Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers
David R. Tanks 1 : "Ballistic Missiles in South Asia: Are ICBMs a Future
India and Pakistan are both seeking indigenous ballistic missile
capabilities. Pakistan is desperate for a missile-delivered nuclear
deterrent against India's superior power; it also has some concerns that
Israel might mount a preemptive attack against its nuclear and missile
development sites. Conversely, while India finds Pakistan annoying, its
primary security concern is China. India worries about China's superior
military capabilities (proven in the 1962 Indo-Chinese border conflict) and
is envious of the international recognition and prestige that China has
garnered as a missile-armed nuclear power. Thus, India is driven to develop
advanced military capabilities by two factors: its military security
vis-à-vis China and its intense desire to gain international prestige
commensurate to that accorded other major powers (especially China). 2 On
the other hand, China is clearly assisting Pakistan to develop its nuclear
and missile capabilities as a means of diverting India's attention from
Sino-Indian differences. 3
As complicating factors, both India and Pakistan hold a special hatred for
the other, both are very sensitive to slights to their national
sovereignty, and both (especially India) resent the United States for
treating their missile development efforts differently from that of other
states (e.g., Saudi Arabia's acquisition of DF-3 missiles from China,
Israel's development of the Jericho I and II, and Japan's development of a
family of space launch vehicles). 4 In short, many Indians believe the
United States is conspiring to thwart Indian efforts to gain their rightful
share of international prestige and influence. 5
However, both India and Pakistan are desperately poor states and thus
vulnerable to international sanctions. As a result, the United States has
been partially successful in using export restrictions and sanction threats
to slow the rate at which Indian and Pakistani missiles and weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) have been developed. Notwithstanding this partial
success, nuclear and missile capabilities are continuing to grow in South
Asia. The key questions that will be explored in this paper are: What is
happening in South Asia with regard to nuclear and missile development and
what is the prognosis for the future?
A Look at India
India is generally credited with having sufficient fissile material to
build 60-200 nuclear weapons, with most reports placing the figure at
85-100. 6 Regardless of the actual numbers, India is a nuclear power, but
one that is very uncertain of the reliability of its nuclear weapon
designs. As will be shown, India's nuclear-design uncertainties act as a
brake on its offensive missile development program.
Nuclear development. India's only test of a nuclear device occurred in 1974
when it detonated a 12 KT (or less) plutonium fission device in a 107 meter
deep hole at Pokran in the Rajasthan desert (near the Pakistani border). 7
India termed the test a "peaceful nuclear explosion." As a matter of
policy, Indian scientists have always defined a nuclear weapon as a warhead
mated with a delivery system. 8 Thus, by definition, India can claim that
it has no nuclear warheads. However, Indian scientists and engineers have
worked steadily since 1974 to refine and expand India's nuclear capability.
For example, reports surfaced in 1985 that India was working on a
thermonuclear device. 9 The veracity of those reports was strengthened when
in 1989 the Director of U.S. Central Intelligence told a Senate
Subcommittee that India was seeking to purify Lithium-6, which he called an
"indication of interest" in thermonuclear devices. 10 In the same time
frame, fusing tests were carried out by the Indian military to verify that
a nuclear bomb could be attached and released from Indian aircraft. 11 From
1980 onward, pressure has been building in India to conduct another nuclear
test. Indian scientists are anxious to measure the efficiency of new
approaches to bomb-making "including miniaturization of warheads and new
triggering mechanisms." 12 It is believed that the "miniaturized warheads"
are boosted fission devices. Moreover, there have been recurring reports
that India has developed a thermonuclear device. 13 One report even claimed
that the attempted nuclear test in December 1995 (canceled under U.S.
