A 2002 report (pdf) prepared by the CIA Counterterrorist Center discusses how terrorists recruit members in prisons such as Guantanamo Bay.

“Terrorists groups, including al-Qa’ida, use incarcerated members to recruit and train new members, and in some cases run terrorist organizations and manage or facilitate terrorist attacks.”

The classified CIA report was previously published on the web site The Smoking Gun.

See “Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars,” CIA Counterterrorism Center, August 20, 2002.

The last page of the document provides an extensive list of sources which are numbered — “but the numbers aren’t keyed to the text,” noticed former CIA analyst Allen Thomson.

He recalled being puzzled by this practice of decoupling the sources from the text more than two decades ago, and investigating the matter at the time.

“The list of sources wasn’t kept for reasons of documenting the reasoning that went into publications,” Mr. Thomson explained. “It was solely a security requirement so that, should somebody think that information had been published at too low a level of classification, the matter could be checked. Curiously, there was no master copy with the sources keyed to the text to aid in such security checking, so I suspect that checking was seldom done, if ever.”

“Operations security” (OPSEC) refers to the practice of identifying and controlling information that could be exploited by a hostile observer to discern intelligence about U.S. operations.

“OPSEC is a methodology that denies critical information to an adversary,” according to a new Defense Department publication (pdf) on the subject.

“Unlike security programs that seek to protect classified information, OPSEC measures identify, control, and protect generally unclassified evidence that is associated with sensitive operations and activities.”

See “Operations Security,” Joint Publication 3-13.3, June 29, 2006.

Many U.S. intelligence agencies as well as the congressional intelligence oversight committees hire their senior staff from a predictable, somewhat in-grown pool of personnel, which frequently includes those who have previously worked in the intelligence field since they can be immediately cleared.

But the Office of the Director of National Intelligence seems to be casting an unusually wide net as it seeks the best qualified staff it can find in academia and the public interest sector.

Historian Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, a China specialist at Georgetown University, became an Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analytic Integrity in January 2006, and was appointed last month as the first ODNI “analytic ombudsman.” (She also previously served in the State Department.)

In her new capacity, Dr. Tucker will be “a fact finder, mediator, and facilitator for intelligence analysts who desire to raise concerns regarding timeliness, politicization and objectivity in intelligence analysis without fear of reprisal,” according to a June 16 ODNI news release.

Even more remarkably, Timothy H. Edgar, a prominent critic of Bush Administration national security policies with the American Civil Liberties Union, has joined the ODNI staff.

“I have recently taken a job as deputy to Alex Joel, the Civil Liberties Protection Officer in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,” he wrote in an email message to former colleagues last week.

“This was a position that Congress mandated in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and it reports directly to the DNI.”

“The new job is challenging and I am looking forward to continuing to defend civil liberties within the government,” Mr. Edgar wrote.

The tiny Western European nation of Andorra has become the latest country to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

On July 12, it became the 134th country to do so, according to a news release today from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization in Vienna.

On the same day, Armenia became the 133rd country to ratify the Treaty. The United States has not ratified it.

The need to improve the dissemination of terrorism-related information was among the preeminent policy lessons of September 11.

Yet five years later, “systematic, trusted information sharing remains more of an aspiration than a reality,” according to a new task force report from the Markle Foundation.

The report proposes a new conceptual framework for authorizing and promoting information sharing, based on the information’s intended uses rather than its bureaucratic origin or other incidental characteristics.

This would permit each agency to get the information it needs to perform its mission, the authors say, while allowing auditing to ensure proper use and instill public confidence.

The Markle task force report also calls for a new approach to national security classification policy that is more tolerant of potential disclosure risks so as to permit more effective sharing.

“Current classification procedures and practices… overemphasize the risks of inadvertent disclosure over those from failing to share.”

“We recommend a new risk management approach to handling classified and other sensitive information that gives adequate weight to the risks of not sharing, and provides greater flexibility and more emphasis on mitigating the risks of disclosure.”

The authors stress the need for a transparent policy development process.

“In the absence of public confidence that personal information is being used effectively, appropriately, and consistently with both applicable laws and shared expectations of privacy, the necessary public support will not be forthcoming, and even the most promising intelligence systems will fail.”

The task force does not envision the general public as a consumer of terrorism-related information and so it does not contemplate measures to improve public disclosure of such information, whether classified or unclassified.

And in an overview of information sharing policy development, the report neglects a few recent innovations that are at least modestly consistent with its recommendations, such as the 2003 executive order provision (sec. 4.2b) that permits emergency disclosure of classified information to non-cleared persons, and the “RELIDO” marking that delegates disclosure authority for intelligence information beyond the originator.

