Security Council

7 October 1994



                       I.  INTRODUCTION

1.  The present report is the sixth submitted pursuant to
paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 715 (1991) which
requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the
Council every six months on the implementation of the Special
Commission's plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of
Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of section C of Security
Council resolution 687 (1991). 1/

2.  The present report marks a very important stage in the
evolution of the Commission's mandate.  It is particularly
detailed in order to support the conclusion contained in
chapter VI below that the Commission's ongoing monitoring and
verification system is provisionally operational.  While
certain elements are not yet in place, so much of the
preparatory work is complete, with gaps being filled for the
time being by use of alternative measures, that the Commission
can with confidence commence the testing of the thoroughness
and efficacy of its system.  The remaining elements should be
in place shortly.

                  II.  CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

3.  The attachment to document S/1994/341 outlined the
Commission's operational concept for implementing its plan for
ongoing monitoring and verification as contained in document
S/22871/Rev.1.  In brief, the concept is based on regular
inspection of facilities of concern, on an inventory of all
dual-purpose items (i.e. those which have permitted uses but
which could be used for the acquisition of banned weapons) and
on following the fate of all inventoried items.  Underpinning
the inspections and the establishment and maintenance of
accurate inventories will be a full array of interlocking
activities:  aerial surveillance with a variety of sensors,
remote sensors, tags and seals, a variety of detection
technologies, information obtained from other sources, and,
when sanctions on the dual-purpose items are lifted,
notifications under the export/import control mechanism.  No
one of those elements on its own would
suffice to provide confidence in the system but together they
should constitute the most comprehensive international
monitoring system ever established in the sphere of arms
control.  Confidence in its effectiveness will rely, inter
alia, on the following:

    (a)      Possession by the Commission of a full picture of
Iraq's past programmes and full accounting of the facilities,
equipment, items and materials associated with those past
programmes, in conjunction with full knowledge of the
disposition of dual-purpose items currently available to Iraq.
That information provides the baseline data from which ongoing
monitoring and verification proceeds.  Uncertainties relating
to the accuracy or completeness of those data will feed
through into uncertainties as to whether the ongoing
monitoring and verification system is indeed monitoring all
the items that should be monitored.  This, in turn, would
entail more inspections to obtain the data required to provide
confidence in the system.  This information is primarily
obtained from Iraq's declarations, required under resolutions
687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991), and through the
Commission's inspection and analysis activities.  Iraq is
required to update its declarations on its dual-purpose
activities and capabilities every six months;

    (b)      Completion of comprehensive monitoring and
verification protocols for each site at which monitoring will
be conducted as a consequence of the dual-purpose items
present or activities undertaken there.  These protocols are
the product of the baseline inspection process, that is,
inspections for the purposes of familiarization, tagging and
inventorying, sensor installation and protocol-building as
necessary.  They provide the basis for future ongoing
monitoring and verification activities at the specified site;

    (c)      Successful testing of the system of ongoing
monitoring and verification in order to:

    (i)      Establish a clear understanding and practice of
             how the elements of the system, including the
             actions required of Iraq, should operate;

    (ii)     Evaluate the effectiveness of its elements both
             individually and as a whole.

While the system is premised on the provision by Iraq of
accurate and complete declarations of its dual-purpose
activities and capabilities and cannot be operated at its most
effective and least intrusive without such full declarations,
it has also been designed to be robust.  Experience has shown
that, even when initially presented with inadequate
declarations, the Commission has been able, through the
deployment of its various resources and the exercise of its
inspection rights, to elicit the information required for the
system to be established.  However, should Iraq seek
systematically to block the work of the Commission by, for
example, preventing access to sites, the Commission would not
be able to provide the Security Council with the assurances it
seeks concerning Iraq's compliance with the terms of paragraph
10 of resolution 687 (1991).  If such a case were to arise,
the Commission would immediately inform the Council.

4.  Once the sanctions imposed on Iraq under resolution 661
(1990) are eased or lifted in accordance with paragraph 21 of
resolution 687 (1991) to the extent that the export to Iraq of
dual-purpose items is again permitted, a further essential
element of the overall monitoring of Iraq's dual-purpose
capabilities will be the export/import mechanism envisaged
under paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991).


5.  Implementation of the plan is predicated on the
Commission's obtaining full accounting for Iraq's past
capabilities and full information on current dual-purpose
activities and capabilities in Iraq.  However, until
26 November 1993, Iraq failed to acknowledge its obligations
under resolution 715 (1991) and the plans for ongoing
monitoring and verification approved thereunder and, until
that time, made no declarations in accordance with the
requirements of the plans.  It also impeded or blocked certain
activities it deemed to be of a monitoring nature.  Thus, in
the circumstances that prevailed until Iraq's acknowledgement,
while the Commission undertook much preparatory work, it was
in no position to initiate its plan.

6.  Once Iraq's formal acceptance of the resolution, adopted
on 11 October 1991, was obtained on 26 November 1993, the
Commission, while continuing efforts to elucidate all aspects
of Iraq's past programmes, immediately reallocated the bulk of
its resources to the establishment, as soon as feasible, of
the system of ongoing monitoring and verification.  In
addition, the Commission added substantially to its staff in
New York in order to ensure that personnel restrictions did
not become a significant delaying factor in this process.
This reallocation and increase of resources is amply
demonstrated by the fact that, in the 30 months to November
1993, the Commission conducted 44 inspections, whereas, in the
10 months since then, the Commission conducted or initiated 29
inspections, of which all but 5 were directly related to the
establishment of ongoing monitoring and verification.

7.  The concept of operations and the numbers of inspections
conducted show that establishment of the ongoing monitoring
and verification system is a complex and large undertaking.
It has entailed inspection of entire categories of sites and
industries not previously visited by Commission personnel.

This has required the Commission to adapt as follows:

    (a)      The new inspections called for expertise not
previously used by the Commission and not available to it from
amongst its own staff.  Consequently, the Commission drew upon
the resources of a large number of Member States to ensure
that it was able to conduct its operations to the highest
standards.  Even so, in several areas the expertise could not
be found from amongst the employees of supporting Governments
and so had to be obtained through the recruitment of
specialists from private industry;

    (b)      New methods needed to be developed for the conduct
of baseline inspections and to assess the feasibility of
monitoring methods;

    (c)      New applications of technologies had to be
developed to serve the monitoring needs identified in the
baseline inspection process.

8.  The specific steps undertaken to establish and operate the
system of ongoing monitoring and verification since 26
November 1993 are described in detail in annex I to document
S/1994/489 and in annex I to the present report.  The
following paragraphs summarize the current status of those

              A.  Knowledge about past programmes

9.  The Commission's understanding of Iraq's past programmes
has grown considerably during the past six months as a result
of improvements in Iraq's declarations and to the inspection
and analytical efforts of the Commission.  As a result, the
Commission is approaching a full understanding of those past

10. A full picture of Iraq's past programmes in relation to
proscribed weapons is important as it provides a crucial part
of the baseline information from which ongoing monitoring and
verification proceeds.  It is essential to verify Iraq's
declarations if one is to have confidence in those baseline
data and hence in the system built on them.  Efforts to verify
the information provided by Iraq, particularly that concerning
foreign supplies, are ongoing.  Given that Iraq has provided
only limited documentation (claiming all documentation
relating to its past programmes has been destroyed), those
efforts have had to rely on the Commission's inspection
activities, on interrogation of Iraqi personnel involved in
the programmes and on contacts with the Governments of the
declared or presumed suppliers.  Through that process, the
Commission has obtained additional information, which itself
needed further investigation, including data concerning the
disposition of production equipment and the acquisition and
use of items and materials for the programmes, some of which
revealed inconsistencies in Iraq's declarations.  While those
efforts helped to close gaps in Iraq's declarations of its
past programmes and to verify other aspects declared but not
previously supported by corroborating evidence, further
actions are required by Iraq to provide all the necessary
data.  In that regard, follow-through on Iraq's commitment,
expressed on numerous occasions, to cooperate in providing
further complementary information and clarifications
concerning its past programmes is essential in arriving at the
full picture of those programmes referred to above and thus in
building full confidence in the monitoring system.

        B.  Iraq's declarations on current capabilities

11. The situation is much improved from that which prevailed
in November 1993 when Iraq, upon accepting the terms of
resolution 715 (1991), announced that its previous reports
entitled "Information and data related to the ongoing
monitoring and verification plan" should be "considered to
have been made and submitted in conformity with the provisions
of resolution 715 (1991) and the plans approved thereunder".
The Commission at that time responded that those previous
reports were deficient in many regards and could not be
considered as initial declarations under the plans, nor did
they constitute a sufficient basis for the proper planning and
implementation of ongoing monitoring and verification.

12. The Commission has since obtained a great deal of
information about Iraq's dual-purpose activities and
capabilities, enough to commence ongoing monitoring and
verification.  However, some of Iraq's declarations in this
regard are still incomplete.  Iraq needs to improve these
declarations.  There are gaps and discrepancies in each area,
which the Commission has endeavoured to resolve.  Great
difficulties were faced in obtaining the necessary data,
particularly in the biological area.  The process being
pursued by the Commission to overcome them is illustrative of
the process pursued in the other areas.  Chapter III of annex
I describes this in detail.

13. During the discussions in New York in September 1994
between the Commission and a high-level Iraqi delegation led
by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz, the
Commission indicated areas where further information was
required in this regard.  Subsequent follow-up action is
continuing in Iraq at the expert level in the course of
inspection and ongoing monitoring and verification activities.
Methods have been suggested by the Commission whereby
information required for monitoring could be obtained.  The
Commission has received assurances that the missing
information will be provided.

14. The complexity and size of the task of establishing the
system of ongoing monitoring and verification is reflected in
the difficulties encountered by the Commission in obtaining
and by Iraq in gathering the required information.  In large
part, these difficulties can be ascribed to the fact that the
Commission's ongoing monitoring and verification activities
are taking it to sites it has not visited before and hence
into contact with Iraqi personnel who have not previously had
to deal with the Commission.  Further efforts, primarily by
Iraq, whose obligation it is to provide complete declarations,
but also by the Commission in clarifying the requirements of
the plan, are required to educate the Iraqi officials
concerned.  This should rectify the situation in the coming

                   C.  Baseline inspections

15. The purpose of baseline inspections is to assess whether a
site requires monitoring and, if so, to make recommendations
on how monitoring should be conducted at the sites in
question, on the items to be tagged and on the installation of
monitoring devices.  The end product of the baseline process,
after decisions have been made on these recommendations, are
site monitoring and verification protocols for each site to be
monitored.  Such protocols contain all information about the
site and its contacts with other organizations of relevance to
the Commission's monitoring activities.

