Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers


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System Planning Corporation: "Non-Proliferation Issues" France Executive Summary As one of the world's five declared nuclear powers, France currently possesses the ability to deliver MIRVed ICBM's and SLBM's to targets anywhere in the world. France has developed this capability from an aerospace industry that is one of the most technologically advanced in the world. In addition to producing state of the art ballistic and aerodynamic missiles, and fighter aircraft, France has been the most powerful force behind the Ariane generation of space launch vehicles, including, Ariane-5. Since the end of the Cold War, France's defense budget has declined steadily. It appears that this trend will continue in the future, as the nation will further reduce its military procurement and manpower levels. To compensate for this drop off in domestic defense spending, French defense conglomerates have looked to the international arena as a market for its exports. In recent years, France has established itself as one of the world's preeminent arms suppliers. Although it appears that France has attempted to implement new export control mechanisms since the end of the Gulf War to prevent the spread of WMD and their delivery systems, some questions remain about France's ability to halt the spread of its ballistic missile and SLV technology. If domestic procurement levels in France continue to decline, French defense conglomerates will almost certainly continue to look to exports to ensure their vitality and profitability. In the future, France may be forced to alter its current export control system if France is to ensure that its exports are not used to create WMD or their delivery systems. But more importantly, France must be able to control the spread of Ariane generation space launch technology as the European Space Agency establishes partnerships with nations such as Russia, Japan, and the CIS states. If France is unable to effectively control the spread of Ariane rocket and propulsion technology, nations with hostile intentions towards the United States may ultimately gain access to critical technology that will aid the development of their own ballistic missile capabilities. Prior Assessments There is a wide body of unclassified information that describes the structure of France's defense industry, its arms export policies, and its ballistic and aerodynamic missile capabilities. Virtually all of these sources, which are typically journal and newspaper articles, government reports and academic articles, are descriptive in nature. None of the sources offer an analysis of how France's military capabilities, particularly the developments in France's aerodynamic and ballistic missile capabilities, may affect U.S. security in the coming years. Much of the same can be said about the literature that examines France's space programs, including France's participation in the European Space Agency (ESA), and its cooperative ventures with non-ESA members. This body of literature is comprised of ESA press releases and journal articles. It is purely descriptive and does not offer any analysis of how France's space-related endeavors will affect the U.S.'s national security. The body of literature that examines France's export controls is very limited. This study was able to find two works that deal with this subject. These include a 1994 report by the American Bar Association Task Force on Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction entitled, "Beyond CoCom - A Comparative Study of Export Controls: Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan and the European Union Export Control Regulation," and an article published in 1994 by Marie Helene Labbe, "French Export Control Policy." In general, the American Bar Association Report is highly descriptive in nature. It describes the organization and structure of France's export control policies, as well as the statutory requirements of France's export control laws. Labbe's article, however, is more analytical. It examines the political importance of export controls in France and analyzes how the defense industry and the French Government interact on this subject. The study also draws several conclusions about the strong points and weaknesses of the French system. Neither Labbe's study nor the ABA report, however, analyze how the weaknesses in France's export control system affect the national security of the United States. France's Defense Industry: Domestic Structure, Arms Exports, and Future International Cooperation Domestic Structure Charles de Gaulle established the foundation on which France's military infrastructure currently stands. This was done in order to retain French self-sufficiency and to reduce France's dependence on American armaments. To further such goals, de Gaulle strengthened the Ministry of Defense to oversee France's defense activities. The Ministry of Defense supervises virtually all French defense activities, including, weapons procurement and arms sales. Today, France possesses one of the largest and most technologically advanced defense industries in the world. In 1997, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency estimated that France allocated nearly $48 billion to defense activities, making France the fifth largest defense spender in the world behind the United States, Russia, PRC and Japan. 1 As a result of its long-standing commitment to national defense, France has developed the capability indigenously to produce virtually any kind of armament. This ability has made France one of the world leaders in the aerospace sector. It produces state-of-the-art fighter aircraft, including the Mirage 2000 and Rafale. The French have also used their aerospace ingenuity to develop highly advanced ballistic and aerodynamic missile systems. France has produced several different types of SLBM's, and IRBM's that can carry both single-warhead and MIRVed nuclear warheads, as well as air-launched cruise missiles that can be armed with nuclear warheads of up to 300 kT. International Cooperation Since the end of the Cold War, France's military expenditures and domestic procurement levels have fallen like those of all the other nations of Western Europe. President Jacques Chirac has announced plans to reduce the size of the Army by one-third, and the Navy and Air Force by 25 percent over the next five years. 