Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers


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Stephen J. Blank 1 : "Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Proliferation in Russian Strategy" 2 Russian Nuclear Forces: The Military-Strategic Dimension Today Russia faces its greatest military crisis since June, 1941. 3 And if the armed forces collapse, so too will the state. Chechnya revealed the extent of Russia's conventional forces' degradation and confirmed Russia's need to rely excessively on nuclear forces to achieve strategic military and political goals. This reliance will likely continue into the next decade and decisively shape Russian policies at home and abroad. Meanwhile the overburdened and under-financed nuclear forces could disintegrate by 2007, leaving behind only about 10% of the current number of usable warheads. Russia's C3I system is in comparably bad shape and worsening. 4 Current systems are decaying, and some 62% of missiles have outlived their guaranteed service dates. 5 Yet Moscow is also building, albeit with difficulty, the Topol-M (SS-27) land-based ICBM, new SLBMs and SSNs, and major C3I facilities in the Ural Mountains. The 1993 military doctrine and subsequent policy statements accept deterrence as the basis of Russian strategy and policy, and deny that Moscow sees any state as its enemy. Moscow also openly announced a first-strike use if attacked even by purely conventional means and has unified its space and strategic nuclear forces. 6 These provisions seemingly reversed the public Soviet disavowals of deterrence and of striking first. In fact, Russia's deterrence contains three elements. First, is Russia's readiness to launch first-strikes even against purely conventional attacks on key targets. But this first-strike policy is coupled with an extended deterrence against nuclear and conventional attacks on the CIS to whom Russia offers an unsolicited and unwanted extended deterrence. 7 That extended deterrence comprises the second element of Russian deterrence and is linked to Russia' stated intention to launch first-strike and even preemptive nuclear weapons if attacked. 8 In fact, the prior secret intention to launch a first strike is now public policy precisely because there is little or no usable conventional power available to defend against threats above minor police actions. But this first-strike policy linked to homeland and extended deterrence goes still further. Russian military writers generally argue that these weapons are no longer just weapons of mass destruction. Instead, they are perfectly legitimate weapons capable of performing military missions. Essentially there is no clear firebreak between conventional and nuclear scenarios in the open sources. 9 This policy fundamentally contradicts the notion that nuclear weapons are primarily for deterrence. Rather they remain legitimate weapons of warfighting and of victory. Nor is it clear if Moscow distinguishes between tactical or strategic missiles. Indeed, many military-political analysts view NATO's enlargement as preparation for a future military threat that can only be countered by the combat threat or use of tactical, if not strategic, nuclear missiles. 10 Hence nuclear warfighting and nuclear victory scenarios also now become or are thought to be truly feasible options. 11 Nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, and policy have become conventionalized, and are seen as no more than large, more destructive conventional weapons that can be used in war. Russian planners can then conceive of their use as if they were just particularly lethal missiles. Accordingly, Russian writers openly speculate on how nuclear weapons might be adapted for conventional use. 12 Doing so also implies incorporating a new generation of lethal, highly accurate, third generation nuclear weapons into Russia's arsenal. Russia can do this by reducing the number and yield of nuclear warheads, and concurrently increasing the accuracy of delivery to the military target and the effectiveness of target engagement. 13 The third aspect of deterrence is Russia's reliance, although this is allegedly changing, on a Launch on Warning doctrine. Conventionalization of nuclear weapons and of nuclear warfighting scenarios substantially lowers the threshold for nuclear use and places enormous new stresses for adaptiveness, and high quality upon Russia's decaying early warning and C2 systems to prevent unauthorized, and unintended nuclear strikes or excessive nuclear responses to conventional attacks. This trend also adds stress to an already overburdened, insufficient, and degraded C4I and Early Warning system and heightens the chance for unauthorized, mistaken, or unintended attacks. The 1995 incident, when Moscow nearly launched a nuclear strike against a Norwegian weather rocket, in the mistaken belief that it was a nuclear attack, and other evidence shows continuing reliance on LOW to deter against conventional and nuclear threats and Moscow's predisposition to strike first. Since the decaying and overstressed control system's first priority is to ensure that a launch occurs if the CINC is unavailable, not to prevent unauthorized launches, LOW becomes much more likely. Preventing unauthorized launches only comes second. The risk of accidental, unauthorized, or mistaken launches, grows as Russian forces are increasingly placed on a taut hair trigger. 14 These three points also raise issues about the use of nuclear weapons as surrogates for new conventional weapons and information warfare capabilities. Moscow argues that high-tech precision-guided missiles, weapons, and information warfare could degrade strategic stability and threaten the government's ability to command its armed forces or govern. 