Security Council

22 April 1994




1. 	The present report is the fifth submitted pursuant to 
paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 715 (1991), adopted on 
11 October 1991, which requests the Secretary-General to submit a 
report to the Council every six months on the implementation of 
the Special Commission's plan for ongoing monitoring and 
verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of 
section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).  It updates 
the information contained in the first four reports (S/23801, 
S/24661, S/25620 and S/26684).
2. 	Further information concerning developments relating to the 
implementation of the plan is contained in the reports to the 
Security Council of the high-level talks, held in November 1993 
and March 1994, between the Special Commission and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the one hand and 
Iraq on the other (S/26825 and Corr.1 and S/1994/341).  The 
attachment to document S/1994/341 contains an outline of the 
activities planned by the Special Commission to implement ongoing 
monitoring and verification of Iraq's obligation not to reacquire 
the weapons banned to it under section C of resolution 
687 (1991).  Document S/1994/151 contains the text of a joint 
statement made by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the 
Executive Chairman after the February 1994 round of high-level 
talks in Baghdad.

                       II.  DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE PERIOD
                            10 OCTOBER 1993-10 APRIL 1994

	A.  Acknowledgement of resolution 715 (1991)

3. 	The major development in the period under review was Iraq's 
acceptance of Security Council resolution 715 (1991), received in 
the form of a letter from the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. 
Tariq Aziz, to the President of the Security Council (S/26811, 
annex).  This came at the end of a round of 

94-18971 (E)   250494	/...

high-level talks held in New York between the Special Commission 
and IAEA, on the one hand, and Iraq, on the other, reported in 
documents S/26825 and Corr.1.

	B.  Provision of information

4. 	At that time, Iraq declared that its previous declarations 
concerning its current dual-purpose capabilities should be 
"considered to have been made and submitted in conformity with 
the provisions of Security Council resolution 715 (1991) and the 
plans approved thereunder".  The Commission responded to Iraq 
that those previous declarations were deficient in many regards 
and could not be considered as initial declarations under the 
plans, nor did they constitute a sufficient basis for the proper 
planning and implementation of ongoing monitoring and 
5. 	To assist Iraq in the preparation of adequate declarations, 
the Commission prepared formats in which such declarations should 
be made.  The first of these, covering ballistic missiles and 
chemical weapons, were provided to Iraq in late December 1993.  
The Commission received in Baghdad Iraq's first declarations on 
16 January 1994.  While these new declarations were a 
considerable improvement on Iraq's earlier reporting, they still 
were incomplete, particularly those relating to chemical 
facilities.  In some instances, Iraq not only failed to answer 
some of the questions contained in the formats, but unilaterally 
rewrote the formats to delete those questions.
6. 	In parallel with its efforts to elicit full information on 
current dual-purpose capabilities, the Commission continued its 
efforts to obtain a complete account of Iraq's programmes banned 
under the terms of section C of resolution 687 (1991).  Only with 
full information about these programmes and complete information 
on current dual-purpose capabilities would the Commission be in a 
position to plan and implement an effective ongoing monitoring 
and verification system.
7. 	Efforts here concentrated on information relating to the 
supply of precursor chemicals, chemical agent production capacity 
and its utilization, expenditure of SCUD-derivative missiles and 
suppliers of components for missile production.  Discussions on 
chemical issues took place in the framework of the high-level 
talks held in Baghdad in February 1994 and in New York in 
November 1993 and March 1994.  Ballistic missile issues were also 
addressed in the New York meetings.  The outcome of these 
discussions was reported in documents S/26825 and Corr.1 and in 
the enclosure to document S/1994/341.  In the absence of 
documentation that would assist in the verification of the latest 
data provided on chemical programmes, the Commission intends to 
send a team of experts to Iraq in May 1994 in order to interview 
former senior personnel associated with the programmes.