16. A total of 27 inspection teams, in addition to numerous
visits by smaller groups of specialists in sensor
technologies, have conducted activities related to the
acquisition of the baseline information.  While that process
will never be complete, in that the system will evolve
continually in response to changes in Iraq's industrial base
and developments in relevant technologies (e.g. development of
new processes for the production of banned items or materials
or of new monitoring technologies), the Commission now has the
information necessary to prepare usable monitoring and
verification protocols for all the sites to be subjected to
regular monitoring.

17. In the missile area, that process is most advanced.  All
the protocols currently envisaged have been prepared, that is,
for some 30 sites.  In the chemical area, the baseline
inspections have been completed and the Commission's staff in
New York are currently using the data from those inspections
to prepare some 50 protocols.  Those for the most important
sites have already been completed.  In the biological area,
while gaps remain in the information provided about
dual-purpose capabilities and further inspections are planned
to address the matter, the Commission has completed its
protocol-building inspections and hopes soon to have
sufficient information to prepare the protocols currently
envisaged, that is, some 75 protocols.

             D.  Installation of sensors and tags

18. The conduct of baseline inspections has given the
Commission the information it requires to make decisions on
the types of tags and monitoring sensors to be used in the
ongoing monitoring and verification system in general and on
how many and where they should be deployed.  Tagging of all
identified dual-purpose items and permitted short-range
missiles and installation of sensors has been completed in the
missile area.  In the chemical area, four chemical air-
sampling devices have been installed at one site.  There are
plans to install a further 20 such samplers in addition to
monitoring cameras and flow meters.  All identified relevant
dual-purpose items in the chemical area have been tagged.  In
the biological area, tagging of all identified items is still
proceeding - a team is currently in Iraq to pursue this.  A
comprehensive plan for the installation and operation of
remote-controlled monitoring cameras at key biological sites
has been prepared by a team sent to Iraq to study the
feasibility of remote-controlled sensors in biological
facilities.  The Commission has identified funds and equipment
to proceed with the plan, which it intends to do shortly.  In
its efforts to install sensors and tags, the Commission has
received considerable assistance and support from Iraq.

        E.  Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre

19. Upon initiating the process of establishing the ongoing
monitoring and verification system, it became apparent that
the Commission would need to create a centre in Baghdad to
operate the system.  The intention to do so was reported to
the Security Council in March and April 1994 (S/1994/341 and
S/1994/489).  Since that time, the Commission has undertaken a
feasibility study for such a centre; identified a site;
obtained the agreement of the Government of Iraq to the use of
that site as the Centre; drawn up architectural and
engineering plans for the reconstruction of the building
concerned to conform with the requirements of the Centre;
accepted the Iraqi Government's offer to perform the
reconstruction; supervised the construction work; conducted a
security review upon the completion of the construction work
undertaken by the Government of Iraq and produced a security
programme for the Centre; identified major components of the
security system (doors, locks, railings and surveillance
cameras); acquired much of the furniture and equipment
required for the Centre; and started the process of installing
the communications and other equipment required for the
Centre.  The Commission notes Iraq's contribution to and
cooperation in the construction works required to establish
the monitoring system.  These efforts, particularly those to
construct a communications mast and to renovate the building
to be used for the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre,
have significantly expedited the process of establishing the
system.  Full details are contained in annex II.

20. When the Centre is fully operational, it will comprise the
following:  offices of the Director and Deputy Director;
monitoring experts in each of the areas to be monitored
(missile, chemical, biological and - from IAEA - nuclear);
export/import control experts; biological and chemical
laboratories; the aerial inspection team with their
photographic laboratory and imagery library; communications
with New York, Vienna and all the remote-controlled sensors
installed by inspection teams; equipment for reviewing the
product of the remote-controlled monitoring cameras; medical
and logistics support, including helicopter and ground
transport; and interpretation and translation services.  It is
expected that, once fully operational, the Centre will have a
total complement of approximately 80 persons.

21. Recruitment of personnel for this Centre is proceeding.
For the monitoring, aerial inspection and export/import
control experts, the Commission is setting up a pool of
experts whom supporting Governments would make available to
serve for a minimum of 90 days at the Centre.  The aim is to
rotate staff on a three- or six-month basis, with experts
returning for several tours at the Centre, so as to benefit
both from fresh perspectives and from continuity of

22. In the missile area, the first monitoring group of experts
arrived and commenced work on 17 August 1994.  The first
rotation is due on 14 October 1994.  The first chemical team
arrived in Iraq on 2 October 1994 to commence operations
immediately.  The first biological team is to arrive in the
near future.  The aerial inspection team has been operating in
Iraq since June 1992.  Export/ import control experts will be
recruited as and when it becomes evident that sanctions
imposed by Security Council resolution 661 (1990) are due to
be eased or lifted in accordance with paragraph 21 of
resolution 687 (1991).

             F.  National implementation measures

23. Paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Commission's monitoring plan
require Iraq to adopt the measures necessary to implement its
obligations under section C of resolution 687 (1991),
resolution 707 (1991) and the plan itself.  Those measures are
to include a prohibition and penal legislation forbidding all
national and legal persons under Iraq's jurisdiction or
control from undertaking anywhere any activity prohibited for
Iraq by resolution 687 (1991) and all other related

24. Iraq has forwarded to the Special Commission and IAEA the
draft of a decision by the Revolutionary Command Council
intended to give effect to those requirements.  The Commission
has discussed the draft decision informally with the competent
Iraqi officials and has made certain suggestions.  The
Commission has drawn attention to the need to provide for
prompt action in respect of any changes in the items
prohibited or controlled under the annexes to the Commission's
plan, as these annexes may be updated and revised from time to
time.  It would seem preferable to embody the lists of such
materials and equipment in administrative regulations rather
than the law itself.  The Iraqi side has undertaken to review
this aspect of the draft decree, which had annexed the lists
of items to the decree itself, before being presented to the
Revolutionary Command Council for adoption.

25. The Commission has also indicated the desirability that
the legislation should make it clear that cooperation by
natural or legal persons in Iraq with the Commission in
carrying out its tasks is required and that such cooperation
would not per se be the subject of any legal or other punitive


26. As mentioned in the last report (S/1994/489), the Special
Commission and IAEA prepared, pursuant to paragraph 7 of
resolution 715 (1991), a concept paper outlining their
proposal for an export/import mechanism for monitoring any
future sales or supplies by other countries to Iraq of items
relevant to the implementation of section C of resolution 687
(1991) and other related resolutions.  The concept paper sets
out procedures for notifications to the Commission and IAEA of
exports of dual-purpose items to Iraq.  Such notifications
would be made both by the exporting country and by Iraq for
the items referred to in the relevant annexes to the plans of
the Commission and IAEA for ongoing monitoring and
verification already approved by resolution 715 (1991).

27. On 13 May 1994, the Executive Chairman of the Commission
addressed a letter to the Chairman of the Committee
established under resolution 661 (1990) (i.e. the "Sanctions
Committee"), transmitting to him the concept paper for
consideration and approval by that Committee.  It will be
recalled that paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991) had
requested that the Sanctions Committee, the Commission and the
Director-General of IAEA develop "in cooperation" the
export/import mechanism for approval by the Council.

28. In his letter of transmission, the Executive Chairman
pointed out that paragraph 7 envisioned a system of monitoring
that was to be of indefinite duration.  It was thus understood
that paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991) was intended to make
provision for the monitoring of sales or supplies by other
countries to Iraq of relevant dual-purpose items after the
general sanctions imposed by resolution 661 (1990) on those
items had been lifted, pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution
687 (1991).

29. In order to avoid confusion between the sanctions regime
and the monitoring mechanism, the Executive Chairman proposed
that the two regimes should be kept entirely separate.  The
role of the Sanctions Committee would have priority for as
long as items covered by the plans for ongoing monitoring and
verification remained subject to the general sanctions under
resolution 661 (1990).  Any requests for their sale to Iraq,
as essential for civilian needs, would continue to be
addressed in accordance with existing procedures to the
Sanctions Committee.  Once the sanctions under resolution 661
(1990) on any dual-purpose items or categories of items were
lifted, those items would become subject to the proposed
export/import mechanism.

30. The joint Commission/IAEA concept paper, together with the
Executive Chairman's letter of transmittal, were submitted by
the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee to that Committee.
Informal discussions in the Sanctions Committee appeared to
reveal that a consensus could be arrived at on the proposal
contained in the concept paper.  However, before going to the
Security Council with the required tripartite proposal for the
export/import mechanism, the members of the Committee
preferred to see a more detailed list of items to be reported
than already appeared in the relevant annexes to the
Commission's plan for ongoing monitoring and verification.

31. In the light of this, the Commission decided to prepare
revisions to the annexes in its plan to provide therein more
detailed information and lists on the items to be covered by
the reporting procedures.  These revised lists have now been
completed, and informal expert discussions will shortly be
held to determine the adequacy of the revisions for purposes
of implementing an export reporting procedure.  Those
discussions should be completed in the near future, after
which the proposed revisions to the annexes will be made
available to the Sanctions Committee and will be reported to
the Security Council.  It will be recalled that the plans of
the Commission and IAEA for ongoing monitoring and
verification permit the Commission and IAEA to update and
revise the annexes to their plans based on information and
experience gained in the implementation of resolutions 687
(1991) and 707 (1991) and of the plans, after informing the
Council of such revisions.  This is, therefore, the procedure
that will be followed.  The Commission and IAEA hope that it
will be possible then to submit to the Security Council an
agreed proposal by the Sanctions Committee, the Commission and
IAEA, for the export/import mechanism.