15 That threat justifies deterring an information, or electronic warfare, or space-based attack by readiness to strike first and preemptively with nuclear systems and forestall the degradation of functional parity with the United States by even purely conventional attacks, even at conventional targets like power plants. 16 Nuclear systems also are vitally important for Russian military policy. They encouraged and allowed Russian leaders to delay costly major military reforms. They remain a surrogate for reforming the regular army as well as those forces' shield during reform. Therefore, as long as Russia lacks quality armed forces, it must emphasize the nuclear deterrent against a host of purely conventional and even low-level threats. Unfortunately, given the bitter political struggles over military reform in Russia, this continuing over-reliance on nuclear weapons may paradoxically help undermine the revival of Russian conventional power and preserve the current status quo, albeit at a much lower nuclear force structure and a rather low threshold for nuclear use. 17 Until now Russia has assumed that nuclear weapons are cheaper than a large, well-trained, competent, professional, and well-equipped army at a time of economic crisis. Since the government cannot afford to create or maintain such an army, or accomplish the military reform needed to do so anytime soon, and is arguably not even truly serious or conceptually aware of what must be done; nuclear weapons are a tempting surrogate. They seemingly offer a cheaper, but equally reliable defense against foreign threats. Finally because of the destructive Western and potentially Chinese potential of high-tech conventional weapons and of IW and REW, nuclear systems deter those threats to Russia. Until Russia overcomes its technological backwardness and inability to compete in the evolution in military affairs (RMA) or IW, nuclear weapons must stand in for the advanced technologies and high-precision conventional weapons that constitute the RMA's mainstays. Russian Nuclear Forces: The Political Dimension Nuclear weapons also have critical political uses for Russia. They alone ensure that Russia is a great power whose vital, secondary, and even tertiary interests are taken seriously by foreign states. 18 On that basis Russia can then take part in all issues of world affairs where it has or expresses an important interest. Russian elites also assert, probably rightly, that otherwise Moscow's interests would not be taken very seriously. 19 Possession of nuclear weapons has already let Russia proclaim extended deterrence across the CIS, call for reuniting the CIS into a single defense space, and deter CIS members from attacks upon each other, including Russia. It also let Russia threaten outside states, e.g. Turkey, in 1993, with nuclear war, if they intervened in the CIS for or against one of its members. 20 As the sole heir of Soviet nuclear weapons Russia enjoys a vast disparity in power between it and other "heirs" which it has exploited to prevent Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan from going nuclear. 21 At the same time, nuclear weapons ensure Russia's standing as a major player in international non-proliferation efforts. Russia can then help define individual and multilateral non-proliferation outcomes to advance its interests. Russia can strongly support non-proliferation while selling high-quality conventional or even nuclear technology and weapons to clients who are willing to buy them. Since it is vital for Washington to win Russian assent and compliance to the many regimes it is constructing against WMD proliferation, Russia can drive hard bargains even if it does not then live up to its side of the deal, as with regard to Iran. Russian Threat Assessments Russia's new security blueprint states that its main threats are internal and economic-political, not military. But actually it exudes a perception of multiple threats on all axes. 22 Despite continuing crises and weakness, Russia insists on its status as a major military power, covets military-political equality with the United States, believes it is somehow entitled to this status, and cannot otherwise accept the status quo. 23 As one general wrote, A number of political scientists are of the opinion that there can be seen in relations between the West [note not just the United States, but the West as a whole-SB] a "slow creeping into a semblance of standoff which threatens serious losses both for international security and security of individual countries, and for Russia" It is caused by a whole number of factors. First, there is the apparent incompatibility of Russia's and the United States' current potentialities on the world scene which makes the prospects of their relations on a parity basis illusory [and] for which reason Russia is hardly going to settle for the role of junior partner. 24 Hence global deterrence on all azimuths is necessary. Many Russian analysts and officials contend that the armed forces must prepare for a wide range of missions, including those that cannot now be discerned or clearly defined. Those missions comprise the entire spectrum of conflict from low-level conflicts to inter-continental nuclear war and everything in between. e.g., small-scale conflicts, peace operations, warfare using high-tech conventional weapons in an old-fashioned theater war across several theaters, information warfare, and intercontinental nuclear war. 25 Military spokesmen consistently insist that the real threat is U.S. and Western naval, air, and strategic superiority. And should deterrence fail, "the task is to protect sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the other permanent vital interests of the country." 