Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers


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Keith Payne and Robert Rudney: "The Unique Value of Ballistic Missiles for Deterrence and Coercion" Executive Summary A variety of motives lead proliferant states to choose ballistic missiles over alternative delivery platforms. An important factor in this regard is the intended purpose for ballistic missiles. Because the United States is a global power, a self-identified goal for some regional powers is to establish a deterrent capability against U.S. and allied force-projection, thereby gaining a "free hand" locally. When deterrence is the objective, the priority role for ballistic missiles and WMD may neither be to strike U.S. or allied targets, nor to achieve a militarily significant capability. Rather, the goal is to establish a sufficiently plausible ballistic missile/WMD threat to U.S. and allied civilian targets to deter U.S. and allied force projection. The distinctions here are between the intent to threaten a U.S. target for deterrence/coercive purposes as opposed to destroying it, and between seeking to shape U.S. will, not to battle the U.S. militarily. For this purpose, ballistic missiles combined with WMD offer significant advantages over other delivery platforms. These advantages include: 1. Missiles are an excellent deterrent threat as there are very limited defenses against them. 2. Missiles may be operationally effective on the battlefield, increasing the anticipated cost of U.S. and allied force projection. 3. Missiles are relatively cheap compared to air- and naval-delivered modes. 4. Missiles have a longer-range potential than available air and naval-delivered threats. 5. Missiles are secure, home-based systems. 6. Missiles are controllable, especially when compared with terrorist modes of delivery. 7. Missiles have prestige value. 8. Missiles are relatively survivable, especially when mobile. Despite serious economic and technical impediments, several countries are actively seeking to acquire a ballistic missile capability. There is a spectrum of motives that leads countries to acquire missiles, and to value them for certain purposes over alternative delivery platforms. Often, a missile capability addresses more than one concern, both internal and external, for a developing country's leadership. For example, missiles may be valued for prestige, as an export, for their operational capabilities, and/or for their potential as a deterrent. Most importantly for this report, some proliferator states seek weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile delivery systems for their potential deterrent effect on the United States and other Western powers. It is hoped that missiles, in combination with WMD, will deter U.S. force projection and thereby provide the proliferator with a "free-hand" to pursue its own regional objectives. The incentive to acquire missiles for deterrence purposes is strengthened by the open and sometimes lengthy U.S. political debate regarding military engagements, and the obvious U.S. sensitivity to casualties. Each of these factors contributes to a general perception that U.S. political will can be slow to coalesce and may be relatively easily deterred. Historically, this perception has been the basis for challengers, including Japan, Germany, and Iraq to anticipate achieving a fait accompli that the United States would be unwilling or unable to reverse. 1 Most important to note in this regard is that for deterrence purposes challengers do not need to launch a missile strike against the United States: the value of missiles is as a withheld threat intended to deter. Indeed, if a challenger employed its missiles and WMD, they likely would have failed in their primary role as a deterrent to U.S. force projection. The frequent assertion that "they would never dare" to strike the United States does not address this motive for acquiring missiles. The threat they pose in this manner has little to do with actual use per se; it is the effect that concern of their possible use will have on the willingness of U.S. leaders and allies to project power in regional crises. Anticipation of an effective deterrent to U.S. intervention may embolden some regional challengers to provocations that otherwise would have been deterred by the prospect of U.S. power projection. 2 That is, some regional challengers may themselves be undeterred by U.S. power from provocation in the belief that their missile and WMD capabilities will enable them to exploit the deliberative character of the U.S. political process and deter U.S. intervention for a useful period of time or entirely. As the OSD report, Proliferation: Threat and Response, observes: "The potential for coercion is perhaps the long-range ballistic missile's greatest value to a proliferator and the greatest challenge to those seeking to restrain that state." 3 This value applies not only to long-range missiles that could conceivably threaten the United States directly, but also to missiles capable of threatening U.S. expeditionary forces, regional assets and allies. Some proliferator states clearly value missiles and WMD as a means to deter and coerce their regional neighbors as well. There is direct evidence that many states in the developing world, particularly "rogue" states hostile to U.S. interests, see WMD and missiles in these terms, i.e., as means to deter and coerce their potential opponents, including the United States. The threat of missile strikes against population centers, and to a lesser extent forces in the field, are seen as compensatory when an opponent has numerical or technological superiority. Libyan leader Moammar Qadhafi explained this rationale explicitly in a 1990 speech: If they know that you have a deterrent force capable of hitting the United States, they would not be able to hit you. If we had possessed a deterrent--missiles that could reach New York--we would have hit it at the same moment. [reference to 1986 U.S. air strike on Tripoli] Consequently, we should build this force so that they and others will no longer think about an attack. 