Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers


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System Planning Corporation: "Non-Proliferation Issues" Great Britain Prior Assessments There is a broad array of literature that describes British foreign and defense policy, arms export policies, British participation in international fora, and its defense capabilities. For the purpose of this review, System Planning Corporation consulted periodicals, government documents, public statements, and Internet sources. None of the sources assessed British defense capabilities explicitly in terms of United States' national security. Quite the contrary, British capabilities are more often linked to the United States through cooperative endeavors, research and development projects, and information sharing. Similarly, the literature that addresses British space programs, in particular its European Space Agency membership and its non-ESA projects, is descriptive in nature. The sources come primarily from ESA press releases and scientific journals. No correlation is made between British space capabilities and potential threat to the United States. There is very limited information on British export controls. Although a number of articles address Britain's general nonproliferation policies, they do not outline the structure of the nation's export control system, and the initiatives that the British government has taken to control British exports A September 1994 report by the American Bar Association Task Force on Weapons of Mass Destruction entitled, Beyond CoCom--A Comparative Study of Export Controls: Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan and the European Union Export Control Regulation, offers a comprehensive assessment of Britain's export control system, however. This work describes Britain's export control structure and the legal framework of its national export controls. British Defense Industry: Domestic Structure, Arms Exports, and European Cooperation Great Britain possesses one of the largest and most technologically advanced militaries in the world. In 1996, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency estimated that Britain allocated over $33 billion to defense activities, making Britain the seventh largest defense spender in the world. 1 As a result of its long-standing commitment to national defense, Britain has developed the capability to produce indigenously virtually any kind of armament. This ability has made Britain one of the world leaders in the aerospace sector. British Aerospace has established itself as one of the world's premier aerospace companies. It produces state-of-the-art military and civil aircraft, guided weapons systems, guns and ammunition, plus other high technology products and systems. In 1997, BAE had annual sales of nearly $12 billion. Exports to customers in 72 nations accounted for 87 percent of sales. 2 International Cooperation: Defense Consolidation and Arms Sales Since the end of the Cold War, Britain's military expenditures and domestic procurement levels have fallen like those of all the other nations of Western Europe. Declining defense budgets have prompted Britain to decrease force structures, reduce modernization pursuits, and to reduce domestic procurement. Throughout the first half of the 1990s, defense spending in Great Britain dropped between three and four percent per year in nominal terms. 3 Decreased defense spending has forced all three branches of the British Armed Services to reduce manpower levels. Procurement and weapons modernization plans have also been cut back. 4 In an attempt to soften the effects of decreased defense spending on domestic industry, the government has encouraged Britain's defense conglomerates to consolidate their operations with their British and European counterparts. In December 1997, French President Jacques Chirac, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced in a joint press statement that their respective countries would participate in European initiatives to consolidate defense operations. By supporting consolidation, the British, French and German governments hope to position European firms to compete with the U.S.'s large defense conglomerates in the world market, particularly, Lockheed Martin and Boeing. British Arms Sales Since the end of the Cold War, the British government has also encouraged Britain's defense conglomerates to look to international markets to make up for lost revenue in the domestic market. In 1995, Great Britain was the second largest exporter of armaments in the world. Its $5.2 billion in sales accounted for 54 percent of Western European sales and 16 percent of world sales. Reduced domestic procurement activities has spurred export initiatives in the Middle East and East Asia. Between 1993-1995, the UK exported $11.4 billion (77%) of its arms to the Middle East, with 90 percent of this figure going to Saudi Arabia. East Asia was the UK's second largest recipient in the region with nearly $1.7 billion in purchases (11% of total). In this period, Britain also exported $1.2 billion worth of armaments to North America, all of which went to the United States. 