	C.  Operations

8. 	The concept of how the Commission intends to conduct ongoing 
monitoring and verification is contained in the plan approved by 
Security Council resolution 715 (1991) (S/22871/Rev.1).  It was 
summarized in the attachment to document S/1994/341. 
9. 	In parallel with the above efforts to elicit further 
information, the Commission has continued its assessment of 
Iraq's capabilities, in terms of sites, activities, equipment and 
materials, which will need to be monitored under the plan for 
ongoing monitoring and verification.  Planning and identification 
of means for such monitoring is well advanced.  These efforts 
have drawn upon international expertise through the holding of 
topic-specific seminars in the Commission's headquarters in New 
York.  Trials have been conducted on certain of the tagging and 
sensor techniques to be deployed for ongoing monitoring and 
verification purposes.  Several inspections focused primarily on 
ongoing monitoring and verification have already been launched or 
completed.  Details of activities undertaken are contained in 
annex I to the present report.
10. 	Plans for further ongoing monitoring and verification 
activities remain as detailed in the attachment to document 
S/1994/341 with the following updates:

	(a)	The ballistic-missile protocol-building team planned to 
start its tasks on 30 March 1994, is now in Iraq and working 
smoothly, with good Iraqi cooperation;

	(b)	The chemical sensors referred to in paragraph 8 of the 
attachment have now, with the assistance of Iraq, been installed 
and their performance is being assessed;

	(c)	The biological protocol-building team started its 
mission in Baghdad on 8 April 1994; 

	(d)	A team to assess plans for establishing a monitoring 
centre in Baghdad arrived there on 10 April 1994.

	D.  Export/import monitoring mechanism

11. 	Paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991) requires the 
Commission, in cooperation with the Committee established under 
resolution 661 (1990) and the Director General of IAEA, "to 
develop a mechanism for monitoring any future sales or supplies 
by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to the 
implementation of section C of resolution 687 (1991) and other 
relevant resolutions, including the plans approved hereunder".  
The Commission and IAEA have prepared a concept paper outlining a 
mechanism which, in their view, would fulfil the requirements of 
resolution 715 (1991).  It is the intention of the Commission and 
IAEA to present the paper formally to the Committee established 
under resolution 661 (1990) before the end of April 1994.  
Thereafter, the three bodies will need to submit their joint 
recommendations to the Security Council for its consideration.

Prospects for the future

12. 	As indicated in the attachment to document S/1994/341, the 
Special Commission is mobilizing its resources and those of 
supporting Governments to ensure that an effective ongoing 
monitoring and verification system will be implemented as soon as 
feasible.  However, in reaching that stage, the Commission is, in 
large part, dependent on the actions of others, foremost among 
which is Iraq itself.  Without the cooperation of the Iraqi 
authorities, both in the provision of relevant information and in 
undertaking the many actions required of them to establish the 
system, effective implementation of the plan cannot be assured.
13. 	Iraq has, on several occasions and most notably in the joint 
statement (S/1994/151) issued at the end of the high-level talks 
held in Baghdad in February 1994, stated its intention to so 
cooperate in order to expedite the establishment of ongoing 
monitoring and verification, thereby enabling the Commission and 
IAEA to report Iraq's fulfilment of the terms of paragraph 22 of 
resolution 687 (1991).  The Commission hopes and expects this to 
be the case.  However, during the latest round of high-level 
talks between the Commission and Iraq held in New York in March 
1994 and reported in document S/1994/341, Iraq expressed a lack 
of confidence in the impartiality of the Commission and implied 
that, unless the Commission reported immediately under paragraph 
22 of resolution 687 (1991), cooperation might be withdrawn.
14. 	It was in the light of these statements that the Commission 
viewed with great concern an incident involving one of its 
helicopters, in which a crowd threw stones at the helicopter as 
it was taking on board two injured soldiers from the United 
Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq for medical evacuation.  A full 
account is contained in annex II to the present report.
15. 	This incident placed the aircraft and those on board in 
severe danger.  Iraq is required, under its obligations in 
respect of United Nations operations in Iraq and, in particular, 
under the status arrangements through which the Special 
Commission operates in Iraq, resolution 707 (1991) and the plans 
for ongoing monitoring and verification approved by resolution 
715 (1991), to ensure the safety and security of Special 
Commission personnel and property.  Iraq's failure in this 
instance to provide adequate security was strongly protested by 
the Commission to Iraqi authorities in both Baghdad and New York.
16. 	In response, the Iraqi Government has firmly denied any 
involvement in the attack, blaming the Commission for the alleged 
last minute change in landing site.  However, the Commission has 
noted Iraq's assurances that this incident should not be seen as 
being in any way politically motivated and its undertaking to 
ensure that similar incidents do not recur.