4 In late 1995, Qadhafi similarly asserted that "...As things stand today I would attack every place from where aggression against Libya was being planned. I would even be prepared to hit Naples where there is a NATO base." 5 In 1993 Serbian political leader Vojislav Seseij made missile threats against Italian cities in an ill-fated effort to deter Italy from serving as a base for NATO air operations. "We have FF-22(sic) missiles which can reach your country, but we will not target military compounds, because their defense is prepared. In case we are attacked, we will fire at your civilian targets." 6 Iran and Iraq see ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, in part, as a deterrent against the Israeli nuclear force, should either of these Islamic states enter into a conventional war with the Israelis. Kim Myong Chol, a North Korean writer living in Japan and reportedly with close ties to the North Korean government, has written that "in less than 10 years, North Korea will likely deploy an operational intercontinental ballistic missile force capable of hitting the American mainland." Kim also asserts that the North Korean leadership recognizes that missiles are "politically effective" instruments and that one of the steps Kim Jong-il could take to convince U.S. leaders that "war would be futile" would be to threaten long-range missile strikes against strategic targets like nuclear power stations and major population centers in Japan and the United States. 7 It is important to recall here that a primary motive for acquiring missiles is deterrence. The obvious limitations of relatively primitive missiles, such as limited payload and accuracy, are relatively insignificant for this basic mission. The goal is to shape U.S. and allied decision-making with regard to regional force projection. Some proliferant states obviously have judged that this mission does not necessitate sophisticated counterforce capabilities; a primitive countervalue threat is deemed sufficiently deterring to be of interest. China also recognizes the value of WMD and missiles for deterrence and coercion. China has used "test" launches of its TBMs, which landed in international waters very near Taiwan, in a self-defined attempt to intimidate voters during Taiwan's first democratic presidential election. A senior Chinese military leader also reportedly stated that the United States would not become involved in a conflict over Taiwanese independence because U.S. leaders "care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan;" a deterrent threat made possible by China's long-range missile capability. 8 The motive to acquire a deterrent, of course, is not limited to those countries hostile to the United States. In reference to the DF-3/ CSS-2 missiles Saudi Arabia purchased from China, Saudi Prince Sultan has observed: It was against this background of Iranian violence and persistent belligerence that, I assume, King Fahd decided that we needed a weapon to improve the morale of our armed forces and our people; a deterrent weapon not intended to be used, except as a last resort when it should be able to demoralize the enemy by delivering a painful and decisive blow; a weapon which once launched, could not be jammed or intercepted; a weapons which would make an enemy think twice before attacking us. The challenge was to find a country able to supply such a weapon at speed and without constraining conditions. 9 Thus, Saudi Arabia moved to acquire CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China. The following summarizes why ballistic missiles are particularly attractive to Third World countries as instruments of deterrence and coercion, in addition to several additional motives for missile acquisition. 1. Missiles are an excellent deterrent threat as there are very limited defenses against them. As noted by Saudi Prince Sultan above, post-launch survivability contributes to the attractiveness of ballistic missiles in comparison to manned aircraft. A 1998 National Air Intelligence Center report noted: "Missiles are attractive to many nations because they can be used effectively against an adversary with a formidable air defense system, where an attack with manned aircraft would be impractical or too costly. Missiles also have the advantage of fewer maintenance, training, and logistic requirements than manned aircraft." 10 In the words of one analyst, "[b]allistic missiles may be unique among weapons for their ability to affect perceptions in great disproportion to their actual ability to cause death and destruction." 11 The absence of active defense and sufficient warning time for civilian populations to seek secure passive protection, makes the ballistic missile an ideal instrument of civilian terror. The chaotic evacuation of Teheran in the wake of Iraqi missile attacks during the War of the Cities has already been cited. The German V-2 ballistic missile offensive in 1944-45 severely undercut civilian morale in London, even though these inaccurate missile attacks caused limited damage and casualties. 