Tracking Number: 136769
Title: "US Troops Must Stay in Korea, Nunn Says." Senator Nunn's speech on overall defense policy to the Senate on April 19. (900420)
04/20/90 * U.S. TROOPS MUST STAY IN KOREA, NUNN SAYS (Transcript: Nunn speech on U.S. troop cuts) (6810)
Washington -- A continued U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula "is required to make clear to North Korea that an attack on the South will constitute an attack" on the United States, according to Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat of Georgia).
During a speech on the Senate Floor April 19, Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said the U.S. needs to continue to provide to South Korea support in areas such as: intelligence; command, control and communications; and reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities."
Regarding U.S. ground combat forces, Nunn said the U.S. role "should be to provide increased high-firepower support to Korean front-line defenders."
Overall, U.S. military capabilities should be "tailored to complement -- but not substitute for or duplicate" that of friends and allies, he said.
An essential element for the new U.S. military strategy, he explained, is "to reduce forward-deployed U.S. forces, increase specialization among allied nations, and emphasize a reinforcement capability, including the use of reserves to augment the remaining forward-deployed U.S. forces." Although this strategy applies primarily in Europe, it also applies to a certain extent in Korea, he said.
Following is the text of Nunn's speech:
Mr. President, in the last few weeks I have delivered two speeches on our national security and budget problems. In the first, I outlined the problems that the blanks in the Defense Department's incomplete Five Year Defense Plan and Amended Defense Budget Request for Fiscal Year 1991 pose for our committee and the Congress as a whole. In the second, I assessed the recent changes in the world scene and their implications for the threat environment of the 1990s. In my remarks today, I will discuss the major changes that should be made in our military strategy in light of these changes in the threat abroad and the fiscal realities at home.
In the early 1980s, at the request of former Ambassador David Abshire, I had the privilege of co- chairing with then-Congressman Dick Cheney a study group at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on "Grand Strategy." As a result of that experience, both Dick and I well understand how difficult it is to formulate a coherent strategy -- even when the world is not being turned upside down. In a speech I made in connection with the CSIS project, I noted that military strategy has been
GE 2 pxf509 defined as: "the art of looking for danger, finding it everywhere, diagnosing it inaccurately, and prescribing the wrong remedy." I will keep this definition in mind as I address the subject of strategy again today.
In presenting these remarks, I hope to contribute to a much-needed and overdue debate and dialogue on strategy. As I discussed in remarks to the Senate on March 29, the threat has changed significantly over the last year, and many of these changes present opportunities for substantial reductions in U.S. military expenditures over the next several years. The question today is not whether we reduce military spending. That is inevitable. The question is whether we reduce military spending pursuant to a sensible military strategy that meets the threats of today and tomorrow.
At the outset, I think it is important to distinguish between national security strategy and military strategy. National security strategy is designed to protect and preserve broad and enduring national interests and goals. It seeks to meld a wide array of means to achieve these ends, including political, diplomatic, arms control, economic, and military instruments of policy. Military strategy is a narrower component of national security strategy and describes how we structure and use our military forces, based on the threat and the available resources, in support of our interests and goals.
Last month, President Bush submitted to Congress his Administration's National Security Strategy Report for 1990.
In this report, the President summarizes our Nation's broad national interests and objectives as follows:
-- The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
-- A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at home and abroad.
-- A stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions.
-- Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.
The President then went on to pose a series of questions for the future, as follows:
-- How can we ensure continued international stability as U.S./Soviet bipolarity gives way to global interdependence and multipolarity?
-- What will be America's continuing leadership role - - and the new roles of leadership assumed by our allies?
-- What are the risks that today's positive strategic trends will be reversed, and how do we take due account of them in our long-term planning?
-- How much risk can we prudently accept in an era of strategic change, fiscal austerity, and great uncertainty?
-- While maintaining a balance of power with the Soviet Union as an inescapable American priority, how can
GE 3 pxf509 we adapt our forces for the continuing challenge of contingencies elsewhere in the world?
-- How do we maintain the cohesion among allies and friends that remains indispensable to common security and prosperity, as the perceived threat of a common danger weakens?
