Intelligence personnel who are trying to elicit information from a prisoner or a detainee can effectively do so in a non-coercive manner, according to the Intelligence Science Board (ISB), an official advisory group to the Director of National Intelligence.

“The United States and other democracies can benefit from exploring and learning more in the area of non-coercive intelligence interviewing,” the Board said in a sequel (pdf) to its December 2006 report on “Educing Information” (pdf).  That earlier study found that existing U.S. intelligence interrogation practices were not scientifically well-founded.  “The study team could not discover an objective scientific basis for the techniques commonly used by U.S. interrogators.”

The newly disclosed follow-on report, dated April 2009, “is written primarily for individuals concerned with ‘high-value’ detainees and those who focus mainly on strategic interrogation.”  It provides a survey of behavioral science perspectives on topics relevant to the interrogation process — including persuasion, power, stress, resistance, and memory — as well as two case studies of actual interrogations.

A copy of the ISB report was obtained by Secrecy News.  See “Intelligence Interviewing: Teaching Papers and Case Studies,” A Report from the Study on Educing Information, Intelligence Science Board, April 2009 (211 pages).

The ISB report adopted the new term “intelligence interviewing” instead of “interrogation” in part because it said “interrogation” is freighted with stereotypes often involving coercion.  The report emphasized the utility of non-coercive interrogation but acknowledged the difficulty of empirically establishing its superiority to coercive questioning.

“During Phases I and II, contributors could find no studies that compare the results of ‘coercive’ interrogations with those of non-coercive intelligence interviews. It is also difficult to imagine how such studies might be conducted in a scientifically valid, let alone morally acceptable, manner.”

The ISB study notably dissected the “ticking time bomb” scenario that is often portrayed in television thrillers (and which has “captured the public imagination”).  The authors patiently explained why that hypothetical scenario is not a sensible guide to interrogation policy or a justification for torture.  Moral considerations aside, the ISB report said, coercive interrogation may produce unreliable results, foster increased resistance, and preclude the discovery of unsuspected intelligence information of value (pp. 40-42).

“There also are no guarantees that non-coercive intelligence interviewing will obtain the necessary information,” the report said. “However, the United States has important recent examples of effective, non-coercive intelligence interviewing with high value detainees.”

The ISB said its report could “provide experienced and successful interviewers a more formal understanding of the approaches they may have used instinctively. It may also help them to communicate their expertise to their colleagues… This [report] is intended to foster thinking and discussion and to encourage knowledge-based teaching, research, and practice. It does not, and cannot, offer doctrine or prescriptions. It is a start, not an end.”

The mission of the Intelligence Science Board is “to provide the Intelligence Community with outside expert advice and unconventional thinking, early notice of advances in science and technology, insight into new applications of existing technology, and special studies that require skills or organizational approaches not resident within the Intelligence Community.”

Rare earth elements — of which there are 17, including the 15 lanthanides plus yttrium and scandium — are needed in many industrial and national security applications, from flat panel displays to jet fighter engines.  Yet there are foreseeable stresses on the national and global supply of these materials.

“The United States was once self-reliant in domestically produced [rare earth elements], but over the past 15 years has become 100% reliant on imports, primarily from China,” a new report (pdf) from the Congressional Research Service observes.  “The dominance of China as a single or dominant supplier […] is a cause for concern because of China’s growing internal demand for its [own rare earth elements],” the report said.

The CRS report provides background and analysis on the uses of rare earth elements, existing reserves, national security applications, the global supply chain and relevant legislation.  See “Rare Earth Elements: the Global Supply Chain,” July 28, 2010.

In “The Twilight of the Bombs,” the fourth and final volume of his epic history of the nuclear era, author Richard Rhodes examines “how the dangerous post-Cold War transition was managed, who its heroes were, what we learned from it, and where it carried us.”

Covering the years 1990-2010, from the collapse of the Soviet Union onward, much of the latest history is familiar.  But by focusing on nuclear weapons development, proliferation and testing, Rhodes fashions his own narrative arc, enriched by new interviews and insights.