pressure) was of a "hydrogen" device. 14 Yet, without testing, Indian
scientists and policymakers cannot be certain that India's thermonuclear
weapon design will function or that other states will credit India as being
a nuclear power. 15 Indians routinely note that China was not given much
international respect until it developed nuclear weapons and missile
In terms of nuclear nonproliferation, since India has an extensive civil
and military nuclear program, which includes 10 nuclear reactors, uranium
mining and milling sites, heavy water production facilities, a uranium
enrichment plant, fuel fabrication facilities, and extensive nuclear
research capabilities, 16 it is now impossible to stop India's nuclear
program by means of a nuclear export control regime. In the future, India
plans to commission fast-breeder reactors, thorium 232 reactors (which will
yield U233--a plutonium-type substance), and nuclear-powered submarines. 17
In short, India has the capability of becoming an overt nuclear power if it
is willing to absorb the short-term economic and political pain that the
resulting international sanctions would inflict.
Missile Programs. India has methodically built an indigenous missile
production capability, using its commercial space-launch program to develop
the skills and infrastructure needed to support an offensive ballistic
missile program. For example, during the 1980s, India conducted a series of
space launches using the solid-fueled SLV-3 booster. Most of these launches
put light satellites into near-earth orbit. Elements of the SLV-3 were
subsequently incorporated into two new programs. In the first, the new
polar-space launch vehicle (PSLV) was equipped with six SLV-3 motors
strapped to the PSLV's first stage. 18 More importantly, the Agni IRBM
technology demonstrator uses the SLV-3 booster as its first stage. 19 In
short, India's missile program routinely adapts previously developed space
technology to new applications. It is well worth the time to review the key
* Prithvi. The Prithvi I is mobile liquid-fueled 150 kilometer tactical
missile currently deployed with army units. It is claimed that this
missile is equipped only with various conventional warheads (which
stay attached to the missile over the entire flight path). The missile
is of particular interest to the United States (and potential buyers)
in that has the capability of maneuvering in flight so as to follow
one of six different preprogrammed trajectories. 20 Based on the same
design, a modified Prithvi, the Prithvi II, is essentially a
longer-ranged version of the Prithvi I except that it has a
250-kilometer range and a lighter payload. (It is suspected that any
nuclear missions will be executed by the Prithvi II.) Currently, the
Prithvi II has completed development and is now in production. When
fielded, it will be deployed with air force units for purpose of deep
target attack against objectives such as air fields. For the Indian
Navy, a 350-kilometer version of the Prithvi is under development. The
new system is being called the Dhanush, testing is planned to begin in
December 1998. 21 It is unclear whether or not this system will be
deployed on India's new nuclear missile submarine (under
* Agni. The 2500-kilometer Agni technology demonstrator uses the SLV-3
booster for its first stage and a liquid-fueled Prithvi for its second
stage. Three test shots were conducted before the U.S. successfully
pressured India into suspending testing (1994). Of particular
interest, the Agni tests demonstrated that India can develop a
maneuvering warhead that incorporates endo-atmospheric evasive
maneuvers and terminal guidance in the reentry vehicle. India has also
developed the carbon-carbon composite materials needed for long-range
missile components and reentry vehicle ablative coatings. 22 Recent
Indian articles have proposed that the 4000 to 5000-kilometer Agni II
project be aggressively pursued. 23 Unlike the Agni I, the Agni II
will have a solid-fueled second stage. 24 Although India has claimed
that the Agni would be equipped with a conventional warhead, the cost
of the missile cannot be justified unless it is used as a nuclear
delivery vehicle. It is clear that one of the major constraints for
this program is the lack of a proven nuclear warhead. Nuclear testing
is a key related issue. India developed its own thermonuclear design
which has not been tested; India also lacks a data base of nuclear
test results upon which to develop a computer simulation model.