26 Presumably first-strike or even preemptive means are thereby justified. 27 Such thinking enroots itself in military policy as worst-case scenarios for Europe and Asia. German defense analyst Reiner Huber recently noted that Russian models of offense and defense in Europe are based on paranoid calculations. Current models state that Russia, to feel secure in Europe, requires a potential successful defense of at least 90% if NATO attacks in a purely conventional war. And this calculation excludes Russia's nuclear retaliatory capability! As Huber wrote, This underscores the deep mistrust still prevailing in Russia vis-a-vis NATO and the United States. For example, if we were to assume that the success of defense is equivalent to the failure of aggression, the defense sufficiency principle suggests that the Russians believe NATO will attack even if the chances of success were only about 10 percent. Obviously NATO and the United States are perceived as being quite reckless. 28 Accordingly NATO enlargement is a threat because it forces Russia to move troops from other theaters to the West against NATO even in peacetime. This allegedly opens the way to attacks from the South and East although it is hard to see who would be so rash. The definition of stability in this analysis is simple. Nobody anywhere can threaten Russia. Absent a political accord with NATO and other states that would banish fears of attack, Russia must have conventional, if not nuclear, parity with all states along its frontiers to create a "stability of force equilibrium." 29 Similar thinking has dominated assessments in the Far East. 30 Nor is this outlook far removed from the threat assessments that dominated Soviet planning. Meanwhile the threat of nuclear use in a preemptive or first strike capability is all Russia has to defend Russia and CIS. Virtually all official threat assessments and Russian procurement policies since 1991 are premised on multiple threats up to an including intercontinental nuclear war! 31 New force deployments also suggest the ongoing primacy of conventional, if not nuclear, warfighting in doctrine and policy. Russia is building ever quieter nuclear powered attack submarines with conventional ordnance and missiles to conduct strategic ASW with greater attack ranges at a steady rate. They are tracking the U.S. fleet for the first time in years and reflect continuing threat assessments based on premises of intercontinental nuclear naval war. Russia is building new strategic sea and land-based missile systems, and high-performance fighter aircraft, e.g. SU-32, 34, 35, 37, MiG-29 and MiG-31. 32 Russian policy also stresses dual-use technologies which biological and chemical warfare systems exemplify. 33 Inasmuch as nuclear war and weapons substitute for the absent high-tech and IW capabilities that Russia lacks, those capabilities are viewed as particularly dangerous. Without them Russia faces the United States, NATO, and China with glaring conventional inferiority. Therefore nuclear weapons are the only feasible reply to attacks based on high-tech, REW, or IW weapons. Influential elites also charge that Russia already is and for some time has been fighting an information and psychological war with the United States. This struggle occurs continuously since 1985 within and without Russia, and Russia has been losing this war due to superior Western technology and internal betrayal. 34 Moreover, IW undermines prospects for strategic stability as it can degrade first strike capability by stealth and surprise attacks on C4I. Those attacks negate Russian capability for deterrence or surprise if Russia does not then preempt the IW attack e.g. by nuclear means. 35 Some current IW scenarios suggest that key military elements feel that Russia is already at war, but there is a more widespread belief that the state, as such, is under siege from internal and external enemies. IW and EW, as new forms of war occur all the time. 36 This outlook updates Stalin's notion of a conjoined internal civil war and foreign encirclement. Everything or everyone is an equal and compelling threat. Hence strategy loses touch with its formative political reality. 37 As Alexei Zagorsky observed for the period 1991-97, Compared with the late 1980s, the most fundamental change is that instead of taking into account threat perceptions existing outside Russia, the only factor considered is the minimum force needed to defeat them. Evgeny Shaposhnikov stresses: `reasonable sufficiency is the ability of a nation to ensure a loss that is unacceptable for the offending side.' In accordance with this interpretation, the composition and strength of the Russian armed forces should be limited only by the subjective judgments of the Russian military, not by international complaints and interferences. 38 Thus Russian threat assessments and planned procurements remain wedded to the threat of a war with the United States and/or its allies as well as to nuclear scenarios for that war even as Russia demands equality with the United States. Other WMD Capabilities Russia's former Soviet biological and chemical warfare programs continue despite adherence to international conventions and "decrees" from President Yeltsin. The military has successfully disregarded domestic and foreign admonitions and continued the programs despite their costs. 39 Russia now claims it cannot afford to destroy its CW stocks and faces both bureaucratic and local Russian opposition to building cleanup facilities. 