Updated below

A new U.S. Army regulation (pdf) on Operations Security (OPSEC) would sharply restrict the ability of soldiers to participate in public life without supervision and authorization from superior officers.

The regulation also encourages Army personnel to view attempts by unauthorized persons to gather restricted information as an act of subversion against the United States.

“All Department of the Army personnel and DoD contractors will… consider handling attempts by unauthorized personnel to solicit critical information or sensitive information as a Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the U.S. Army (SAEDA) incident,” the regulation states (at section 2-1).

“Sensitive” information is defined here (at section 1-5(c)(3)(e)) to include not just vital details of military operations and technologies but also documents marked “For Official Use Only” (FOUO) that may be exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.

It follows that inquisitive members of the press or the public who actively pursue such FOUO records may be deemed enemies of the United States.

In what seems to be a serious conceptual muddle, the new regulation conflates OPSEC, which is supposed to be a defense against adversaries of the United States, with FOIA restrictions, which regulate public access to government information. As a result, it appears that OPSEC procedures are now to be used to control access to predecisional documents, copyrighted or proprietary material, and other FOIA-exempt records.

A copy of the new regulation, dated April 19 and itself marked For Official Use Only, was obtained by Wired News and is posted here.

Taken at face value, the regulation would spell the end of military blogging and would severely curtail military participation in public life. It imposes a non-discretionary pre-publication review requirement, stating that “all Department of the Army personnel… will… consult with their immediate supervisor… prior to publishing or posting information in a public forum.” (sec. 2-1).

It was reported by Noah Shachtman in “New Army Rules Could Kill G.I. Blogs (Maybe E-mail, Too),” Danger Room, May 2.

The terms of the Army regulation are so expansive as to create innumerable new opportunities for violations and infractions. Just this week, for example, the Army’s own 1st Information Operations Command ironically posted a briefing on “OPSEC in the Blogosphere” (pdf) marked For Official Use Only.

(Thanks, again, to Entropic Memes.)

Update: The Army issued a fact sheet (pdf) that appears to retreat significantly from the provisions of the new Regulation. See Army to Bloggers: We Won’t Bust You. Promise. by Noah Shachtman in Danger Room, and Army clarifies blogging policy by Jason Miller, Federal Computer Week.

The planning and performance of Joint Special Operations are described in some detail in a new publication (pdf) from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

“Joint special operations (SO) are conducted by SOF [special operations forces] from more than one Service in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement.”

“These operations may require low visibility, clandestine, or covert capabilities.”

“SO differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, use of special equipment, modes of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.”

See “Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations,” Joint Publication 3-05.1, 26 April 2007 (400 pages, 1.8 MB PDF).

“Air Force intelligence components do not engage in experimentation involving human subjects for intelligence purposes,” a new Air Force Instruction (pdf) states categorically.

Except for the exceptions.

“Any exception would require approval by the Secretary or Under Secretary of the Air Force and would be undertaken only with the informed consent of the subject and in accordance with procedures established by AF/SG to safeguard the welfare of subjects.”

The new Instruction presents a generally scrupulous account of the regulatory framework within which Air Force intelligence operates. It addresses domestic search and surveillance, imagery collection and dissemination, mail covers, and other intelligence activities.

See Air Force Instruction 14-104, “Oversight of Intelligence Activities,” 16 April 2007.

Some other noteworthy new Air Force Instructions include these (both pdf):

AFI 10-2604, “Disease Containment Planning Guidance,” 6 April 2007.

AFI 40-201, “Managing Radioactive Materials in the U.S. Air Force,” 13 April 2007.

“During calendar year 2006, the Government made 2,181 applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for authority to conduct electronic surveillance and physical search for foreign intelligence purposes,” according to the latest Justice Department report to Congress on implementation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (pdf). The court approved 2,176 applications, making substantive modifications to 73 of them, and denying one, in part.