* PSLV. The Polar Space Launch Vehicle is a 44.4-meter four-stage
missile comprised of a huge 9.2 ft diameter booster equipped with six
SLV-3 strap-ons, a 9.2 ft diameter liquid-fueled second stage, a
solid-fueled third stage, and a liquid-fueled fourth stage. The
Indians claim that the first stage generates nearly one-million pounds
of thrust. 25 This missile has successfully launched a 1200 kilogram
(5-meter resolution) Indian imaging satellite into an 800-kilometer
high orbit in September 1997. 26 During its next excursion, this
missile will triple-launch a reconnaissance satellite and two
piggy-backed light-weight satellites in an attempt to prove the
missile's value to the commercial space-launch world. 27
Unfortunately, some of the skills required to launch three satellites
on separate trajectories from the same missile also contribute to
building the prerequisite skills necessary to aim MIRVed warheads.
* GSLV. This three-stage missile will allow payloads of 2500 kilograms
to be lifted to geo-transfer orbit, 22,000-miles high. The missile
will use the first two stages (a solid and a liquid) of the PSLV, but
replace the third and fourth stages with a single cryogenic stage. In
addition, the six solid-fueled strap-on motors used in PSLV launches
will be replaced with four 9.2 ft diameter liquid-fueled strap-ons,
which are being adapted from the PSLV's 40-ton second stage. 28 This
missile is expected to make its maiden launch in first-quarter 1999.
* Surya. The Surya is an unconfirmed ICBM program that has been
discussed repeatedly in the Indian press. It is reported that the
program began in 1994; the missile design is thought to be based on
the PSLV. Although the existence of this program is doubted by some,
the amount of public discussion, to include budget figures, have led
many analyst to suspect that such a program exists. 30 It is generally
thought that the missile will have a range of 8000-12,000 kilometers.
If such a missile should achieve a 12,000 kilometer range, it would be
able to strike targets in the United States north of an arc extending
from Raleigh, NC to Eugene, OR (if launched from New Delhi).
India's missile program did not reach its current stage unaided, it was
nourished by imports of critical technologies and components from countries
such as the United States, France, Germany, Israel, and Russia. Some of
these imports were overt, some clandestine. 31 Although the United States
has acted in recent years to curtail such activity (mainly through the
MTCR), reports persist of continued Russian and Israeli involvement in
India's space and missile programs. 32 While Indian commentary acknowledges
that MTCR restrictions have slowed their missile program, the program is
continuing to make progress.
A Review of Pakistan
Pakistan is generally credited with having fissile material for 10-30
nuclear weapons. 33 Pakistan's original nuclear design was based on a
uranium implosion design that was obtained from China during the early
1980s. The design was tested by China in 1966 as part of its fourth nuclear
test. 34 China's fourth test live-fired a missile 894 kilometers to Lop Nur
where its warhead detonated with a yield of about 12 KT. Thus, Pakistan
received a tested nuclear design, one that is known to function. 35 As will
be discussed, Pakistan has been moving forward with its nuclear
development, but its missile program lags behind India's. The question is,
"How much will Chinese and North Korean assistance change that equation?"
Nuclear developments. Dr. A. Q. Khan, a German-educated metallurgist, was
previously employed at the uranium enrichment facility (URENCO) in Almelo,
Netherlands. In 1975, one year after India exploded its nuclear device, Dr.
Khan left URENCO taking with him a copy of the uranium centrifuge
blueprints and a list of URENCO's key suppliers. Shortly thereafter, he was
appointed to his current position as the director of Pakistan's
nuclear-weapon laboratories at Kahuta. He has also been a major force in
Pakistan's missile development program.