                     V.  FUTURE OPERATIONS

                          A.  Finance

32. The monitoring and other activities of the Special
Commission and of IAEA, undertaken pursuant to the relevant
Council resolutions, are to be of indefinite duration and have
to be planned on the assumption that there will be a
sufficient, guaranteed, long-term source of funds to finance
those activities.  At the present time, as described in detail
in annex III to the present report, financial restraints under
the legal and other arrangements now pertaining have come very
close to delaying the acquisition of all items and supplies
required to have the monitoring system "up and running".
Quite apart from this consideration, the constant need to seek
contributions in cash and in-kind from various Governments is
proving to be a time-consuming and onerous responsibility for
the executive management of the Commission, diverting
resources that could otherwise be devoted to operations.  At
the end of 1994, the funds for financing the operations of the
Commission and IAEA will be exhausted and, at the time of
writing, there is no firm undertaking that those funds will be
replenished.  The Council needs to address the issue of both
short- and long-term financing at an early date if it is to
have an assured and effective monitoring system.

                B.  Operations and organization

33. Funds permitting and unforeseen obstacles not intervening,
the Commission expects to have installed all the tags and
sensors currently envisaged and to have the Baghdad Monitoring
and Verification Centre fully equipped and staffed by the end
of 1994.  Work there will then focus on the conduct of ongoing
monitoring and verification activities, which have already
been initiated.  In New York, while there will be further
efforts to resolve outstanding issues in relation to Iraq's
past programmes and to complete the installation of the
currently envisaged elements of the ongoing monitoring and
verification system, there will be a further redeployment of
resources from efforts to establish ongoing monitoring and
verification towards the organization and analysis of data
being obtained from the monitoring process and preparations
for the operation of the export/import control mechanism.

34. It is envisaged that, until the implementation of the
export/import control mechanism, ongoing monitoring and
verification activities will comprise primarily the following
types of activities:

    (a)      Inspections to verify the completeness of the list
of sites monitored and of the inventories, to verify
declarations as to the activities conducted at sites, or to
pursue any information obtained that might question Iraq's
compliance with its obligations under paragraph 10 of
resolution 687 (1991);

    (b)      Aerial surveillance, from both the Commission's
high-altitude surveillance aircraft (the U-2) and its

    (c)      Maintenance of the site-monitoring and
verification protocols by the monitoring experts at the
Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre;

    (d)      Monitoring activities conducted by experts
dispatched to Iraq for that specific purpose because either
the expertise required for the activity is not available among
the staff of the Centre or because the scope of the activity
is too great for the staff of the Centre to undertake without
additional assistance;

    (e)      Review and analysis of the product of the sensors
installed at the various sites.

                 C.  Revisions to the annexes

35. In the course of operations in Iraq, it has become evident
that some revisions to the annexes to the Commission's plan
for ongoing monitoring and verification are in order.  This is
in response to a number of factors:

    (a)      As indicated in chapter IV above, discussions with
the Sanctions Committee on the export/import control mechanism
concept paper have shown that exporting States will require
greater specification in technical terms of what constitutes a
dual-purpose item and hence the export of which to Iraq would
be subject to notification to the joint Commission/IAEA unit
provided for in the concept paper;

    (b)      Experience gained by the Commission during its
inspection activities and in the course of establishing the
system of ongoing monitoring and verification;

    (c)      Iraqi requests that provisions of the annexes to
the Commission's plan be specified in greater technical detail
to assist Iraq in understanding what is covered by the plans.

36. As noted above, revisions to the annexes have been
prepared by the Commission.  These should facilitate the
performance by all concerned of their obligations under the
Commission's plan and the export/import monitoring mechanism,
thereby contributing to the increased effectiveness of the
overall regime to monitor Iraq's compliance with paragraph 10
of resolution 687 (1991).

                       VI.  CONCLUSIONS

37. The establishment of the system for ongoing monitoring and
verification was a highly complex and sizeable undertaking,
achieved not without difficulty.  The Commission believes that
the basic elements for a thorough system are now in place.
There are plans to introduce in the immediate future technical
additions to the system to improve its efficiency and
convenience.  In the light of the progress reported above, the
Commission's system of ongoing monitoring and verification is
now provisionally operational.  The testing of the
thoroughness and efficacy of the system has begun.

38. Enough operating experience will have be gained to
demonstrate that the integrated system will provide the
Council with the assurance that Iraq's obligations not to re-
acquire proscribed weapons can indeed be verified.  After the
lifting of the sanctions, the system, if it is to be effective
and to endure, will have to be a dynamic one, refined and
augmented in the light of experience, of technological
developments and of the growth of Iraq's economy.

39. An essential condition for the effective operation of the
system will be Iraq's actions in compliance with its
obligations in accordance with the plans approved under
resolution 715 (1991).  If Iraq extends to the operation of
ongoing monitoring and verification the same level of
cooperation that it has to date in its establishment, there
can be cause for optimism.  The Executive Chairman will keep
the Security Council informed each month in his oral reports
on the working of the system so that the Council can draw the
necessary conclusions at the appropriate time.


    1/  The present report updates the information contained
in the first five reports, circulated as documents S/23801,
S/24661, S/25620, S/26684 and S/1994/489.  Further information
concerning developments relating to the implementation of the
plan is contained in the reports to the Security Council
contained in documents S/1994/520, S/1994/750 and S/1994/860.
The first is a joint statement issued at the conclusion of the
high-level talks, held at Baghdad from 24 to 26 April 1994,
between the Special Commission and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) on the one hand and Iraq on the other.
The second is the sixth report provided in accordance with
paragraph 3 of resolution 699 (1991), appendix II of which
covers in detail the array of ongoing monitoring and
verification activities undertaken by the Commission in the
period from December 1993 to June 1994.  The third is the text
of a letter sent to the President of the Security Council and
subsequently circulated on the instructions of the President.
It contains, in the appendix, the joint statement issued at
the end of the July 1994 high-level talks and an assessment of
how the process of establishing ongoing monitoring and
verification was proceeding at that time.

                            ANNEX I

        Ongoing monitoring and verification activities

                    I.  MISSILE MONITORING

1.  Since the last report, intensive efforts have been made to
put into operation ongoing monitoring and verification of
Iraq's missile-related activities and dual-purpose
capabilities.  Those efforts resulted in putting in place the
essential elements of the system, including the creation of a
group of resident expert monitors in the Commission's Baghdad
Monitoring and Verification Centre.  Protocols for
missile-related facilities have been completed and serve as
guidelines for ongoing monitoring and verification activities
at the specified facilities.  They also form an information
source on Iraq's past and present activities.  Iraq's
declarations submitted under the plan for ongoing monitoring
and verification, including the required biannual declarations
received in July 1994, were assessed on a continuous basis.
In parallel, the Commission continued its investigations into
Iraq's past prohibited missile programmes and its compliance
with resolution 687 (1991).

            A.  Activities to establish monitoring

                      1.  UNSCOM 71/BM22

2.  After Iraq's initial declaration under the plan for
ongoing monitoring and verification had been received in
January 1994 and analysed by the Commission, the Commission
was able to proceed to the preparation of monitoring and
verification protocols for identified missile-related
facilities.  UNSCOM 71/BM22 was tasked with that mission.  The
team carried out its activities in Iraq from 30 March to 20
May 1994.  It visited more than 30 facilities to verify on
site Iraq's declarations concerning those facilities and to
identify focal points for future monitoring activities.

3.  UNSCOM 71/BM22 prepared monitoring and verification
protocols for each facility with specific recommendations for
monitoring arrangements and inspection modalities.  Depending
on the nature of facilities and activities, different regimes
of monitoring were envisaged.  These included, inter alia,
modalities for the collection of information, installation of
cameras and other sensors, tagging and on-site checks of
missile-related and dual-purpose equipment.  The protocols
also contain outlines for on-site inspection programmes for
each facility.  Successful completion of UNSCOM 71/BM22 marked
a critical step towards the creation, in the missile area, of
an ongoing monitoring and verification system covering
research, development, modification, production, testing and
other facilities, and missile-specific and dual-purpose items.

             2.  UNSCOM 79/BM23 and UNSCOM 80/BM24

4.  Ongoing monitoring and verification provides for
monitoring of missiles designed for use, or capable of being
modified for use, in a surface-to-surface role with a range
greater than 50 kilometres.  UNSCOM 80/BM24 was given the task
of tagging a number of operational missile systems to be
monitored.  The purpose of the tagging is to assist the
Commission in effective monitoring of non-modification of
missile systems and in keeping a reliable missile inventory

5.  UNSCOM 80/BM24 conducted its mission in Iraq from 10 to 24
June 1994.  In total, the team tagged more than 1,300 missiles
of different types in a manner that would preclude undetected
modifications of missiles to achieve proscribed ranges.  All
missiles were tagged by Commission inspectors, with Iraq's
authorities providing preparations and support necessary for
safe and efficient operations.  UNSCOM 80/BM24 also visited a
number of missile sites to ascertain that they were not
suitable for prohibited modification activities.

6.  After completion of the baseline activities related to
operational missiles, the Commission will request Iraq, up to
three times per year, to assemble a limited number of tagged
missiles for purposes of inspecting them and making sure that
they have not been modified to enable those missiles to reach
a range greater than 150 kilometres.  The Commission will
select for each inspection up to 10 per cent of the quantity
of tagged missiles.  The first inspection of that kind will
take place shortly.

7.  Tagging operations with live missiles required extensive
preparations, personnel training and elaboration of
appropriate inspection modalities and safety procedures.
UNSCOM 79/BM23 was in Iraq from 23 to 28 May 1994 to conduct
preparations for UNSCOM 80/BM24 activities.  UNSCOM 79/BM23
checked on-site work areas for tagging operations and other
preparatory work done by the Iraqi authorities.  Prime
attention was paid to the safety aspects of working with live
missiles.  Special operational procedures, commensurate with
the unique character of tagging activities, were established
by the Commission.

8.  UNSCOM 79/BM23 also compiled a technical reference
baseline for Iraq's missile systems of interest to the
Commission.  Reference data for each missile system were
obtained to include measurements and photography of major
parts and components.  The data collected will be used to
establish "official" missile configurations for each missile
system for use in future inspections and to support automated
processing of data collected from the monitoring cameras.

