"First and foremost they are highly skilled specialists, mainly missilemen, with long service and life experiences.... They are mainly senior officers. But there are young people too--translators. . . . And the average age of the center's personnel is a little over 40.... He [the Soviet INF inspector/escort] strictly abides by the provisions of the treaty and the protocol on inspections--they lay down the rights, duties, and procedures. The inspector arrives at the point of entry into the country. . .where he is met by the U.S. officials who will accompany him. The inspector can stay, as a rule, no more than 24 hours. During that time he has to announce the site of the inspection--it is not announced in advance. Then the hosts have no more than 9 hours to get him to the requisite site. The inspection lasts for up to 24 hours. The inspector checks whether the facility has the number of weapons it is supposed to have and makes a report. It is unusual work, and there is a great deal of interest in it."²¹

On the last day of July 1988, General Lajoie was in Ulan-Ude with two American inspection teams. Ulan-Ude, 3,430 miles east of Moscow, was the point of entry for American teams arriving in the eastern Soviet Union. Lajoie had been a member of the first American inspection team in the Soviet Union on July 1, 1988. Now, nearly a month later, he was in this eastern Siberian city enroute to another inspection. At the airport, he discussed the status of the INF treaty with Soviet reporters: "All the initial inspections have gone very well. On our side, we have completed about 50 inspections of Soviet bases in the USSR, the GDR [East Germany] and the CSSR [Czechoslovakia]. Your inspectors have not been wasting time either. They have carried out 13 inspections in the United States and at U.S. bases in Western Europe." Lajoie complimented the Soviets on their organization and reception of U.S. inspection teams.²²

Two weeks later, on August 18, Colonel Shabalin, deputy director of the NRRC center, spoke with TASS reporters about the reciprocal nature of the INF inspections. Shabalin said that the American inspection teams had conducted 108 on-site inspections of Soviet INF sites in the first six weeks. Soviet teams, he continued, had checked 26 of the 31 INF sites in Western Europe and the United States. In addition, by mid-August, he stated, the United States had four teams of on-site inspectors observing INF missile eliminations--in Saryozek, Stan'kovo, Sarny, and Lesnaya--and one group of resident inspectors conducting portal monitoring inspections in Votkinsk. This unprecedented, intense activity had produced, he believed, good working relations. Looking to the future, Colonel Shabalin concluded, "The acquired experience of the [INF] inspections proved their high effectiveness as a means of control. It could be used in the future for control over strategic offensive armaments."²³

Another part of the record established during the baseline period was the verification of the technical data in the MOU. These data established the standard length, diameter, height, and weight for INF missiles, launchers, and associated equipment. It was important data; both inspecting and inspected parties needed to have standard technical references for the missile systems to distinguish treaty items from nontreaty items and noninspectable storage areas.

Lieutenant Tamara Suwalow McKenna, U.S. Coast Guard, was an American military linguist during the first two years of the INF Treaty. Educated at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and holding an advanced degree from George Mason University, Lt. McKenna served as a linguist on American inspection teams conducting on-site inspections in the Soviet Union. In two years she participated in 34 inspections.

On the initial inspections: "I was very apprehensive, even though I had participated in two mock inspections in the United States, I knew it would be much different in the Soviet Union. I thought that the translating would be very difficult. I was very worried there would be times that I didn't know the terminology . . .I didn't feel very confident. Our team was the third team to go into the Soviet Union (July 1988). We really didn't know what had happened with the first two teams that had gone in. We went to an INF training facility, to Serpukhov, which was just outside of Moscow."

"I thought they treated us very well. I was expecting it to be much more formal. I was really surprised at the way the Soviets went out of their way to show us everything and to satisfy us that they were complying with the treaty. They were definitely prepared and everyone knew an important event was taking place. They wanted to make sure that things went well, especially in the beginning they paid attention to the small details, and made sure that no mistakes occurred."

On linguistic preparations: "It turned out to be adequate. It turned out that there weren't quite as many technological terms as I thought there would be. Our relations with the Soviet interpreters were very good."

On the pace of the initial inspections: "There was a time when everyone would get tired. In the beginning there was a lot of adrenaline, and even if you did have a long day, it might not affect you that much. But towards the end of baseline, teams would get tired. Because people might be away from home for two or three months, it could be very difficult. "

On the difficult aspects of inspections: "[There were several]. . . a large area, bad weather, many things to look at, difficult travel to the site. You knew you would always be waiting. The inspectors became very patient people. You just had to learn how to sit in an airport and read or do something, knowing that eventually you'll leave, but also knowing that you really had no control of when you would go. It was tiring travelling on the busses. The weather was very hot [July 1988], it was very dusty."

On being an American woman in the Soviet Union: "First, let me say something about the Soviet women. I was amazed at how poorly they were treated. They have very difficult lives. They do all of the hard work. They work on the railroads and the little old ladies sweep the streets. I remember during the first inspection, my Soviet escorts asked me, 'Why are you doing this? This is a man's job, it's not a job for women.' They were just saying, women weren't meant for military work. Soviet women have some of the hardest jobs, and yet these Soviet men were telling me that women were fragile flowers that shouldn't do difficult work."

On Soviet attitudes towards destroying modern weapons: "We discussed it with them. A lot of them said, well this is the way it has to be because of the treaty, and it's for the good of man. Others were sad. It was equipment that they were taking care of for such a long time, and after being so painstakingly careful, they had to destroy it. From my perspective, they were very professional. We talked about the INF Treaty. I never felt that any of the Soviet soldiers or officers thought that the treaty was a bad decision. They all supported it; they thought it would bring about peace."

Source: Interview, September 11, 1990

Another part of the diplomatic note specified which stages and equipment of the U.S. and Soviet missile systems would be used officially as the smallest inspectable treaty items. The dimensions of these items, which were critical to all on-site inspections, were published in the June 1, 1988, Memorandum of Understanding Data Update.²⁷

For the United States, U.S. Navy Commander John C. Williams led a team of INF specialists to six Soviet elimination sites--Sarny, Stan'kovo, Lesnaya, Kapustin Yar, Saryozek, and Jelgava--where they selected randomly from each Soviet INF missile group one missile, one launcher, and one item of associated equipment to measure. During these special inspections, they measured the length, width, height, and weight of the SS-20, SS-4, SS-5, SSC-X-4, SS-12, and SS-23 missiles. For the same missile systems they also measured the dimensions of the missile launchers, canisters, missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors, propellant tanks, and designated support structures. These measurements became the standard for all American INF inspection teams. During the same period, the Soviet Union's technical data inspection team took measurements of the Pershing II, Pershing IA and IB, and BGM-109G missiles, launchers, associated equipment, and structures. These measurements became the standard for all Soviet INF inspections.