Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers


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Daniel Gouré 1 : "The Evolution of Russian Nuclear Forces: Working to a Plan" The continuing decline of many elements of the Russian Federation's Armed Forces and ongoing struggles over budgets, reform proposals and organization should not be allowed to obscure the fact that in the area of strategic nuclear forces Moscow has a plan for the future, one which the leadership is striving seriously to implement. This plan has a number of elements: * Creation of a smaller strategic force reflective of both strategic requirements and budgetary realities * Re-organization of the strategic forces * Improvement of the C3 for strategic forces * Selected modernization of strategic systems * Maintenance of a critical strategic industrial base * Pursuit of selected long-term R&D projects designed to enable Russia's Armed Forces to "leapfrog" into the Revolution in Military Affairs sometime in the early part of the next century. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian academics and military theoreticians have been struggling to define the basis for a national security policy and corresponding military strategy that would guide military planning and force development into the next century. In May 1997 the Russian Security Council published a national security strategy. This document focused primarily on Russia's internal weaknesses as the major source of potential security risks. However, it does argue for the maintenance of military power sufficient to protect Russia's. national interests and territorial integrity. At the same time, the national security concept clearly places primacy on placing Russia's economic house in order. 2 As part of that effort to define the objectives of a military reform program and force development plan, Russian experts have engaged in a lively debate over the character of nuclear doctrine, utility of nuclear forces, and the direction of development of Russian strategic forces. The question of the role of nuclear forces in Russian is clearly of more than academic significance. Given the evident weakness of the Russian state, how can Moscow maintain the military power necessary to meet its national security interests. As one Russian analyst noted, Russia's strategic Missile Forces consume only 8 per cent of the current defense budget. 3 One school of thought that emerged in this period argued that nuclear weapons had lost whatever usefulness they had had with the end of the Cold War. on of nuclear weapons in Russian national security policy and defense strategy. This line of argument supports advocacy of minimum deterrent postures and even the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. 4 Some analysts in this school argued that the only purpose of nuclear forces should be only to deter nuclear attack on Russian itself. 5 Other analysts claimed that nuclear weapons serve a largely political purpose, countering perceptions of Russian military weakness, but that their value in this regard would diminish over time as Russia's economic and military situations improved and as relations with the other nuclear powers, particularly the U.S. and China, continued to progress. A second school made a very different argument. They agreed with those in the first school who acknowledge that nuclear weapons serve a political function as a guarantor of stability in relations with other nuclear powers. But, they go on to argue that strategic forces, and specifically ballistic missiles, have an increasing role to play as usable instruments in Russian military planning. Because of its current economic and military weakness, Russia must rely heavily nuclear weapons to guarantee its security not only in the event of a strategic threat, but also in the event of theater conventional aggression. 6 According to some members of this second school, Russia requires its own version of NATO's erstwhile concept of flexible response which would permit limited nuclear strikes not only in response to nuclear first-use, but also in response to conventional aggression. 7 Russian analysts make arguments similar to those once made by Western analysts, specifically that escalation can be controlled particularly if limited strikes are not conducted against U.S. territory and Russia retains sufficient strategic power to conduct a large second strike in the event the U.S. escalated to homeland attacks. 8 It is not surprising, given the discussion above, that a number of Russian defense analysts also focus on the potential utility of tactical nuclear weapons. 9 One Russian source claimed that while the official position of the Russian Government, MOD, and General Staff was to reject the use of tactical nuclear weapons, among the "staff generals" there was a commonly held view that such weapons are a necessary part of the country's defense capability. 10 According to an article in the journal of the Russian General Staff, tactical nuclear weapons could provide escalatory options for the Russian Armed Forces without crossing the threshold to strategic exchanges: * the presence of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the Russian Federation's * Armed Forces permits the restoration of the unequal balance in general purpose * forces and their use in the course of military operations permits compensating * for enemy superiority on individual strategic (operational) axes without crossing * the activation threshold of strategic nuclear forces in the process. 