In the end, he sees a hopeful trajectory of “nuclear limitation and foreclosure:  from Mikhail Gorbachev’s and Ronald Reagan’s initiatives to end the Cold War, to the voluntary disarming of the former Soviet republics and the security of nuclear materials, to the U.S. and Russia’s deepening mutual arms reduction, to the up-and-down negotiations with North Korea that have nevertheless prevented another Korean war, to international diplomatic pressure brought to bear effectively on India and Pakistan, to the persistent march forward of negotiations toward treaties to limit nuclear testing and proliferation.”  (However, Rhodes does not specifically address the case of Iran’s nuclear program, as noted by Tim Rutten in an August 18 review in the Los Angeles Times.)

In the concluding pages of the book, Rhodes posits an analogy between previous campaigns to eradicate or limit disease and current efforts to abolish nuclear weapons, which he deems both necessary and feasible.  “In 1999, for the first time in human history, infectious diseases no longer ranked first among causes of death worldwide” thanks to the discipline of public health.  In a similarly efficacious way, he says, the ingredients of the analogous discipline of public safety against nuclear weapons “have already begun to assemble themselves: materials control and accounting, cooperative threat reduction, security guarantees, agreements and treaties, surveillance and inspection, sanctions, forceful disarming if all else fails.”

“The Twilight of the Bombs” cannot match Rhodes’ first volume on “The Making of the Atomic Bomb” for sheer mythological power, but it is fluidly and eloquently written.  The author’s prose ranges widely, sometimes vertiginously:  In the book’s Index, Scott Ritter comes right after Rainer Maria Rilke, the Ayatollah Khomeini is just above Nicole Kidman, and Sig Hecker of Los Alamos is separated from Jesse Helms by G.W.F. Hegel.

Mr. Rhodes (who I should say has been a consistent supporter of Secrecy News) ends the book with Acknowledgments, including a valentine to his wife:  “She, not thermonuclear fusion, makes the sun shine.”

The Obama Administration plans to increase the frequency, rigor and realism of emergency planning exercises involving senior government officials and emergency responders in an effort to improve the nation’s emergency preparedness.

“This administration understands and believes in the importance of exercising [for national emergencies] and requires that the most senior levels of government are involved in all aspects,” wrote Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano in an internal memorandum (pdf) last week.

“Much has been accomplished through the implementation of the first generation of a national exercise program, however it is also critical that we continue to improve these programs,” she wrote.

The Secretary directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency to “develop a two-year progressive exercise program that increases the total number of exercises and culminates in a full-scale biennial intergovernmental National Level Exercise.”

“Drills should be primarily no notice, or limited notice, and be conducted periodically during the two-year cycle by partners across DHS and the interagency, focusing on testing a single specific operation or function.”

Functional level exercises are to be conducted “in settings such as they would experience during an actual event.”  The culminating National Level Exercise is to involve “actual ‘boots on the ground’ responders, with exercise elements driven by field actions rather than purely by scripted injects.”

The National Exercise Program currently includes a planned 2011 exercise on terrorism, and a 2012 exercise on cyber terrorism.  These previously planned exercises should adhere to the new standards “to the maximum degree practicable,” Secretary Napolitano indicated.

“[A]n effective exercise program is the cornerstone of our nation’s collective preparedness and resilience.  Only by testing… can we be sure of the effectiveness of our plans for preventing, responding to an recovering from disasters and acts of terrorism and the preparedness of those charged with supporting and protecting the American people,” she wrote.

A November 2008 report from the Congressional Research Service examined “Homeland Emergency Preparedness and the National Exercise Program: Background, Policy Implications, and Issues for Congress” (pdf).

The White House issued an executive order last week to formalize procedures for sharing classified information with state, local and private sector entities.  The new order does not alter or amend previous orders on national security classification or access to classified information, but it should facilitate increased sharing of classified information with non-federal officials.

The closest thing to a policy innovation in the new order seems to be a provision that “a duly elected or appointed Governor of a State or territory… may be granted access to classified information without a background investigation” once he or she has signed a non-disclosure agreement and “absent disqualifying conduct as determined by the clearance granting official” (Section 1.3b).