Overall, however, the Markle task force report provides an intelligent account of a vexing set of issues. And it has the great virtue of going beyond critique to propose potentially workable solutions as well as a process for implementing and refining them.

See “Mobilizing Information to Prevent Terrorism: Accelerating Development of a Trusted Information Sharing Environment” (pdf), Third Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force chaired by Zoe Baird and James Barksdale, July 13.

As if to validate the most pessimistic view of the state of information sharing, the Baltimore Sun reported that a White House initiative to strengthen sharing by standardizing the use of “sensitive but unclassified” markings is off track and behind schedule.

See “Turf war hampers war on terror” by Siobhan Gorman, Baltimore Sun, July 13.

A new Congressional Research Service report provides a resume of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program that was recently described in news stories.

See “Treasury’s Terrorist Finance Program’s Access to Information Held by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT)” (pdf), July 7, 2006.

News reports on the program elicited furious criticism of the New York Times and other publications from those who believed classified information had been improperly and damagingly disclosed.

But “closely similar” accounts were publicly presented years ago in open congressional hearings, the Washington Post reported today.

See “Watching Finances Of Terror Suspects Discussed in 2002” by Walter Pincus, Washington Post, July 14.

Another new CRS report describes the erosion of the U.S. Army officer corps.

“The Army currently projects an officer shortage of nearly 3,000 in FY2007, with the most acute shortfalls in ‘senior’ captains and majors with 11 to 17 years of experience.”

See “Army Officer Shortages: Background and Issues for Congress” (pdf), July 5, 2006.

The Congressional Budget Office has prepared a new account (pdf) of U.S. spending in Iraq in response to a request from Rep. John Spratt (D-SC).

“The Congress has appropriated $432 billion for military operations and other activities related to the war on terrorism since September 2001. According to CBO’s estimates, from the time U.S. forces invaded Iraq in March 2003, $290 billion has been allocated for activities in Iraq.”

For reasons explained in the report, the estimates are slightly lower than those prepared recently by the Congressional Research Service (pdf).

See “Estimated Costs of U.S. Operations in Iraq Under Two Specified Scenarios,” Congressional Budget Office, July 13.

Donald Keyser, who had been a respected State Department expert on China, pled guilty last year to illegally removing classified documents from the State Department, making false statements to the FBI, and concealing his relationship with a Taiwanese intelligence officer.

Now the government says that he is failing to fulfill the terms of his plea agreement, and it told a court that the agreement should therefore be revoked, the New York Sun reported today.

In support of its position, the Justice Department filed a detailed and occasionally sordid account (pdf) of Keyser’s alleged entanglement with Taiwanese intelligence.

“The unusual filing opens a window onto the FBI’s counterintelligence tradecraft,” wrote reporter Josh Gerstein in the Sun. He also noted that Keyser’s attorney denies the allegations and says the new Justice Department memo is unfair and inaccurate.

See “A Novel-Like Tale Of Cloak, Dagger Unfolds in Court” by Josh Gerstein, New York Sun, July 14.

The government memorandum places the worst possible construction on Keyser’s activities, including many that seem easily susceptible to benign explanations. In any case it remains true that he conducted an improper relationship with a foreign intelligence officer and violated classification procedures.

A copy of the July 5 government memorandum in support of its motion to find Keyser in breach of his plea agreement is posted here.

“Don’t use your left hand for contact with others,” advises the U.S. Marine Corps in a new edition of the Iraq Culture Smart Card (very large pdf) which is distributed to military personnel in Iraq. “It is considered unclean.”

It seems late in the day for such niceties. Amid the daily brutality of the Iraq war, there is probably little to be gained by courtesy or to be lost by mere rudeness.

But the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity evidently thinks otherwise.

The MCIA has produced an updated Iraq Culture Smart Card, dated May 2006, which features rudimentary information on Iraqi customs, religion and language. A copy was obtained by Secrecy News and is available here (in a very large 22 MB PDF file).

In a significant policy reversal, the Department of Defense last week formally directed that the humane treatment requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions shall henceforth be applied to all prisoners and detainees in DoD custody (as first reported by the Financial Times). See this July 7 memorandum (pdf) from Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England.

The procedures for trying enemy prisoners and detainees in the war on terror are again a subject of deliberation (and of a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee today) in the wake of the Supreme Court’s ruling that the tribunals established by the Bush Administration are unlawful.

A 2005 report of the Congressional Research Service provides some background on the development of this issue. Though now out of date in certain respects, it includes useful tables comparing the various features and procedural safeguards of general courts-martial with those of military commissions and tribunals.