-- What will be the structure of the new Europe -- politically, economically, and militarily -- as the Eastern countries move toward democracy and Germany moves toward unification?
-- If military factors loom less large in a world of a more secure East-West balance, how shall we marshal the other instruments of policy to promote our interests and objectives?
President Bush's strategy report raises the right questions concerning the security issues facing America. In considering the Fiscal Year 1991 defense budget request, we must begin answering these questions.
In an excellent recent paper on U. S. military strategy for the 1990's, Senator Bill Cohen and Senator John McCain properly urged caution in changing our defense posture. But they went on to make two important points that we should all keep in mind in the continuing debate over our national security policy.
First, they noted that "The specter of the Cold War's possible return ... cannot be used to defer a reconsideration of defense policy that was warranted even before the events of the last six months."
Secondly, they stated that "we believe the American people will support the budget levels that are needed only if they believe our defense policies correspond to the changing world scene."
Mr. President, I agree with Senator Cohen and Senator McCain. We must act now to design a new military strategy to meet the changed threat and to help shape our defense budget priorities.
With an eye both to recent changes in the world and future defense budgets, I would suggest the following key tasks which we should ask and expect our military forces to accomplish:
-- deter any attack on the American homeland;
-- deter the use of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union or any other nuclear-armed adversary against our homeland, against our allies, or against our military forces deployed in any region of the world;
-- join with our allies to deter Soviet conventional aggression in Europe at lower levels of forces as the threat decreases, and with the capability to rebuild to higher levels in time, should the Soviets attempt to re- establish a credible invasion threat;
-- help defend our friends and allies in Korea, the Far East, the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and Latin America with U.S. military capabilities tailored to complement -- but not substitute for or duplicate -- their own military capabilities;
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-- be prepared to conduct forcible entry in small- or medium-scale contingencies;
-- ensure that the sea lines of communication remain open;
-- counter drug trafficking, terrorism, and other unconventional military threats; and
-- provide accurate, timely and responsive intelligence in conjunction with other elements of the intelligence community concerning changes in the global threat environment.
If we are to design a new military strategy that effectively relates our means to the ends outlined above, I believe we should be guided by five essential elements:
I. First, although nuclear deterrence will provide the critical underpinning of our military strategy for now and for the foreseeable future, it should be achievable at significantly lower levels of weaponry and with a much higher degree of stability (i.e., with reduced incentives for either side to strike first with strategic nuclear weapons).
II. Second, our forward deployed forces should be reduced consistent with the changes in the threat while placing much greater emphasis on increased specialization among allied nations and much greater reliance on reinforcement with deployable U.S. combat forces to support our allies.
III. Third, more of our forces should be put in the reserves, specifically structured for a reinforcement mission.
IV. Fourth, we should employ a concept of flexible readiness high readiness for certain forces and adjustable readiness for others.
Fifth, our defense management and resource strategy should be guided by the phrase suggested by former Ambassador David Abshire: "think smarter, not richer." Under this approach I would include greater emphasis on flying before buying, reduced costs of procuring and maintaining weapons, including improving existing platforms and reducing new starts; innovative research to preserve our technological superiority; and preserving a viable defense industrial base.
These five elements constitute the framework I suggest for a revised military strategy. I want to take a few moments to discuss each of these five elements in greater detail.
The first essential element of a new military strategy is deterrence of nuclear war at lower levels of nuclear weaponry with a much higher degree of stability. This element includes two components: deterrence of a direct Soviet nuclear strike against the United States and deterrence of a Soviet use of nuclear weapons in conjunction with aggression against a U.S. ally. In addition, we must join with our allies and other nations, including the Soviet Union and China, to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the spread of missile technology. We must also intensify our efforts with other
GE 5 pxf509 nations to prevent the use of any weapon of mass destruction by any nation or terrorist group.
In my remarks to the Senate on March 29 regarding threat assessment, I stated "In contrast to the momentous reductions in the Soviet conventional threat, Soviet modernization of its strategic nuclear forces has tended to continue apace." For this reason, U.S. nuclear forces will remain the bedrock of deterrence and modernization of our nuclear forces will be required.