11 Russian military leaders appear to have adopted this second set of arguments. They see the need to make nuclear weapons a central element of their operational planning for future conflict, as well as of their declaratory policy. The budgetary impetus to find a low cost means of meeting security requirements is self evident, and reinforced by the new national security doctrine. 12 The doctrinal impetus for the restructuring of the Russian strategic forces came in 1993 with the formulation of a new Russian military doctrine that formally renounced the long-standing Russian no first-use pledge. Russia's commitment to a military doctrine and strategy in which nuclear weapons play a central role is reflected by a series of actions they have taken to maintain and even increase the effectiveness of its strategic forces. One Russian commentator referred to this as the "Malinovsky" military reforms, referring to Soviet Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, who presided over the development of Russia's first nuclear force posture and strategy in the 1960s. 13 The "Malinovsky strategy" was based on the premise that a future war with the West inevitably would be intercontinental and nuclear and that the Soviet Union must plan for the use of nuclear weapons from the outset of even a local or regional conflict. 14 The Russian military has taken a number of steps to reorganize and reform their strategic forces in line with a military strategy that relies more heavily on nuclear weapons. First among these actions is the reorganization on November 1, 1997 of the strategic forces, specifically the integration of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), Military Space Forces (MSF), and Military Space Defense Forces (MSDF) into the Strategic Deterrent Forces (SDF). Russian military leaders assert that this has several positive points. First, it is supposed to reduce costs by eliminating redundant and parallel command structures, thereby saving, by some estimates, over a trillion rubles. 15 Second, it simplifies command and control of nuclear forces by concentrating planning, release authority and execution in the hands of the SDF's General Staff which is a national-level command echelon responsible to the General Staff of the Armed Forces. One commentator characterized the new system as permitting the General Staff to control all of the SDF assets from a single command center. 16 Third, Russian sources also claim that integration has both increased the survivability of top echelon command centers and improved the efficiency with which warning information is moved and orders are transmitted. 17 Reorganization of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces is scheduled to take in 1998. A second set of actions the continuing development, improvement and expansion of the C3 for strategic forces. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union engaged in a forty-plus year program of building underground command posts and leadership shelters. There are current reports that work continues at a number of these Cold War-era sites. This suggests continuing interest on the part of Russia defense decision makers in survivable command and control. In addition, the Russian military appears to be continuing to maintain and even upgrade a series of communications systems built by the Soviet General Staff. Starting in the 1970s, the Soviet General Staff and strategic services build a massive and redundant set of C3 capabilities that linked the General Staff and command centers of the strategic forces with operational units. The essential purpose of the Cold War-era system was to ensure positive launch control, that is the ability to launch a retaliatory strike. As such, it was the military which had control of the launch codes and which was responsible for the execution of launch orders. 18 One aspect of that system which has received attention in the West is the so-called "doomsday machine," a set of sensors co-located with some of Soviet command centers that could detect signs of nuclear detonations and respond by triggering the launch of specially-equipped ballistic missiles that, once launched, would transmit launch codes to the ballistic missile force. The apparent intent of this system, called Perimetr, was to provide a final launch enabling capability should the Soviet Union suffer a successful decapitating strike. 19 Public statements suggest that work is continuing on the Soviet-era strategic forces C3 systems, with the intent of increasing the degree of centralization. According to one source, at the Strategic Rocket Forces Central Command Post an integrated system for command and control of attack, reconnaissance and information forces has been created and is successfully operating. 20 Strategic Forces commander, Colonel General Yakovlev, is quoted in one article as saying that now "tactical control signals from the Central Command Post are guaranteed to reach the SRF subunits deployed near China within five to eight seconds." 21 This would appear to provide a rationale for the continuing expenditures on superhardened underground structures: a launch on attack strategy would be supportable if Russia possessed a centralized command and control structure housed in these underground retreats and, linked by secure, redundant communications to strategic launchers. 