5 Britain has exported a wide range of military equipment abroad, including aerospace hardware and technology. Although there is nothing in the literature suggesting that Britain has exported ballistic missiles or its related technology to nations of proliferation concern, Britain has exported shorter range anti-ship and air-to-air missiles to Middle Eastern nations like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE. Based on Britain's future defense outlook, which calls for further declining procurement budgets, the nation will almost certainly continue to look to the international arena as a market for its armaments. If Britain remains one of the world's principal suppliers of weapons, the possibility exists that hostile nations may gain access to British ballistic missiles and aerospace technology that may one day affect U.S. national security. British Ballistic and Aerodynamic Missile Capabilities The following sections offer a brief description of Britain's ballistic and aerodynamic missile capabilities, as well as specific missile systems that the British are currently developing. Polaris A-3 and A-3TK In the 1960s, the United Kingdom began development of the A-3 Polaris missile, an intermediate range, solid fueled, MIRV capable SLBM. The missile was deployed in the 1960s, and has served as the cornerstone of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent ever since. The original A-3 design is a two-stage solid fueled MIRV system with three 200 kT nuclear re-entry vehicles. It has a range of 4630 km, and a CEP of 900 meters. The TK version of this missile, code named "Chevaline," is an upgrade of the A-3 design and is based on the U.S. penetration aided system "Antelope". It comprises a Penetration Aid Carrier (PAC), the British version of a warhead dispensing system, capable of maneuvering in space and fitted with guidance sensors and a computer-controlled stable platform. Although the "Chevaline" system is not a MIRV system, the re-entry vehicle can be maneuvered. Testing of this system began in September 1977. Submarine launches took place on the Eastern test range off the coast of Florida. The upgrade, testing, and operationalization of both the A-3 and A-3TK was completed in 1986. Trident II D-5 The Trident D-5 missile was first deployed on U.S. Ohio Class nuclear submarines in 1989. It is a three-stage solid fuel, MIRV capable, SLBM with a stellar-aided guidance system. The missile has a range of 12,000 km, and a CEP of 90 meters. In 1980, the United States agreed to sell the UK an unspecified number of Trident D-5s. The U.K.'s D-5 Trident missiles are identical to those used by the United States, except for their warhead configurations. The missiles use the US designed MIRV bus with U.S. Mk 4 RVs but with UK-built warheads. These warheads are smaller than the U.S. W-76, and have a yield of approximately 100 kT. The U.K. does not outfit the Trident D-5 to full capacity. It appears that the U.K. outfits six warheads per missile, although it could load eight warheads per missile if it chose to do so. According to the Military Balance 1997/98, the U.K. currently has 48 active Trident D-5 ballistic missiles aboard 3 Vanguard SSBN's. Although the majority of these missiles have six warheads each, some D-5 are loaded with single warheads for sub-strategic roles. Aerodynamic Missiles The literature suggests that Britain is developing an aerodynamic air-to-surface missile that could pose a threat to the United States if launched from air-borne or sea-borne platforms owned by hostile nations. Sea Eagle/Golden Eagle The Sea Eagle, originally known as P3T, was designed by British Aerospace to replace the Anglo-French Martel standoff air-to-surface missile. Development of the Sea Eagle began in 1979, and production in 1982. The missile is designed for carriage on Buccaneer and Sea Harrier aircraft. The missile may also be carried by Tornado GR, MK 1, Tornado GR, MK 4 and Jaguar. The Sea Eagle entered service in 1985. The Sea Eagle has a similar airframe to the Martel, but has an underbody air inlet for its turbofan jet engine. The missile has an inertial and active radar guidance system, and can carry a 230 kg semi-armor piercing HE warhead to a range of approximately 110 km. According to Jane's Air Launched Weapons, Hughes and British Aerospace may have started development of the Sea Eagle's successor, a program known as the Golden Eagle. The two companies have examined an IIR terminal seeker option with a digital data link. Jane's reports that this missile could have a range of more than 200 km. 6 British Space Programs Great Britain's space programs are handled by its Department of Trade and Industry. The UK participates in space missions, research, and information gathering through the European Space Agency (ESA), and retains a modest domestic program of space research through universities, research institutes, and private industry. In July 1988, the government announced that Great Britain's space initiatives would focus on the development of earth observation activities, with particular emphasis on developing advanced telecommunications and remote sensing capabilities. Although British funding accounts for only five percent of ESA's total budget, Britain participates in multiple international space efforts within the ESA and with non-ESA members. While Britain possesses an independent space launch capability through its Skylark SLV, it continues to maintain interest in the Ariane 5 launcher. Ferranti provides the guidance system's gyro units, and British Aerospace the Spelda payload units. In addition, Britain has been a partner of the United States since the 1960s in national security programs related to earth observation and surveillance activities. Moreover, Britain is jointly developing the Hotol in conjunction with Russia and the Ukraine. Skylark Skylark has served as Britain's space launch vehicle for over forty years. The launcher is available in three different variants, the 5, 7 and 12 versions. Development of the Skylark 17 model began in the late 1980s. In addition, other motor variants are available on request from British Aerospace Space Systems Ltd., the Skylark's principal contractor. Skylark 5, with its single-stage solid-fueled propulsion system, is the smallest in the family. It has the capability to deliver a 250 kg payload to 200 km. Skylark 7 