Critical Logistical Infrastructure    
To complete the INF Treaty baseline inspection record that far exceeded in number and scope the on-site inspections used to monitor any other recent arms control treaty or agreement, the U.S. government relied on the Air Force to transport American and Soviet inspection and escort teams. The Military Airlift Command (MAC) used dedicated aircraft to fly American inspection teams to the treaty-designated points of entry in the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. The Air Force also transported Soviet inspectors and American escort teams from points of entry in the United States and Europe to declared INF missile operating bases and facilities.28

The flights to and from the Soviet Union were the most frequent and challenging. Because of the short time period for completing the baseline inspections (60 days), the number of Soviet sites (130), and a simultaneous requirement to establish a U.S. portal inspection team in Votkinsk, the Air Force flew transport flights almost daily to and from the Soviet Union. Beginning on July 1, 1988, there were 54 missions in 60 days from Frankfurt to Moscow and 31 missions from Yokota to Ulan-Ude. The Air Force also flew Soviet inspection teams and their American escorts to INF bases and missile sites in the United States and Europe. At OSIA headquarters, Lt. Colonel Gerald Heuer, USAF, and Master Sergeant Wilbur Lewis, Jr., USAF, provided the expertise to initiate, coordinate, and track these military flights. At the culmination of the baseline inspections, the Military Airlift Command had flown 185 INF teams on 114 baseline inspection missions, with a reliability rate of 98.1 percent. This rate meant that only five flights could not be flown as scheduled. The United States met all of its treaty obligations to transport Soviet teams within mandated timeframes. The performance record also established precedents for future arms control treaties.29

 
In Washington, a Soviet team departs for an inspection at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

 


In Moscow, an American team departs for Frankfurt, West Germany.
  Another important precedent set during the INF baseline period was the establishment of small offices in U.S. and Soviet embassies to assist INF inspection teams and aircrews. In the U.S. embassy in Moscow, the office was called the Arms Control Implementation Unit (ACIU).30 This unit supported three arms control treaties and agreements: the 1986 Stockholm CDE Agreement, the 1987 INF Treaty, and the 1988 U.S./USSR Joint Verification Experiments on Underground Nuclear Explosions. For implementation of these agreements, treaties, and technical experiments, this new embassy office served as the point of contact with the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center and other Soviet government agencies.

Under the INF Treaty the office had another significant function. The treaty's Protocol on Inspections stipulated that the inspectors "shall have the right through the period of inspection to be in communication with the embassy of the inspecting party...."31 During the technical talks, this treaty provision was determined to mean communicating by telephone. When the baseline inspections were underway in July and August 1988, several U.S. inspection teams were in the Soviet Union simultaneously. Each had the right to communicate by telephone with the U.S. embassy. Other provisions in the treaty's Protocol on Inspections permitted embassy officials to meet and assist INF aircrews and inspection teams upon their arrival at the point of entry. This assistance was especially important during and after baseline to provide logistical support to the American and Soviet portal monitoring teams establishing operations in Votkinsk and Magna.

In June 1988, the U.S. State Department activated the ACIU in the U.S. embassy in Moscow and a subunit in Ulan-Ude. In Moscow, the ACIU staff consisted of Lt. Colonel Ken Keating, U.S. Army; Eileen A. Malloy, State Department; Major Stephen E. Freeman, U.S. Army; and Sergeant First Class John M. Steinmetz, U.S. Army. In Ulan-Ude, Captain James Connell, U.S. Navy Reserve, and later John Floyd, U.S. Navy, and his wife, Jane, U.S. State Department, established a small office and residence in a city hotel and assisted American INF teams inspecting in that sector.32 The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs established similar arms control implementation units for Soviet INF inspectors in the Soviet embassy in Washington and the consulate general in San Francisco.


 

A third aspect of this critical logistical infrastructure was the people who were deployed from OSIA headquarters in Washington to work at the agency's gateway field offices in Frankfurt and Yokota. In the final week of June 1988, Lt. Colonel Jerome E. Johnson, USAF, went from Washington to Rhein Main Air Base, Frankfurt. Working with Colonel John Fer, USAF; Lt. Colonel Scott G. Lang, U.S. Army; and the staff of the European field office over the next two months, he assisted arriving and departing American inspection teams that carried out all of the INF baseline inspections in the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. At Yokota, Captain Michael W. Slifka, USAF, helped the American teams deploying to conduct baseline inspections in the eastern Soviet Union. Thirty-six teams went from Yokota to Ulan-Ude in July and August. In fact, during baseline so many agency people participated directly as inspectors, escorts, or as operational and logistical staff that headquarters was nearly empty. At times, fewer than 15 of the 120 people assigned to OSIA were in Washington. It was, without question, the busiest phase of the INF Treaty.    
Evaluation    
The record of the first 90 days of the INF treaty was extensively evaluated. Public interest was at a peak as Soviet, American, and European television and print media covered the treaty and the initial on-site inspections. The news bureaus of the major television networks--ABC, NBC, CBS, CNN, PBS, the BBC, and Soviet television--ran feature stories on the INF Treaty during the Moscow Summit of June 1988 and the first baseline inspections in July 1988. National, local, and foreign press--including the New York Times, Washington Post, Washington Times, Christian Science Monitor, Los Angeles Times, London Times, Pravda, Time, Newsweek, and the world press--reported on the treaty and the initial inspections. For nearly six weeks--from early June to mid-July--the international media fixed their attention on the INF Treaty and the first groups of Soviet and American inspectors and escorts. Their evaluations, which formed an important part of the public's perception, focused to a large degree on the historical precedents of the treaty and the role of the on-site inspectors who were examining treaty missiles and equipment scheduled for destruction."33

Three weeks after the baseline phase ended on August 30, General Lajoie discussed these precedent-setting inspections in a lengthy interview. He explained the inspection process, related some of the American inspectors' experiences, and summarized his thoughts up to that point:

On-site inspection has limits; we can go to specific sites in search of specific information and return with more confidence than before concerning compliance at that particular site. But it's not an anytime/anywhere regime, certainly not for INF.... On-site inspection under the INF Treaty has given the U.S. government increased confidence. We now have more knowledge about Soviet forces, and with that knowledge comes perhaps a somewhat better understanding and maybe eventually more predictability in our relationship. It's still early in the game, but I think on-site inspection has a very positive role to play in arms control.34

 
Soviet Major Igor Kirichenko and American Lt. Colonel Vitali Mostovoj at Saryozek, USSR.

 


At the conclusion of every INF Treaty on-site inspection, the respective team leaders, in this case Colonel Gerald V. West, senior escort, and Colonel Vladimir A. Akimenkov, co-signed the official inspection report. This report detailed the time, place, treaty article and paragraph, inspection activity, and any comments concerning the inspection.


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