                      3.  UNSCOM 81/BM25

9.  UNSCOM 81/BM25 was in Iraq from 14 to 22 June 1994.  The
objectives of the team were twofold:  to present to Iraq's
experts definitions under elaboration by the Commission of the
dual-purpose items and technologies contained in annex IV of
the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification and to
discuss certain aspects of past prohibited activities in Iraq,
including missile production, modification projects and
foreign supplies.  As a special task related to verification
of Iraq's compliance with resolution 687 (1991), the team was
requested to investigate the alleged use of a tracking radar
to support launches of prohibited missiles in December 1990.
Iraq's officials strongly denied that the radar had been used
during those tests or even had been intended to be used in any
activities related to prohibited missiles.  Those denials are
contrary to information obtained by the Commission, which is
currently pursuing its investigations in order to arrive at a
final determination of the disposition of this radar.

                      4.  UNSCOM 82/BM26

10. The Commission decided to use cameras and other sensors to
increase the effectiveness of monitoring activities at a
number of missile-related facilities selected by it for
monitoring.  Through efforts of several inspection teams,
including UNSCOM 66, 69 and 71, specific areas were identified
where hardware or technology essential for acquiring crucial
elements of proscribed capabilities were present.
Furthermore, the suitability of camera surveillance for
monitoring activities at those areas was assessed.  Over all,
some 30 areas at 13 facilities were selected for camera

11. UNSCOM 82/BM26 was mandated to carry out actual
installation of monitoring camera systems.  A typical system
with constant data-collection capability consisted of the
following:  camera(s) with trigger sensors (if necessary), a
controller, a recorder, a power unit and a transmitter at the
monitored site; and a receiver, a controller computer and a
recorder at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre.
Each system is self-sufficient, with built-in redundancy and
security controls.  Interlinking communications are
accomplished through a specifically designed system.

12. The team operated in Iraq from 3 to 28 July 1994 and
installed more than 50 cameras with associated equipment.  The
team also placed tags and inventory labels on equipment
identified for monitoring.  The team used tamper-proof tags,
specially designed to provide for high security, durability
and effective inventory control.

13. After a period of initial operation of camera systems, a
special sensor- testing team was dispatched to Iraq from 8 to
16 August 1994.  The team's mission was to validate
operational capabilities of the camera-monitoring systems
(through tests of sensor and communication technologies),
operation and maintenance procedures and processing
modalities.  The team provided recommendations for improved
use of sensor-monitoring systems in the missile area.

14. As of now, a system for data collection from the camera
systems and data analysis is provisionally operational.

                      5.  UNSCOM 85/BM27

15. The team was in Iraq from 15 to 24 July 1994 with the
primary mission of updating Iraq's information and the
Commission's assessments of missile research and development
activities in Iraq.  Such research and development updates,
based on the declarations and special reports by Iraq and data
collected by inspection teams, are carried out by the
Commission on a biannual basis.  UNSCOM 85/BM27 was the second
team to perform such a task.

16. Extensive discussions were held with Iraq's officials and
missile experts to obtain information relevant to the team's
mission.  Iraq submitted a detailed report of its current
missile programmes relevant to surface-to-surface missiles
with a range greater than 50 kilometres.  The team reaffirmed
limitations established by the Commission on some missile
design features so as to preclude the production of missiles
that might achieve the proscribed range.

17. UNSCOM 85/BM27 was also mandated to investigate a number
of issues related to research and development activities
carried out by Iraq for the past proscribed missile

                            6.  MG1

18. Upon completion of the baseline process in the missile
area, the Commission decided to dispatch the first missile
group of resident inspectors to the Baghdad Monitoring and
Verification Centre.  Such groups will operate continuously
from the Centre and will be a core element in the ongoing
monitoring and verification system.  They are to perform a
variety of important ongoing monitoring and verification
missions, including:

    (a) Execution of monitoring inspections on a regular basis
at all missile-related sites under monitoring;

    (b) Checks of the tagged operational missiles;

    (c) Initial assessment and verification of Iraq's
declarations and reports;

    (d) Upkeep of a current inventory of items under

    (e) Supervision of the operation of the sensor-monitoring
system and initial screening of the system output.

19. The first monitoring group arrived in Iraq on 17 August.
The group is composed of four experts.  The group's personnel
will be rotated every three months, with the first rotation to
take place on 14 October 1994.  So far, MG1 has conducted more
than 40 visits to facilities being monitored and has presented
a number of monitoring reports to the Commission.

        B.  Past prohibited missile-related activities

20. To establish a solid and verified baseline for ongoing
monitoring and verification, the Commission needs to have a
full and comprehensive picture of Iraq's missile-related
capabilities, both present and past.  As stipulated in
Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715
(1991), Iraq is required to provide full, final and complete
disclosure of all aspects of its proscribed programmes and to
respond fully, completely and promptly to questions and
requests from the Commission.  Through its inspection
activities, lengthy technical discussions with Iraq's
authorities and in-depth analyses, the Commission now
possesses a much fuller and more accurate picture of Iraq's
past prohibited programmes, as compared with that presented by
Iraq in its official "Full, final and comprehensive report"
submitted in May 1992.

21. The Commission has continued its investigations into
issues related to the past proscribed missile programmes.
Special emphasis has been placed on verification of
information provided by Iraq on foreign acquisition of
proscribed missiles, their components and related production
capabilities.  Verification of this and other information
provided by Iraq has been pursued by the Commission

22. Issues related to past programmes were also discussed with
Iraq during the rounds of high-level talks in April and
September 1994.  During the reporting period, several
inspection teams also addressed the relevant issues with
Iraq's officials.  While Iraq has not volunteered information,
neither has it declined to provide answers to the Commission's
specific requests.  In general, information thus provided by
Iraq agreed with that obtained by the Commission from other
sources.  Some explanations and clarifications from Iraq are
still pending.

               C.  Current monitoring programme

23. The current monitoring programme in the missile area
constitutes a multilayered system to accomplish the tasks of
the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification in an
efficient and practical manner.  It covers, inter alia:

    (a) A variety of sites and facilities, both currently
engaged in missile activities and having relevant
capabilities.  At the present moment, the number of such
facilities under monitoring exceeds 30;

    (b) Activities crucial to re-acquiring prohibited
missiles.  Special modes of monitoring, that is, camera
systems, were established.  Such focal points for monitoring
include missile-propellant mixers/extruders, equipment for
liquid engine production and gyro balancing, missile/warhead
assembly lines, wind tunnel and static test stands;

    (c) Specialized and dual-purpose equipment.  Appropriate
inventory control was established.  For example, nearly 200
items have been tagged by the Commission.  Many more are
covered by facility protocols;

    (d) Operational missiles designed for use, or capable of
being modified for use, in a surface-to-surface role with a
range greater than 50 kilometres.  More than 1,300 missiles
have been tagged by the Commission and will be regularly
checked for non-modification.

24. Under its current monitoring programme, the Commission
will use a variety of inspection modalities, including:

    (a) Resident monitors (missile groups) in the Baghdad
Monitoring and Verification Centre to perform a number of
monitoring and verification tasks.  It is envisaged that
missile groups would carry out more than 150 inspection visits
per year to facilities under monitoring;

    (b) Camera and sensor monitoring of specific areas to
collect on a continuous basis data on activities under

    (c) Special inspection teams to address specific issues,
for example, research and development activities and static
and flight missile tests;

    (d) Compliance inspection teams to investigate Iraq's
compliance with the relevant provisions of resolution 687

    (e) Missile monitoring activities to be supported by
aerial inspections and surveillance carried out by the

25. It should be noted that the key to implementation of
missile-related provisions of ongoing monitoring and
verification will be transparency on Iraq's part concerning
its activities to be monitored under the plan.

26. In summary, elements of monitoring and verification have
been put in place and are operational.

                   II.  CHEMICAL MONITORING

27. Since the last report, the Commission has worked in four
areas to implement the chemical-monitoring aspects of the
plan.  Firstly, the Commission continues to investigate past
Iraqi chemical weapons activities using seminars and
question-and-answer sessions with competent Iraqi officials.
A thorough understanding of Iraq's technical capabilities,
manufacturing equipment and precursor suppliers, and past
chemical weapons production activities are necessary
prerequisites for the successful design and implementation of
the ongoing monitoring and verification system.  Secondly, the
Commission conducted a site sweep and hand-over of the
Muthanna State Establishment.  That facility was the hub of
Iraq's past chemical weapons programmes.  As such, it
contained the bulk of the declared and discovered chemical
agents, filled munitions and munitions production and filling
equipment.  The site survey and hand-over teams established
that the site was free of prohibited materials and that all
dual-use equipment at the site was properly tagged and
inventoried.  Thirdly, three chemical protocol-building
missions have been conducted at a variety of sites. Finally,
the chemical group has arrived in Iraq as part of the Baghdad
Monitoring and Verification Centre and started its monitoring

            A.  Activities to establish monitoring

             1.  UNSCOM 67/CW13 and UNSCOM 70/CW14

28. The inventory and protocol testing activities of UNSCOM
67/CW13 and the chemical air sampler installation by UNSCOM
70/CW14 have been described fully in chapter II.2.B, annex I
of S/1994/489.

                      2.  UNSCOM 75/CW16

29. The first series of chemical baseline inspections was
carried out by UNSCOM 75/CW16 from 25 May to 5 June 1994.  The
team's task was to conduct baseline inspections and build
protocols for the chemical sites known to have been associated
with Iraq's past chemical weapons programmes or to have
dual-purpose capabilities of specific concern for the future
ongoing monitoring and verification system.

30. The team generated protocols for 14 sites.  The protocols
include data on the layout of the site, the chemical processes
used, precursors utilized and waste materials produced.  The
team was able to make recommendations on the frequency of
monitoring inspections for the 14 sites.  They were also able
to refine the baseline data requirements established by UNSCOM

                      3.  UNSCOM 76/CW17

31. The destruction of declared and discovered chemical
weapons and related equipment and materials took place at the
Muthanna State Establishment beginning in the summer of 1992.
The work of the chemical destruction group was completed in
the spring of 1994.  Because the Muthanna site had been used
as both Iraq's main chemical weapons production facility and
as a collection point for prohibited items awaiting
destruction, a team was dispatched to the site to certify the
successful completion of destruction operations.