During the intervening years, Pakistan has developed an extensive nuclear
program. Much of the materials needed for this program were obtained from
the West, to include Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Canada, and the United
States. 36 In this effort, Pakistan successfully created dummy companies,
trans-shipped dual-use materials through multiple counties, or out right
stole or smuggled needed components. 37 During recent years, the United
States has tried to contain Pakistan, but those efforts have not been
totally successful since Pakistan's underground procurement network,
coupled with Chinese assistance, has continued to provide the needed tools,
materials, and technical knowledge required. 38
The intelligence community has credited Pakistan with miniaturizing and
packaging their nuclear device for missile delivery, although there is some
doubt as to the degree that effort has been successful. 39 Moreover,
Pakistan completed an unsafeguarded 40-50 MW PHWR reactor at Khushab in
1996. 40 Russian special service experts claim Pakistan is now producing
plutonium. As a result, Pakistan should be able to construct 1-3
plutonium-based warheads per year which are smaller, lighter, and more
powerful than those based on a uranium design. As a result, Pakistan's
future missile-delivered nuclear potential should improve. 41
Missiles. Pakistan established, with U.S. assistance, a civilian-based
research organization (SUPARCO) in 1961. This organization developed two
rockets with limited range and payload capacity. Around 1980, Pakistan
embarked on a program designed to produce indigenously constructed
ballistic missile systems for military use. The current program includes
both liquid- and solid-fueled missiles, both of which are benefiting from
Chinese and North Korean assistance.
* Hatf I (Hatf: name of the Holy Prophet's sword). Unconfirmed reports
indicate the 80-kilometer Hatf I missile was shelved following three
unsuccessful test flights. 42 Other reports claim that a few copies of
the missile were produced and are believed to be armed with chemical
warheads. 43 Regardless of the current status of the Hatf I, it is a
relatively inconsequential missile system.
* Hatf II. The 300-kilometer indigenously developed Hatf II missile
project may have been an unsuccessful endeavor in that the missile
system reportedly experienced persistent problems with directional
control. It is believed that the original indigenous development
program may have been shelved. 44
* Chinese M-11 (Hatf II?). China began supplying solid-fueled M-11
missiles to Pakistan around 1991 (or perhaps before). This missile has
a 300-kilometer range carrying a 500-800 kilogram warhead. While the
estimates of M-11s in Pakistan's possession range from 30-84 systems,
the actual number of M-11s in Pakistan's inventory is likely near the
upper end of the scale. 45 It is also known that China assisted
Pakistan with the construction of an M-11 missile assembly plant; a
team of Chinese technicians reportedly provide technical advise and,
as needed, rotate special teams to the plant to deal with particular
problems. This on-site assistance seems to be augmented with training
in China for Pakistani missile technicians. 46 It is likely that
recent Pakistani references to a Hatf II missile system refers to the
Chinese M-11 missile. 47
* Hatf III (M-9 or modified M-11?). In July 1997 a story broke in South
Asia that Pakistan had tested an 800-kilometer missile. A couple of
days later, the Pakistani Government acknowledged that a missile had
been tested, but did not identify its range. Shortly thereafter,
former Pakistani army chief, General Beg, said the range of the Hatf
III should be increased to 800 kilometers. It is widely believed in
India that the missile in question is a 600-kilometer Chinese M-9. 48
Conversely, most U.S. reports claim that the missile is an improved
M-11. Either way, Pakistan apparently has a 600-km solid-fueled
* Ghauri. On April 6, 1998, Pakistan tested a 1500-km liquid-fueled
missile, one capable of carrying a 700-kg payload. U.S. officials
claim the tested missile was based on the Nodong-2, a missile long
rumored to be under development in North Korea. Reportedly, the
missile flew roughly 800 to 1000 kilometers during its 8-10 minute
flight on April 6th, reaching an apex of 350-kms altitude. (It should
be noted that the Nodong missile incorporates a separating warhead
section.) Pakistan is believed to have assembled this missile
in-country using mostly North Korean and indigenously produced
assemblies and components, with perhaps some specialized Chinese
components and technical assistance being provided as needed. 49
Apparently, North Korea and Pakistan have had a long history of
nuclear and missile cooperation. This cooperation has been marked by a
long series of monthly cargo aircraft flights between these two
states, the frequency of which increased recently. 50 Undoubtedly,
North Korea also benefited from access to the Ghauri test, since it
flew further than any North Korean missile to date. More Ghauri tests
* Ghazni. On April 15, 1998, Dr. A. Q. Khan told reporters that the
Ghauri missile would be followed by the development of the 2000-km
Ghazni missile. 51 He claimed that both the Ghauri and Ghazni missiles
were completely indigenous, though inputs for them have been procured
from different parts of the world. 52 It is interesting to note that
North Korea's Taepodong 1 (which is also the first stage of the
4000-6000 km Taepodong 2) is reported to have a range of 2000 kms. If
indeed the Ghauri is the Nodong 2, than it may be that the Ghazni is
the Pakistani version of the Taepodong 1. It is a possibility that
Prognosis of Future Missile Developments
In making judgments with regard to future nuclear and missile developments,
the most difficult problem to deal with is assessing the synergistic
effects that will develop from foreign assistance to some countries
indigenous missile development efforts, both with regard to the speed with
which the assisted programs will develop missile capabilities and the
motivation that the accelerated progress will inspire in other states to
match or surpass the observed accomplishments. Even so, some reasoned
judgments can still be made as to the most probably course that future
events will follow.