2 As a result of these defense cut-backs, France has downsized and restructured its military industrial base and has emphasized that multinational consolidation will be necessary to ensure the future prominence of France's defense industry. In December 1997, France, Germany and the U.K announced a political initiative to consolidate European aerospace/defense activities. The Prime Ministers of these nations issued a joint statement declaring that their new plans for "civil and military programs should lead to European integration based on balanced partnership." 3 European defense industry executives praised the initiative. They asserted that such consolidation would allow European companies to compete more effectively with America's giant defense companies in the international market. Still, consolidation will have its limits. Cooperation on combat aircraft, for example, will remain outside the scope of this agreement for the time being. 4 Despite the absence of cooperation for fighter aircraft, France has collaborated extensively with the United States and its European partners on tactical missile development. In fact, in 1996 the French conglomerate Lagardere Groupe combined its missile-making activities with British Aerospace PLC to form Europe's largest missile manufacturer, Matra BAE Dynamics. This company is now the world's third largest missile producer with revenues of more than $2 billion. 5 In recent years, France has cooperated with both the United States and its European allies on several aerospace defense initiatives, most notably, the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). In January 1995, the United States, Germany, France, and Italy signed a statement of intent to merge their extended air defense programs and to jointly develop and produce a ballistic missile defense capability that will be lightweight, transportable and effective against a variety of tactical threats. Although France has recently terminated its involvement in the program, its technical contributions have been assimilated into the program's development. At this juncture it is not known whether France will purchase the system once it is ready for deployment, but it is unlikely to do so. 6 French Arms Sales Although French defense conglomerates like Aerospatiale, Matra and Thompson CSF have more diversified operations and have been considerably less dependent on domestic weapons procurement than their American counterparts, in recent years the French defense industry has been forced to rely heavily on weapons exports to make up for lost revenue in the domestic market. 7 In 1995, France was the fourth largest exporter of armaments in the world. Its $2.2 billion in sales accounted for 23 percent of Western Europe's exports and seven percent of the world market. 8 During the 1990's, the Middle East has been the largest importer of French armaments, with Saudi Arabia and Egypt accounting for a large percentage of French imports to the region. France has exported a wide range of military equipment abroad, including aerospace hardware and technology. Based on France's future defense outlook which calls for further manpower reductions and declining procurement budgets, the nation will almost certainly continue to look to the international arena as a market for its armaments. If France remains one of the world's primary suppliers of weapons, the possibility exists that hostile nations may gain access to French ballistic missiles and aerospace technology that may one day affect U.S. national security. French Ballistic and Aerodynamic Missile Capabilities The following sections offer a brief description of France's ballistic and aerodynamic missile capabilities, as well as specific missile systems that the French are currently developing. 9 Hades France began development on the Hades shorter-range ballistic missile program in 1983 to find a successor to the Pluton System. The missile was designed for transportation on wheeled TEL's, accompanied by a tractor and trailer. Each trailer was designed to carry two missiles in containers that also served as launch boxes. The missile made its first test flight in 1988, and was scheduled for production in 1992. In 1991, however, the French government announced that the missile would not be deployed, but kept in storage for use at a later date if needed. President Chirac announced in 1996 that the missiles would be dismantled. The unclassified body of literature suggests that this single-stage ballistic missile has a maximum range of 480 km, and can carry either a single conventional HE warhead or the nuclear TN-90 warhead with a yield of approximately 80 kT. Based on Hades range and payload specifications, any transfer of this missile or its technology would be in violation of the MTCR. S-3 The S-3 is a two-stage, solid propellant, silo-based intermediate-range ballistic missile with a range of 3000 km. The S-3 program, which was designed as the successor to the S-2, the cornerstone of France's land based strategic missile systems, was started in 1973. The missile carries a single TN61 nuclear warhead with a yield of 1.2 MT in its 1000 kg payload. The French government announced in 1996 that the S-3 would be taken out of service and deactivated. By September 1996, all 18 of the missiles were formally deactivated, and are scheduled to be dismantled. M-4 The M-4, the fourth generation missile in the MSBS (Mer-Sol-Balistique-Strategique) family, currently is deployed on four French SSBN's. The first test launch of the missile took place in November 1980. The M-4 entered service in 1985. The M-4 is a submarine launched, intermediate range ballistic missile that is capable of carrying 6 re-entry vehicles in MIRV