“Information sharing” in this context is a paradoxical term that also implies “information non-sharing” with those who are not cleared for access to the information.  For that reason it is a mixed blessing that some otherwise qualified persons may choose to forgo. See Executive Order 13549 on “Classified National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Entities,” August 18, 2010.

Newly published Congressional hearing volumes on national security-related topics include the following (all pdf).

“Nomination of Stephen W. Preston to be General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency and Robert S. Litt to be General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,” Senate Intelligence Committee, May 21, 2009 (published August 2010).

“The Legal, Moral, and National Security Consequences of ‘Prolonged Detention’,” Senate Judiciary Committee, June 9, 2009 (published June 2010).

“National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats: Diplomacy and International Programs,” House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 18, 2010 (published June 2010).

Catastrophic flooding in Pakistan, which has displaced millions of persons over the last several weeks, submerged huge portions of the country, and crippled much of the nation’s infrastructure, is first and foremost a humanitarian crisis that requires an urgent international response.  But it also may have national, regional and global security implications.

“Environmental stresses, when combined with the other socio-economic and political stresses on Pakistan, have the potential to further weaken an already weak Pakistani state,” the Congressional Research Service observed in a new report (pdf) this month.  “Such a scenario would make it more difficult to achieve the U.S. goal of neutralizing anti-Western terrorists in Pakistan.  Some analysts argue that disagreements over water could also exacerbate tensions between India and Pakistan.”

The new CRS report “examines the potentially destabilizing effect that, when combined with Pakistan’s demographic trends and limited economic development, water scarcity, limited arable land, and food security may have on an already radicalized internal and destabilized international political-security environment.”

The CRS report does not come out and say so, but it points clearly to the conclusion that a U.S. foreign policy that gave greater emphasis to relief and reconstruction would have much to recommend it, even (or especially) from a national security point of view.  See “Security and the Environment in Pakistan,” August 3, 2010.

As is often pointed out, Congress does not permit CRS to make its publications directly available to the general public.

The U.S. Army has issued several new doctrinal or regulatory publications that may be of interest beyond their intended audience (all pdf).

A new Army regulation “provides a broad overview of [arms control] treaties and agreements with which the U.S. Army must implement and comply.” See “Army Arms Control Implementation Policy,” Army Regulation 525-92, 2 August 2010.

A newly updated Field Manual provides guidance on “site exploitation.”  That term refers to “systematically searching for and collecting information, material, and persons from a designated location and analyzing them to answer information requirements, facilitate subsequent operations, or support criminal prosecution… A site, in general, is a location that potentially contains valuable information.  Site exploitation operations doctrine describes a systematic and comprehensive approach to obtaining information of value from a site for exploitation.”  See “Site Exploitation Operations,” Army Field Manual 3-90.15, 8 July 2010.

Army bands, known to some as “music performance teams (MPTs),” are the subject of another newly updated Field Manual.  “Bands provide music for ceremonial and morale support within full spectrum operations to sustain warriors and to inspire leaders… Army bands of the 21st century are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct concurrent operations in supporting multiple objectives with targeted musical styles.”  See “U.S. Army Bands,” Field Manual 12-50, 7 July 2010.

Could someone be considered an intelligence community employee even if his salary is not paid out of the intelligence budget?  Intelligence officials say yes, claiming that a person’s status as an intelligence employee can be based on an “assessment of the functions [he] performs.”  This novel approach conveniently allows agencies to curtail oversight of such employees’ activities.

In a letter sent to the Government Accountability Office last year, the Federal Bureau of Investigation articulated its position that the GAO is generally not entitled to review intelligence community information and, in particular, that the GAO would not be granted access to information about vacancies in the FBI counterterrorism program that could be considered intelligence jobs.

“The FBI will provide the GAO with information about FBI-wide vacancies for all ‘position types’ except those that are defined as being under the combined or shared authority of the Bureau and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI),” wrote FBI General Counsel Valerie Caproni on July 28, 2009.  A copy of her letter (pdf) was obtained by Secrecy News.