India. India clearly has the physical capability to develop an ICBM by
2005-10. It seems highly likely that design work on the rumored Surya ICBM
is underway. As for a warhead, India clearly has the means to design and
test a warhead for an ICBM. The unknown factor in the equation is political
It seems very unlikely that India will long tolerate Pakistan testing 1500-
or 2000-kilometer missiles while India does nothing with regard to its own
missile program. Therefore, it seems probable that India will develop and
test the Agni II within the next 1-3 years. Where the program goes from
that point may depend on the United States handling of the situation. If
the U.S. should impose blanket sanctions against India, the sanction threat
will be gone. India will have no further reason to exercise restraint. A
full fledged nuclear and missile development program would almost certainly
be executed. Considering the resentment that sanctions would generate,
India would probably field the Surya.
At the same time, India's situation in South Asia could in itself generate
an imperative to develop nuclear/missile systems. The growing power of
China, the proliferation of missiles in other states in the region
(Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Syria, Egypt, etc.) coupled
with a continuation in the trend toward increased levels of Hindu
nationalism in India, could result in an Indian decision to become a
nuclear armed missile power regardless of the short-term costs.
In either case, it almost seems certain that the United States will
retaliate, thus setting up the conditions for India to develop an ICBM
capability. Consequently, the preponderance of pressure seems to point
toward a future in which India will be armed with a limited number of
Pakistan. Pakistan's nuclear program is fairly well developed. In terms of
uranium technology, Pakistan is almost self-sufficient. However, its
missile development program is still heavily dependent upon foreign
assistance. Thus, the key to Pakistan's future strategic capabilities is
highly dependent on foreign assistance factors. If North Korea and China
help Pakistan develop the Ghazni, its 2000-km range would put most of India
at risk, however, Pakistan would still be unable to target Israel. Thus, it
seems likely that Pakistan's missile capabilities will be limited to
regional targets for the next decade. The one exception to this judgment
would be if North Korea should collaborate with Pakistan to develop the
Taepodong 2 (4000-6000 km range). That capability would give Pakistan the
ability to target Israel and Central Europe. It might also help North Korea
develop the capability sooner to target Alaska.
The possible leakage of sensitive technologies from Pakistan to other
states must also be considered. In the past, Pakistan has quietly
collaborated with North Korea, Iran, and possibly other states on nuclear
and missile technology issues. If, as seems likely, Pakistan continues to
test IRBMs, the United States may feel forced to tighten sanctions against
Pakistan. Such a move may increase Pakistan's activity level in sharing
sensitive technologies with other states. Thus, it must be considered that
in the future Pakistan might become a significant contributor to
international proliferation in the future.