32. From 31 May to 12 June 1994, UNSCOM 76/CW17 surveyed the
Muthanna site.  The team conducted extensive chemical sampling
and analysis operations in order to be able to declare the
site free of chemical weapons hazards.  During their survey
operations, the team noted the existence of several pieces of
equipment and other materials on which the Commission needed
to take a decision as to their disposition.  A complete
description of those items was passed to the hand-over team.

                      4.  UNSCOM 77/CW18

33. In addition to the work of the site survey team, a second
mission (UNSCOM 77/CW18) reviewed the environmental analysis
report of the survey team.  The team, inter alia, tagged
several pieces of relevant chemical-manufacturing equipment
and dual-use metal working tools.

34. On 13 June 1994, a formal meeting was held at Iraq's
National Monitoring Directorate at Baghdad.  A protocol
describing Commission actions at Muthanna and future Iraqi
obligations with respect to the site was signed by
representatives of Iraq and the Commission.  This inspection
ended the Commission's two-year control of the facility.

                      5.  UNSCOM 89/CW19

35. This team operated in Iraq from 10 to 23 August 1994.  Its
task was to build protocols for 22 chemical facilities
associated with the oil and petrochemical industry.  Those
sites were of interest because of the potential presence of
either equipment or raw chemicals that could be used in the
production of chemical warfare agents or equipment that could
be used to store such chemicals.

36. The team verified declared equipment and activities, for
example, the hydrofluoric acid catalysed alkylation of olefin
to produce detergents, at the sites, which indicated that they
should be subjected to monitoring.  It collected the
information required for the building of protocols for each of
the sites and undertook much of the work to create the

                      6.  UNSCOM 91/CW20

37. This team conducted its activities in Iraq from 13 to 24
September 1994.  Its principal task was to conduct
protocol-building inspections for 12 sites associated
primarily with Iraq's chemical fertilizer industry in order to
identify possible dual-purpose equipment, equipment or
facility redundancies, plant capacity and normal utilization,
unusual chemical processes and waste disposal methods, and to
resolve anomalies in Iraq's declarations about those sites.
The team obtained the information required to build protocols
for these sites.

                            7.  CG1

38. The first chemical monitoring group (CG1), arrived in Iraq
on 2 October 1994 and comprised four experts.  The team
immediately initiated chemical monitoring.  The experience of
the team will be used to refine chemical monitoring and to
refine further the information requirements for monitoring and
verification protocols and baseline.

39. Under the guidance of the Commission's staff in New York,
the chemical group at Baghdad will:

    (a) Draft and revise site monitoring and verification

    (b) Conduct inspections of research, development and
university facilities;

    (c) Tag and monitor dual-use chemical-processing

    (d) Conduct inspections of sites of potential relevance to
the chemical- monitoring regime;

    (e) Collect, assess and record monitoring sensor data;

    (f) Provide technical expertise to the export/import
monitoring group.

          B.  Iraq's past chemical weapons programme

40. As indicated throughout the present report, full knowledge
and accounting for Iraq's past programmes is essential for
confidence in the baseline information from which ongoing
monitoring and verification will be conducted.  The Commission
has continued its efforts to fill in gaps in Iraq's
declarations of its past chemical weapons programmes,
particularly those relating to suppliers and quantities of
items and materials supplied, as well as to find ways to
verify independently Iraq's accounting of the past programme.

41. At the high-level political talks held in New York in
November 1993 between the Commission and representatives of
Iraq, it was suggested that seminar-style meetings between
former officials involved in Iraq's chemical weapons
programmes and Commission experts be held.  The goal of those
seminars would be to develop a more complete, accurate and
detailed view of the past chemical weapons programmes.

42. A major breakthrough in that regard was made in April
1994, when a team (UNSCOM 74/CW15), sent to Iraq specifically
to address that set of issues, obtained a hand-written list of
the letters of credit authorized for the import of items in
support of the chemical weapons programmes.  Iraq claims that
the list covers its entire procurement activities, which used
letters of credit for its past chemical weapons programmes.
Verification of the newly revealed Iraqi procurement data is
complicated by the sometimes overly generalized descriptions
of procured items associated with each letter of credit.  Also
complicating the assessment of this new data is the difficulty
of obtaining corroborating information from the alleged
supplier Governments.  The Commission continues to pursue
vigorously its efforts to refine and verify this new, and
potentially valuable, information.  With this information
verified, it should prove possible to have a firm
understanding of the capabilities acquired by Iraq and hence
to account for the materials and equipment supplied.  This, in
turn, will allow the Commission to be certain that it is
indeed monitoring all the dual-purpose items in the chemical
area that should be subjected to monitoring.  Another
inspection is planned for the second half of October 1994 to
pursue the matter further.

          C.  Current chemical-monitoring activities

43. In addition to conducting ongoing monitoring and
verification activities at sites for which monitoring and
verification protocols have been prepared, the chemical
monitoring teams (CG1) will also conduct visits to various
institutions at which chemical research is undertaken but
which might not need to be subject to regular monitoring.  The
aim of such visits would be to have an understanding of the
direction and level of Iraq's basic research into chemistry
and chemical processes that might also be useful for the
production of chemical warfare agents or their precursor

44. The team will also seek to clarify outstanding anomalies
in Iraq's declarations concerning its dual-purpose
capabilities.  Minor adjustments have been made by the
Commission to the formats under which Iraq reports such
capabilities in order to facilitate both the collection of
data by Iraq and its analysis by the Commission.  The team
will explain those changes to its Iraqi counterparts and
provide such further clarifications as are required for Iraq
to provide full and consistent declarations.

45. In support of ongoing monitoring and verification in the
chemical area, the Commission intends to install further
sensors.  An additional 20 air-sampling devices are envisaged
for installation at various chemical production facilities of
special interest.  At least one site will have flow meters
installed at key points in the production equipment and
several sites will be monitored by remote-controlled cameras.

46. Analysis of the samples taken by the air samplers will
initially be conducted in laboratories outside Iraq.  However,
with the completion of the equipping of the Baghdad Centre, it
is intended that analysis of those samples should be conducted
at the chemical laboratory in the Centre.  Only the samples
that deviate from the normal background levels will be sent to
approved international laboratories in order to obtain a
cross-check from an independent laboratory.  From time to
time, calibrating exercises will be undertaken to ensure the
accuracy of analysis at the various laboratories.


47. In preparation for the monitoring of Iraq's biological
activities, UNSCOM has proceeded with the evaluation of the
sites or facilities concerned, by assessing the various
elements that constitute Iraq's capability.  Iraq's
declarations form the basis for that work and are verified by
the Commission for completeness and accuracy, after which the
Commission is able to conduct a full analysis of Iraq's
biological capabilities of concern to ongoing monitoring and

           A.  Baseline data on Iraq's capabilities

48. Following discussions held in Baghdad and New York during
the autumn of 1993, formats for reporting under the plan were
established and presented to Iraq in December 1993.  These
were designed to facilitate the task of providing information
concerning dual-purpose sites or facilities, activities,
equipment, import or export and technical expertise.  Iraq
returned to the Commission formats for 35 biological sites in
January 1994, but these did not contain complete responses to
all the questions in the formats and hence did not furnish a
full picture of the sites' capabilities.

49. Following discussions in February 1994 regarding the scope
of Iraq's reporting on biological issues, the Commission
presented Iraq, in March 1994, with a revised format for
reporting to facilitate the task of gathering the information
required and to incorporate questions to cover the information
missing from the previous Iraqi response.  In two subsequent
inspections (UNSCOM 72/BW4 and UNSCOM 78/BW5, in April and May
1994, respectively), Commission teams visited sites declared
by Iraq to familiarize themselves with the sites in
preparation for later protocol-building and in order to tag
and inventory declared dual-purpose items.  During the course
of those inspections, further discussions were held with Iraq
on the information required.  Further information was
obtained, but also undeclared dual-purpose items, which should
have been declared, were found and inconsistencies between the
various sets of Iraqi declarations were noted.  In short, the
information contained in the total set of declarations
remained incomplete.

50. Consequently, a team (UNSCOM 86/BW7) was dispatched to
Iraq in June 1994 specifically to address the question of the
gaps, inconsistencies and anomalies in the Iraqi declarations.
As a result of those talks, Iraq was requested to provide
supplementary information on 24 sites with biological
activities and capabilities.  Discussions focused on
university laboratories, production facilities, breweries,
import facilities and factories for the manufacture in Iraq of
equipment that could be used in the production of biological

51. Even so, the next inspection team (UNSCOM 84/BW6) in June
1994, with the task of inspecting a combination of declared
and undeclared sites to assess how and whether they should be
monitored, concluded that eight of the undeclared sites
visited required monitoring because of the presence at the
sites of items or activities subject to declaration.  Iraq was
again asked to provide missing information and clarifications
to its earlier declarations.  The issue was pursued further
during technical talks held in New York in July 1994.

52. The next stage was to write the monitoring and
verification protocols during a two-month long
protocol-building inspection (UNSCOM 87/BW8) in July-September
1994.  During the course of the inspection, more undeclared
sites were inspected and found to require declarations and
further inconsistencies were noted between previous
declarations and the situation observed at the sites by the
team, to include the discovery of undeclared equipment and
activities that should have been declared.  A follow-up
inspection (UNSCOM 92/BW10) in September 1994 was organized to
address issues not satisfactorily resolved during the
protocol-building inspection.  The results of the mission were
pursued further during discussions in New York in September
1994.  At that time, the Commission informed the high-level
Iraqi delegation of the various steps taken in order to obtain
the data required for monitoring and the difficulties
encountered in doing so, while acknowledging Iraqi cooperation
in facilitating access to sites.  It was agreed that a further
team (UNSCOM 96/BW12) should be dispatched to Iraq to present
a list of additional information required.  This team held
discussions with Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate from
23 to 26 September 1994, stressing the link between full
knowledge of Iraq's past programmes and in monitoring as well
as the need for a full inventory of dual-purpose items.  It
suggested ways in which Iraq might assist the Commission in
indirectly substantiating its account of its past programmes
and accurately reporting its dual-purpose activities and
capabilities in order to expedite the Commission's fulfilment
of its mandate.  Iraq reiterated its willingness to cooperate
and, upon receipt of the list of additional information
required, promised to respond promptly to all the questions.