At the same time, the decrease in the Soviet conventional threat holds important implications for the Soviet nuclear threat. As I said in my remarks last month: "As the likelihood of a conventional war in Europe has significantly decreased, a nuclear war originating from escalation of a European conflict has also significantly decreased." In future remarks, I will discuss in some detail my views on the implications of this development for our strategic posture, our objectives in arms control, and the appropriate role of strategic defenses.
The emergence of newly-democratic governments in Eastern Europe; the scheduled withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary and Czechoslovakia; and the likelihood of equal ceilings on tanks, artillery, aircraft and other categories of military equipment being established in a treaty on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) also have significant implications for the Alliance's short-range nuclear forces (SNF) and tactical air-delivered nuclear weaponry.
The United States currently provides NATO with several thousand nuclear bombs and weapons for delivery by artillery, by the short-range Lance missile, and by tactical aircraft. In addition, a number of U.S. submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) have been designated for NATO, and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) has the option of requesting other U.S. strategic and non-strategic nuclear capabilities.
NATO doctrine has looked to nuclear weapons to serve three critical functions:
-- First, to provide deterrence against a Soviet first-use of nuclear weapons in Europe.
-- Second, to deter any massing by the enemy of its tank armies and thereby contribute to NATO's overall deterrence of conventional attack.
-- Third, to compensate for conventional inadequacies should deterrence fail. Consistent with its doctrine of flexible response, NATO has maintained that any Warsaw Pact attack could be halted and the hostilities terminated at an early stage by demonstrating that the Alliance was prepared to initiate nuclear war to defend its freedom.
In a post-CFE situation of conventional parity (particularly one in which Soviet tank armies have withdrawn from Eastern Europe), NATO's reliance on the threat of an early first use of short-range nuclear weapons to deter conventional attack is no longer credible. I do not believe there is a role in a new military strategy for
GE 6 pxf509 land-based nuclear weapons whose range is so limited that they could only detonate on the soil of our allies or the newly emerging democracies in Eastern Europe. Ground-based nuclear missiles and nuclear artillery in Europe should be phased out, preferably pursuant to NATO and Warsaw Pact discussions and agreements.
Even if this is accomplished, however, a requirement will exist to deter Soviet use of nuclear weapons in Europe. Nuclear systems which are deployed on European soil, including the British and French nuclear forces, represent a credible retaliatory threat. Air-delivered weapons allow significantly greater flexibility for military planners, permit basing of nuclear capabilities in several NATO countries, and do not pose the significant security and political problems that accompany systems whose range is far more limited.
With these considerations in mind, I suggest that NATO emphasize tactical air-delivered nuclear bombs and missiles, including the TASM, and adjust its modernization and arms control planning accordingly. For purposes both of shared risks and survivability, NATO's tactical air- delivered nuclear weapons should be widely deployed at airfields throughout NATO, including in the Federal Republic of Germany.
The second element for a new U.S. military strategy is to reduce forward-deployed U.S. forces, increase specialization among allied nations, and emphasize a reinforcement capability, including the use of reserves to augment the remaining forward-deployed U.S. forces. This element applies primarily in Europe, and to a certain extent in Korea.
In my remarks on the Senate floor last month, I presented two key conclusions regarding the recent changes in the threat:
First, the threat of a large-scale Warsaw Pact attack against Western Europe has virtually been eliminated and the chances of any Soviet go-it-alone attack are very remote....
Second, any Soviet effort to re-establish a credible threat of a large-scale conventional attack on NATO would be very difficult and would require a vast extended mobilization, thereby giving NATO many months of warning time.
In my remarks, I emphasized the profound implication of these developments for NATO's military strategy:
(T)he critical point is this: even if one deems it necessary to hedge against the possibility, however remote, of a reestablishment of a Soviet invasion threat against Western Europe, it does not necessarily follow that the appropriate precaution is to maintain huge American standing armies on guard in Europe. ... NATO's criterion should be whether the Alliance is capable of maintaining deterrence at lower levels and mobilizing and rebuilding to higher levels in time should a Soviet buildup begin.