But in a remarkable concluding passage, Ms. Caproni went on to argue that the “definition” of who is an intelligence employee is itself subject to interpretation:

“[T]he determination of whether an employee works in the Intelligence Community turns not only on the funding mechanism for their positions but on an assessment of the functions the employee performs,” she wrote.

Thus it seems that regardless of whether or not an intelligence agency pays someone’s salary, the Administration believes it can label that person an intelligence employee and then deny the GAO access to information about his or her position.

The U.S. Senate has yielded to the Obama Administration’s pressure to block congressional use of the GAO as an intelligence oversight tool, and it removed a provision to strengthen GAO oversight authority from the FY 2010 intelligence authorization bill that passed the Senate on August 5.  But the question of GAO oversight of intelligence remains a live, unresolved issue in the House.

Unauthorized disclosures of classified information (“leaks”) often play an important role in the proper functioning of American democracy.  They can serve as a safety valve against official excess, and an implicit check against government misconduct.  Even the mere possibility of a leak can have a salutary effect, because it imposes conscious or subconscious limits on what officials might try to do if they were certain they would be undetected.  (The FAS Project on Government Secrecy began in 1991 with our unauthorized receipt and disclosure of records on a problematic unacknowledged special access program called Timber Wind (pdf) whose very existence was classified.)

But though many government records are wrongly kept secret, the anti-secrecy website Wikileaks managed to get its hands on some documents on the Afghanistan War that were properly classified, at least in part — since they included the unredacted names of Afghan intelligence sources and collaborators — and then to release them (while temporarily withholding others for closer review).

One initial response to Wikileaks’ clumsy disclosure has been to bolster public support of the classification system, which was presumably not the intended result.  Sixty-seven percent of respondents polled endorsed the view that “When media outlets release secret government documents relating to the War in Afghanistan [they are] hurting national security,” according to a July 30-31 poll conducted by Rasmussen Reports.

Rep. Rush Holt (D-NJ), who has been a persistent critic of overclassification — and who voted to oppose supplemental funding for the war in Afghanistan — last week joined the chorus of critics who have spoken out against Wikileaks’ indiscriminate disclosure practices.

“Before rushing to judgment about this very large, unauthorized disclosure of information, I wanted to review some of the documents myself to determine if indeed potential human sources of information had been compromised,” Rep. Holt said in a statement in the August 10 Congressional Record.  “After reviewing some of these documents, I have concluded that their release could indeed cause real harm to real people.”

Daniel Ellsberg, the archetypal modern leaker of classified information who was responsible for the unauthorized disclosure of the Top Secret Pentagon Papers in 1971, nevertheless withheld from public disclosure four volumes of the 47-volume Papers which dealt with diplomatic negotiations because he judged them to be too sensitive for release at that time (as noted by John Prados and Margaret Pratt Porter in “Inside the Pentagon Papers,” p. 10).  The four withheld volumes were not released in full until 2002.  Regrettably, Wikileaks has failed to demonstrate similar discernment in handling classified records, and it will be up to others to try to repair the damage it has caused.

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) has awarded two large contracts for commercial satellite imagery to meet U.S. intelligence community needs. DigitalGlobe received a contract worth $3.5 billion and GeoEye received another worth $3.8 billion over ten years, according to an August 6 news release (pdf) from NGA.  The contracts “will help meet the increasing geospatial intelligence needs of the Intelligence Community and Department of Defense,” NGA said.

“This is such good news for the commercial satellite imagery industry,” said Mark Brender of GeoEye.  “Our government is really moving to ‘outsource overhead’,” he said.

A few years ago the Office of the Director of National Intelligence established a “Biological Sciences Experts Group” consisting of scientists from industry and academia to advise the intelligence community on the threat of biological weapons proliferation and related matters.  But not a single fact concerning the Group’s actions or accomplishments can be publicly disclosed, the ODNI said last week in response (pdf) to a Freedom of Information Act request.

As is often the case, a bit more about the Group can be learned through unofficial channels, as previously reported in Secrecy News (“Experts Advise IC on Classified Biosecurity Activities,” April 13, 2010).