            B.  Activities to establish monitoring

53. From April to October 1994, a total of nine inspections
have been conducted in the biological field.  They focused on
the analytical work required to establish effective and
efficient monitoring.

  1.  Initial inspection of undeclared sites (UNSCOM 72/BW4)
54. The team conducted its activities in Iraq from 8 to 26
April 1994.  Its objective was to assess the information
supplied by Iraq concerning the 35 sites declared by Iraq in
January 1994 and 2 sites designated by the Commission.  The
inspection sites included university laboratories,
laboratories for routine control in medical diagnosis,
veterinary diagnosis and food control, breweries and alcohol
production facilities, and production facilities for vaccines,
single-cell protein, fertilizers, pesticides and castor oil.

55. As noted in paragraph 49 above, the team also held
discussions with Iraq on the content of its declarations.
Just before the team left Baghdad and at the team's request,
Iraq submitted copies of the declarations, information and
data sent to the United Nations pursuant to the agreements on
confidence-building measures for the year 1994 in accordance
with document BWC/Conf.III/23/II and its annex on
confidence-building measures.

                       2.  UNSCOM 78/BW5

56. The purpose of the inspection was to identify and
inventory equipment subject to declaration under the plan.
This included equipment declared by Iraq or observed sites
during UNSCOM 72/BW4.  The inventory data is subsequently
processed in a computer database, where it can be readily
analysed and accessed by future inspectors.

57. UNSCOM 78/BW5 carried out its duties in Iraq from 28 May
to 7 June 1994.  It visited some 31 sites, at which 330 pieces
of equipment were identified, described in detail, tagged and

58. In addition to the preparation of inventories, the team
discussed with Iraq the issue of changes to the configuration
of dual-purpose equipment.  During discussions held with Iraq,
it was stressed that the monitoring of dual-purpose equipment
was a crucial element in the monitoring regime for a site and
that the Commission needed to be aware of any changes of the
location of and modification to such equipment.  The team
prepared a procedure for 30-day prior notification of transfer
or modification of inventoried equipment.  Iraq was informed
that notification would be processed by the Commission on a
no-objection basis.  No such notification has yet been

                       3.  UNSCOM 86/BW7

59. Biological technical talks (UNSCOM 86/BW7) were held at
Baghdad from 5 to 8 June 1994.  The purpose was to try to
clarify inconsistencies and anomalies in declarations of the
biological area submitted by Iraq in January and April 1994.
The results of the mission were noted in paragraph 50 above.

                       4.  UNSCOM 84/BW6

60. UNSCOM 84/BW6 had the task of conducting initial
inspections at an additional 35 biological sites, either for
initial inspection or in preparation for protocol-building.
The objective of the inspection was to assess activities
conducted and to identify the equipment present at the sites
in order to assess whether those sites, activities and
equipment should be subject to declaration and hence to
monitoring.  UNSCOM 84/BW6 carried out its tasks from 24 June
to 9 July 1994.  In addition, and with a view to facilitating
subsequent protocol-building at the biological sites to be
monitored, protocols were built for four sites in order to
test the viability of the draft protocol for such sites.  The
sites chosen for the testing had been visited previously.
They represented four different activity areas:  vaccine
production, supplier company, research and development
laboratory and single-cell protein production.

                       5.  UNSCOM 87/BW8

61. The team's objective was to establish protocols for sites
identified as requiring ongoing monitoring and verification.
The main focus of this inspection was to establish guidelines,
questionnaires and detailed instructions to be followed by the
monitoring inspectors to be based at the Baghdad Monitoring
and Verification Centre.

62. The team conducted its activities in Iraq from 25 July to
8 September 1994.  It was planned that the inspection would
prepare protocols for 55 sites.  The team made three trips to
Iraq (for a period of 10 days each) and visited facilities
designated by the Commission.  Each of the trips to Iraq was
followed by a six-day protocol-drafting session at the Field
Office in Bahrain.

63. Prior to the inspection, the team was provided by the
Commission with a great deal of background information
prepared from previous declarations and special reports,
inspection findings and assessment work by the Commission's
experts.  However, the team had to gather much additional
information in order to be in a position to prepare the
protocols, given the inconsistencies between the situation it
found on the ground and the information declared (see para. 52
above).  Site plans and organizational charts requested during
previous inspections but not received were provided by Iraq
during the inspection.

                       6.  UNSCOM 88/BW9

64. The team's objectives were to perform a feasibility study
of remote monitoring in the biological area and, for the sites
where this was deemed feasible, to establish the scope,
foundations and requirements for the installation of remote
monitors at biological sites.

65. It carried out its tasks in Iraq from 20 to 25 August 1994
and visited five biological facilities.  It concluded that, at
those sites, remote monitoring equipment could constitute an
effective means of supplementary on-site inspections.

                      7.  UNSCOM 92/BW10

66. The team's objectives were to visit sites falling under
two main categories:

    (a) Initial inspection of additional sites in order to
assess activities at those sites and to identify dual-purpose
equipment present there, with a view to subsequent

    (b) Follow-up inspections of declared sites in order to
complete the protocols for the sites.

67. The team carried out its tasks in Iraq from 29 August to 3
September 1994.  During that time, the team visited a total of
seven sites, acquiring further or new knowledge of them.  The
information is currently being analysed by the Commission's
staff in New York.

                      8.  UNSCOM 96/BW12

68. Further biological technical talks (UNSCOM 96/BW12) were
held at Baghdad from 23 to 26 September 1994.  The results of
those talks are recorded in paragraph 52 above.

            C.  Past military biological programmes

69. The verification of Iraq's account of its past military
biological programme has been rendered difficult by the
claimed lack of supporting documentation.  The areas where
full verification remains pending include various aspects of
the programme, such as storage of equipment, storage of
organisms, personnel, relationships between the declared
biological warfare research site and other organizations and
facilities, and the acquisition of biotechnology.  Additional
information has been obtained on many of those areas in the
course of the baseline inspection process, but more is
required.  The Commission continues to pursue the matter
vigorously in all its contacts with Iraq.

         D.  Current biological monitoring activities

70. UNSCOM 94/BW11 was dispatched to Iraq on 29 September
1994.  Its main objective is to continue the inventory and
tagging of dual-purpose biological equipment started in May
1994 with UNSCOM 78/BW5.  Owing to the receipt of additional
information, including the new findings of declarable
equipment during inspections since the first inventory, it has
been necessary to perform a further inventory at approximately
50 sites.  The team will also try to establish the
circumstances that gave rise to the damage to or loss of tags
noted during recent inspections, with a view to remedying the
problem.  The team is expected to operate in Iraq for
approximately two weeks, covering a variety of sites falling
in the categories of research and development facilities (such
as universities and research institutes) and industrial
facilities (such as vaccine production and pharmaceutical

71. Once the process of preparing the protocols for each of
the sites to be monitored in the biological area is complete,
which should be in the near future, monitoring in the
biological area will be conducted along the same lines as
missile and chemical monitoring, with a resident team of
experts based in the Baghdad Centre.  Currently, it is
envisaged that the team will comprise four experts.

                    IV.  NUCLEAR MONITORING

72. The Director-General of IAEA is reporting separately on
the activities of the action team set up to implement
paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991) and the IAEA
plan for ongoing monitoring and verification approved under
resolution 715 (1991).

73. The Special Commission continues, in accordance with
paragraph 9 (b) (iii) of resolution 687 (1991) and paragraph 4
(b) of resolution 715 (1991), to provide its assistance and
cooperation to the IAEA action team through the provision of
special expertise and logistical, informational and other
operational support for the carrying out of the IAEA plan for
ongoing monitoring and verification.  In accordance with
paragraph 9 (b) (i) of the same resolution and paragraph 4 (a)
of resolution 715 (1991), it continues to designate sites for
inspection.  In accordance with paragraph 3 (iii) of
resolution 707 (1991), it continues to receive and decide on
requests from Iraq to move or destroy any material or
equipment relating to its nuclear weapons programme or other
nuclear activities.  Furthermore, it continues, in accordance
with paragraph 4 (c) of resolution 715 (1991), to perform such
other functions, in cooperation in the nuclear field with the
Director-General of IAEA, as may be necessary to coordinate
activities under the plans for ongoing monitoring and
verification, including making use of commonly available
services and information to the fullest possible extent, in
order to achieve maximum efficiency and optimum use of

74. In conformity with its obligations to designate sites for
inspection, the Commission, in late 1993, conducted a second
aerial survey of gamma radiation over certain locations in
Iraq.  The results of the analysis of the survey were
discussed at a meeting in September 1994 in New York.  The
assessment of the system for detecting gamma emissions and
surveying gamma radiation levels concluded that the equipment
could be of great potential use to the Commission in the
performance of its mandate to support the work of the IAEA
action team.

                    V.  AERIAL INSPECTIONS

75. The aerial inspection team continues to undertake aerial
inspections at sites being monitored and at new facilities
considered to be of possible relevance to the Commission's
mandate.  Where required, the team also provides support to
ground inspections.  All aerial inspections continue to be
conducted on a no-notice basis.  To date, some 500 aerial
inspections have been undertaken by the team.

76. In response to the evolving requirements of ongoing
monitoring and verification, the aerial inspection team is in
the process of making a number of changes to its method of
operations.  As the expert monitoring groups become
established at the Baghdad Centre, members of the groups are
accompanying the aerial inspection team on relevant aerial
missions.  This allows the experts to advise the aerial
inspectors to focus on particular areas or activities of
importance at the facilities.

77. The aerial inspection team's photographic library will
shortly be moved from its present location in the Commission's
Bahrain Field Office to the Baghdad Centre.  The library
contains copies of all imagery and reports prepared by the
team since the commencement of aerial inspections in June
1992.  Immediate access to this historical imagery will
enhance the aerial and ground teams' operations by allowing
them to study sites in advance of inspections and thus readily
to detect any external changes that have taken place at a
facility since the previous inspection.  In addition to the
library, the aerial inspection team's photographic processing
laboratory will also be moved into the Centre, thus permitting
rapid access to the product from the aerial missions.  During
the course of the next three months, additional equipment will
be procured for the team to assist in refining and improving
the product from the aerial inspections.