40 Russia's huge but highly covert biological warfare (BW) program also continues in spite of long-standing official statements and conventions. 41 Strangely the United States consistently refuses to discuss this program openly and thereby pressure Russia, but undoubtedly the program continues, as recent evidence from Ken Alibekov and Milton Leitenberg suggests. 42 The Ministry of Defense is now trying to throw responsibility for chemical and BW cleanup onto the public or private organizations, apparently with Yeltsin's agreement, on the grounds that this is not a true responsibility of or work for the Ministry. 43 This new campaign suggests that the programs will continue despite "official" condemnation, but perhaps under deeper cover. Proliferation Motives Russia's proliferation policies are either incoherent or, to be frank, duplicitous, if not a mixture of both elements. On the one hand, Russia's proximity to the Middle East and Asia requires Moscow to oppose any foreign military presence in the former and nuclear proliferation in both regions. These points should mandate very strict efforts to supervise arms sales and nuclear transfers to the Middle East and Asia to prevent a recurrence of past conflicts or the outbreak of new ones. Even critics of the orientation to the United States concur that Moscow and Washington have a common interest in preventing such conflicts and stopping proliferation of weapons of mass destruction e.g. in Iran and Iraq. They also state that Russia will not let Iran go nuclear. 44 Russian leaders also regard proliferation as a major threat. Foreign Minister Evgeny Primakov repeatedly denies Russia's support for the would-be proliferators and both he and the Ministry of Defense oppose support for further nuclear proliferation. Officially Russia has opposed Indian and North Korean nuclearization. 45 The Foreign Intelligence Service's (SVR) 1995 report on the Nonproliferation Treaty, submitted by Primakov, its then director, states, For Russia the specific fate of the NPT will not only inevitably affect its strategic course for enduring security, but will also have a major impact on national security interests: The appearance of new nuclear countries on RF [Russian Federation] borders would create a real threat, destabilize the situation in the "near abroad" zone, and force it to revise the guidelines of Russian defense policy, including in terms of its nuclear component. 46 The SVR stated that the main threat to nonproliferation regime is states like Israel, Pakistan, and India who are de facto nuclear powers but remain outside the treaty. Their capability is dangerous in itself and can spread to other countries, e.g. Pakistan's transfer of know-how to Iran. Since these states are outside the NPT, they cannot rely on the international community to compel their potential enemies to refrain from going nuclear. Accordingly, their exclusion from the NPT regime is destabilizing because it stimulates their enemies to follow suit. 47 Certainly Iran fulfills this designation vis-a-vis Israel. That alone logically should lead Moscow to work against further nuclearization of the Middle East. Furthermore the SVR report categorically states that Russia cannot support states pursuing a double standard toward "unofficial" nuclear countries or states, like Iran, who are on the nuclear threshold or seeking to acquire weapons. Because such tactics allow both these sets of states to nuclearize further and triggers arms races among them and their enemies, supporting such states is a highly dangerous policy. 48 Yet the SVR then complains that states like Iran who criticize the NPT regime provisions on access to certain nuclear materials rightly highlight the purely political nature of such restrictions. U.S. anti-proliferation efforts against Iran are purely politically motivated since Russia's sale of a reactor cannot be used effectively for producing weapons. Russia also denies that Iran has decided to go nuclear and is developing capabilities beyond those of other possible "threshold states". 49 This conceals Minatom's readiness to sell centrifuges to Iran without its government's knowledge before Washington intervened. 50 Russia clearly downplays Iranian capability. And Iran's difficulties has forced it to let Russia take over the Bushehr reactor project as a turnkey. But U.S. and Israeli intelligence report that Iran is within 2-5 years of a nuclear missile capability. 51 These and other sources cite great strides in ballistic missiles with Chinese, DPRK, and potentially Russian help. 52 Recent reports detail the knowing participation and coordination of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), the high-level state commissions on non-proliferation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and probably the Ministry of Defense in projects to send Russian scientists to Iran to transfer nuclear know-how as Iran aims at IRBM and then ICBM capability. 53 Already in 1992 officials argued that Russia must sell arms to prevent Iranian support for Islam in the southern CIS and Russia and that it is best to influence Iranian progress by these sales to limit the threat. 54 Hence, Russian-Iranian cooperation could be a unique testing ground where the possibility and need for a member state of the "nuclear club" to fulfill its obligations under Article IV of the NPT whereby the participants in the Treaty must promote equitable, nondiscriminatory cooperation in the field of peaceful atomic power engineering but must, in doing so, prevent conditions for the proliferation of nuclear weapons [and this] would be meaningfully examined. Cooperation in the cause of replacing the North Korean gas-graphite reactors with light water ones can also be the same kind of example. 