India's Nuclear Infrastructure
Trajectory Ground Range
Pakistan's Nuclear Infrastructure
1. David Tanks is a senior defense analyst with the Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis (IFPA). Has led and supervised study efforts dealing with
transparency in armaments, U.S. military support to the counter-drug war,
future roles for international organizations in Europe, defense conversion
in the former Soviet Union, and U.S. economic and strategic factors and
their interrelationship with defense reinvestment and arms transfer
2. A summary of India's missile motivations is contained in Ali Abbas
Rizvi, "Indian Missile Programme," Asian Defence Journal, May 1995, pp.
3. "Experts Discuss Ghauri Missile Implications," Delhi All India Radio
Network, transcribed in FBIS-NES-98-098, April 8, 1998.
4. For example, see Air Commodore Jasjit Singh's comments in Dinesh Kumar,
"Prithvi: US Concern Is To Legitimize Pak Missile Program," Munbai The
Times of India, transcribed in FBIS-NES-97-118, June 17, 1997. Note: Jasjit
Singh is a member of the three-person task force appointed by the new BJP
government to recommend the composition and powers of the proposed Indian
National Security Council (NSC), see Rajesh Ramachandran, "Task Force
Report On National Security Council in a Few Weeks," New Delhi REDIFF On
The Net, April 11, 1998.
5. For a sample report see "Daily on Pentagon's Paranoid Forecasting,"
Delhi The Hindustan Times, transcribed in FBIS-NES-98-100, April 10, 1998.
6. Brian Chow, Richard Speier, and Gregory Jones, The Proposed
Fissile-Material Production Cutoff: Next Steps (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND,
1995), pp. 9, 13, 44.
7. WPS Sidhu, "India's Nuclear Tests: Technical And Military Imperatives,"
Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1996, p. 172.
8. Ibid., p. 170.
9. Ibid., p. 172.
10. Stephen Engelberg, "CIA Chief Wary Of Pakistani Nuclear Program," The
New York Times, May 19, 1989, p. A7; and David B. Ottaway, "Signs Found
India Building An H-Bomb: W. Germany Shipped Beryllium, CIA Says," The
Washington Post, May 19, 1995, p. A29.
11. Sidhu, op. cit. p. 173.
12. John F. Burns, "India Denies Atom-Test Plan But Then Turns Ambiguous,"
The New York Times, December 16, 1995, p. A4; and Raj Chengappa, "Testing
Times: India's Nuclear Policy," India Today, December 31, 1995, p. 50; "AEC
Chief Says India Ready `To Go Nuclear'," Bangalore Decccan Herald (Internet
Version), March 4, 1998.
13. For some examples see Ali Abbas Rizvi, "The Nuclear Bomb and Security
of South Asia," Asian Defense Journal, April 1995, p. 27; and "India:
9/3/95," The Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1996, p. 106.
14. K.K. Sharma, "India Said To Have H-Bomb, May Test It," Newsday,
December 27, 1995.
15. India has attempted to conduct at least three nuclear tests since 1974.
See Sidhu, op. cit., pp. 172-73; and "AEC Chief Says India Ready To Go
Nuclear," Bangalore Deccan Herald (Internet Version), March 4, 1998.
16. Andrew Koch, "Nuclear Testing In South Asia and the CTBT," The
Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1996, pp. 98-104.
17. For additional reading see Ibid.; Vivek Raghuvanshi, "Technical Snags
Frustrate Indian Nuclear Sub Program," Defense News, June 24-30, 1996, p.
40; and Biman Basu, "India: Commentary Views Breakthrough Achieved in
Nuclear Field," Delhi All India Radio, transcribed in FBIS-NES-96-215,
November 3, 1996.
18. For a good discussion of the PSLV see, N. Gopal Raj, "The Importance of
PSLV," The Hindu, transcribed in FBIS-NES-97-272, September 29, 1997.
19. "Missile Forecast, Agni," Forecast International, The Teal Group,
February 1996, pp. 1-2.