78. The Commission's high-altitude surveillance aircraft, the
U-2, continues to undertake an average of one or two flights a
week.  To date, 224 missions have been flown.  The imagery
obtained through those missions is crucial to the Commission's
analysis of Iraq's capabilities and the Commission's
operational planning.  The Commission's photographic
interpretation abilities have further improved during the
period under review.

                           ANNEX II

          Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre

                    I.  PREPARATORY EFFORTS

1.  The concept of a Centre to support the ongoing monitoring
and verification programme became an operational goal in early
1994.  At the request of the Executive Chairman, the Chief of
the Commission's Field Office at Baghdad undertook a study of
alternative means to achieve a secure area for the collection
of data from the ballistic-missile-monitoring camera system.
On 7 February 1994, the Chief submitted a report in which the
United Nations offices at the Canal Hotel at Baghdad were the
recommended site.  On 7 March 1994, the Executive Chairman
formally approved the site selection and a detailed plan of
action to acquire 15 rooms on the second floor of the hotel.

2.  The Canal Hotel was donated for exclusive use of the
United Nations in the mid-1980s.  It had been operated as a
training hotel since 1978 in conjunction with a hotel
management school that continues to operate in an adjacent
compound.  The facility is managed by the United Nations
Administrative Unit, Baghdad, for a variety of United Nations
agencies, including the Special Commission.  The compound is
guarded by a small contingent of the Iraqi Army.  The main
gate and immediate perimeter are guarded by Administrative
Unit guards, all of whom are local nationals approved for
United Nations employment by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Iraq.  The Commission's efforts focused upon providing for
facilities for a continuous presence in Iraq (beyond the
presence of the small logistics support, medical and
communications contingent within the Commission's Field
Office), and within those offices to provide a secure area for
sensitive information acquired from monitoring and from

3.  By mid-April 1994, the Executive Chairman received a final
report from a technical team addressing the design and
installation of missile-monitoring cameras at (then) 14 sites
in Iraq, connecting the cameras to the Centre and transmitting
data to and from New York, Vienna and supporting analytical
facilities.  The technical team also conducted further
assessment of the communications and security requirements for
the Centre.  Plans were completed for the transition of the
Commission's Field Office facilities in the Ishtar Sheraton
Hotel to the Centre.

4.  In May 1994, via an exchange of letters, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Iraq accepted a proposal by the Executive
Chairman to designate the Canal Hotel as the Baghdad Centre.
The Chairman also selected Rear Admiral (retired) Goran Wallen
of Sweden to be the first Director of the Centre.  On 20 May
1994, the Commission presented its requirements for personnel
and equipment to the representatives of 20 permanent missions
to the United Nations, and requested that interested Member
States respond with an expression of support no later than 1
July 1994.

5.  Including the small cadre of United Nations international
staff members  assigned to the Commission's Field Office, the
Centre would support monitoring groups and technical support
staff, totalling approximately 50 personnel.  The staff would
be recruited from contributing Governments for a minimum
period of 90 days.  Ideally, the Commission looked for
national commitments to staff certain positions during
specific cycles or on a constant basis.  Some Governments
quickly affirmed their support, such as that of New Zealand,
which is providing medical and some communications personnel.
Including the Commission's helicopter unit, provided by the
German army at Al-Rasheed Air Base, within the Centre's
resources, the total complement for the Centre would be
approximately 80 staff.  While Governments evaluated the
Commission requirements of 20 May 1994, the Commission's New
York staff commenced active recruitment from contributing
Governments of persons known for their expertise and, in many
instances, their experience during previous inspections.  In
the course of that process, several Governments commenced
personnel contributions to the Commission by offering experts
in a variety of disciplines for service in the Centre and on
inspection teams.

6.  As the Commission prepared its equipment requirements for
ongoing monitoring and verification, several contributing
Governments made available computer and communications
systems, chemical air-sampling stations, cameras and
associated detection equipment, along with technical experts
to install and initially operate the equipment at remote sites
and within the Centre.  One Government, for example, provided
intrusion detection and surveillance cameras for interior
Centre areas.  Another Government donated over 50 cameras for
remote site monitoring.  Yet another Government paid for the
purchase of computer equipment for use within the Centre.

7.  In June 1994, the Administrative Unit staff assisted the
Commission with preliminary assessments of the types of
renovations required to provide for the varied operations
within the Centre.  To achieve greater efficiencies with the
available floor space, for example, the Unit experimented with
the removal of bathroom walls within several rooms.  Every
room included a bathroom.  It was determined that removing the
bathrooms increased the available space by 27 per cent in each
room.  Based on this and other considerations, initial
allocations of space within the Centre indicated that more
rooms would be required than the original conception of 15.
Requirements for IAEA monitors were incorporated into the
Centre.  Studies also indicated the need for the Commission to
secure the services of civil engineers to evaluate facility
electrical, heating and air-conditioning systems, and to
oversee renovation construction work.

8.  The Administrative Unit, the Commission's Field Office,
and other United Nations agencies resident in the Canal Hotel
developed a plan for the reallocation of floor space to
accommodate the expanding needs of the Commission.  By
mid-July, the Commission was granted an area encompassing most
of the second floor, with the potential for future expansion
if needed.

9.  The Government of Iraq offered to construct a 92-metre
antenna mast near the Centre to support the Commission's
communications requirements and to eliminate the need for
remote transmission via an antenna on the Ishtar Sheraton
Hotel roof.  The mast was erected within two weeks, from 13 to
25 June 1994, and was quickly put into service by the
Commission.  The height of the antenna fully supported
Commission requirements for transmissions from remote
locations.  Further, the size of the mast platforms
(approximately every two metres) affords great capacity for
the addition of system equipment for the Commission and other
United Nations agencies.

10. The pace of building the Centre accelerated with the joint
announcement by the Commission, IAEA and the Government of
Iraq on 5 July 1994 that the Centre should be provisionally
operational during September 1994.  In mid-July 1994, the
Executive Chairman accepted the Iraqi Government's offer to
perform the larger renovation tasks within the Centre area as
a further step to meet the September date.  The Government
designated the Al-Fao Construction Bureau to design and
implement the renovations to meet Centre requirements.  The
demolition and construction was performed beginning 8 August
1994 and terminated on 17 September 1994.  The extensive
renovation was accomplished under the supervision of
construction engineers from a supporting Government.


11. As the construction efforts were being arranged, the
Centre staff was moving into the Canal Hotel building.  On 31
July 1994, the staff of the operations room in the Ishtar
Sheraton Hotel ceased functioning and relocated to the Canal
Hotel building.  On 1 August 1994, the Director assumed
responsibility for the Commission's operations in Baghdad.
The Chief of the former Field Office was designated Chief of
Logistics within the Centre.

12. The first resident monitoring group for the Centre arrived
at Baghdad on 17 August.  This four-person team, the missile
monitoring experts (designated MG1), was soon followed by the
nuclear monitoring group (NMG 94-01), a two-person team, on 22
August 1994.  (NMG 94-01 expanded to three persons on
29 September.)  On 2 October, the first chemical group members
arrived at Baghdad.  The first biological group members are
expected to arrive in the near future.

13. Missile group and nuclear monitoring group personnel
commenced monitoring activities at various sites throughout
Iraq.  Remote camera monitoring systems were tested and the
Commission's and the IAEA's tags were checked for tampering or
damage from movement of equipment.  Several inspection teams
used the temporary facilities within the Centre.

14. As the staff assembled, preparatory activities continued
to move the Centre offices and functions to their permanent
areas.  The Centre security doors controlled access to 49
rooms on the Canal Hotel second floor.  Furniture was being
donated for the Centre from the Australian and American
Embassy compounds.  Office furniture was also acquired from
the former Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
(ESCWA) at Baghdad.

15. In the final days of the present reporting period, a
special team of security experts conducted an extensive survey
of the facility to recommend measures for the Centre.
Commitments from several contributing Governments were made to
donate equipment, materials and technicians to ensure that the
security programme was an integral function of Centre
operations.  Those commitments include ongoing maintenance,
repair and renovation resources to sustain the Centre for as
long as its operations are required.

                           ANNEX III

              Administrative and financial issues

                          I.  FINANCE

1.  The financing of the operations of the Commission and IAEA
under section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and
other relevant resolutions continues to be a matter of the
most serious concern.  Council resolution 699 (1991)
explicitly provides that Iraq "shall be liable for the full
costs of carrying out the tasks authorized by section C".
However, the only Iraqi funds made available for financing the
operations concerned are Iraqi frozen assets provided by
Member States, under paragraph 1 of resolution 778 (1992), to
the United Nations escrow account established pursuant to
Council resolution 706 (1991).  To the extent that those
assets have not been sufficient to meet all the requirements
of the Compensation Commission, the Special Commission and
IAEA, and other United Nations operations in Iraq under the
Council's resolutions, the financing of all those activities
has had to be on the basis of voluntary contributions from
States.  In that regard, it will be recalled that resolution
699 (1991), in addition to laying down Iraq's obligations,
encouraged "the maximum assistance, in cash and in kind, from
all Member States to ensure that activities under section C of
resolution 687 (1991) are undertaken effectively and
expeditiously".  The Council augmented that request in its
resolution 715 (1991), approving the plans of the Commission
and IAEA for ongoing monitoring and verification, by calling
for such assistance "in carrying out (their) activities under
the plans approved by the present resolution, without
prejudice to Iraq's liability for the full costs of such

2.  The Council's calls for such assistance have been
generously responded to by a number of Governments, which have
provided cash, equipment, services and personnel.  However, it
cannot be expected that the generosity of Governments will
continue indefinitely or that funds in the escrow account will
be sufficient, for even the immediate future, to meet the
requirements of the various activities that are financed from
that account, the Compensation Commission's Fund having the
priority in that respect.