configuration. There are reportedly two different versions of the missile, the M-4A, which has a range of 4000 km, and the M-4B, with a range of 5000 km. However, in 1986, a French boat test-fired an M-4 over a distance of 6,000 km. The weight of the payload for this flight, however, is not known, and some believe that this was the first test flight of the longer range M-45 missile. The M-4's TN-70 or TN-71 warheads have a yield of approximately 150 kT, and weigh 250 kg. Five French nuclear submarines are currently in service, with each carrying up to 16 missiles. These include four SSBN's of the older Le Redoutable class, and Le Triomphant, the lead submarine of a new class SSBN. M-45 The M-45 is a longer range version of the M-4, with a range of approximately 6,000 km. Like the M-4, this three-stage missile carries six 150 KT re-entry vehicles in MIRV configuration. It is believed that this missile entered service in 1996, having been fitted on Le Triomphant. There was considerable speculation that the M-45 was going to replace the eighteen S-3 silo-based missiles that were scheduled for dismantlement in 1996. This idea was dismissed, however, after the French decided that the S-3's were not going to be replaced. M-5/M-51 France began development of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, the M-5, in 1992. In 1996, the government announced that it would instead develop the less expensive M-51, that will replace the M-4 and M-45 between 2010 and 2015. The M-51 will be a three-stage solid propellant ballistic missile with a range estimated to be approximately 10,000 km. Like the M-4 and M-45, the M-51 will carry six Multiple Independent targeted Re-entry Vehicles with yields of 150 kT. In addition to possessing modern penetration aids, the bus vehicle will have greater flexibility in releasing the MIRVs, thus increasing its accuracy. Air-Launched Cruise Missiles France currently possesses the ability to deliver a nuclear warhead to targets by Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). France has had this capacity for at least eleven years, and is developing a new generation of ALCM's to ensure this capability in the future. 10 ASMP In 1976, France began development of the ASMP air launched cruise missile to provide a successor to the AN-22 nuclear bomb carried by the Mirage IV. Although the missile was originally designed to be carried by the Mirage 2000N, the missile has been modified for carriage by the Mirage IVP and the Super Etendard aircraft. The ASMP is powered by a liquid-fueled ramjet engine that can propel a 300 kT TN-80 or TN-81 nuclear warhead to a range of 250 km when launched at high altitudes, or 80 km at lower altitudes. In addition, in 1993 the ASMP's lead contractor Aerospatiale proposed a conventional version of the missile called the ASMP-C or Asura, that could strike targets up to 400 km away. According to one unclassified source, approximately 100 operational ASMP's have been put in service since the missile entered service in 1986. There are no known exports of this missile, although its transfer would not be violation of the MTCR's parameters. ASMP Plus The French government revealed in 1996 that it plans to replace all active ASMP missiles with a new missile called the ASMP Plus. The missile is expected to have a similar propulsion system to the ASMP, and will cruise at M2.5 on a low-high-low trajectory. The ASMP Plus, however, is expected to have a longer range than the ASMP, and could be used to strike targets as far as 500 km away with a 300KT warhead. It will be carried by the Mirage 2000N, Super Entendard, or Rafale. French Space Initiatives France was the third nation behind the United States and USSR to develop an independent space launch capability and significant space-imagery systems. 11 The nation currently possesses one of the most technologically advanced space programs in the world, and the most advanced in Europe. In this regard, France has developed advanced space launch, telecommunications and earth observation ability through the nation's two largest aerospace firms, Aerospatiale and Matra Marconi Space. Although France has considered in recent years to develop a NASA-like organization to direct its aerospace and aeronautical programs, its current space initiatives are coordinated by the Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES). In addition to overseeing French space policy, CNES often aids in the creation of corporations and other private sector initiatives that may aid France's space activities. Past companies have included Arianespace, the manufacturer of the Ariane launcher family, and Spot Image, which develops earth observation equipment. European Space Agency France is arguably the most important nation in the European Space Agency (ESA) an organization created in 1975 to replace the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) and the European Space Research Organization (ESRO). France contributes more than 45 percent of its space budget to ESA, which in turn accounts for roughly 25 percent of ESA's total budget. 12 This organization was created "to provide for and to promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, cooperation among European States in space research and technology and their space applications, with a view to their being used for scientific purposes and operational space application systems." ESA attempts to implement a long-term European space policy that will allow the nations of Europe to both become and remain competitive forces in the field of space technology. In addition to implementing such space plans, the Agency encourages competition and innovation in Europe's space industry, and attempts to ensure that each ESA member nation receives a return on its investment in both a financial and technological sense. France and International Space Cooperation While France collaborates on a wide range of space-related issues with its fellow ESA member states, it has also engaged in cooperative ventures with other nations attempting to advance their space capabilities. 