20. Pravin Sawhney, "Prithvi Position: India Defends Its Missile," Jane's
International Defense Review, July 1997, p. 43.
21. John Wilson, "Sources Report New Version of Prithvi," Delhi The
Pioneer, transcribed in FBIS-TAC-98-104, April 14, 1998; and Srinjoy
Chowdhury, "Work On Indian Missile Program Reported," Calcutta The
Telegraph, transcribed in FBIS-TAC-98-104, April 14, 1998.
22. "Kalam: Reusable Missiles Under Development," Delhi The Pioneer,
transcribed in FBIS-TAC-97-334, November 30, 1997.
23. J.F.R. Jacob, "In The Line Of Fire, Higher Direction Of Defense," The
Times of India (Internet version) January 28, 1998; and Brahma Chellaney,
"Article Views Phase II of Agni Program," Delhi The Pioneer, transcribed in
FBIS-NES-98-056, February 25, 1998.
24. "India Refires Agni Project To Counter Pakistani Test," Jane's Defence
Weekly, August 5, 1997, p. 3. Note: The recent testing of Pakistan's Ghauri
missile has resulted in intensified calls in India to get on with the
development of the Agni II.
25. Michael Mecham, "India Sees Commercial Future For New Booster,"
Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 12, 1996, p. 62.
26. "India Uses Own Rocket for Major Launching," International Harold
Tribune, September 30, 1997, p. 2; and "In Orbit," Aviation Week & Space
Technology, October 13, 1997, p. 17. Note: In the year 2000, India plans to
launch an indigenous 2.5 meter resolution imaging satellite.
27. Conversation with Dr. Rajeev Lachan, Counselor, Indian Space Research
Organization, April 9, 1998.
28. Mecham, op. cit.; and K. Kasturirangan, "Aerospace Technologies: A
Terrestrial Focus," IEEE Spectrum, March 1994, p. 42; and Michael Mecham,
"India Sees Commercial Future for New Booster," Aviation Week & Space
Technology, August 12, 1996, p. 62.
29. Lachan, op. cit. Note: Russia is providing India with seven cryogenic
engines. India has an indigenous cryogenic development program ongoing.
30. N.C. Menon, "India: Continuation of Missile Project Urged," Delhi, The
Hindusstan Times, transcribed in FBIS-NES-97-097, May 19, 1997; Soumyajit
Pattnaik, "India: Regional Balance of Missiles Detailed," Delhi The
Pioneer, transcribed in FBIS-NES-97-115, June 14, 1997; John Wilson,
"India: Article Views Country's Missile Program," Delhi The Pioneer,
transcribed in FBIS-TAC-97-195, July 14, 1997; and "Agni Sans Fire," Delhi
The Hindustan Times, transcribed in FBIS-TAC-97-216, August 4, 1997.
31. Ghani Eirabie, "US Duplicity Over Missile Policy Questioned," Karachi
Dawn (Internet version), July 1, 1997.
32. Nonattribution conversation with an Israeli IAI manufacturing
33. For a good overview of Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure see Andrew
Koch and Jennifer Topping, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: A Status
Report," The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1997, pp. 109-113.
34. Ian Brodie, "Spies Proved China Helped Pakistan Get Nuclear Bomb," The
Times, April 2, 1996, p. 14; and Pravin Sawhney, "Standing Alone: India's
Nuclear Imperative," Jane's International Defense Review," November 1996,
35. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Pakistan Plans Tit-for-Tat Test Of Nuclear Blast,
Officials Say, The Washington Post, March 6, 1996, P. A14.
36. Kathleen C. Bailey, Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many (Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 1991), p. 24; Early Warnings on Pakistan,
Middle East Defense News, October 12, 1992; and Marcus Warren, "Pakistan's
Nuclear Program at a Screwdriver Level, The Washington Times, February 20,
1996, p. A1.