3.  By the end of 1994, the Special Commission and IAEA will
have spent a total of $81.5 million for their operations,
including the costs of the contracts for the removal of fresh
and irradiated nuclear fuel.  A total of $71.4 million was
provided through the escrow account and $9.4 million from
direct contributions and loans.  The operational budget of the
Commission under long-term monitoring will in essence be for
travel and mission subsistence allowance of experts and for
the salary of the administrative and support staff provided by
the United Nations.  The Commission and IAEA will require an
estimated $25 million in 1995 in support of their operations.
This forecast assumes that Governments will pay for the salary
of the experts and technical staff and that the monitoring
equipment, that is, cameras, sensors, data-processing and
analysis equipment will be provided by donor countries.
However, the present funds earmarked for the Commission in the
escrow account will be depleted at the end of 1994 if further
funds earmarked for the Commission are not provided to the
escrow account by Member States.

4.  Contributions in cash and in kind from Governments may be
either donations or subject to reimbursement of the costs
involved when adequate Iraqi funds are available.
Accordingly, the Special Commission, acting under the Security
Council resolutions, has sought contributions directly from
Governments for services, equipment and personnel needed to
carry out its mandate.  It has also given the necessary
undertakings to Governments regarding reimbursement of their
costs, if they indicate their intention to seek such
reimbursement under the terms of the Council's resolutions,
when Iraqi oil funds are available.  That direct procedure,
under the Council's authorization, is essential to a timely
performance of the Commission's mandate, and the Commission
will continue to act on it.

                       II.  ORGANIZATION

5.  The establishment of ongoing monitoring and verification
required a new infrastructure within the Commission to reflect
its expanded activities.  The operations of the Commission
will now focus on monitoring activities while maintaining the
ability to respond to any new information that might be
obtained on Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes.  The new
organizational structure will eventually also have the
additional mandate of implementing the export/import control
mechanism required under paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991).

6.  The following paragraphs contain a review of how the
structure of the Commission has evolved or will evolve in
order to respond to the changed circumstances in which it is
now operating.

          A.  Headquarters of the Special Commission

7.  At the headquarters of the Commission, the focus of effort
shifted to the building of protocols, the development of
relevant databases and the analysis of information - written
and visual.  Additional technical expertise was requested from
Governments in order to boost the Commission's ability to cope
with the additional workload.  The total number of technical
experts was increased from 12 at the end of 1993 to 23 by
early September 1994.  The most dramatic change occurred in
the biological area.  The Commission had only one biological
expert in October 1993:  it now has five.

8.  The development of a custom-designed computer database in
support of data gathering and analysis has been made possible
thanks to the generosity of various Governments who
contributed equipment, specifically designed software and
training.  Funds were allocated from the operational budget to
improve the satellite link between New York and Baghdad and to
increase the number of lines to allow the smooth and secure
transmission of data.

        B.  Office of the Special Commission at Baghdad

9.  The functions of the Office of the Special Commission at
Baghdad, which previously had comprised essentially logistic
support for inspections, were revised to respond to the
additional requirements of ongoing monitoring and
verification.  The Executive Chairman decided that the Office
would be replaced by a Baghdad Monitoring and Verification
Centre, headed by a Director who would act as his personal
representative in Iraq.  Details of developments in that
regard are contained in annex II.

                           ANNEX IV

                      Inspection schedule

                      (in-country dates)


    15-21 May 1991                     IAEA1/UNSCOM  1
    22 June-3 July 1991                IAEA2/UNSCOM  4

    7-18 July 1991                     IAEA3/UNSCOM  5
    27 July-10 August 1991             IAEA4/UNSCOM  6
    14-20 September 1991               IAEA5/UNSCOM 14
    22-30 September 1991               IAEA6/UNSCOM 16
    11-22 October 1991                 IAEA7/UNSCOM 19
    11-18 November 1991                IAEA8/UNSCOM 22

    11-14 January 1992                 IAEA9/UNSCOM 25
    5-13 February 1992                IAEA10/UNSCOM 27
    7-15 April 1992                   IAEA11/UNSCOM 33
    26 May-4 June 1992                IAEA12/UNSCOM 37
    14-21 July 1992                   IAEA13/UNSCOM 41
    31 August-7 September 1992        IAEA14/UNSCOM 43

    8-18 November 1992                IAEA15/UNSCOM 46
    5-8 December 1992                 IAEA16/UNSCOM 47
    25-31 January 1993                IAEA17/UNSCOM 49
    3-11 March 1993                   IAEA18/UNSCOM 52
    30 April-7 May 1993               IAEA19/UNSCOM 56
    25-30 June 1993                   IAEA20/UNSCOM 58

    23-28 July 1993                   IAEA21/UNSCOM 61
    1-15 November 1993                IAEA22/UNSCOM 64
    4-11 February 1994                IAEA23/UNSCOM 68
    11-22 April 1994                  IAEA24/UNSCOM 73
    21 June-1 July 1994               IAEA25/UNSCOM 83
    22 August-2 September 1994        IAEA26/UNSCOM 90

    3-29 September 1994               NMG 94-01
    29 September-21 October 1994      NMG 94-02
    14-21 October 1994                IAEA27/UNSCOM 93


    9-15 June 1991                       CW1/UNSCOM  2
    15-22 August 1991                    CW2/UNSCOM  9
    31 August-8 September 1991           CW3/UNSCOM 11
    31 August-5 September 1991           CW4/UNSCOM 12
    6 October-9 November 1991            CW5/UNSCOM 17

    22 October-2 November 1991           CW6/UNSCOM 20
    18 November-1 December 1991         CBW1/UNSCOM 21
    27 January-5 February 1992           CW7/UNSCOM 26
    21 February-24 March 1992            CD1/UNSCOM 29
    5-13 April 1992                      CD2/UNSCOM 32
    15-29 April 1992                     CW8/UNSCOM 35

    18 June 1992-14 June 1994            CDG/UNSCOM 38
    26 June-10 July 1992                CBW2/UNSCOM 39
    21-29 September 1992                 CW9/UNSCOM 44
    6-14 December 1992                  CBW3/UNSCOM 47

    6-18 April 1993                     CW10/UNSCOM 55
    27-30 June 1993                     CW11/UNSCOM 59
    19-22 November 1993                 CW12/UNSCOM 65
    1-14 February 1994                  CW13/UNSCOM 67
    20-26 March 1994                    CW14/UNSCOM 70

    18-22 April 1994                    CW15/UNSCOM 74
    25 May-5 June 1994                  CW16/UNSCOM 75
    31 May-12 June 1994                 CW17/UNSCOM 76
    8-14 June 1994                      CW18/UNSCOM 77
    10-23 August 1994                   CW19/UNSCOM 89
    13-24 September 1994                CW20/UNSCOM 91

    2 October-       1994 (ongoing)     CG1


    2-8 August 1991                      BW1/UNSCOM  7
    20 September-3 October 1991          BW2/UNSCOM 15

    11-18 March 1993                     BW3/UNSCOM 53
    8-26 April 1994                      BW4/UNSCOM 72
    28 May-7 June 1994                   BW5/UNSCOM 78
    24 June-8 July 1994                  BW6/UNSCOM 84
    5-8 June 1994                        BW7/UNSCOM 86
    25 July-8 September 1994             BW8/UNSCOM 87

    20-25 August 1994                    BW9/UNSCOM 88
    29 August-3 September 1994          BW10/UNSCOM 92
    29 September-14 October 1994        BW11/UNSCOM 94
    23-26 September 1994                BW12/UNSCOM 96

Ballistic missiles

    30 June-7 July 1991                  BM1/UNSCOM  3
    18-20 July 1991                      BM2/UNSCOM 10
    8-15 August 1991                     BM3/UNSCOM  8
    6-13 September 1991                  BM4/UNSCOM 13
    1-9 October 1991                     BM5/UNSCOM 18

    1-9 December 1991                    BM6/UNSCOM 23
    9-17 December 1991                   BM7/UNSCOM 24
    21-29 February 1992                  BM8/UNSCOM 28
    21-29 March 1992                     BM9/UNSCOM 31
    13-21 April 1992                    BM10/UNSCOM 34
    14-22 May 1992                      BM11/UNSCOM 36

    11-29 July 1992                     BM12/UNSCOM 40A+B
    7-18 August 1992                    BM13/UNSCOM 42
    16-30 October 1992                  BM14/UNSCOM 45
    25 January-23 March 1993           IMT1a/UNSCOM 48
    12-21 February 1993                 BM15/UNSCOM 50

    22-23 February 1993                 BM16/UNSCOM 51
    27 March-17 May 1993               IMT1b/UNSCOM 54
    5-28 June 1993                     IMT1c/UNSCOM 57
    10-11 July 1993                     BM17/UNSCOM 60
    24 August-15 September 1993         BM18/UNSCOM 62
    28 September-1 November 1993        BM19/UNSCOM 63

    21-29 January 1994                  BM20/UNSCOM 66
    17-25 February 1994                 BM21/UNSCOM 69
    30 March-20 May 1994                BM22/UNSCOM 71
    23-28 May 1994                      BM23/UNSCOM 79

    10-24 June 1994                     BM24/UNSCOM 80
    14-19 June 1994                     BM25/UNSCOM 81
    3-28 July 1994                      BM26/UNSCOM 82
    15-24 July 1994                     BM27/UNSCOM 85
    17 August-9 October 1994            MG1

    3-6 October 1994                    BM28/UNSCOM 98A
    21-31 October 1994                  BM28/UNSCOM 98B
    14 October-       1994 (ongoing)   MG2
    14-19 October 1994                  MG2A

Computer search

     12 February 1992                        UNSCOM 30

Special missions

    30 June-3 July 1991

    11-14 August 1991
    4-6 October 1991
    11-15 November 1991
    27-30 January 1992
    21-24 February 1992
    17-19 July 1992

    28-29 July 1992
    6-12 September 1992
    4-9 November 1992
    4-8 November 1992
    12-18 March 1993
    14-20 March 1993

    19-24 April 1993
    4 June-5 July 1993
    15-19 July 1993
    25 July-5 August 1993
    9-12 August 1993
    10-24 September 1993

    27 September-1 October 1993
    1-8 October 1993
    5 October-16 February 1994
    2-10 December 1993
    2-16 December 1993
    21-27 January 1994

    2-6 February 1994
    10-14 April 1994
    24-26 April 1994
    28-29 May 1994
    4-6 July 1994

    8-16 August 1994
    15-19 September 1994
    21-25 September 1994
    23-26 September 1994
    3-6 October 1994