The Open Government Act of 2007, which would strengthen several access provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, was favorably reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee for consideration by the full Senate. Much of the Committee report on the bill was devoted to a lengthy critique by Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ), who unsuccessfully opposed it, and a letter from the Justice Department, likewise in opposition.

The responsibilities of various Pentagon components in dealing with the threat of weapons of mass destruction are delineated in a new directive. See “Department of Defense (DoD) Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Policy” (pdf), DoD Directive 2060.02, April 19, 2007.

“Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the North-South Peace Agreement” (pdf) is the subject of a report from the Congressional Research Service, updated March 27, 2007.

With one remarkable exception noted below, no one believes that congressional oversight of intelligence has served the nation well in recent years or that it has been adequate to the momentous demands of the time.

While the country has been roiled by debates over detention and interrogation policies, warrantless domestic intelligence surveillance, extraordinary rendition, the legality and efficacy of torture, and many other urgent and fundamental issues, the congressional intelligence committees have had surprisingly little to contribute.

Under the leadership of Sen. Pat Roberts and Rep. Pete Hoekstra, the committees could not even accomplish their baseline task of legislating an intelligence authorization bill during the past two years.

“The 109th Congress … became the first since the 94th Congress that did not pass an Intelligence Authorization Act,” observed a new report of the Senate Intelligence Committee. “Fiscal year 2006 became the first since 1978 to not only begin but also to end without an intelligence authorization [act].”

Though the committees have been largely ineffective, they were not idle. The 36-page Senate committee report details the proposals that were debated, the legislative initiatives that were introduced, and the various hearings that were held, during the 109th Congress.

See Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence covering the period January 4, 2005 to December 8, 2006, Senate Report 110-57, April 26, 2007.

But from the perspective of the Central Intelligence Agency, the sharply diminished productivity of congressional oversight was just about optimal.

In particular, Senator Roberts’ leadership of the Senate Intelligence Committee was “exemplary,” the CIA proclaimed in a March 19 news release.

Neither his colleagues nor his constituents found much reason to celebrate intelligence oversight during his tenure. But at a March 16 luncheon ceremony at CIA headquarters, Senator Roberts was awarded the Agency Seal Medal, which is given to people outside the Agency who have made significant contributions to the work of CIA.

Today, Senate Intelligence Committee member Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) introduced a bill (pdf) to close the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay.

“Guantanamo Bay has become a lightning rod for international condemnation,” Senator Feinstein said. “This has greatly damaged the nation’s credibility around the world. Rather than make the United States safer, the image projected by this facility puts us at greater risk. The time has come to close it down.”

Across the globe from Iraq and Afghanistan to Africa to Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, U.S. Special Operations Forces are deployed to conduct unconventional warfare, psychological operations, and other activities in support of U.S. military and foreign policy objectives.

In Fiscal Year 2007, U.S. Special Operations Command has total authorized manpower of 47,911 persons, according to a new SOCOM posture statement, which provides an overview of special operations capabilities and missions.

See “U.S. SOCOM: Posture Statement 2007” (pdf), April 2007.

Earlier this month, the National Security Agency released several brief historical essays that had been prepared for the Agency’s Cryptologic Almanac on the occasion of its 50th anniversary in 2002. The essays were declassified on April 10 in response to a Mandatory Declassification Review request from Michael Ravnitzky. They include (all pdf):

“Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?” on the origins of NSA.

“SIGINT and the Fall of Saigon, April 1975”

“The First Round: NSA’s Effort Against International Terrorism in the 1970s”

“A Brief Look at ELINT at NSA”

On January 26, 2007, the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council approved the establishment of a National Exercise Program (NEP) that would conduct management exercises to help senior government officials prepare for national crises from terrorism to natural disasters.

In a briefing last month (pdf), the Department of Homeland Security presented a proposed Five Year Schedule for the NEP.

Proposed exercises would model government responses to a nuclear weapons accident, pandemic influenza, Olympic terrorism, IED and MANPADS attacks, and other emergency scenarios.

Cabinet officers and other senior officials would be required to participate in five such exercises annually.