	Annex I

	Ongoing monitoring and verification activities


1.	Iraq's acceptance of its obligations under Security Council 
resolution 715 (1991) led to intensive work to establish a 
monitoring mechanism of missile-related activities and dual 
purpose capabilities in Iraq pursuant to the plan for ongoing 
monitoring and verification in the non-nuclear area 
(S/22871/Rev.1).  These efforts included a number of inspections, 
assessment of Iraq's declarations submitted under the plan, 
identification of focal points for monitoring and appropriate 
monitoring techniques including their field trials, preparation 
of draft ongoing monitoring and verification protocols, and 
in-depth discussions with the Iraqi side of monitoring issues, 
including during the rounds of high-level talks both in New York 
and in Baghdad.  In parallel, the Special Commission continued 
its investigation into the past prohibited missile programmes of 
Iraq and of Iraq's compliance with resolution 687 (1991).

	A.  UNSCOM 66

2.	UNSCOM 66 carried out an inspection in Iraq over the period 
from 21 to 29 January 1994.  In view of Iraq's acceptance of 
resolution 715 (1991), UNSCOM 66 was tasked to accomplish the 
following missions:

	(a)	To update data collected by previous inspection teams on 
Iraq's missile research and development (R&D) programme;

	(b)	To examine issues related to Iraq's reporting on 
facilities to be monitored under the ongoing monitoring and 
verification plan in the missile area as approved by resolution 
715 (1991); 

	(c)	To conduct a preliminary survey for possible application 
of appropriate monitoring sensors and technologies.

3.	UNSCOM 66 visited a number of R&D and industrial facilities 
to be monitored under the ongoing monitoring and verification 
plan.  Iraq provided the team with a detailed update of its 
current missile programmes relevant to surface-to-surface 
missiles with a range greater than 50 kilometres.

4.	UNSCOM 66 carried out extensive work related to Iraq's 
reporting obligations under the ongoing monitoring and 
verification plan.  This included discussions of Iraq's reporting 
on facilities to be monitored, examination of declarations 
submitted by Iraq in January 1994 pursuant to the ongoing 
monitoring and verification plan and practical on-site 
investigation of relevant issues.  This work resulted in a draft 
format for Iraq's reporting on those missile R&D and production 
facilities that would be under the most intensive monitoring 
regime.  During inspection and soon after it, Iraq submitted to 
the Special Commission reports under this format for all relevant 
facilities.  As a result of UNSCOM 66, Iraq also provided 
corrections to its January declarations under the ongoing 
monitoring and verification plan in the missile area.

5. 	UNSCOM 66 started a survey of sites where installation of 
sensors and use of other technologies might be appropriate for 
monitoring purposes.  This survey addressed issues of inventory 
control of dual-purpose equipment, non-removal of equipment from 
declared facilities and monitoring of activities at facilities.  
Use of a variety of sensors and recording devices could be an 
important part of monitoring procedures under the ongoing 
monitoring and verification plan.

