Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers


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Daniel Gouré 1 : "WMD and Ballistic Missiles in South Asia" Both India and Pakistan have sophisticated and, now, relatively well-advanced WMD and ballistic missile programs. For both states the acquisition, first, of WMD and, second, of longer-range delivery systems was a core national security and foreign policy interest. At this point in time, both countries are capable of delivery nuclear warheads using ballistic missiles, at least to battlefield ranges. It is likely that within a short period of time, both countries will have the capability to deliver such warheads to MRBM/IRBM ranges. India The Indian commitment to the development of a world-class nuclear energy and science infrastructure dates back almost to the day of independence. The ability to control nuclear energy was seen as both one of the most obvious symbols of first world status and as a means of addressing India's energy needs. India built its first nuclear research reactor in 1956 and its first power reactor in 1960. Currently India generates nearly 2,000 MW of power from nuclear energy. It has an extremely large and sophisticated nuclear infrastructure involving some 17 nuclear power plants, either operational or under construction, a number of government-backed nuclear research centers, and fuel and reprocessing facilities. India had announced a plan to build a 500 MW fast breeder reactor, apparently as part of an Indian program to develop a nuclear energy program based on thorium, which unlike uranium ore, India possesses in abundance. 2 The Indian pursuit of nuclear weapons was triggered by its losing 1962 war with India and that country's subsequent detonation of a nuclear device in 1964. At that time, India had access to spent fuel from the Canadian-supplied CIRUS research reactor and a newly built reprocessing plant. These capabilities allowed it to develop a nuclear "device" by 1974. Subsequent to that, India has constructed additional weapons-grade material producing reactors and reprocessing facilities. These allow the production of hundreds of kilograms of plutonium per year. 3 India is believed to have produced as many as 60 nuclear weapons. There have been no known nuclear tests beyond the first conducted in 1974. However, there are a few sources which suggest that India may have conducted tests of nuclear weapons using inert nuclear materials, U-238, as a substitute for plutonium. 4 Such an approach would allow India to conduct virtually all the testing necessary to validate the design and components of its weapons. Geography dictates India's requirement for long-range ballistic missiles. The longer-range versions of the Prithvi (250 and 300 km) have the capacity to hold at risk most strategic targets in Pakistan. However, they are relatively useless with respect to China. That country, on the other hand, can hold Indian targets at risk not only with its longer-range systems based in central and Eastern China, but with shorter-range systems deployed in Tibet. For India to be capable of striking critical Chinese targets, it requires a missile of some 2,500 km, reportedly the range of the Agni. India has pursued both a military missile and civil space launch capability. The military missile program, which began in the 1980s, and which centers on the short-range Prithvi and longer-range Agni missiles, is now part of an Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP), begun in the early 1990s. The purpose behind the IGMDP is to make India self-sufficient in the design and production of a full range of missiles, from anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles, through, at least, IRBMs. It should be noted that the director of the IGMDP, Dr. Kalam was originally with DRDO, then moved to ISRO to work on the SLV program, and returned to DRDO to lead the IGMDP. In organizing the IGMDP, India assumed that its efforts to develop a long-range ballistic missile capability and its opposition to the Missile Technology Control regime (MTCR), would result in denial of access to critical components. As a result, under, the IGMDP, India has pursued indigenous development of critical technologies such as phase shifters, advanced fiber optic and laser gyroscopes, carbon composites, VLSI microchips, and supercomputers and associated computational capabilities. 5 The Indian space launch program has developed at least two vehicles, the PSLV and GSLV, intended to support the launch of satellites, both of which can place large payloads into low-earth orbits. Critical technologies associated with the space launch systems are readily transferable to the Indian missile program. It should be noted that the first stage of the Agni is a version of the now obsolete Indian space launch vehicle (SLV), the precursor to the PSLV and GSLV. The SLV was, in turn, a design based on the venerable U.S. Scout rocket. More recently, India has received assistance from Russia in the development of cryogenic upper stage technology for the PSLV and GSLV. The Indian WMD and missile programs has been shaped in small part by that country's drive for self-sufficiency, a goal which they have been relatively successful at achieving with respect to critical design and production capabilities. At present, both India and Pakistan remain dependent, albeit to different degrees and in different technology areas, on foreign assistance, notably Russian and Chinese. Nevertheless, it may be a mistake to project India's future development path on the basis of what has come before. A combination of unpredictable factors, most notably the current policy of economic liberalization and the partial reversal of the "brain drain" of scientific talent out of India, could add both capability and energy to the Indian WMD and missile programs. Until about a decade ago, most research and development in fields related to WMD and ballistic missiles was the province of government institutions and laboratories. Relatively little advanced work in relevant fields was done in Indian universities. In addition, India industry was almost uninvolved in the R&D process. Production contracts for defense and space goods generally went to specialized, government-owned industries based on blueprints produced by the R&D sector. While the R&D sector had foreign contacts and benefited from collaborative research and even work