See “The Department of Defense Rules for Military Commissions: Analysis of Procedural Rules and Comparison with Proposed Legislation and the Uniform Code of Military Justice” (pdf), updated August 4, 2005.

Other notable new CRS reports not readily available in the public domain include the following.

“National Emergency Powers” (pdf), updated June 20, 2006.

“Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty” (pdf), updated June 21, 2006.

“Combat Aircraft Sales to South Asia: Potential Implications” (pdf), July 6, 2006.

“Restructuring U.S. Foreign Aid: The Role of the Director of Foreign Assistance” (pdf), June 16, 2006.

The House Government Reform Committee will hold a hearing July 13 on the role that considerations of foreign influence play in decisions to grant or deny security clearances for access to classified information.

One of the principal considerations leading to denial of a security clearance is when the applicant has relatives or relationships or other ties abroad in countries of concern, and particularly in the Middle East and the Far East.

This approach, if applied too rigidly, can be counter-productive since the best linguists and the most accomplished area experts will almost invariably have “relationships” of one kind or another with persons in their region of expertise.

But the process for adjudicating disputes over clearances seems distinctly skewed against the applicant.

In a new report (pdf), attorney Sheldon Cohen identified a peculiar anomaly in the performance of the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA), which rules on disputed clearance matters for the Defense Department. In the large majority of disputes presented to it, he found, DOHA has consistently ruled against the applicant.

“If Department Counsel appeals a decision granting a clearance, it is virtually assured that the Appeal Board will reverse. Yet, if an applicant appeals a decision involving a foreign connection denying a clearance, the Appeal Board will assuredly affirm the denial,” found Cohen, who specializes in security clearance cases.

See “Appeal Board Decisions of the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals: Are They Arbitrary and Capricious?” by Sheldon I. Cohen, July 10, 2006.

A May 18 letter sent to President Bush by House Intelligence Committee chairman Rep. Pete Hoekstra criticizing Administration policy on intelligence (first reported July 9 by Eric Lichtblau and Scott Shane of the New York Times) has already earned an enduring place in the annals of congressional oversight of intelligence.

While it has been welcomed by some as a sign of congressional vigor and independence, the letter from Chairman Hoekstra also features a weird admixture of paranoia and pique.

“I have been long concerned that a strong and well-positioned group within the Agency intentionally undermined the Administration and its policies,” he wrote.

This conspiracy theory, previously alleged mainly by conservative bloggers and editorial writers, “is supported by the Ambassador Wilson/Valerie Plame events” — despite the fact that Valerie Plame, whose CIA career was destroyed, would appear to be a victim rather than a perpetrator — “as well as by the string of unauthorized disclosures.”

“I have come to the belief that, despite his service to the [Directorate of Operations], Mr. Kappes [the new CIA Deputy Director] may have been part of this group.”

Kappes must be viewed with suspicion, Hoekstra explained, since his appointment was not opposed by House Democrats!

“I must take note when my Democratic colleagues – those who so vehemently denounced and publicly attacked the strong choice of Porter Goss as Director – now publicly support Mr. Kappes’s return,” Chairman Hoekstra observed acutely.

“Further, the details surrounding Mr. Kappes’s [2004] departure from the CIA give me great pause. Mr. Kappes was not fired, but, as I understand it, summarily resigned his position shortly after Director Goss responded to his demonstrated contempt for Congress and the Intelligence Committees’ oversight responsibilities.”

This is an idiosyncratic description of a dispute that arose between senior DO officials and the former congressional staff members who accompanied Director Goss to CIA, which led to the resignations of several officials.

“The fact is, Mr. Kappes and his Deputy, Mr. Sulick, were developing a communications offensive to bypass the Intelligence Committees and the CIA’s own Office of Congressional Affairs. One can only speculate on the motives but it clearly indicates a willingness to promote a personal agenda,” Rep. Hoekstra wrote.

As David Corn wrote in The Nation, “It’s hard to know who to root for” in this strange clash of personalities and institutions.

Maybe the answer is that the conflict itself is the good news, since it restores a healthy tension to the oversight process and drives the disclosure of new information into the public domain.

Coincidentally, Michael Sulick, one of the members of the supposed anti-Bush “cabal” at CIA named by Rep. Hoekstra, is the author of a colorful new first-person account of a CIA initiative to establish relations with Lithuania in 1991 when the Soviet Union fell.

See “As the USSR Collapsed: A CIA Officer in Lithuania” by Michael J. Sulick, Studies in Intelligence, vol. 50, no. 2, 2006.