	B.  UNSCOM 69

6.	UNSCOM 69 was in Iraq from 17 to 25 February to accomplish 
the following missions:

	(a)	To assess Iraq's dual-purpose missile industrial 
capabilities that might be used in support of missile production;

	(b)	To continue compiling the database on Iraq's machine 
tools and equipment usable for missile production; 

	(c)	To carry out an assessment of possibilities to install 
sensors and use other technologies to monitor missile-related 

7.	UNSCOM 69 visited 15 facilities in Iraq, identified a number 
of focal points for monitoring activities at those sites and 
carried out a survey for the use of sensors.  The machine tool 
database built by the previous inspection team (UNSCOM 57) was 
updated, new machines were recorded and some items were tagged.

8.	The results of UNSCOM 69 provided the Commission with the 
necessary background data to refine a scope of facilities for 
ongoing monitoring and verification under the ongoing monitoring 
and verification plan.

	C.  UNSCOM 71

9.	Based on the results of UNSCOM 66 and 69, UNSCOM 71 was 
organized to prepare draft ongoing monitoring and verification 
protocols for facilities identified so far by the Commission as 
needing to be subject to ongoing monitoring and verification.  A 
monitoring and verification protocol would incorporate detailed 
procedures for monitoring activities utilizing a variety of 
different means at sites in Iraq covered by the ongoing 
monitoring and verification plan.  It would also contain 
systematized collection of information known about a specific 
site essential for effective monitoring and verification.  Once 
created, the protocol for a given site would be updated as a 
result of monitoring and verification activities at that site.

10.	UNSCOM 71 started its activities in Iraq on 30 March.  The 
team will continue its work through a succession of rounds of 
visits to Iraq until the accomplishment of all its tasks.  It is 
anticipated that this will take at least two months.

11.	At the time of writing, UNSCOM 71 has completed its first 
round of activities in Iraq.  During this round, the team visited 
nine facilities to be placed, depending on the nature of their 
activities, under different regimes of monitoring.  UNSCOM 71 
also verified on-site Iraq's declarations and reports for 
monitoring and verification protocols on facilities visited by 
the team.  The team is currently working on the draft protocols 
for those facilities.  UNSCOM 71 will return to Iraq on 18 April 
to start the second round of its inspection activities.  In 
total, it will visit more than 30 sites.

	D.  Other activities

12.	In support of its efforts to establish a mechanism for 
ongoing monitoring and verification, the Commission held a number 
of meetings with international experts.  During these meetings, 
issues were discussed related to the assessment of Iraq's 
declarations, identification of focal points for monitoring 
missile-related activities and appropriate monitoring techniques, 
including sensors, to ensure effective monitoring.  Lists of 
dual-purpose equipment, technologies and other items that could 
be used for the development, production, modification or 
acquisition of ballistic missiles with a range greater than 
150 kilometres were also discussed.

	E.  Past prohibited activities

13.	The Commission continued its investigation of the 
outstanding issues related to the past missile programme 
proscribed under resolution 687 (1991).  This work is essential 
to establish a solid and verified baseline for ongoing monitoring 
in accordance with resolution 715 (1991).  In particular, this 
will allow the Commission to have a full and comprehensive 
picture of the knowledge and know-how Iraq obtained in the 
missile area through its past activities.

14.	Issues related to programmes proscribed under section C of 
resolution 687 (1991) were discussed with Iraq on a continuous 
basis, especially during the rounds of the high-level talks in 
November 1993 and March 1994 in New York.  Iraq has furnished 
additional details on foreign acquisition of critical ballistic 
missile items as well as its expenditure of ballistic missiles 
with a range greater than 150 kilometres.