abroad in foreign institutions and industries, the same was not true of Indian industry. Heavily subsidized or operating in protected markets, Indian industries had little incentive to innovative or diversify. The absence of competition, domestic or foreign, even in such sectors as white goods, transportation, and consumer electronics, resulted in a lack of attention to quality control. This resulted in chronic production problems and schedule slippage in Indian defense programs. Economic liberalization, begun almost a decade ago, is transforming the Indian economy and the face of Indian R&D. The opening of large sectors of the Indian market to foreign goods and overseas investment has forced domestic producers to radically change their business practices. Many companies have formed joint ventures with major overseas producers, the former gaining production and process technology and skills and the latter access to markets and indigenous sales networks. Liberalization has also brought with it an explosion of investment in India by foreign high technology firms. 6 Companies such as IBM, Phillips, Sun, Intel, NEC, Siemens, Motorola, Oracle, Mitsubishi, DASA, Alcatel, and others have set up laboratories and research centers in India, often in association with India's premier university-level educational institutions. Microsoft has opened its first research center outside the U.S. in Hyderabad. In most cases, creation of these R&D centers involves the transfer of equipment and know-how, including in a number of instances production equipment and source codes, to India. Many of these same companies provide scholarships for students at academic institutions associated with their R&D facilities. Liberalization has also radically changed the economic incentive structure and, hence, the behavior of Indian universities. For most of its modern history, Indian universities were state sponsored. 7 Research money was provided by state institutions, such as the Indian department of Science and technology or from foreign grant-making institutions such as the U.S. National Science Foundation. Under liberalization, Indian universities are given a fixed amount to cover basic operating expenses and encouraged to seek additional funds from work for the private sector. As a result, for the first time, the relatively untapped technical talent and research base of India's universities was made available to the private and public sectors. Each of the major Indian technical institutes has created a center for consultancy which serves as a clearing house for requests for support and assist the various university departments in developing proposals and organizing teams. One result of this change in behavior is a major increase in the level of support provided by Indian educational institutions to Indian government defense activities. Sponsored research from the Indian Defense Research Organization (DRDO), the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) and the Department of Atomic Energy of India (DAE) account for as much as eighty per cent of outside funding for some of the better departments at Indian universities. 8 Indian universities are now under contract to the above organizations for: the development of, top cite just a few example: air defense radars, the design of the Agni rocket engines, the design and construction of fiber optic and ring laser gyros, the development of cryptological systems, the creation of advanced heat resistant materials, the design and fabrication of laser targeting devices, computational fluid dynamics, the management of remote sensing data, the construction of electronic devices, small motors, VLSI chips and associated instruction sets, and automated target recognition and tracking systems. These institutions are also benefiting from a partial reversal of the "brain drain" of the past forty years. During most of its experience since Independence, India experienced a serious outflow of critical technical and scientific talent. Even today, more than 95% of the graduates of the premier Indian technical programs go abroad for advanced education, post-docs, etc. The latest estimates from both Indian and Western sources indicate between 25 and 30-000 Indian students attending Western graduate science and technology programs. 9 In that past, the vast majority of these students stayed in the West, often permanently. Depending on the year, there are between 50 and 80,000 Indian nationals working at various high technology companies and institutions in Western countries. Most of these are recruited directly from graduate schools. Still additional thousands of Indian scientists are annually invited to conduct research at a wide range of Western institutions. In the U.S. these have included Kirtland AFB, the Aeronautics Center at Wright Patterson, AFB, Rome Air Development Center, and various NASA centers and laboratories. This "brain drain" is beginning to reverse itself. One factor leading to a change in the pattern is the effort of Western technology corporations to open R&D centers in India, thereby providing the opportunity for Indian expatriates to return home. Indian universities and technical institutes are also seeing the return of younger professionals. In many instances these are individuals who have spent several years in the private sector abroad or teaching at Western - principally U.S. - universities, before returning. At more than three quarters of the twenty-five or so departments canvassed in a recent CSIS study, newly-hired professors were predominantly or exclusively returning Indians from major Western educational institutions and corporations. 10 The availability of consultancies and government-sponsored research provide additional sources of incomes is an important cause in their decision to return In addition to the changes discussed above, there is also the growth of opportunities for private companies, heretofore excluded from or unwilling to do work for the Indian government, to compete with existing government-funded companies. These companies bring with them the advantages of cost consciousness, a concern for efficiency, and greater access to Western dual-use technologies. In an effort to accelerate progress, the head of the Indian missile program, Dr. Kalam, is reported to have organized in the mid-1990s a first-ever consortium of institutions, including academic institutions and more than thirty non-defense industries. 