13 In addition to engaging in cooperative ventures with both the United States and Japan, France is currently the world's leading collaborator with Russia and the CIS nations, thus allowing these states access to a wide variety of space technology, including, technology associated with the Ariane space launch vehicle. 14 Furthermore, both France and ESA have enhanced their cooperation with developing countries. Such endeavors have included setting up a network for transmitting weather and environmental data for the African countries. Although France is the most influential member of ESA, and is by far the most active ESA member in arranging cooperative agreements with other nations, some have suggested that the French should further expand the scope of their space collaboration with other nations. In June 1997, the Paris-based Economic and Social Council issued a report to the French government calling for the closer integration of French and European space activities. In addition to calling for the establishment of a new entity similar to that of the U.S.'s National Space Council which would define a common European space strategy, the group also urged France to adopt a multi-year budget for space activities, and suggested enhancing the synergy between civil and military space programs. Furthermore, the group asserted that France should expand the scope of its collaborative efforts with non-ESA members like Japan and the CIS states in order to counterbalance the U.S.'s great space superiority. 15 There is no information suggesting that the French Government has ever responded to this report. French Space Launch Systems: The Ariane Family Throughout the 1960's and early 1970's, France and the member states of ESA realized the need for both an ambitious and independent space program that would be centered around the capability to independently develop a space launch vehicle. France and the other ESA members put their plans into motion in July 1973 when they announced that Europe would seek this capability through the Ariane class space launch vehicle, a system that would combine the technological know-how of Europe's national programs, and ultimately provide ESA members with their own access to space. French ingenuity and technical know-how has been an indispensable element in the creation of the Ariane family of space launch vehicle. Not only has France provided a significant amount of the funding for the Ariane system, but the French aerospace giant Aerospatiale has been the prime contractor for the rocket program since its beginning. Ariane 1-4 The first successful launch of an Ariane-1 took place on December 24, 1979. The missile was specifically designed to place satellites for telecommunication and meteorological purposes into geostationary transfer orbit. As the size of satellites became larger, so too did the requirement for more powerful launch vehicles. In 1984, Ariane-1 was replaced by the more powerful Ariane-2 and Ariane-3, and in 1988, these systems were superseded by the Ariane-4 which became known as Europe's "space workhorse". 16 By March 1996, the Ariane 1-4 generation of rockets had completed 84 successful launches and placed a total of 153 satellites into orbit. The rocket has been selected by many nations as their satellite launch vehicle of choice. Today, Arianespace, the international company that markets the Ariane family of launchers, holds more than fifty percent of the open, global launch market. In addition to having customers in Europe and the United States, Arianespace has clients in Japan, Canada, India, and Brazil. Although the Ariane-4 is still used as Europe's primary space launch vehicle, it will soon be supplemented by the heavier lift Ariane-5 (For details on the Ariane 4, see Apendix A). Ariane- 5 European research on the Ariane 5 program commenced in 1986, as ESA members began to realize the need for a more powerful successor for the Ariane- 4. ESA members believe that, by the end of the decade, Ariane-5 will become Europe's standard launcher and remain so for the next twenty years, making approximately seven launches per year. According to Interavia's space directory, France has the largest stake among ESA members in the Ariane-5 program. It has annually provided over 45 percent of the program's funding, and is currently Aerospatiale's largest program (for details on the Ariane-5, see Appendix B). Test flights indicate that Ariane-5 will be significantly more powerful than Ariane-4. It will have the capability of delivering dual 2800 kg payloads into geosynchronous orbit, and will place Europe's first manned spacecraft, Hermes, into low earth orbit. 17 Its level of performance and manned flight capability make Ariane-5 considerably different from its predecessors. It consists of a lower section which is identical for all missions and an upper section whose configuration varies according to the mission. Although Ariane-5 experienced a booster failure on its maiden test flight in June 1996, it was successfully launched on October 30, 1997 from the Guina Space Center. Twenty seven minutes into the flight, MAQSAT H and MAQSAT B, platforms carrying instruments to analyze launcher flight behavior, and the technology satellite TEAMSAT were ejected into orbit. A third qualification flight, under ESA and CNES responsibility, has been scheduled for the spring of 1998. If this flight proceeds as planned, commercial Ariane-5 flights will begin sometime during the fall of 1998. 