15.	The Commission continued to reiterate its request that Iraq 
provide original documentation that would substantiate the 
declarations made by Iraq concerning its past prohibited missile 
programmes.  During the February visit of the Executive Chairman 
of the Special Commission to Baghdad, Iraq finally agreed to hand 
over to the Commission documentation on the expenditure of 
prohibited missiles.  This documentation covers the period from 
1977 to December 1990 and accounts for nearly three quarters of 
the missiles covered by resolution 687 (1991) and declared by 
Iraq.  Currently, the Commission is conducting an in-depth 
investigation of these documents and information contained 
therein.  The results of this investigation will be critical for 
the Commission's reporting to the Security Council under 
paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991).


	A.  Data collection

16.	In parallel with the various rounds of high-level political 
talks, UNSCOM experts have held three technical meetings with 
Iraq on chemical weapons issues.  

	1.  Past programmes

17.	In the course of the meeting held in New York in November 
1993, Iraq stressed that it had tried to meet all the 
requirements put forward by the Commission on the provision of 
information.  However, Iraq agreed to endeavour to address any 
questions that might arise during the Commission's verification 
activities.  The Commission, for its part, informed Iraq that it 
had assessed as credible the information provided in the talks 
held in Baghdad in October 1993 regarding Iraq's past chemical 
weapons programme.  However, in the absence of documentation, 
independent verification of the data remained problematic.  The 
Commission suggested that Iraq, in order to address that problem 
in part, hold seminars of the officials involved in the chemical 
weapons programme aimed at stimulating their collective memory to 
remember details that might facilitate independent verification. 

  The issue of equipment and chemicals left at the Muthanna State 
Establishment was also discussed.  It was agreed that the 
Commission should send a mission to Baghdad in January 1994 to 
mark equipment in order to prepare an inventory as to the release 
or disposal of this equipment.  Further discussion was reserved 
on the release or disposal of chemicals remaining at the site.  

18.	During the meeting held in Baghdad in February 1994, Iraq 
informed the Commission of the results of its seminar with senior 
Iraqi personnel formerly involved in the chemical weapons 
programme.  Additional data on outstanding issues, e.g. the 
research and development programme and imports of precursor 
chemicals, were provided.  

19.	During the meeting held in New York in March 1994, the 
Commission asked Iraq for additional details to fill in gaps in 
previously provided information.  In response, Iraq presented the 
results of another seminar it had convened, this time involving 
retired former officials.  These included a breakdown of the 
quantities of imported precursor chemicals by year and contract. 

 In addition, Iraq was able to present a correlation, on an 
annual basis, between produced quantities of agents, available 
precursor chemicals, stored and consumed agents, and available 
chemical production capacity.  A complete overview of its 
chemical weapons research and development programme, including 
time-frames, was also provided.

20.	The additional information obtained during the course of 
these meetings was essential to the Commission's efforts to 
obtain as full a picture of Iraq's chemical weapons programme as 
possible.  For example, in October 1993 Iraq declared 13,221 tons 
of traceable imported precursor chemicals; in February 1994, 
15,037 tons; and in March 1994, 17,657 tons.  The declared 
quantities of produced agents, however, remained unchanged at 
4,340.5 tons.

21.	The picture created by this additional information is more 
internally consistent than previous accounts given by Iraq.  The 
order of magnitude of the declared figures appears credible.  
However, in the absence of supporting documentary evidence, the 
issue of independent verification remains.  In this context, the 
Commission plans, in April 1994, to interview the personnel 
involved in Iraq's data recollection seminars.

	2.  Declarations of dual-purpose facilities

22.	In December 1993, the Commission provided Iraq with model 
formats for the latter's initial declarations, required under the 
plan for ongoing monitoring and verification, of dual-purpose 
chemical facilities.  On 16 January 1994, Iraq delivered to the 
Commission's field office in Baghdad partially completed formats. 