NATO still has an important role to play in safeguarding Western security -- militarily, politically,
GE 7 pxf509 and diplomatically. However, in these changed circumstances, the burden of proof is on NATO to demonstrate to its publics that it remains relevant. As former NATO Ambassador David Abshire has said, "NATO should undertake -- with highest political visibility -- twin studies that update its political and military strategies." A study by a recognized group of wise men equivalent to the 1967 Harmel Report could play an important role in establishing a new transatlantic consensus of the Alliance's defense needs and defense posture for the future.
I believe this study must take account of three realities:
-- First, NATO's reliance on the threat of early first use of short-range nuclear weapons to deter a conventional attack is no longer credible.
-- Second, NATO's assumption that the United States will maintain 195,000 troops in Central Europe is no longer realistic.
- Third, NATO's current strategy for forward defense at the inter-German border is no longer viable.
In light of future instabilities in Europe which are likely, if not inevitable, caution and prudence are clearly in order as we build down our military forces in NATO. American troops in Europe can and should play a stabilizing role during this period of transition. Nevertheless, the greatly lengthened warning time of a credible Soviet conventional attack against NATO allows the U.S. to reduce the size of our standing armies defending well forward and to emphasize reinforcement instead.
Despite the Administration's view that 195,000 U.S. troops in Central Europe is a "floor" below which the United States cannot reduce, I think we must begin planning for a significantly lower level in the years ahead. I agree with former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger that we should start planning on a residual force in Europe on the order of 75,000 to 100,000 troops within five years.
These reductions not only go hand in hand with the decrease in the threat, they will also be required by changing German attitudes on the fundamental issues of sovereignty and nationalism. Opposition to a large U.S. military presence in Germany will increasingly come from the cumulative annoyance associated with training, exercises, maneuvers, and low-level flying. In addition, the major shortage in Germany of housing, hospitals, schools and open land is stimulating rising German desires to take back U.S. military facilities and land areas and convert them to German civil uses.
Recently I received a letter from a member of the German Parliament, who is a member of the Defense Committee and a strong supporter of NATO. He pointed out that within his constituency there are over 4,000 German families on waiting lists for apartments or other housing, and that the local hospitals are overtaxed. He then went on to itemize the U.S. bases, barracks and medical facilities in his district, including their acreage and recreational
GE 8 pxf509 potential. His request to me was that the first U.S. soldiers to be withdrawn from Germany be taken from his district.
As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger told our Committee: "Whatever its present inclinations, a German government will be obliged to pay heed to public opinion. We should begin to prepare now for that development, already foreseeable."
For many years, NATO's strategy in the center region has been to defend well forward, along the West German border with East Germany and Czechoslovakia. This border has been divided into eight Corps Sectors, and the ground defense of each sector has been assigned to the national forces of a single country. Within each Corps sector, logistics and support is also the sole responsibility of the country defending that sector. This is, of course, the opposite of "specialization" -- because within its area of responsibility each nation replicates virtually all of the military capabilities in the other national sectors. In addition, the traditional strategy of "defending forward" is about to be transformed by the uniting of the two Germanys.
Assuming Soviet unilateral and CFE agreed reductions are completed, the changes in both the threat and Alliance geography offer the opportunity to sharply modify the traditional concept of Corps areas of responsibility. NATO must have a new strategy, one that is developed by the Alliance as a whole. My ideas as to the role our nation should play in a new NATO strategy are as follows:
-- We must insist on greater specialization of roles and missions among NATO nations. The European members of NATO should assume the primary responsibility for the initial forward ground defenses, which should be heavily anti-armor and not rely on large numbers of forward- deployed U.S. ground forces. The U.S. ground force commitment to NATO should be restructured to provide NATO's mobile strategic reserves, rather than NATO's forward defenders.
-- The U.S. peacetime ground presence in Europe should be largely lead elements of combat units and combat support units. These support units should include tactical planning elements, intelligence and surveillance units, command and control forces, and "reception" forces along the lines suggested by former Army Chief of Staff General "Shy" Meyer.