18 Ariane-5: Repercussions for the Nonproliferation Regime The state of the art capabilities of Ariane-5 clearly demonstrates that France has become one of the world's leaders in space launch technology. Yet, it does not appear that France will ever have the need to modify the Ariane-5 SLV into an ICBM: It already possesses an intercontinental capacity with its M-4, M-45, and soon to be M-5/M-51 generations of ICBM's. In the future, however, the development of Ariane-5 and its related technology could have serious consequences for the nonproliferation regime. This exclusively depends upon France's and ESA's ability to ensure the peaceful use of Ariane-5 technology in the future. On the one hand, if France and ESA can guarantee that Ariane-5 space launch technology will be responsibly used by any nation with which it has a cooperative agreement, then there may not be any consequences for the international nonproliferation regime. On the other hand, if France and its European partners fail to ensure the peaceful use of EAS technology (which may someday include Ariane-5 SLV technology) during their cooperative ventures with CIS states, India and Japan, these nations may gain access to technology that may ultimately aid the development of their own long-range missile or rocket programs. The French have previously demonstrated that they are willing to export Ariane rocket technology to other nations. In 1989, Arianespace planned to export rocket engines and their associated technologies to India and Brazil for use in their domestic space programs. Although India and Brazil claimed that they would use the technology to enhance their civilian space programs, the Bush Administration asserted that Ariane rocket technology could be easily adapted for military purposes, and that the transfer would ultimately contribute to the spread of sophisticated missiles designed to carry WMD warheads. 19 Even though the French backed down from the transfer because of U.S. pressure, similar situations could unfold in the future with the ESA' new partner states. It is thus essential for France and its fellow EAS member states to exercise effective export controls over all technology associated with the Ariane-5 program to ensure that such technology is not used for military purposes. France's International Arms Control Commitments Prior to joining the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1992, France's export policies were highly problematic for international nonproliferation efforts. For over twenty years, France refused to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) despite its status as a declared nuclear power, believing that the treaty discriminated against all nations except the United States and USSR. In addition to consistently voicing opposition to the treaty, during this era France established itself as one of the world's preeminent nuclear suppliers. It has since become evident that French nuclear technology, components and equipment were used in the secret nuclear weapons programs of a number of nations, including Israel, Pakistan, India, Iraq, South Africa and Algeria between 1960 and 1990. It appears, however, that France's nonproliferation efforts experienced a drastic change after the Gulf war. France is currently party to virtually every multilateral agreement and regime that is designed to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. In addition to signing the NPT in 1992, France has become a strong supporter of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Zangger Committee, the Australia Group (AG) and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Despite France's past behavior, scholars such as Marie-Helene Labbe contend that France's export control system for WMD material and technology has become one of the most effective in the world. Labbe writes, "the realization of the absolute necessity of controlling the spread of nuclear technology, without hindering the development of civil nuclear technology, has led France to set up a monitoring system that, even today, is without doubt one of the most efficient for reducing proliferation in the world." 20 In addition to its nonproliferation efforts, France cooperated in the negotiations for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and has been a strong proponent of the START Treaties signed between Russia and the United States. Furthermore, France has engaged in nonproliferation efforts at the regional and national level. It has aided Russia in the dismantlement of some of its nuclear weapons, and French officials have helped the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) arrange the construction of two light water commercial reactors in North Korea as a means of curbing the DPRK's nuclear weapons program. France and the Missile Technology Control Regime France has been a member of the MTCR since the organization's creation in 1987. France, however, did not publish specific Missile Control lists until 1990 because exporters were subject to COCOM and CIEEMG controls, which ultimately covered MTCR controls. 21 It appears that the French became more assertive with their control over missile technology following the creation of specific MTCR lists. French President Francois Mitterand called for a "global approach," rather than adopt regional-specific strategies, for combating WMD and their delivery systems. French Export Controls: Statutory Requirements Although there are explicit legal regulations controlling French exports, the French rely on just a handful of decrees and pronouncements to outline the structure, implementation and enforcement mechanisms for export controls. This has resulted in a somewhat obscure legal export control framework. 22 Several Government Decrees outline the only explicit authority for French export controls relating to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Decree Law of April 18, 1939 and the Decree of November 30, 1944. These two laws outline the framework under which the Government controls the movement of all weaponry and war material into and out of France. As a condition of the 1939 Decree, all exports of weapons and armaments are prohibited unless permitted by the French government. In the early 1990's, however, the French government issued several decrees relating to international nonproliferation called the "Nonproliferation Decrees." Under one of these decrees, France published the MTCR list of controlled materials and technology, thereby outlining the missile technologies that are subject to government control. Although the above three decrees outline the overall framework for France's export controls, Article 38 of the French Customs Code delineates how France's export controls will be implemented and enforced. These conditions were enacted in the "Export/Import Decree" of January 30, 1967 by the Director General of Customs and Indirect Taxes in order to establish the conditions under which exporters must "submit the export of certain strategic products or technologies to authorization." 