 At subsequent meetings of the two sides, Iraq was informed by 
the Commission of the inadequacies of these returns and of what 
was required to bring them into conformity with the Commission's 
requirements.  Iraq was told that full initial declarations were 
one of the main prerequisites for the protocol-building procedure 
and hence for the initiation of ongoing monitoring and 

	B.  Inspections

23.	In the period from 1 to 11 February 1994, UNSCOM 67/CW 13 
inventoried and tagged approximately 240 pieces of dual-use 
chemical production equipment.  This equipment had been procured 
under the auspices of Iraq's chemical warfare programme.  On 14 
March 1994 Iraq was informed that 44 pieces that had been used 
for the production of agents and precursor chemicals would have 
to be destroyed.  Iraq was provided with precise descriptions of 
those items.  In addition, Iraq was asked to provide, by 30 April 
1994, a detailed description of the intended permitted future use 
of the remaining tagged equipment for a final decision on their 
disposal.  Those items not destroyed would then be subjected to 
ongoing monitoring and verification.  

24.	In the course of UNSCOM 67/CW 13, the team also visited the 
Ibn al Baytar facility in order to create a monitoring and 
verification protocol for that site.  The purpose of this was to 
assess whether the general model for monitoring and verification 
protocols developed in the Commission's headquarters in New York 
was indeed applicable in practice to dual-purpose chemical 

25.	During the period from 20 to 26 March 1994, UNSCOM 70/CW 14 
installed four air samplers at the Muthanna site.  These samplers 
are designed to determine the types and levels of chemicals in 
the air at that site.  The team also employed portable samplers 
that took additional samples for gaining an even more 
comprehensive survey of the air at Muthanna.  The samplers were 
installed in a pattern that would cover air quality on the site 
from all wind directions.  An Iraqi maintenance and construction 
crew prepared the mounting poles for the samplers.  The samplers 
were programmed to sample the air around the clock in a 
discontinuous mode for a 30-day period.  The sample tubes are to 
be removed, replaced with fresh tubes every 30 days and sent to 
laboratories for analysis.  The sampler mechanism is 
microprocessor-controlled and is powered by a storage battery 
charged by a solar panel.  A microprocessor-driven meteorological 
station is mounted on one of the samplers to record hourly wind 
speed, wind direction, temperature and humidity.  The 
meteorological data are to be down-loaded each time the sampler 
tubes are changed and will become a part of the permanent record 
of the sample set.


26.	The first biological inspections in the baseline process 
started with the arrival in Iraq of the fourth biological 
inspection team on 8 April 1994.  The team is scheduled to 
conduct its activities over a three-week period.  The main 
purpose of this inspection is to verify the declarations 
submitted by Iraq in January 1994, pursuant to the plan, approved 
by Security Council resolution 715 (1991), for the ongoing 
monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance not to reacquire 
items prohibited under resolution 687 (1991).  Other objectives 
of this inspection are to provide an assessment of the work being 
undertaken and of the equipment present at those biological 
facilities declared by Iraq, many of which have never been 
visited by the Special Commission; to establish an inventory of 
said equipment for future tagging; and to draft a format for 
Iraq's regular reports under the monitoring and verification 

	A.  Talks with Iraq to fill in data gaps

27.	In November 1993, discussions that had started in October 
1993 regarding formats for reporting under the plan continued.  
The purpose of these discussions was to provide the Government of 
Iraq with a frame that would facilitate reporting under the plan 
by the drafting of limited-text answers, yes/no answers or 
multiple-choice answers.

28.	Following the presentation of Iraqi declarations in January 
1994, high-level talks were conducted with Iraqi officials in 
February and March 1994.  These discussions focused upon the 
information to be provided by Iraq for an efficient and effective 
monitoring of the biological area.  The outcome of these 
discussions was the provision by Iraq of a new version of the 
declarations required under the plan in a form that would allow 
completeness and clarity of the information to be analysed.