22 The expenditure on strategic forces C3 is also in keeping with the argument made by senior Russian military leaders that deterrence in the modern era is less a matter of the numbers of weapons on both sides as it is in their deterrence potential, meaning their ability to inflict a retaliatory attack even under the most unfavorable circumstances. 23 A third set of actions involves the restructuring of the strategic forces themselves, essentially downsizing the force, coupled to an effort at selected modernization. The reduction in overall numbers is mandated by Russia's economic situation, in addition to circumstances associated with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, arms control, etc. As a result, the air breathing and sea-based legs of the Russian nuclear triad have shrunk dramatically. 24 In addition, obsolescence of the residual force is an increasing problem. At present, according to one report, some 58 percent of strategic missiles are being operated beyond their guarantee period along with 31 percent of space launchers and 67 percent of orbiting hardware. 25 Other reports put the numbers of systems exceeding their age as even higher. In addition, there are some holes in the Russian early warning net due to a combination of the closing down of land-based early warning radars and the failure to replace space-based early warning satellites. While they recognize these weaknesses, Russian military leaders are quick to point out that their exercises indicate that their systems and the supporting C3 are operating with a high degree of reliability and technical performance. The Russians claim that the announced tests of SS-25s and SS-18s have all been successful, despite the fact that the latter have been in service more than twice their guaranteed operating time. 26 The Russians have held a number of strategic exercises in 1996 and 1997 to demonstrate both the reliability of their ICBM force and, more important, of their command and control system. The exercises, apparently successful, simulated stressing conditions including launch during a period of escalating conflict. 27 Most unclassified assessments suggest that Russia is seeking to stabilize its strategic force posture at the level of approximately 2,000-2,500 warheads. The centerpiece of the modernization program is the SS-27, or Topol-M, an advanced, single-RV ballistic missile which will be deployed in both a road-mobile and silo-based configuration. One description of the future Russian strategic force posture had a mix of approximately 200 silo-based SS-19s and SS-27s and 600 road-mobile SS-25s and SS-27s, some 1,200 warheads on 15 SSBNs (a mix of Delta IV and new Boray's, both armed with the new SS-N-28) and approximately 100 strategic bombers. 28 Depending on warning and deployment states, this would allow for a retaliatory strike of about 1,000 weapons, the bulk of which would be by SRF forces. 29 In addition, one source claims that the Topol-M would permit Russia to increase available warheads in response to a breakdown in arms reductions by deploying that system with three or four MRV warheads. 30 The Topol-M is also alleged to contain advanced features for penetrating ABM systems. 31 The last set of actions by the Russian military leadership involves investments in advanced technology to support a leap-frog into the RMA, early in the next century. The current plan is to apply savings achieved through restructuring and downsizing of the Armed Forces to the acquisition of advanced weapons and hardware. According to Minister of Defense Sergeyev, the goal of current investments in the Russian military-industrial complex is to develop breakthrough capabilities that are 10-15 percent ahead of all existing in the world. 32 Among the critical areas that Russian sources identify for investment in the future are: stealth and counter-stealth, automated control systems, information warfare capabilities, strategic delivery systems, and precision strike technologies. In conclusion, Russia's military leadership is implementing a reorganization and investment intended to provide Moscow with a strategic force with the following features: * Capable of launching, under the worst conditions, a retaliatory strike of up to 1,000 warheads; * Able to conduct flexible response options with strategic forces; * Able to maintain positive control over strategic forces in the face of both conventional and nuclear strikes; * Designed with the ability to respond to a breakdown in strategic arms control negotiations. Overall, the current C3 system for Russian strategic forces appears to be in relatively good shape technically, although admittedly, elements of it are obsolescent and there are concerns for the ability of the early warning net to cover some threat corridors. There appears to be little reason to worry about unauthorized launch or a truly accidental launch. In addition, the Russian military is taking steps to reduce the risk of inadvertent launches such as might occur due to warning errors in a crisis. The reorganization of strategic forces into the Strategic Deterrent Force is intended, in part, to ameliorate some of the impacts of aging. More important, however, it is intended to reduce the risk of unintended nuclear launches by more closely coupling warning forces to launch commanders and reducing the time necessary to transmit launch orders. This can have the effect of increasing the time available to make a decision, even in a