23 These control item lists are updated periodically. Administrative Agencies The Customs Office and SAFICO Within the Ministry of Finance's Customs and Excise Department, the Section des autorisations financieres et controle de la destination finale, Service des Autorisations Financieres et Commerciales (SAFICO) coordinates the processing of all license applications for the export of any strategic goods or technologies, as well as war material. France's export controls are enforced by The National Direction of Customs Research and Investigations (Direction Nationale des Recherches et Enquetes Douanieres). In cases of possible espionage, however, Customs must defer to the jurisdiction of The Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire within the Ministry of the Interior. 24 Although SAFICO possesses sole authority in administering exporting control regulations, other government ministries have a role in creating export control policies. The Ministries of Industry, Defense and Foreign Affairs all have jurisdiction in the formulation process. In addition, the French have established special interministerial committees that review license applications for nuclear items, although these committees ultimately send their decisions regarding such exports to the Customs office for Implementation. 25 CIEEMG The Commission Interministerielle pour l'Etude des Exportation de materiel de Guerre (CIEEMG) holds all of the decision-making authority for exports of war material and armaments. This Commission, comprised of members of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Industry, Finance and Foreign trade, oversees the Liste des Materiels de Guerre that outlines the controlled items and incorporates the former CoCom munitions lists. If the participating Ministers agree that the exports are worthy of licensing, the exporters are issued an authorization to export war material (AEMG), which permits the material from leaving French territory. If the Ministers are unable to reach a decision, the Prime Minister will make the final decision. CIEEMG receives approximately 600 requests for authorizations each month. CIEEMG, however, has administrative but not legal authority over weapons transfers. Even after obtaining CIEEMG approval for an export, an exporter still must obtain SAFICO authorization to transfer any controlled item. 26 List-Specific Controls France's export controls are mostly destination based, although France has consistently resisted the incorporation in the post-CoCom Regime of any list of proscribed or sensitive destinations. The following offers a brief description of the different types of controls that France adheres to. Commodity-Based Controls All exports of controlled commodities require formal permission from French customs. The French government periodically updates national control lists under a formal notice in the Journal Officiel relating to technology exports. Specifically, such controls require that exporters must obtain a license for the export of any technology that may be used for the development, production or utilization of any controlled item. 27 The recent Nonproliferation Decrees incorporate the control lists of the former CoCom Atomic Energy, Munitions and Industrial Lists, in addition to the control lists of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group and the MTCR. Destination Based Controls France controls the exports of goods and technologies to certain destinations. France breaks down these destinations into three different groups of nations: Group One includes former CoCom members; Group Two includes Austria, Finland, Hong Kong, Ireland, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia; Group Three includes all other countries. In general, exporters to Group One nations may be able to obtain preferential licenses. On the other hand, exporters to Group Three nations are subject to much stricter licensing requirements, requiring both an individual export license and a letter of intent by the cosignee declaring that it will not retransfer the exported items. Unilateral Controls France does not impose unilateral export controls for security or any other reasons. Interestingly, under the text of the proposed French Disarmament Plan that was espoused by President Miterrand in 1991, France expressed interest in seeing the creation of a broader and more effective MTCR framework. The new arrangement would document "the rules favoring civilian space cooperation, while averting the danger of a diversion of technology to the benefit of a military ballistic capacity." 28 Catch-All Controls France has never adopted Catch-All controls designed to combat the spread of WMD and their delivery systems. French Export Controls and Private Industry The French Government requires that all exporters that receive export licenses must set up and maintain an internal compliance program. These compliance programs must include an internal verification procedure, a list of company personnel with jurisdiction over verification; a training program for all individuals involved in the export process, and a special record system for all license-related behavior. 