has two solid stages, and can place a 100 kg payload to 460 km, a 300 kg to 270 km, and 400 kg to 210 km from vertical launch. Skylark 12 is essentially a Skylark 7 with a solid-fueled third stage. It can lift 100 kg to 1030 km and 200 kg to 575 km. Britain's International Arms Control Commitments Britain belongs to virtually every international organization that seeks to halt the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction and related technologies. In particular, the United Kingdom signed the Non-proliferation Treaty (1970), is a member of the Zangger Committee; the Nuclear Suppliers Group; and the Australia Group. Great Britain was also instrumental in the establishment of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Control for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods in 1997. Furthermore, Britain has been one of the Missile Technology Control Regime's strongest supporters. Despite Britain's commitment to arms control, British technology has been transferred to nations of proliferation concern in the past. The most notable example is the Matrix Churchill scandal. The Matrix Churchill Scandal Matrix Churchill was a Midlands based machine tool manufacturer which was purchased in 1987 by an Iraqi-controlled company, TMG Engineering. This company, in turn, was controlled by a larger Iraqi company, Technology and Development Group Ltd. In the late 1980s, two contracts were placed with Matrix Churchill. The first contract was placed by Industrias Cardoen of Chile to supply Iraq with machine tools to manufacture fuses for shells. The second contract was placed directly with Iraq's NASSR Establishment for Mechanical Industries for a project code named "ABA". Under the terms of the agreement, Matrix Churchill agreed to provide the NASSR with machine tools to construct multi-launcher rocket systems. The British Government granted export licenses for both of these contracts on the basis that the materials were for civil use, as the applications had specified. In the spring of 1990, West German intelligence informed the British government that Matrix Churchill machine tools were being illicitly diverted to Iraqi military programs. Soon after learning of these reported breaches of British export control regulations, Britain's Department of Trade and Industry, and British Customs began their investigations of Matrix Churchill . Inquiries at Matrix Churchill in June 1990 indicated that export breaches in relation to the Cardoen exports had occurred, and that British equipment was being diverted to Iraq's military programs. Investigations also revealed that Matrix Churchill machine tools had been diverted to an Iraqi rocket launcher program through NASSR, and that the export violated existing export control regulations. The Matrix Churchill case ultimately led to modifications in Britain's export control guidelines. In 1990 and 1994, Britain enacted several legal statutes to improve Britain's export control system, and to ensure that all British exports are used responsibly. The literature suggests that Britain now has one of the most effective export control systems in the world. Export Controls: Statutory Requirements The U.K. relies on several laws and regulations to outline the structure of Britain's export control system. The legal basis for the U.K.'s export control system is the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defense) Act of 1939, as amended by the Import and Export Act of 1990. Under these Acts, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has the authority to regulate Great Britain's export control system. DTI imposes specific export control guidelines under the 1994 Export of Goods (Control) Order (EGCO). In addition, the U.K.'s export controls are enforced under the 1979 Customs and Excise Management Act. 7 Administrative Agencies UK Export Control Office (EC) and The Customs Office The Department of Trade and Industry, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defense are all involved in Britain's export control process. Within the Department of Trade and Industry, the UK Export Control Office manages export licensing efforts and monitors the exports and the transfer of dual-use good and technologies. The ECO coordinates with the other government agencies to update control lists for end-use and end-users. The centralization of the licensing, implementation, and monitoring activities illustrates the British government's commitment to control the spread of WMD and their delivery systems. Government oversight and cooperation with private industry have been integral parts of Britain's non-proliferation policies. 8 The Customs Office is responsible for control at the national borders and the detainment of suspect articles (unlicensed or otherwise). Under this authority, the Customs Office is responsible for investigating and levying punishments for export licensing violations. Unlike other European nations, the Customs Office does not need proof of intent when an export control violation has occurred. Moreover, if a non-licensed controlled item is destined for a country on the control list, additional proof is required to determine that the exporter did not intend to subvert the export control system. 9 Recently, the British government has installed a hot line and a computerized information sharing system for use the Customs Office and the ECO to facilitate information sharing. Moreover, the government has stressed the need for inter-agency communications to address export control issues. 