crisis. Greater concerns should be focused on the combination of the new Russian doctrine of "flexible options," coupled to a command and control systems which permits the General Staff or other senior command echelons to send launch orders directly to firing units. The idea expressed by some analysts that Russia could employ nuclear weapons in a local conflict while controlling the escalation process is fraught with danger. Russian strategic miscalculation, not accidental launch, should be considered the greater source of threat to the U.S. A second source of threat is a political crisis in Russia in which the military fractures and factions seek to gain control of strategic forces in the struggle for internal power. The Russian military is increasingly politicized. Because of the technical and organizational reforms undertaken to make the SDF more responsive and secure, a small clique within the General Staff has the potential to gain control over strategic nuclear weapons. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. Dr. Daniel Gouré is the Deputy Director for Political Military Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); responsible for analyses of U.S. national security policy, U.S. domestic management, the future conflict of warfare, the information revolution, and counter proliferation. Directs analyses of emerging social issues, with a special emphasis on advanced technologies. 2. Dr. Sergey Rogov, Military Reform and the Defense Budget of the Russian Federation, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA, August 1997 3. Ibid, p. 45 4. Nikolai Sokov, "Russia's Approach to Nuclear Weapons," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 20, Num. 3, Summer, 1997, pp. 107-114 5. General M. A. Gareyev (Ret.), "Nuclear Weapons and Russia' Security: Specific Steps in the Cause of Disarmament are more Effective than Loud Declarations." Foreign Military Review, No. 43, November 13, 1997, p. 4 6. Professor V. Surikov, "Fate of the Weapons of Retribution: Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces on he Threshold of a New Century," Pravda Five, September 10, 1996, p. 1 7. Alexander Golts, "The Last Attribute of a Superpower," Itogi, No. 49, December 16, 1997, p. 29 8. Victor Starukhin and Gennadiy Kuznetsov, "The Basis of Strategic Stability, "Foreign Military Review, No. 31, August 22, 1997, p. 6 9. David Markov, "The Russians and Their Nukes," Air Force Magazine, February, 1997, pp. 40-43 10. "Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Russia: Today's Position of the Military-Political Elite and Prospects for its Transformation," Problems of Security, No. 20, December, 19976, pp. 3-5 11. Colonel V. Kruglov and Colonel M. Sosnovsky, "On the Role of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear Deterrence," Military Thought, No. 6, September, 1997, p. 12 12. So serious is the defense budget problem that Minister of Defense Rodionov was fired in May, 1997, allegedly for criticizing defense budget shortfalls, and replaced by Colonel General Sergeyev, former chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces 13. Pavel Felgengauer, "The Rocket Troops are Ready for Local Wars," Today, July 29, 1997, p.3 14. William and Harriet Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1979, pp.41-44 15. Yuri Golotyuk, "The Kremlin Gambles on Nuclear Shield and Sword: The Combat Efficiency of the Russian Nuclear Missile System has Increased 15 Percent," Russian Telegraph, November 19, 1997, p. 2 16. Igor Korotchenko, "Russia's Strategic Deterrent Forces," Foreign Military Review, February 8, 1997, p. 1 17. "With a High Degree of Reliability: Strategic Missile Forces Commander-in-Chief, Colonel General V. Yakovlev Answers Red Star's Questions," Red Star, December 17, 1997, p. 1 18. Valery Yarunich, "Russian Strategic Command and Control, Chapter 4, paper presented at the conference on ussian Missile Programs, the MTCR and the Future of U.S.-Russian Arms Control, Monterrey, California, July 21-22, 1995, pp. 5-17 19. Steven A. Zaloga, "Russian's Doomsday Machine," Jane's Intelligence Review, Volume 8, No. 2, February 1, 1996, p. 54 20. Goltz, op.cit., p. 30 21. Golotyuk, op. cit., p. 2 22. This possibility was suggested by Yarunich, op. cit., p. 24 23. "All are Responsible for the Security of the Fatherland," An interview with Colonel General V. Yakovlev, CinC of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Red Star, March 13, 1998, p. 1 24. For example, the majority of the Typhoon SSBNs have already been removed from service. See David Hoffman, "Shattered Shield: The Decline of Russia's Nuclear Forces, The Washington Post, March 16, 1998, p. A1 25. Ilya Kedrov, "In Brief," Foreign Military Review, No. 44, November 28, 1997, p. 1 26. "With a High Degree of Reliability," op. cit., p. 1 27. David Isby, "Russians Raise Strategic Exercise Numbers to Make a Point," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, Vol. 1, Number 8, November, 1997, p. 15 28. Surikov, op. cit., p. 1 29. Colonel General Yakovlev speaks of the SRF accomplishing 90 percent of the required tasks for strategic forces in the event of a surprise attack. See Golotyuk, op. cit. 30. Ibid, p. 5 31. Valentin Kunin, "Russia Develops 21st Century Strategic Weapons," News, February 20, 1998 32. Minister of Defense, I. Sergeyev, "Army Reform to Rely on Breakthrough Technology," ITAR-TASS, September 3, 1997


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