-- The U.S. should continue to maintain large prepositioned stocks of combat and support equipment in Europe. With this, an initial U.S. reinforcement of NATO could be accomplished by transporting Army combat personnel from the U.S. to Europe, where they would break out their prepositioned combat equipment and move to reinforce NATO's ground forces.
-- The U.S. should maintain some tactical air force units in Europe for both conventional and nuclear missions, and would commit to provide significant numbers of reinforcing tactical aircraft from the United States to
GE 9 pxf509 Europe. This pledge must be contingent on NATO providing adequate numbers of semi-hardened aircraft shelters, fuel and munitions storage, and maintenance and operations areas at co-located operating bases (COBs) in Europe.
-- Since U.S. ground forces in Europe would be reduced in numbers and consist mainly of combat support units, it should be possible to greatly reduce tour lengths and the number of accompanying dependents.
-- The U.S. should make a determined effort to obtain agreement from France in advance for the U.S. use of French ports, airfields, and air bases for U.S. reinforcing units in a period of emergency. No U.S. forces would need to be stationed in France in peacetime, but occasional joint exercises of reentry capability would greatly increase NATO's deterrent posture.
In my March 29 threat assessment, I stated that North Korea continues to pose an invasion threat against our ally, South Korea. I believe that a continued U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula is required to make clear to North Korea that an attack on the South will constitute an attack on us. U.S. capabilities to reinforce South Korea with tactical, naval and long-range air power are significant. The U.S. needs to continue to provide other forms of support to South Korea -- intelligence; command, control and communications capabilities; and reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities.
Since the border with North Korea is only a few miles from South Korea's capital city, Seoul, the objective of South Korean and U.S. military planners has been, of necessity, to defend far forward, and to blunt any massive North Korean attack without yielding territory. This can only be achieved by applying prompt and massive firepower against the assaulting waves of enemy forces. Tactical air power is one way of providing the needed firepower, and that is the main role of the U.S. Air Force in the region. The U.S. Army, however, consists largely of mechanized infantry units, which do not provide high, sustained firepower. The South Koreans have no shortage of infantry.
Again, in keeping with the concept of specialization, I believe U.S. ground combat forces in Korea should emphasize long-range artillery, including the Multiple Launch Rocket System, or MLRS. Our role should be to provide increased high-firepower support to Korean front- line defenders, with U.S. units assigned to support specific South Korean units. This augmented firepower approach should permit a significant drawdown, over time, of U.S. stationed forces in Korea.
In locations where the United States does not have prepositioned equipment and stationed forces, there is a broad range of contingencies to which U.S. force projection capabilities must be able to credibly respond.
Many contingencies would present threats of one sort or another to U.S. interests. Where our vital interests may be threatened, we need to be capable of military intervention. But we should, whenever possible, attempt to manage the threats through diplomatic, economic and other
* PAGE 10 PAGE 10 pxf509 non-military measures, with the option of increased -- and increasingly visible -- military presence in the area.
The U.S. must be capable of performing a range of force projection missions:
-- At the low end of the spectrum of operational intensity are missions whereby a U.S. "presence" is intended to deter rash actions and stabilize potential crises. Nation-building and training of foreign military forces would also be included in this category.
-- The next level of support would be for the U.S. to provide non-combat military support -- things like intelligence information, surveillance and warning, logistical assistance, and perhaps rear-area security.
-- Combat situations involving the U.S. military could range from firepower support of indigenous forces, from either aircraft or naval gunfire, through full-blown intervention by a U.S. expeditionary force.
Contingencies in and around the Persian Gulf, on the Arabian peninsula, and in southwest Asia are a demanding case and pose serious problems for U.S. military planners. In the not-too-distant past, conflicts have occurred there between Israel and several of the Arab states, between the two Yemens, and between Iran and Iraq, in addition to the continuing strife in Lebanon. The U.S. has important security interests in Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and several of the other Gulf states. In addition, the economies of the Western world are critically linked to the free flow of oil from the Middle East producing states. Our own economy increasingly shares a growing dependence on Middle Eastern oil as both domestic production and that of several major hemispheric producers have begun to decline.