10 Export Control Structure Schedule 1 of the 1994 EGCO lists the types of goods and the countries to which British export controls apply. Sections II and III of Schedule 1 clearly outline Britain's nonproliferation controls. Part II outlines the "catch-all" or "end-use" provisions for goods and technologies that may be used to produce WMD and their delivery systems. Part III outlines Britain's "commodity-based controls." Commodity-Based Controls Part III of Schedule 1 of the 1994 EGCO is divided into three groups. The first group covers military or paramilitary equipment, firearms and software-related technologies. Group two covers atomic energy minerals and materials as well as nuclear facilities, equipment, and technology. Group three covers all dual-use industrial materials and technologies that can be used in WMD applications. In general, Schedule 1 follows the listing system of the former CoCom, and incorporates the control lists of the NSG, AG and MTCR. It does not appear, however, that intangible technologies that may be used in WMD applications are covered by EGCO controls. Destination-Based Controls In addition to the EGCO's commodity based control lists, the ECO continuously updates a list of sensitive destinations for which license applications are subject to special procedures. Although exports of controlled goods and technologies are not prohibited to sensitive destinations, the ECO considers license applications for such destinations on a case by case basis. ECO will not, however, issue a license without consulting other government agencies if the importing nation is of proliferation concern. Catch-All Controls The United Kingdom has adopted "catch-all" provisions in its export control system. These controls have been implemented for three reasons: to outline the goods and technologies that may be used to develop WMD; to describe the activities relating to the production of WMD; and to prohibit the export of such goods and technologies to any destination where the exporter knows or suspects that the goods will be used to produce WMD and their delivery systems. If an exporter has any reason to believe that any export may be covered under catch-all provisions, the exporter is advised to contact the Inquiry Unit of the ECO to determine if an export license is required. Export Controls and Private Industry The British government has maintained a close connection to its national defense conglomerates despite consolidation and privatization. The DTI has drawn up an "Export Control Code of Practice" to increase awareness of UK export controls among exporters. The code consists of eight elements: commitment to compliance, identification of responsible personnel, information and training, internal compliance procedures, awareness of suspicious inquiries or orders, record keeping, internal audits, and integration with quality management practices. Although this code is not legally binding, when assessing license applications, DTI will evaluate the extent to which an exporter has complied with the code and incorporated its practices. Increased communications between industry and government officials are evident by the increasing volume and public availability of export control orders, publications, and notices. The government has established a corporate export control compliance program complete with training seminars by the ECO and on-site evaluations. 11 The Effectiveness of British Export Controls The literature suggests that Great Britain has established one of the most effective export control systems in the world, and that it is highly unlikely that a scandal such as the Matrix Churchill incident will occur in the future. The steps that Great Britain has taken since the Matrix Churchill scandal clearly reaffirm the government's commitment to ensure the responsible use of British exports. Nothing in the literature suggests that British companies have exploited loopholes in the existing export control structure to aid a nation of proliferation concern acquire WMD material or technology. Along the same lines, there is nothing in the literature which suggests that nations like Iran and Iraq (which have reportedly set up clandestine procurement networks in Western European nations like Germany and France) have attempted to acquire dual-use material and technology from British companies. The literature suggests that this is largely due to the initiatives of the British government to strengthen its export control system after the Matrix-Churchill scandal. Following the Matrix-Churchill scandal, Britain established comprehensive guidelines for the export of dual-use material in the 1994 Export of Goods (Control) Order (EGCO). This order specifically lists the goods and technologies, the destinations with respect to certain goods, and the circumstances under which U.K. export controls apply. In addition to outlining the "catch-all" or "end-use" provisions for goods and technologies that may be used in WMD applications, it also subjects exporters to strict licensing regulations. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996, Washington D.C.. 2. For more information, see British Aerospace's homepage at www.bae.co.uk/html. 3. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1996, Washington D.C., p.2 4. OTA, Global Arms Trade: Commerce in Advanced Military Technology and Weapon, p. 67. 5. ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996, p. 22. 6. See Duncan Lennox, ed. Jane's Air Launched Weapons, October 1995, JALW-Issue 22. 7. See ABA Task Force on Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, "Beyond CoCom- A Comparative Study of Export Controls: Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan and the European Union Export Control Regulation," September 1994. The Section on the United Kingdom offers a detailed description of the structure of Britain's export control system. pp. 33-54. 8. Ibid., p. 45. 9. Ibid., p. 52. 10. Ibid., p.51. 11. Ibid., p.51.


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