12 In each case missile attacks and the threat of attack against civilians had a political impact far out of proportion to their direct military significance. Even in use, reliable penetration to target helps make missiles an excellent means to demoralize an enemy, as demonstrated by the panic in Teheran during the Iran-Iraq war, 13 and by the significant slowing of the Israeli economy caused by the Israeli sheltering program during the 1991 Gulf War. Iraqi aircraft were mostly either destroyed or neutralized by being flown to Iran. The U.S. maintained air supremacy. It could not, however, effectively counter Iraqi ballistic missile attacks. This lesson has not been lost on the Iraqis and other proliferator-states. Moreover, penetration of air defense systems requires the incorporation of a number of highly sophisticated and expensive systems in combat aircraft. As W. Seth Carus states: High performance engines are needed to move the plane through enemy airspace as quickly as possible, shortening its exposure to enemy air defenses. Sophisticated navigation and attack systems are needed, including high quality radar, to allow a pilot to locate and designate the intended target at distances beyond the reach of antiaircraft weapons. The aircraft must be equipped to operate stand-off munitions that can be released at long ranges. Finally, they must be equipped with sophisticated self-protection systems, including warning devices to detect enemy air defense radar and missiles and electronic countermeasures to defeat radar-guided and infrared homing guns and missiles. 14 2. Missiles may be operationally effective on the battlefield, increasing the anticipated cost of U.S. and allied force projection. A challenger could use missiles to threaten regional targets critical to U.S. expeditionary forces, including airfields, ports, staging areas, depots, C3I, troop concentrations, ships and amphibious landing areas, and maneuver forces. Such threats, by driving up the expected costs of U.S. intervention and discouraging allied participation, are considered an excellent tool for deterring U.S. regional force projection. A number of analyses suggest that for these types of missions, aircraft may be more cost effective delivery vehicles. 15 However, for developing countries, missiles may indeed be the "best available" option. This is particularly true for states which would otherwise have to fly against highly advanced air defenses such as those of the U.S. or Israel. Missiles can also serve operational objectives on the battlefield to degrade U.S. force projection capabilities and thereby challenge U.S. political will. Even if the U.S. maintained air superiority, missile attacks against the U.S./coalition rear can critically disrupt logistics and communications, particularly during a vulnerable deployment such as a long-distance intervention. 16 This ability to create havoc behind the front lines can be intensified by arming missiles with CW or BW. Detection of even traces of CW or BW would result in tedious, time-consuming passive defense precautions. There is considerable evidence to demonstrate that North Korea perceives ballistic missiles, possibly armed with WMD, as "an important means of augmenting its large conventional land forces in the event of a conflict on the peninsula." 17 Similarly, for a country like Syria, ballistic missiles can threaten significant operational effectiveness for pre-war deterrent purposes; including, for example, surprise attacks (conceivably with CW or BW) against Israeli military installations to disable airfields, to neutralize Israeli air assets and to slow down Israeli mobilization. As Dr. Dore Gold, Israel's UN Ambassador and a noted strategist, writes: "...[U]nder conditions of surprise attack, the Israeli Air Force would have virtually no time to reduce adversarial formations before both sides' ground forces engaged. With the eventual modernization of Middle Eastern missile forces through increases in missile accuracy, future missile barrages on Israeli air bases could disrupt any early Israeli air campaign in support of outnumbered Israeli ground units." 18 Gold cites military analyst Major General (res.) Israel Tal who warns: "In the future it will be possible to begin wars at the first stage with firepower and not with mobility, with all its open preparations. This is one of the great dangers that exists with missiles." 19 Missile quantities can conceivably substitute for quality on the battlefield. It is likely that "[s]tates with more launch capability than demonstrated by Iraq during the Gulf War will launch large scale salvo attacks against high priority targets, with smaller numbers of missiles being directed against targets of opportunity. Salvo attacks maximize damage and compensate for the inaccuracy of older technology missiles." 20 Missiles can also be fired at night when aircraft may not be able to operate effectively. And, missiles with primitive nuclear explosives could threaten U.S. low-orbit systems. 3. Missiles are relatively cheap compared to air- and naval-delivered modes. There is also an economic motive to prefer missiles over alternative platforms for deterrent and operational purposes. The OSD report states that "[m]issiles are much less expensive than acquiring and maintaining a world-class air force competitive with U.S. military aviation." 21 In this respect, missiles require less maintenance, training, and logistics than manned aircraft. 22 Effective pilot training represents a particularly heavy cost for developing nations. According to the Office of Technology Assessment: "To the extent that cost matters in delivering a nuclear weapon, it is probably the total cost of acquiring a delivery capability--not the cost per ton of payload--that is relevant. Here, missiles (ballistic or cruise) have a strong advantage, since they are generally cheaper than advanced aircraft." 