37. See Bailey, op. cit.; Rai Singh, "Indian Commentary Views Alleged
Nuclear Smuggling by Pakistan," All India Radio General Overseas Service,
Transcribed in FBIS-TAC-96-003, February 6, 1996; and E. A. Wayne, "Bhutto
Denies Pakistan Has Nuclear Weapons," The Christian Science Monitor, June
9, 1989, p. 7.
38. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Pakistan Has A-Weapons For Missiles, U.S. Fears,"
The International Herald Tribune, June 14, 1996, pp. 1&12; "PRC Said Aiding
Pakistan Develop Missiles With N-Warheads," The Pioneer, transcribed in
FBIS-TAC-97-202, July 21, 1997; and Rai Singh, "Indian Commentary Views
Alleged Nuclear Smuggling by Pakistan, All Indian Radio General Overseas,
transcribed in FBIS-TAC-96-003, February 6, 1996.
39. "India: SAPRA--Pakistan Deploys Nuclear Tipped M-11 Missiles," Delhi,
The Economic Times,, transcribed in FBIS-TAC-97-161, June 10, 1997; Bill
Gertz, "Pakistan Deploys Chinese Missiles," The Washington Times, June 12,
1996; and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Reports Cites China-Pakistan Missile Links,"
The Washington Post, June 13, 1996.
40. Ashraf Mumtaz, "Pakistan: First Indigenously Developed Nuclear Reactor
Completed," Karachi Dawn, transcribed in FBIS-NES-96-048, March 7, 1996.
41. Bill Gertz, "China Aids Pakistani Plutonium Plant," The Washington
Times, April 3, 1996, p. 4.
42. Rai Singh, "Threat From Pakistan's Hatf-3 Missile Viewed," Delhi
Jansatta, translated in FBIS-TAC-97-198, July 17, 1997.
43. Aabha Dixit, "Article Views Pakistan's Missile Program As Serious
Threat," Calcutta The Telegraph, transcribed in FBIS-NES-96-173, September
2, 1996. For an interesting summary of Pakistan's chemical weapon's
program, see Manvendra Singh, "Pakistan Continues Chemical Weapon's Build
Up," Delhi Indian Express, transcribed in FBIS-TAC-97-191, July 10, 1997.
45. "Defense Minister Remarks On Pakistan, Missiles Detailed," Bangalore
Deccan Herald (Internet Version), transcribed in FBIS-TAC-97-210, July 29,
46. "China And Pakistan's Missiles," Foreign Report, Jane's Information
Group, May 2, 1996, pp. 2-3; R. Jeffrey Smith, "China Linked To Pakistani
Missile Plant," The Washington Post, August 25, 1996, p. A1; and Prakash
Chandra, "Pakistan Said Enhancing Range of M-11s," Delhi The Hindustan
Times, transcribed in FBIS-NES-97-115, June 14, 1997.
47. Pravin Sawhney, "Chinese Missile Technology Transfer Alleged," Delhi
The Asian Age, transcribed in FBIS-NES-96-168, August 27, 1996.
48. Shubha Singh, " Report Views Pakistani Missile Programs, Warheads," The
Pioneer, transcribed in FBIS-TAC-97-191, July 10, 1997.
49. In an article submitted to Jane's Defence for publication in the near
future, North Korean expert, Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., provides a detailed
account (fully referenced) of the long-term cooperation between Pakistan
and North Korea regarding nuclear and missile developments. The PRC is
strongly suspected of providing critical components.
50. Tim Weiner, "U.S. Says North Korea Helped Develop New Pakistani
Missile," The New York Times, April 11, 1998; and, Takayuki Shimbun,
"Ghauri Missile Suspected as DPRK's Nodong No. 2," Tokyo Mainichi Shimbun,
Morning Edition, translated in FBIS-EAS-98-102, April 12, 1998.
51. "Top Pak Scientist Hints At Nuclear Bomb," Reuters & PTI, April 16,