significantly impacted by Open Skies overflights today, any more than we have been since the Treaty was implemented in 2002,” said Admiral Cecil D. Haney, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command.

“While the U.S. works with Russia on a number of broader concerns, Open Skies continues to serve as a fundamental transparency and confidence building measure in support of the Euro-Atlantic alliance,” Admiral Haney said.

 *    *    *

Relatedly, on the subject of arms control compliance, the Congressional Research Service updated its report on Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress, October 13, 2015.

Other new and updated CRS reports that have been issued in the past week include the following.

Appropriations Subcommittee Structure: History of Changes from 1920 to 2015, updated October 13, 2015

Congressional Action on FY2016 Appropriations Measures, updated October 9, 2015

EPA Policies Concerning Integrated Planning and Affordability of Water Infrastructure, October 8, 2015

Issues in a Tax Reform Limited to Corporations and Businesses, October 8, 2015

Advance Appropriations, Forward Funding, and Advance Funding: Concepts, Practice, and Budget Process Considerations, updated October 8, 2015

Department of Labor’s 2015 Proposed Fiduciary Rule: Background and Issues, October 8, 2015

U.S.-South Korea Relations, updated October 8, 2015

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, updated October 9, 2015

The Department of Defense needs to take several steps in order to avoid “strategic surprise” by an adversary over the coming decade, according to a new study from the Defense Science Board, a Pentagon advisory body.

Among those steps, “Counterintelligence must be enhanced with urgency.” See DSB Summer Study Report on Strategic Surprise, July 2015.

The Board called for “continuous monitoring” of cleared personnel who have access to particularly sensitive information. “The use of big data analytics could allow DoD to track anomalies in the behaviors of cleared personnel in order to thwart the insider threat.”

“Continuous monitoring” involves constant surveillance of an employee’s activities (especially online activities), and it goes beyond the “continuous evaluation” of potentially derogatory information that is an emerging part of the current insider threat program.

“Insider actions often generate suspicious indicators in multiple and organizationally separate domains–physical, personnel, and cyber security. The use of big data and creative analytics can be carefully tuned to the style and workflow of the particular organization and can help to audit for integrity as well as individual user legitimacy,” the DSB report said.

The DSB report broadly addressed opportunities and vulnerabilities in eight domains: countering nuclear proliferation; ballistic and cruise missile defense; space security; undersea warfare; cyber (“The Department should treat cyber as a military capability of the highest priority”); communications and positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); counterintelligence; and logistics resilience.

To an outside reader, the DSB report seems one-dimensional and oddly disconnected from current realities. It does not consider whether the pursuit of any of its recommended courses of actions could have unintended consequences. It does not inquire whether there are high-level national policies that would make strategic surprise more or less likely. And it does not acknowledge the recurring failure of the budget process to produce a defense budget that is responsive to national requirements in a timely fashion.

In 2010, then-Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair convened a panel to review the November 2009 Fort Hood shooting committed by Army Maj. Nidal Hasan and the Christmas Day bombing attempt by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab aboard Northwest Flight 253.

A redacted version of the resulting panel report was finally declassified and released this week. See Report to the Director of National Intelligence on the Fort Hood and Northwest Flight 253 Incidents, Intelligence Community Review Panel, 15 April 2010.  The panel was led by former Acting DCI John E. McLaughlin.

In a nutshell, the report found, “There were several missed opportunities that could have increased the odds of detecting Abdulmutallab or Hasan. The causes of the missteps ranged from human error to inadequate information technology, inefficient processes, unclear roles and responsibilities, and an occasional lack of individual inquisitiveness.”

Beyond a detailed recounting of what was known by U.S. intelligence about the perpetrators, much of which has been withheld, the report fills a gap in the literature of intelligence reform with a look at systemic issues such as the state of information technology in the intelligence community (as of 2011), the process of watch-listing, and disagreements over the handling of U.S. person information.

“Inadequate information technology runs through both the Fort Hood and the NW Flight 253 narratives, particularly the inability of IT systems to help analysts locate relevant reporting in a sea of fragmentary data or to correct for seemingly minor human errors.”

“NCTC [National Counterterrorism Center] analysts, for example, have access to more than 28 separate databases and systems, each of which, for the most part, has a separate log-on. This means analysts have to search each database separately before trying to identify connections among their results.”

The existing search capacity “is intolerant of even simple mistakes in the queries and does not enable questions like: list everyone that is potentially affiliated with AQAP and has a passport or visa that would permit entry to the United States or UK.”

But the problem is not purely one of technology, the report said. “The Community cannot realize the potential of information technology to assist the counterterrorism mission without clarifying… procedures for sharing information on US persons.”

The report reflects a view that restrictions on collecting and disseminating US person information had become onerous and counterproductive.

“Many of the people we interviewed assessed that policy on handling US Persons data… was limiting the Intelligence Community’s ability to aggregate and exploit available data, especially information pertaining to critical domestic-foreign nexus issues.”

“We noticed a strong belief among collectors and analysts that restrictions on collecting, disseminating, accessing, and analyzing data on US Persons impede mission performance…. We also saw a surprising level of disagreement — even among experienced practitioners — on whether current US Person authorities allow intelligence officers to accomplish their missions, or whether new legal authorities are needed.”

(“Sharing US Person information with foreign partners, and tasking them to collect on US Persons appeared at various points,” the report says at the start of an otherwise redacted paragraph.)

“We see a need to simplify, harmonize, update, and modify the Community’s procedures relating to US persons,” the McLaughlin panel wrote.

What exactly this might mean in practice was not spelled out, but it didn’t seem to entail tightening, narrowing or curtailing the use of US person information, or increasing oversight of it.

“The report’s finding on the Intelligence Community’s ‘caution’ and ‘risk aversion’ in the collection of US persons information is particularly notable,” said Christian Beckner, Deputy Director, GW Center for Cyber & Homeland Security, “leading the review group to worry that ‘the next terrorist surprise could be the result of confusion or excessive caution about how to manage this issue.’  This finding is in striking contrast to much of the public dialogue following the Snowden leaks about intelligence activities related to US persons.”

The panel report also includes various incidental observations of interest.

“The panel is concerned that the overlap between CTC [the CIA Counterterrorism Center} and NCTC [the National Counterterrorism Center] extends beyond healthy competition and that the turf battles, duplications, and clashes are a drain on the resources and creative energy of both organizations.”

Furthermore, “It appears that much of the tension between the two organizations centers on issues related to the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) — everything from who takes the lead to what is said in the articles.”

The report cites inaccuracies in news media coverage of the Fort Hood shootings and Christmas Day bombing “that have skewed the discussions.” For example, contrary to some accounts, “There is no evidence indicating that [Anwar al] Aulaqi directed Hasan.”

The report also presents a previously unreleased 2010 DNI directive on “lanes in the road” (included as Appendix D to the report) that “establishes the responsibilities and accountability of leaders of major organizations with counterterrorism analytic missions.” In other words, it assigned specific counterterrorism roles to each of the relevant intelligence agencies.

“Each organization within the IC with a significant counterterrorism analytic effort is expected to work seamlessly with its counterparts, drawing on the specific strengths and advantages of partners, but is also expected to place particular emphasis on those missions they are uniquely positioned to conduct,” wrote DNI Dennis C. Blair in the April 7, 2010 memorandum.