11 The role of private companies in India's defense business is likely to progress slowly due to the resistance to change from both the government sector and the military. Nevertheless, over time, the increasing role of the private sector in supporting defense could add significantly to India's ability to develop and deploy advanced military equipment, particularly if those systems depend on technologies such as electronics, advanced materials, and computers/ software. Indian educational and research organizations suffer from a number of important deficits that could reduce the advantages gained from a fresh supply of talented individuals and access to Western know-how. These institutions tend to be hardware poor, lacking the kinds of sophisticated equipment common in Western laboratories and universities. Test and evaluation equipment also is in short supply. Both at universities and in industry as a whole. This is one reason why Western companies building R&D centers in India or contracting for research typically provide hardware and supporting test equipment to ensure the quality of the results meet Western standards. Overall, the changes identified above could support a revolution in Indian technological/industrial support for their defense and space programs. Access to an expanding pool of Western-trained, Western-experienced scientists, researchers and technicians could impart new energy to these programs. In addition, economic liberalization will require improvements in the sophistication and performance of Indian industry. These industries are likely to make an effort to compete with the traditional state-owned defense industries in an effort to gain defense funds. Pakistan For Pakistan, the motivation for developing WMD is clearly less one of economics or prestige, and almost exclusively an issue of national security. As Pakistan's former Prime Minister, Mohammed Sharif, stated in 1991: "we will eat one loaf of bread a day rather than forego our peaceful nuclear program." The experience of three Indo-Pakistan wars, the Russia-Indian defense relationship, and the U.S. arms embargo has served to focus Pakistan's attention on the importance of acquiring a WMD capability. It appears that the trigger for Pakistan's aggressive pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, which began in 1972, was Pakistan's defeat in the war over Bangladesh independence and evidence that India was on the threshold of constructing a `device." Unlike India, Pakistan has found it extremely difficult to develop an indigenous high technology/nuclear infrastructure and has had to rely on foreign sources. There are reports that the initial funding for the Pakistan nuclear program came from Libya Pakistan's program has had to rely on clandestine acquisition of materials and equipment and on assistance from China. Pakistan is said to have conducted the most successful nuclear smuggling campaign in history. In the development of a capability to produce nuclear weapons grade material, Pakistan illegally acquired the blueprints for a uranium separation facility from a Dutch firm as well as enrichment technology and know-how from a combination of German, British and Dutch companies. 12 Chinese assistance has been equally critical. It is known that China has provided critical technologies such a ring magnets to Pakistan's enrichment program. There are reports that China also provided Pakistan with the design of a nuclear weapon and may even have conducted a weapons test for Pakistan in China. 13 Pakistan's need for longer range systems is driven by its need to reach targets in central and southern India. While its HATF short-range missiles (80 km/300 km) could provide battlefield capability. Longer -range systems are required if Pakistan is to hold-at-risk strategic targets in India - for example the Indian missile and nuclear production complex in and around Mumbai (Bombay) or Hyderabad. In the early 1990s, China transferred a number of M-11 missiles (300 km) to Pakistan. The M-11 has a separating warhead and additional payload capacity making it desirable as a nuclear-weapons delivery system. China may also have provided Pakistan with an M-11 production facility. There are reports that Pakistan has acquired longer-range missiles from North Korea. The M-11 could not target India's major strategic centers. A missile such as the No Dong, with a 1,300-km range, would constitute a major improvement in Pakistan's capability. Better still would be the Taepo-Dong I missile with a range reported to be 2,400 km. These would allow Pakistan to hold all of India at risk. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. Dr. Daniel Gouré is the Deputy Director for Political Military Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; responsible for analyses of U.S. national security policy, U.S. domestic management, the future conflict of warfare, the information revolution, and counter proliferation. Directs analyses of emerging social issues, with a special emphasis on advanced technologies. 2. Brahma Chellany, "The Challenge of Nuclear Arms Control in South Asia," Survival, Vol. 35, No. 3, Autumn, 1993, pp. 124-125 3. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Enhancing Indo-US Strategic Cooperation, Adelphi Paper 313, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1997 4. Pravin Sawhney, Standing Alone: India's Nuclear Imperative," International Defense Review, Vol. 29, No. 11, November, 1996, p. 25 5. Sidhu, op. cit., pp. 26-27 6. For information on foreign R&D facilities in India see, Dr. Daphne Kamely and Dr. Daniel Goure, India Trip Reports, I&II, CSIS, for the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, December, 1997/March, 1998 7. There are more than one hundred major universities and educational institutions with strong technical and science programs in India. The most important of these are the six Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) located in New Delhi, Bombay, Madras, Cawnpore, Calcutta, and Gwalor, and the Indian Institute of Science (IIS) located in Bangalore. 8. Interviews with university administrators and faculty members at Indian universities and technical isntitutes. 9. Estimates based on NSF and Indian embassy data 10. Kamely and Goure, op. cit. 11. Sidhu, op. cit., pp.25-26 12. Chellany, op. cit., p. 123 13. Sawhiny, op. cit., p. 27


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