The Persian Gulf region is also one of the most heavily-armed regions in the world. Tanks abound, many countries have modern, high-performance tactical aircraft, and ballistic missiles are widely proliferated, including both surface-to-surface and anti-ship missiles. Any U.S. intervention in support of a friendly government must expect to encounter a high-threat environment. Our ability to provide this assistance will require an improved logistics infrastructure in the region, including prepositioned supplies and materiel.
Current U.S. capabilities for intervention at a distance, where there are few bases and a limited infrastructure, are not fully suited to our needs. Today the United States has the greatest force projection capability of any country in the world. However, in general, Army light forces are rapidly deployable but lack sufficient firepower, sustainability and ground mobility; Army heavy forces are too heavy and too slow to deploy; and in recent years Marine Corps forces have allowed their increase in equipment to outstrip their already inadequate amphibious lift. To meet potential force projection missions, we must restructure our forces in accordance with the following priorities:
-- We must give priority to forces that are inherently mobile and rapidly deployable -- maritime-based
* PAGE 11 PAGE 11 pxf509 expeditionary forces, long-range and tactical air forces, and light combat forces that can be quickly transported using amphibious lift, sealift, and airlift assets.
-- Technology must be applied so that in the future our contingency forces have reduced weight and increased mobility, but with improved firepower and survivability.
-- Special attention must be devoted to the proper mix of air, sea and amphibious lift, including fast sealift, to ensure deterrence by providing a ready capability for response to contingencies.
-- We should continue to improve special operations capabilities.
The third key element for our new military strategy is greater utilization of the reserves. In this period of increased warning time and fiscal austerity, we must conduct a fundamental reexamination of the use of the reserves in the military services. This will be a difficult challenge for the military services, but one which must be addressed.
There are some areas in which entire missions can be transferred to our reserve components. As a corollary, active duty personnel have to be more involved in the reserves. We must also be prepared to use the existing authority to call up reserve units at early stages of potential crises if this element of the strategy is to be successful.
At the time of the recent escorting of reflagged tankers in the Persian Gulf, almost all of the Navy's minesweeper ships were in the Naval Reserve. When it became necessary to deploy the minesweepers to the Persian Gulf, the Navy took the Reserve crews off the ships and replaced them with active duty crews. This delayed the deployment of the ships. It also sent the wrong message to both the Active and Reserve forces. It told the Reserves that their skills and training would not be used in a contingency, and it told the Active forces that "we can't afford to rely on the reserves." If we are going to rely on the Reserve forces -- as we must -- and have a true Total Force policy, we must be willing to call up Reserves in the future.
The greatly increased warning time of conventional conflict in Europe increasingly allows the heavy armor mission to be shifted to the reserve components. Army Guard and Reserve units should be designed to be capable of reaching full combat readiness within a scheduled period ranging from weeks to months of a mobilization decision, all well within the available warning times, and matched to available lift and the Soviet build-up curve.
Within the Defense Department, the Air Force has been a leader in the effective utilization of its Reserve components. The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve already make substantial contributions to the overall Air Force missions. Even greater use of the Air Reserve components can be made in the areas of strategic and tactical airlift, close air support and air forces oriented toward a major contingency in Europe. This might require
* PAGE 12 PAGE 12 pxf509 increased assignment of active pilots to expanded reserve squadrons.
With the scaling back of Soviet Navy out-of-area operations and other changes in the threat, the U.S. Navy policy that virtually all deployable ships have to either be at sea or be able to get underway within days becomes increasingly unnecessary and unaffordable. The Navy must get more serious about the use of reserves to handle a portion of the Navy's fleet. To the active Navy, the word "reserve" must not be synonymous with the word "mothball."
Funds will no longer be available to support all of the Navy's fleet at the operational tempos of the Cold War. Thus, the Navy will be faced with choosing between reduced operational tempos, including more ships in reserve status, or a much smaller, all-active Navy. The leading advocate of the 600-ship Navy, former Navy Secretary John Lehman, recommended recently that more of the Navy's ships should be transferred into the Navy Reserve. The Navy will have to find innovative ways of managing a reserve-dominated operation for a larger portion of the current fleet.
