Last month the Director of National Intelligence issued a new Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) on “Technical Surveillance Countermeasures” (pdf) (TSCM).

TSCM “represents the convergence of two distinct disciplines — counterintelligence and security countermeasures,” the directive explained. Its purpose is “to detect and nullify a wide variety of technologies used to gain unauthorized access to classified national security information, restricted data, or otherwise sensitive information.”

The directive was released (in a fuzzy, not very well scanned copy) by the ODNI Freedom of Information Act office.

See “Technical Surveillance Countermeasures,” ICD 702, February 18, 2008.

To its credit, the Defense Intelligence Agency promptly withdrew an official DIA history that mistakenly described the 1981 Israeli attack on an Iraqi nuclear reactor in the 1980s as an attack on Iran. As soon as the error became public, DIA replaced the entire document with an updated account.

In an email message yesterday to Israeli author Gideon Remez, who discovered the error, DIA webmaster David Baird wrote: “You are correct that the historical fact is wrong. We did not realize it until you pointed it out. We are taking steps to correct it.”

By yesterday afternoon, the 1996 “Defense Intelligence Agency: A Brief History” (pdf), which contained the error, had been replaced on the DIA web site by a 2007 “History of the Defense Intelligence Agency” (pdf). Both documents can be found on the FAS web site.

Noteworthy new reports from the Congressional Research Service include the following (all pdf).

“Enlargement Issues at NATO’s Bucharest Summit,” March 12, 2008.

“The NATO Summit at Bucharest, 2008,” March 24, 2008.

“Selected Federal Homeland Security Assistance Programs: A Summary,” updated January 31, 2008.

“Selected Laws Governing the Disclosure of Customer Phone Records by Telecommunications Carriers,” March 10, 2008.

Updated below

In a memorable TV interview with former Secretary of State James Baker, prankster “Ali G” (Sasha Baron Cohen) wondered about the possibility of confusing “Iran” and “Iraq.”

“Do you think it would be a good idea if one of them changed their name to make it very different sounding from the other one?” he asked Secretary Baker.

“Ain’t there a real danger that someone give like a message over the radio to one of them fighter pilots whatever saying bomb ‘Ira…’ and the geezer don’t hear it properly and bomb Iran rather than Iraq?”

“No danger,” Secretary Baker gamely replied.

In an official history (pdf), however, the Defense Intelligence Agency really has confused Iran and Iraq.

Among the “world crises” that transpired during the 1980s, the DIA history cites “an Israeli F-16 raid to destroy an Iranian nuclear reactor.” See “Defense Intelligence Agency: A Brief History” at page 14. (The document, originally published on the DIA web site here, has now been replaced. See update below.)

But there never was an Israeli attack on an Iranian nuclear reactor.

Rather, “The description appears to match Israel’s raid on Iraq’s [Osirak] nuclear reactor” in 1981, observed Gideon Remez, an Israeli scholar who is co-author of the recent book Foxbats Over Dimona (Yale, 2007).

“Today’s preoccupation with Iran’s nuclear program seems to have been projected onto the events of 27 years ago,” Mr. Remez suggested this week in an email message to DIA public affairs.

“If that is indeed the case, I’d recommend a correction,” he wrote.

Update: The DIA webmaster acknowledged the error in an email message to Gideon Remez today:

Thank you for your inquiry. You are correct that the historical fact is wrong. We did not realize it until you pointed it out. We are taking steps to correct it.

In fact, the document on the DIA website has already been modified and corrected. The uncorrected original is still available here.

Close examination of several recent volumes of the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series has turned up errors and questionable editorial judgments.

The record of conversations between Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai and Henry Kissinger that was published in FRUS last month failed to include what is arguably among the more sensitive and significant discussions that they held, regarding Kissinger’s offer to establish a US-China “hotline,” development of contingency plans for accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear-armed missiles, and provision of warning information in the event of Soviet moves against China. That discussion, which does not appear in FRUS, was memorialized in this document (pdf).

Fortunately, this memorandum and many more of comparable significance were collected and published by William Burr of the National Security Archive in his 1999 volume “The Kissinger Transcripts.”

In another surprising editorial lapse (in Nixon FRUS volume XXIX on Eastern Europe, document 77, page 203, footnote 2), the editors state that “On January 17 [1969] student Jan Palach set himself on fire in the center of Prague to protest the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.”

“Anyone who knows this subject is aware that Palach immolated himself on the 16th of January, not the 17th,” said Mark Kramer, editor of the Journal of Cold War Studies at Harvard. “This date is very well known in Czech society, and no one would confuse it with the 17th.”

Interestingly, while the State Department got this date wrong, Wikipedia got it right.

Needless to say, everyone makes errors. The FRUS series remains a crucial resource for historical understanding, even with the occasional error. And a robust FRUS publication schedule with some errors is vastly preferable to a gridlocked schedule with no errors. Still, there may be room for improvement in the editorial process.

The Homeland Security Council (HSC), a White House agency that advises the President on homeland security policy, has become one of the darkest corners of the U.S. Government.

The Council was established by President Bush shortly after September 11, 2001 and it was chartered as an agency within the Executive Office of the President in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.

“Thereafter, the HSC disappeared from the public record,” a new report from the Congressional Research Service (pdf) noticed.