	B.  Seminars of experts in New York

29.	In March 1994, a seminar of international experts was held 
in New York to prepare for inspections connected with 
establishing the biological baseline.  Further seminars to 
discuss past programmes, Iraq's declarations under the biological 
provisions of the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification, 
sensors and other monitoring technologies, monitoring modalities 
and requirements for training of monitoring inspectors are 

	C.  Protocol-building efforts

30.	Efforts to build the protocols for each biological site are 
under way.  The information relating to geographic location has 
been compiled or will be gathered during the first visit 
inspection to take place in April 1994.  The remaining 
information will be assembled throughout the baseline process.  A 
draft of the format for information to be provided by Iraq under 
the protocol will be developed during the inspection in April 

	D.  Sensor/tagging trials

31.	A feasibility study of monitoring by cameras will be 
conducted during the April inspection.  Further efforts in this 
field will be effected by way of seminars in the coming month.  
Tagging technologies have already been identified and deemed 
appropriate with respect to biotechnological equipment.


32.	Activities in the nuclear area since 10 October 1993 are 
reported in the IAEA report (S/1994/490, appendix).  In support 
of its obligation to designate sites, including in the nuclear 
area, the Special Commission conducted one gamma survey in the 
period under review.  

33.	The second gamma aerial survey mission performed its mission 
from 2 to 15 December 1993.  During this mission, the team 
surveyed six sites.  It obtained detailed gamma spectra at 
radioactive disposal areas at Tuwaitha as well as two areas at Al 
Atheer.  In addition, gamma surveys were conducted at Rashdiya, 
Al Hadre, a site near Tikrit and Salah al-Din State Establishment 
(SAAD-13).  While the data are still being analysed, early 
indications show the power of this capability to survey a 
relatively large area rapidly and to pinpoint particular sites 
for more detailed investigation.  This system is still being 
developed, and evident improvements are under way.


34.	The Commission's aerial inspections, using both helicopters 
and high-altitude surveillance aircraft, continued over the 
period under review.  The Commission's high-altitude 
reconnaissance aircraft (U-2) now flies once or twice a week, 
having flown a total of 201 missions since the inception of its 
use in support of the Commission's operations.  The Commission's 
helicopters have now flown 273 missions, covering some 395 sites. 
 The aerial inspection team currently conducts three to four 
flights a week.

	Annex II

	Helicopter-stoning incident

1.	While it was undertaking a humanitarian mission to evacuate, 
at the request of the United Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq, 
two United Nations soldiers shot in the north of Iraq during an 
ambush, a Special Commission helicopter was stoned by a crowd 
that had gathered at the landing site used to take on board the 

2.	For this operation, the Commission had followed normal 
procedures, informing the Iraqi authorities first orally and, at 
1100 hours on the morning of the mission, in writing of the 
flight plan and landing site to be used (a playing field adjacent 
to the Mosul Saddam Hospital).  Iraq had officially expressed 
agreement to these plans. 1/

3.	Upon landing at the hospital at 1600 hours, the helicopter 
was surrounded by a crowd.  When the ambulance arrived with the 
two guards, the crowd sought to hinder its passage to the 
aircraft and started to throw stones.  Only a few of the Iraqi 
military personnel on hand sought to intervene, ineffectively.

4.	Once the injured had been loaded onto the helicopter, the 
Iraqi soldiers gave up their efforts to control the crowd, who 
pelted the helicopter with stones.  Damage was sustained to all 
six rotor blades and stones that went into the air intakes 
damaged the motor bearings and turbine.  Further damage was 
sustained to windows and the fuselage.  This damage grounded the 
aircraft for a period of three weeks while repairs, costing 
around $1.5 million, were undertaken.

5.	The pilot of the helicopter decided that, regardless of the 
damage sustained by the helicopter, immediate departure was the 
surest way to safeguard the lives of the crew and passengers and 
to escape a dangerous situation.

     1/	Contrary to an Iraqi press release dated 29 March 1994, there was no 
last minute change of flight plan or landing site.  Indeed, Iraqi personnel in 
Mosul had assisted in the preparation of the landing site at 1130 hours and in 
Baghdad had received a written flight plan containing flight path and landing 
site details.




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