I am not suggesting that all categories of Navy ships and aircraft could be transferred into the Navy Reserve; aircraft carriers and submarines, for example, would probably not be suitable for reserve operation. However, ships or aircraft involved in sealift, ASW, or sea lane protection missions for NATO all lend themselves to increasing use of reserves.
Additionally, our regional combatant commanders need to take a closer look at the requirements for carrier battle groups, so as not to place excessive at-sea demands on the balance of the active Navy. It is clear that in many instances we do not need an entire carrier battle group to "show the flag"; ships other than carriers and their escorts can perform this mission. Thus, there needs to be a reexamination of the presence mission, a recalculation of the size of a battle group when warranted, and an emphasis on the concept of ships operating independently of a carrier battle group.
By making these adjustments and by expanded use of reserves, I believe the Navy can meet future requirements with between 10 to 12 carrier battle groups.
My fourth essential element is what I call "flexible readiness." I define flexible readiness as the adjustment of the readiness status of various forces based on the threat; the amount of warning time; the likelihood these forces will go into action; and the ability to transport them to the battle. In practical terms, the Military Departments currently utilize a form of flexible readiness. The units that would be the "first to fight" are the first to be equipped with the newest hardware and are manned at the highest levels. Other units, not designated for early deployment, have older equipment and are normally manned at manned at the highest levels. Other units, not designated for early deployment, have older equipment and are normally manned at less than full strength.
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The reduction in the conventional threat and the severe fiscal pressures mean that the size of all of the Military Services will decrease. But the Services face an important choice in how much their forces will decrease:
1. We can have a relatively larger force structure, but with the readiness of those forces based on the threat, the warning time, the likelihood of use, and the ability to get to the battle.
2. If the Services are reluctant to move in this direction, they will face a substantially smaller force structure than is currently being discussed in the Pentagon.
Under my preferred alternative of flexible readiness, the Military Services would keep certain high priority forces, such as strategic forces, expeditionary forces, forward deployed forces, special operations forces, and selected intelligence units, at a high state of readiness. Forces that are not in the high readiness category could be sustained at adjusted readiness levels. More importantly, they should be maintained so that their readiness can be quickly increased if we observe major changes in the threat.
Those military forces that are best suited for the kinds of threats that are most likely in coming years would be kept at high readiness levels. But those forces oriented to counter less likely threats -- such as a major conventional land battle in Europe against Soviet forces -- could be retained in the force structure but at readiness levels tailored to the substantially longer warning time of any increase in the threat.
A carefully planned flexible readiness approach will not produce a hollow military. We had serious morale problems in the 1970s because many units were told they had to be ready to carry out their mission in a matter of days, but they knew they were not staffed, equipped, or trained to do it. We won't have morale problems if our military personnel in selected units understand that their mission is to Set ready to mobilize and rapidly increase combat capability rather than to face an immediate deployment time. In other words, their mission is to "be ready to get ready".
The Military Services and the Defense Department will need to recommend a course of action to the Congress soon. For example, does the Army want to shrink by substantially more in order to keep all active divisions at high readiness levels, or would they rather maintain a somewhat larger force structure with some forces at high readiness and others at adjusted readiness
Does the Navy want to shrink by substantially more with all ships at high readiness levels, or would they rather maintain a somewhat larger Navy with major elements at high readiness and others at adjusted readiness
Does the Air Force want to cut out substantially more of its active tactical fighter wings in order to keep all of the remaining wings on a war footing, or would they
* PAGE 14 PAGE 14 pxf509 rather keep a somewhat larger force with some units at high readiness and others at adjusted readiness?
My preference is to maintain a larger force under the flexible readiness concept. I believe that this option best matches our force structure to the threats we are most likely to face, within the resources that will be available.
The fifth, and final element, of a new military strategy involves fundamental changes in the way we currently manage our defense resources -- "thinking smarter, not richer". I will be addressing this concept in more detail in the near future, but I want to point out today that no discussion of a new military strategy can ignore the major changes that are needed in our defense management and resources strategy.