29 For defense industry companies, the Defense Ministry requires that Ministry Officials known as Controlleur Generaux participate in corporate board meetings and report all proceedings to the Minister of Defense. These Controllers exercise substantial authority, and have the ability to order the inspection of defense factories and the verification of sales. Controller Generals are usually permanently assigned to the larger defense companies, and frequently act as the intermediary between the Defense Industry and the Government. Future Challenges for France's Export Control Initiatives Although it appears that France has taken substantive steps since the early 1990's to ensure that France does not contribute to the spread of WMD and their delivery systems, a number of questions still remain about the effectiveness of France's export controls, and its ability to limit the spread of ballistic missiles and their associated technologies. Three specific issues need to be addressed: Decreased Domestic Defense Spending = More International Exports Based on the trend that has materialized in recent years, France is turning more and more to international markets for the sale of its defense goods. In examining the French government's plan to reduce its armed services over the next five years, it appears that the French defense industry will continue to look to countries in Asia and the Middle East as destinations for its exports. If this trend continues, France's export control system could prove to be ineffective in ensuring that all French exports, including military and dual-use commodities and technologies, are used responsibly. Consolidation in the Defense Industry As previously mentioned, French conglomerates that produce aerospace and other defense related equipment are consolidating their operations with other French and European firms in order to streamline their operations in the post-cold war era. As these mergers continue to take place, France may very well need to alter its existing laws and regulations to accommodate a new arrangement with Europe's defense industries. Enhanced Space Cooperation with non-ESA Member States and Its Effects on the Nonproliferation Regime In the last few years, France has attempted to expand the scope of its space cooperation with non-ESA members such as Japan, Russia, and the CIS states. At this juncture, it appears that France will continue to make ESA technology available to other nations with which it has cooperative agreements. In 1989, France intended to transfer Ariane-4 rocket engine technology to both Brazil and India. Although both Brazil and India asserted that the engine technology would be used exclusively for civil space use, the Bush Administration demanded that the transfer be terminated because the "spin-on" of such technology for military purposes would aid both nations' ballistic missile capabilities. Although France proposed this transfer prior to adopting the Nonproliferation Decree in 1992, when nonproliferation was not as high of a national priority as it is now, it is impossible to say with any degree of confidence that France will not export Ariane-5 rocket engine technology, unless it adopts strict export controls over all space-related exports. If France and other ESA members expand the scope of their space cooperation with NIS states without effective export control mechanisms in place, a nation with hostile intentions towards the United States may gain access to critical Ariane SLV technology. If this occurs, the subject nation could rapidly advance its ballistic missile launch capabilities, perhaps even gaining the capability to manufacture a propulsion system for an ICBM or IRBM by the year 2015. Appendix A: The Ariane 4 Space Launch Vehicle Like its predecessors, Ariane 4 has three stages. The addition of liquid and/or solid boosters strapped to the first stage, makes it possible to obtain six different versions, each with a specific performance. A version is selected for a given flight so as to obtain the best optimization with the payload, thus minimizing the cost per kilo in orbit. Most launches carry two satellites in the SPELDA, Ariane's dual launch device. A total of 86 Ariane 4's have been ordered for launches up till 2000. Initially, Ariane 4's maximum performance was 4,200 kg in GTO. In 1992, Aerospatiale introduced the H-10+ third stage, a new light-weight tank for helium storage, two improvements which brought performance to 4,450 kg in GTO with the Ariane 44L version. Aerospatiale has once again upgraded the third stage. The new version now in service, called the H10 III, carries 700 kg more oxygen and functions about 30 seconds longer, bringing performance to over 4,720 kg. Ariane is a cooperative venture under ESA's leadership. The French space agency, CNES, is prime contractor. Aerospatiale is the industrial architect for the complete vehicle, and is responsible for the development of all of the stages. Aerospatiale builds the first and third stages in its facilities in Les Mureaux. Aerospatiale is also responsible for mission analysis and the flight program for each launch, as well as post-flight data analysis. To satisfy market demands, the production rate of Ariane 4 is increasing from ten to eleven per year. Some 60 companies in 11 European countries participate in the program. Marketing and launch services are the responsibility of Arianespace. Ariane currently has more than 60 percent of the open international market. DESCRIPTION Total height: from 57 to 60 meters Mass at lift-off: from 243 to 480 metric tons Thrust at lift-off: from 2,700 to 5,350 kN Central body diameter: 3.8 meters Performance in GTO* from 1,900 kg to 4,720 kg (with the H-10 III) GTO = Geostationary Transfer Orbit Appendix B: Ariane 5 Space Launch Vehicle The Ariane 5 is the new generation launch vehicle approved by the European ministers in 1987. Development is continuing under ESA's responsibility with the French space agency CNES, as prime contractor. Aerospatiale is industrial architect for the complete vehicle, and prime contractor for both the central cryogenic stage (EPC), built and assembled in Les Mureaux, and the solid booster stages (EAP), built and integrated in Guiana. Ariane 5's cryogenic central main stage is flanked by two solid boosters. For automatic payloads, such as satellites or space station elements, an upper stage using storable propellants, and an equipment bay is also used. The SPELTRA device will make it possible to launch dual payloads. Ariane 5 is designed for high reliability and will be compatible with manned spaceflight. Designed for the commercial missions of the end of the century and beyond, Ariane 5 will be able to place almost twice as much payload into geostationary transfer orbit for a significantly lower launch cost. Development has begun for an upgraded version, Ariane 5 Evolution, which will increase performance progressively to obtain a dual launch capability of well over seven metric tons. DESCRIPTION Total Height: from 45.7 to 55.9 meters Central Corp Diameter: 5.4 meters Maximum diameter: 12.2 meters Mass at lift-off: from 710 to 718 metric tons Thrust at lift-off: 10,660 kN Performance in GTO 5.9 to 6.9 metric tons GTO = Geostationary Transfer Orbit ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1996, Washington D.C., p. 36 and 70. Also, the National Defense University's Strategic Assessment 1997 concluded that total French defense expenditures are in percentage of GDP second only to the United States. 