In particular, according to CRS: The Homeland Security Council “does not appear to have complied with requirements for Federal Register publication of such basic information as descriptions of its central organization.”

It has never disclosed “where, from whom, and how the public may obtain information about it.”  Nor has it published the required “rules of procedure, substantive rules of general applicability, and statements of general policy.”

Moreover, “No profile of, or descriptive information regarding, the HSC or its members and staff has appeared, to date, in the annual editions of the United States Government Manual.”

This peculiar state of affairs was described by Harold C. Relyea of the Congressional Research Service in “Organizing for Homeland Security: The Homeland Security Council Reconsidered,” March 19, 2008.

Last week, President Bush appointed assistant attorney general Kenneth L. Wainstein to be homeland security adviser and chair of the Homeland Security Council, succeeding Frances F. Townsend.

Legislation pending in the Russian Duma [parliament] would impose new Russian government controls on online content, according to an analysis of Russian news reports from the DNI Open Source Center.

Boris Gryzlov, speaker of the Duma, was quoted as saying:  “We know that the Internet is all too often used as an instrument for destabilization and for terrorism. That kind of use of the Internet must be stopped.”

“Bloggers expressed varying degrees of alarm over the potential danger the law would pose to their community, with some alleging [that a sponsor of the legislation] is trying to use the law to silence his opponents and dismissing the law as unlikely to be passed,” according to the OSC report.

See “Russia–Increased Attempts to Regulate Internet,” DNI Open Source Center, March 24, 2008.

Noteworthy new reports from the Congressional Research Service that have not been made readily available to the public include the following (all pdf).

“Satellite Surveillance: Domestic Issues,” March 21, 2008.

“The Next Generation Bomber: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress,” March 7, 2008.

“U.S. Nuclear Cooperation With India: Issues for Congress,” updated February 12, 2008.

“Nuclear Weapons in U.S. National Security Policy: Past, Present, and Prospects,” updated January 28, 2008.

“U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress,” updated February 1, 2008.

“Direct Overt U.S. Aid, Export Assistance and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2009,” March 24, 2008.

“Cybercrime: An Overview of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Statute and Related Federal Criminal Laws,” updated February 25, 2008.

The U.S. State Department last month published four new volumes of its official Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, documenting the foreign relations of the Nixon Administration:

“European Security”

“Germany, 1969-1972”

“Eastern Europe”

“China, 1973-1976”

Inevitably, it seems, the occasional error creeps in.

Document 13 of the China volume transcribes a February 18, 1973 conversation between Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and Henry Kissinger in which Chou cited press reports that “the United States had contacts with Ismail” (on page 148). The FRUS editors inserted Footnote 3 explaining that “Ismail Fahmi was the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1973 until 1977.” That’s true, but that’s not who Premier Chou was talking about. “It is common knowledge that Chou was referring to Sadat’s national security adviser — Hafez Ismail,” wrote A, a Secrecy News correspondent.

The authority of a military commander to arrest and detain U.S. civilians suspected of committing a crime outside of the United States and within that commander’s area of responsibility is detailed in a recent memorandum (pdf) from Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates.

“There is a particular need for clarity regarding the legal framework that should govern a command response to any illegal activities by Department of Defense civilian employees and DoD contractor personnel overseas with our Armed Forces,” Secretary Gates wrote.

Ordinarily, civilians who violate U.S. criminal laws are to be prosecuted by the Department of Justice and commanders are to notify DoJ whenever such cases arise.

However, the Gates memo states, “Commanders should be prepared to act, as appropriate, should possible U.S. federal criminal jurisdiction prove to be unavailable to address the alleged criminal behavior.”

See “UCMJ Jurisdiction Over DoD Civilian Employees, DoD Contractor Personnel, and Other Persons Serving With or Accompanying the Armed Forces Overseas During Declared War and in Contingency Operations,” memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, March 10, 2008.

The memorandum was previously reported by Sebastian Sprenger in InsideDefense.com.

The functions and responsibilities of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) are detailed in a 27-page directive (pdf) that has been newly re-issued by the Department of Defense.

“DIA shall satisfy the military and military-related intelligence requirements of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DNI, and provide the military intelligence contribution to national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.”

See “Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),” DoD Directive 5105.21, March 18, 2008.

A whimsical collection of patches, emblems and insignia associated with classified Department of Defense programs has recently been published in a book by experimental geographer Trevor Paglen.

“Readers of this book will find a collection of images that are fragmentary, torn out of context, inconclusive, enigmatic, unreliable, quixotic, and deceptive,” the author warns. “Readers will find, in other words, a glimpse into the black world itself.”

See “I Could Tell You But Then You Would Have to Be Destroyed by Me: Emblems from the Pentagon’s Black World” by Trevor Paglen, Melville House Publishing, March 2008.

“Military patches and logos–simply the latest examples of heraldry dating back thousands of years–are by definition symbolic, so it is no surprise that they contain symbols. What is surprising is that these symbols often reveal information about … missions that are otherwise classified,” wrote space historians Dwayne A. Day and Roger Guillemette in an impressive analysis of several such images. See their “Secrets and Signs” in The Space Review, January 7, 2008.

Wired’s Danger Room blog recently featured some of the “Most Awesomely Bad Military Patches.”