For example, we must return to the principle of flying before buying. In too many cases we have overlapped development, testing and production of weapons systems, only to have to spend large amounts of money to make weapons work right after they are in the field. There are real concerns about the concurrency -- research and development on weapons already in production -- on a number of major weapons acquisition programs. With the changes in the threat, we must take the time to get it right the first time.
We must emphasize reduced ownership costs for maintenance, logistics, manpower and support in the design of new weapons systems. The argument should not be whether we should apply new technologies -- we must. The real challenge is to utilize our technology not just for sophistication but also for affordability and maintainability. We must also put greater emphasis on the improvement of existing platforms and systems, since we will be able to afford fewer new starts in the future.
We must put greater emphasis on innovative concepts in our research and development efforts to maintain our technological superiority. This applies particularly to systems and capabilities that offer the prospect of "breakthrough" or "leapfrogging" capabilities.
Finally, we must move aggressively to preserve and maintain a viable defense industrial base. This will be particularly important and challenging as the overall level of defense spending -- and future defense investment -- is adjusted over the next five years.
Finally, Mr. President, I want to underscore that the military strategy I have outlined remains a component part of our overall national security strategy, which itself must be responsive to the changing international environment of the 1990s. As President Bush has stated, developments in the Communist world suggest the possibility of moving beyond containment to a more cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union. Assuming that the USSR continues to implement its announced unilateral reductions in Europe, that Soviet forces are withdrawn from Czechoslovakia and Hungary, that the CFE Treaty is completed, that democracy takes root in Eastern Europe, and
* PAGE 15 PAGE 15 pxf509 that the process of reform continues in the Soviet Union, we should indeed be able to move to a new policy. This policy, however, must have some flexibility and must take into account the possibility of setbacks.
Some nine decades ago Lenin wrote a pamphlet about reform in the Czarist Russia of that day which he titled "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back." Developments in Lithuania and elsewhere in the USSR make clear that the process of reform in today's Russia is also likely to be uneven, whether or not President Gorbachev remains in power. In the most optimistic case, I suspect we will see "two steps forward, one step back."
It is not too early to consider what central concept we should be prepared to move toward, as further international change allows. My suggestion would be a policy of "measured cooperation," of cooperation calibrated so that our preparedness to cooperate with the Soviet Union and other countries is in rough proportion to their commitment to human rights, democracy and a market economy.
I hope that developments within the USSR and other Communist regimes will allow "measured cooperation" to supersede containment on a broad scale. We must give more attention to fostering a cooperative world order and to managing potential risks before they escalate into direct threats.
If we are able to move from containment toward measured cooperation, we will need to adjust further our military strategy so that it properly reflects a changing national security strategy. We therefore will need to keep both our national security strategy and our military strategy under continuous and careful review.
Mr. President, the sudden collapse of the Communist empire over the past year has created both a new requirement and a new opportunity for a defense strategy that responds to the changed threat and realistically relates our means to our ends. Our past demobilizations -- after the two World Wars, after Korea, and after Vietnam -- have led, ultimately, to vastly higher defense budgets to make up for the errors of our drawdown. With a new military strategy to govern our force structure decisions and our budgetary actions, we can avoid falling into this same trap.
Mr. President, in the next few days I shall present to the Senate my thoughts on how best to implement the kind of military strategy I have just outlined and on the level of defense spending for fiscal year 1991 and the next five years consistent with this new strategy.
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File Identification: 04/20/90, PX-509
Product Name: Wireless File
Product Code: WF
Keywords: NUNN, SAM; KOREA (SOUTH)-US RELATIONS; FORCE & TROOP LEVELS; MILITARY BASES; DEFENSE POLICY; EASTERN EUROPE-US RELATIONS; USSR-US RELATIONS; DRUG TRAFFIC; DETERRENCE; MILITARY BUDGETS; NUCLEAR WAR; NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANI
Document Type: TRA
Thematic Codes: 1DE; 160; 140; 1EE; 1UR; 1AC; 1WE
Target Areas: EA
PDQ Text Link: 136769