2. National Defense University, Strategic Assessment 1997, United States Government Printing Office, 1997, p. 34. 3. John D. Morrocco, "Defense Impasse Hinders Consolidation," Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 15, 1997, p. 23. 4. Ibid., p. 23. 5. The New York Times, "British-French Deal To Create Missile Giant," May 14, 1996, D 6. 6. John D. Morrocco, "WEU Promotes Missile Cooperation," Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 5, 1998, p. 54 7. The United States Congress Office of Technology Assessment, Global Arms Trade: Commerce in Advanced Military Technology and Weapons, United States Government Printing Office, 1992, p. 39. 8. ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1996, p. 22. 9. For a detailed description of each of France's ballistic missiles see Duncan Lennox, ed. Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, September 23, 1997, JSWS-ISSUE 25. 10. For a more detailed description of France's ALCM's see Duncan Lennox, ed. Jane's Air-Launched Weapons, February 1996, JALW-ISSUE 23. 11. Andrew Wilson, ed. Interavia Space Directory 1992-93, Jane's Information Group Ltd., Surrey U.K., p. 53. 12. Ibid., p. 53. 13. Pierre Sparaco, "`Leaner" CNES Seeks Stronger Partnerships," Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 24, 1997, p. 37. In addition to advocating greater cooperation with nations that are not EAS members, Sparaco suggests that their should be a closer integration of civilian and military space initiatives in France. He writes, "Despite apparently dissimilar requirements, commercial and military space programs share key goals and could be managed jointly. The CNES-Defense Ministry relationship should be optimized to cut costs. Military space should play a major role at CNES." 14. According to Interavia's Space Directory, France has provided Russia and the CIS states with, "an extensive range of instrumentation to Earth-orbiting and deep-space vehicles, including the balloon and several instruments for Mars-94/96, major elements of the Phobos Mars probes and the primary Sigma X/gamma-ray telescope of the Granat Observatory," p. 53. 15. For further information on the group's report see, Michael A. Taverna, "European Space Council Proposed," Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 16, 1997, p. 62. 16. Areospatiale produced six different versions of the Ariane-4, one "bare", and the others fitted (depending on the size of the object to be placed into orbit) with two or four, solid or liquid strap-on boosters. 17. Wilson, Interavia Space Directory, p. 268. See pages 268-270 for a more detailed description of Ariane-5's capabilities. 18. Joint ESA-CNES Press Release, October 30, 1997. 19. The New Scientist, "Rocket deals fuel US concern," November 11, 1989, p. 25. 20. Marie Helene Labbe, "French Export Control Policy," in International Cooperation on Nonproliferation Export Controls: Prospects for the 1990's and Beyond, eds. Gary K. Bertsch, Richard T. Cupitt and Steven Elliot (University of Michigan Press, 1994), p. 205. 21. France's export control system over ballistic missile technology was ineffective during the 1960's and 1970's prior to the adoption of MTCR controls. For instance, French assistance was critical to Israel's ballistic missile programs. In 1963, the Israeli government reportedly signed a $100 million agreement with the French aerospace firm Dassault to develop a ballistic missile, later known as the Jericho I. Reports suggest that the French were to build 25 missiles, although it is not known whether these were designed to be operational systems or test models. Before development of the missile was completed, the French government canceled the contract. After the cancellation of the project, development and production of the Jericho shifted to Israel. 22. See the American Bar Association Task Force on Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, entitled, "Beyond CoCom- A Comparative Study of Export Controls: Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan and the European Union Export Control Regulation," September 1994. The Section on France offers a detailed description of the structure of France's export control system. 23. Journal Officiel, Documents Administratifs, January 24, 1992, "Avis aux impotateurs et exportateurs re: controle de la destination finale," p. 3. 24. Bertrand Warusfel, "Le Controle des exportations strategiques," Defense Nationale, February 1985, pp. 110-111. 25. Any decisions on export licenses for items on the former CoCom Atomic Energy List and the Nuclear Suppliers Group List is reviewed by the interministerial committee called the Groupe Interministerial Restreint which is comprised of by members of the Foreign Affairs, Defense , Industry Finance and Foreign Trade Ministries. 26. ABA Task Force Report, p. 59. 27. Ibid., p. 60. It must be noted, however, that "technology 'existing in the public domain' or of 'fundamental scientific research' is not subject to final destination control." Nowhere is "Fundamental Scientific Research" defined in the regulations. 28. Text of the French Disarmament Plan as Reprinted in Le Monde Hebdomadaire, May 30 - June 5, 1991, p. 2. 29. ABA Task Force, p. 65.


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