23 Even a conventional attack by combat aircraft requires a retinue of expensive support aircraft and other systems. For attacks against Libya in 1986, the U.S. Navy used more than 70 aircraft but only 14 actually dropped bombs. Other missions for support aircraft included defense suppression, electronic jamming, command and control, tanker support, and air cover. 24 Similarly, land-based missile systems do not require the extensive support that is needed to maintain and protect sea-based systems. For some countries like North Korea, ballistic missiles offer an instrument to threaten well beyond national borders without the costs involved in long-range military aviation or a blue-water navy. Indeed, North Korea clearly views missiles as a positive economic asset. They offer a key export commodity and source of scarce hard currency, as well as a means of supporting research and development on more advanced missiles. These exports also serve to gain influence in key areas like the Middle East and South Asia. 25 DIA reportedly believes the North Korean No Dong to be designed as a system for export. An initial customer is likely to be Iran, which reportedly has been closely involved with the North Korean SCUD programs and the No Dong program. 26 In addition to the supply of whole systems, the sale of technologies and expertise is also a motive to develop a credible missile capability. For example, in March and April of 1996, North Korea reportedly shipped materials and equipment to Egypt which "could allow Egypt to begin SCUD C series production." 27 In addition, some non-governmental, and perhaps governmental, entities in the states of the former Soviet Union apparently see their missile technology base as a source of revenue. Sophisticated Russian guidance technology was reportedly intercepted in Jordan on its way to Iraq. According to reports, the guidance components may have been designed for ICBMs. 28 In addition to the obvious functional motives for missile acquisition, there are also internal circumstances which lead countries to pursue missile capabilities. For example, in India the military-technical infrastructure is both highly-capable and independent in what it chooses to explore. In many respects, Indian decisions on missile technology owe more to the interests of the military-technology infrastructure than to driving Army or Air Force missions and requirements (e.g., the Prithvi program had been underway for almost seven years before the Army became directly involved). 29 Acquisition of missile components and technologies may be justified for both military and commercial space launch reasons. 4. Missiles have a longer-range potential than available air and naval-delivered threats. Ballistic missile ranges permit states with otherwise limited power projection capabilities to threaten distant opponents. Chinese deterrence policy vis-a-vis the United States presently is based on fewer than 25 DF-5 ICBMs, with a 13,000 km. range. 30 Neither its SLBM nor its bomber force can threaten CONUS at this time. North Korea is developing its Taepo Dong 2 IRBM with the estimated capability to target U.S. Pacific facilities and territories, in addition to parts of Alaska. 31 For its part, Iran is completing the 1300-km. range Shahab-3 that could target Israel and is reportedly developing the even longer range Shahab-4 that can threaten Europe. Before the Gulf War, Iraq was reportedly working on a long-range ballistic missile that could threaten targets in Western Europe. It should be noted that the Chinese model for missile development and deterrence/coercion was a self-conscious program to expand targeting range: to threaten U.S. regional facilities as Chinese missile programs allowed greater range and ultimately the capability to target the United States itself. North Korea and possibly Iran appear to be consciously pursuing a similar model. Of course, many Third World targets are relatively close to their potential attackers. Seoul is less than 50 kilometers from the North Korean border. Distances between key Middle East targets are also short. Consequently, ballistic missiles of modest range (Scuds or SS-21s) provide the potential for regional deterrence and coercion. 5. Missiles are secure, home-based systems. Ground-based ballistic missiles can be deployed on sovereign territory, thus obviating the risks of sea-basing or dependence on external air bases. 32 This factor is particularly important for an isolated state like North Korea with few friends, a desire for tight central control, and a growing risk of regime destabilization. Command and control (and political reliability), particularly if WMD payloads are involved, are seen as more easily maintained in a missile force based at tightly-controlled facilities. 