See the Department of Homeland Security briefing on the National Exercise Program, March 8, 2007 (For Official Use Only).

See also “Exercise Synchronization Working Group and NEP Implementation Plan Update and Way Ahead” (pdf), Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5-6 March 2007.

Thanks to Nemo at Entropic Memes.

The U.S. Army yesterday issued a new Field Manual on “Sensitive Site Operations” (FM 3-90.15, 25 April 2007).

The document itself is restricted and the Army would not immediately provide a copy to Secrecy News. But a few blanks can nevertheless be filled in.

“A sensitive site is a designated, geographically limited area with special military, diplomatic, economic, or information sensitivity for the United States,” according to the Army Field Manual (2-0) on Intelligence (pdf).

“This includes factories with technical data on enemy weapon systems, war crimes sites, critical hostile government facilities, areas suspected of containing persons of high rank in a hostile government or organization, terrorist money laundering, and document storage areas for secret police forces.”

“Sensitive site exploitation consists of a series of activities inside a sensitive site captured from an adversary.”

“These activities exploit personnel, documents, electronic data, and material captured at the site, while neutralizing any threat posed by the site or its contents. While the physical process of exploiting the sensitive site begins at the site itself, full exploitation may involve teams of experts located around the world.”

For further background and description of some fairly recent sensitive site operations, see a seminar paper entitled “The Strategic Implications of Sensitive Site Exploitation” (pdf) by Col. Thomas S. Vandal, National Defense University, 2003.

See also “Managing Sensitive Site Exploitation — Notes from Operation Iraqi Freedom” (pdf) by Major Pete Lofy, 2003.

Wal-Mart, the massive retail chain, has established its own “intelligence” unit to conduct threat assessments, and to perform intelligence collection and analysis.

And it has been recruiting senior personnel from U.S. intelligence agencies to staff its operation.

“I’ve had a number of people contact me who have purely law enforcement / security investigative backgrounds,” wrote one Wal-Mart recruiter in a January 2007 bulletin board posting. “That is not what the company is looking for.”

“The primary screening criteria for the positions is [sic] formal training and experience in intelligence analysis. If an individual does not possess that minimal criteria, then he will not be considered.”

See “Wal-Mart Recruits Intelligence Officers” by Marcus Kabel, Associated Press, April 24.

See also “Wal-Mart Defends Itself with New Intel Unit” by Jason Goodwin, Government Security News, February 2006.

Having spent months assessing the role of contractors in U.S. intelligence agencies, U.S. intelligence officials say they cannot disclose how many contractors there are, because that’s classified. See “Government Keeps a Secret After Studying Spy Agencies” by Scott Shane, New York Times, April 26.

Veteran female intelligence officers charge that the Central Intelligence Agency deals more harshly with women employees who have relationships with foreign nationals than it does with men. See “Does the CIA have a double standard when its spies cozy up to foreigners?” by David E. Kaplan, U.S. News and World Report, April 22.

A tumultuous congressional hearing on the CIA’s extraordinary rendition program was captured by Jeff Stein in “A CIA Man Speaks His Mind on Secret Abductions,” CQ Homeland Security, April 20.

In 1967 the United States had a top secret contingency plan for attacking Israel to prevent it from moving westward into the Sinai or eastward into the West Bank, reported Amir Oren in Haaretz. See “The Right to Strike,” April 23.

With congressional concurrence, the Congressional Research Service refuses to make its products directly available to the public. Some noteworthy new CRS reports obtained by Secrecy News include the following (all pdf).

“Presidential Advisers’ Testimony Before Congressional Committees: An Overview,” updated April 10, 2007.

“Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues,” updated March 20, 2007.

“Network Centric Operations: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress,” updated March 15, 2007.

“Statutes of Limitation in Federal Criminal Cases: An Overview,” updated April 9, 2007.

“Speechwriting in Perspective: A Brief Guide to Effective and Persuasive Communication,” April 12, 2007.