6. Missiles are controllable, especially when compared with terrorist modes of delivery. A great deal of attention has recently been paid to the possibility of attack by the "smuggled bomb," i.e., bringing WMD to a target (conceivably to CONUS) by covert means, possibly using terrorist networks. A frequent assertion is that ballistic missiles pose no unique threat because WMD could be deployed aboard a barge, smuggled in on a Cessna, etc. While such scenarios should be of concern, they are largely dismissed as "not serious" by the professional military in proliferant states because of the lack of reliable control over smugglers and saboteurs. The political cultures in regimes such as Iraq, North Korea, and Iran are unsympathetic to giving control of an extraordinarily destructive and valuable device over to covert operatives, to move out-of-country, where they may not be subject to sufficient control. In addition, such scenarios also are largely inconsistent with the purpose of deterrence. Operations such as the sabotage scenarios identified above are, for good reason, covert. Deterrence however, is based on the possession of a threat that is sufficiently familiar to the opponent to be regarded as credible. That credibility is best served by a threat that is well-established and even visible, i.e., well-known to the opponent. For this purpose, ballistic missiles are often paraded in public by proliferator states to demonstrate national competence and to serve as a warning to its neighbors and to any Western power contemplating intervention. The 1996 Chinese missile "tests" in the Taiwan Strait were another example of telegraphing a political message by demonstrating missile delivery capability. From this perspective, ballistic missiles are eminently more reliable, controllable, and visible than the oft-suggested smuggler. Because deterrence and coercion is the objective--not destroying a target--reliability, control, and visibility are critical. 7. Missiles have prestige value. Missiles are also acquired as symbols of power and prestige. Some regimes in the developing world see a missile force as a talisman which imparts international respect and ushers them into the company of the great powers: "Much like the dreadnought at the beginning of this century, ballistic missiles are seen as symbols of power and prestige. Because the great powers have such delivery systems, less-developed countries aspire to them as well." 33 Reports suggest, for example, that China's objections to U.S. regional missile defense plans stem in part from concern that BMD deployment would undermine the prestige conferred by China's nuclear missile capability. 34 In another vein, Ukraine's unwillingness to give up its SCUD Bs as a prerequisite for MTCR membership may simply be an issue of national pride. 35 North Korea's ballistic missile program is critical to the regime's self-perception because, as a diplomatic bargaining chip, it forces the United States to negotiate on a one-to-one basis, excluding South Korea. Other countries share similar perceptions of the symbolic value of missiles. Again, according to the Saudi prince charged with creating the Saudi Strategic Missile Force: The acquisition of strategic missiles represented a turning point in Saudi Arabia's defense strategy, and must be placed in the context of the proliferation of missile systems which has characterized the region in recent years. Besides reinforcing Saudi Arabia's defenses, the creation of a Saudi Strategic Missile Force reflected the Kingdom's growing responsibilities in the Middle East, in the Muslim world as a whole, and on the world stage. 36 8. Missiles are relatively survivable, especially when mobile. Another important characteristic of a deterrent threat is its survivability. This is a well-known tenet of U.S. deterrence policy. Here too, missiles offer some important advantages as instruments of deterrence and coercion. In addition to their post-launch survivability, missiles can be highly-survivable prior to launch. Missiles can be mounted on mobile launchers and hidden from attacking forces, as demonstrated by the successful Iraqi concealment and camouflage tactics during the Gulf War. When not in flight, aircraft are vulnerable targets located at specific bases or airfields that can be disabled. The Gulf War experience has impressed itself on proliferator countries: the North Korean No Dong is road-mobile, as are the Indian Prithvi and the Pakistani Hatf. 37 The Indian Agni follow-on is listed as "mobile," while the new Pakistani MRBM is described as road-mobile. All of Iran's missiles are on mobile launchers. 38 Conclusion Because the United States is a global power, the prospect of U.S. force projection often is a concern to local powers seeking a "free hand" in their region--particularly those "rogue" states with self-expressed hostility toward the United States. One reason such states prefer ballistic missiles over alternative delivery platform missiles is for their expected deterrent and coercive potential vis-a-vis the United States. Ballistic missiles have unique characteristics that are particularly valuable for deterrence and coercion. They are relatively survivable, inexpensive, visible, subject to close control, and have a potential effect on civilian morale that may outweigh their military significance. Alternatives such as air and naval platforms, or sabotage are relatively disadvantageous for deterrent purposes. Thinking of the United States as a target of deterrent threats, as opposed to the issuer of threats may be difficult. To understand the attraction of WMD and ballistic missiles, however, the traditional U.S. role as deterrer must be put aside. Acquiring a deterrent WMD/missile capability is important to some "rogue" leaders not because they intend to destroy U.S. targets, but because they see value in "trumping" U.S. force projection capabilities with WMD deterrent threats. They seek to attack what they regard as the vulnerabilities of U.S. will. It is in this context that the unique value of missiles is obvious and frequently so identified by military and political experts and leaders in the developing world. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. This view, although difficult for many Americans to understand, clearly played a role in the Japanese attack in 1941, Hitler's declaration of war against the United States in 1941, China's decision to enter the Korean War, and Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The traditional U.S. sensitivity to casualties now extends not only to taking casualties, but to inflicting them. Note the U.S. concern about Iraqi casualties on the "highway of death" during the Gulf War. See for example, CBS, CBS Reports: The Gulf War +5, 18 January 1996, transcript by Burrelle's Information Services. 2. Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1996) p. 30. 3. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 1996) p. A-7. 4. Speech by Qadhafi at a meeting of students of the Higher Institute for Applied Social Studies at the Great al-Fatih University, 18 April 1990, Tripoli Television Service, 19 April 1990; in FBIS Daily Report: Near East and South Asia (FBIS-NES-90-078) 23 April 1990, p. 8. Abul Abbas, head of the Palestine Liberation Front, has made similar comments: "...revenge takes 40 years; if not my son, then the son of my son will kill you. Some day, we will have missiles that can reach New York." And, "I would love to be able to reach the American shore, but this is very difficult... Some day an Arab country will have ballistic missiles. Some day an Arab country will have a nuclear bomb. It is better for the United States and for Israel to reach peace with the Palestinians before that day." See, "A Terrorist Talks About Life, Warns of More Deaths," Wall Street Journal, 10 September 1990, p.1; and, "Terror Chief Threatens Onslaught in Europe," London Sunday Times, 23 September 1990, p. 2. 5. Reuters, 10:45 EST, 31 December 1995 (mimeo). See also "Gadhafi ready to use missiles," Minneapolis Star Tribune, 1 January 1996, p. A4. 6. Quoted in, RFE/RL Research Institute, RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 91, May 13, 1993, p. 3-4. 7. Kim Myong Chol, "North Korea prepared to fight to the end as Kim Jong-il has his own version of The Art of War," Asia Times, 10 April 1996, p. 9. 8. Patrick Tyler, "As China Threatens Taiwan, It Makes Sure U.S. Listens," New York Times, 24 January 1996, p. A3. 9. HRH General Khaled Bin Sultan, Desert Warrior, (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), p. 145. 10. National Air Intelligence Center, "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat," Wright-Patterson AFB, NAIC-1031-0985-98 (1998), p. 1 11. Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1996) p. 47-48. 12. Robin Ranger, "Theater Missile Defenses: Lessons from British Experiences with Air and Missile Defenses," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 12, No. 4 (October-December 1993), pp. 405-407. 13. Proliferation Study Team, The Emerging Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (Fairfax, VA: National Security Research, Inc., February 1993) p. 5. 14. W. Seth Carus, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: Praeger/Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1990) p. 29. 15. For example, see John Harvey, "Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced Strike Aircraft," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2, Fall 1992, pp. 41-83. 16. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 1996) p. A-7. 17. Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 4. 18. Dore Gold, "The Geopolitics of Arab-Israeli Diplomacy in the 1990s: Security, Territory, and Peace," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 12, No. 4 (October-December 1993), p. 392. 19. Cited in Ibid, p. 392. 20. Proliferation: Threat and Response , p. A-7. 21. Ibid. 22. National Air Intelligence Center, "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat," Wright-Patterson AFB, NAIC-1031-0985-98 (1998), p. 1 23. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, December 1993) p. 199. 24. Janne E. Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991) p. 70. 25. Proliferation: Threat and Response , p. 4. 26. Andrew Rathmell, "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Jane's Intelligence Review: Special Report No. 6, June 1995, pp. 18-22. According to some reports, the new Pakistan missile, the Ghauri, is derived from the North Korean No Dong. "Ghauri, A North Korean Missile Variant," The Hindu, 2 May 1998, p. 8. 27. Evan Medeiros, "Egypt Received Scud Missile Parts from North Korea, Report Says," Arms Control Today, Vol. 26, No. 5, July 1996, p. 25. 28. R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.N. is Said to Find Russian Markings on Iraq-Bound Military Equipment," Washington Post, 15 December 1995, p. A30. 29. Greg Gerardi, "India's 333rd Prithvi Missile Group," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 7, No. 8, August 1995, p. 361. 30. National Air Intelligence Center, "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat," p. 13. 31. National Air Intelligence Center, "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat," p. 8. 32. Proliferation Study Team, The Emerging Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, p. 5. 33. Proliferation Study Team, The Emerging Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, p. 5. 34. Patrick Tyler, "China Warns Against `Star Wars' Shield for U.S. Forces in Asia," New York Times, 18 February 1995, p. 4. 35. Jeff Erlich, "Scud Missile Cache Stymies Ukraine Effort to Join MTCR," Defense News, 30 September-6 October 1996, p. 46. 36. HRH General Khaled Bin Sultan, Desert Warrior, (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), p. 138. 37. National Air Intelligence Center, "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat," pp. 5, 9. 38. Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 27.


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