55 Clearly the issue here is an Iran-Russian security partnership on issues of common concern: Azerbaijan's westward turn, control of Caspian Sea oil and gas flows, stabilizing Central Asia, and policing Transcaucasia. This resembles Russia's main aim in seeking access to the consortium to provide North Korea with reactors, gaining leverage in Korea and Asia. 56 Russia also supports the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Gulf, and aims to create a bloc of pro-Russian forces against U.S. and Israeli interests to compel Washington to admit Russia as an equal player with a veto into the peace process or Gulf security. 57 That drive to resurrect the previous Soviet policy of a bloc or entente among the former "rejectionist front" of the late 1970s is the geostrategic factor driving support for Iran's, Iraq's, Libya's, Sudan's, and Syria's rearmament. 58 The other motive for military and civilian transfers of weapons, and technologies, civilian and military alike, is to save Russian civilian and defense industry. Primakov recently listed that goal as one of the foundations and main goals of Russian foreign policy. Arms sales which are also a major domestic political money tree, is now a major state priority and a factor in destabilizing critical areas. Apart from offering Syria weapons, Russia is selling SAM's (SA-10s) to Cyprus, Iran, and offering nuclear technology and reactors to India, China, Pakistan, Cuba, Syria and Iran. There is talk of $5 billion in atomic reactor deals and even of 50-70 transfers of reactors for cash to China. 59 India has also tried to obtain missile safeguards technology, obviously aiming to enhance control over its weapons. And Iran apparently is seeking heavy water too. 60 We have long known of factions who would sell arms to North Korea if it had the cash to buy them, and there are reports that this argument extends to atomic reactors as well. 61 Minatom strongly pushes nuclear exports to China and Iran, India, and more recently Syria and Cuba, all ostensibly for civilian use. 62 Minatom claims it must market its reactors aggressively to survive and other arguments do not move it for good reason. 63 The known technology transfer of WMD to Iran involve SS-4 technology and the reactor at Bushehr as well as exchange of scientific know-how with Iranian scientists and training in Russia for them. Russia also wants to build another "research' reactor there. 64 We do not know in open sources the extent of scientists' exchange of knowledge either on temporary or on permanent basis to China, Iran, and any other state. But many Middle Eastern states also have either biological or chemical warfare capability or are developing those capabilities and buy what they need abroad, including missiles for these systems' warheads. 65 The Bushehr reactor comprises four reactors plus turbines that Russia is now expected to provide along with more military technology and weapons since Ukraine dropped out under American pressure. 66 Russia is also helping Iran develop a national communications satellite which also will have an earth monitoring capability. The firm doing this work, the Spurt Science and Production Center is known for its work on classified space programs. The space apparatus itself is being developed by the Reutov Mashinostroyenie Science and Production Association which used to develop ballistic and cruise missiles and most important military space systems. The Izhevsk radio plant and the Aksion Joint Stock Company invariably took part in Soviet space programs. Russia clearly knows this is a dual-use system, that Iran will have exclusive control over once it is designed, and that it will take 2-3 years from signing the contracts to finish the satellite. 67 China Although officials argue that Russia's vital interests demand strategic partnership with China, particular interests, like the defense industry, depend on sales to China and lobby strongly for China. 68 Without foreign arms sales neither they nor the Russian army would survive with an adequate domestic conventional weapons base. Therefore the government has reportedly encouraged defense industry to sell even state of the art systems abroad until 2005. At that time it expects to rejoin the conventional arms market for its own troops and reduce industry's need to sell abroad. But until then there is a virtual Carte Blanche for conventional and dual-use platforms, weapons, and technologies. 69 Defense industrialists also claim that, "the active promotion of Russian armaments in the Asia-Pacific Region is leading to a new balance of power taking shape there, in which the United States will no longer play the decisive role." 70 Defense industry and the Ministry of Defense under Pavel Grachev reportedly felt that China's need for military technology to keep pace with Taiwan and Southeast Asia will lead it to buy Russian systems which "could become not only a way for our hapless military-industrial complex to preserve jobs and earn money, but also the start of a long-range strategic partnership and a new balance of forces in Asia that would favor Russia." 71 Given the lucrative benefits deriving from arms sales and because Moscow has neither devised a viable defense program, anticipated its arsenal's impending block obsolescence, nor controlled defense industry, the latter's captains and state organizations and ministries often conduct their own policies towards China and other Asian states regardless of the outcome. Given the pervasive corruption among military officers that prevails in arms sales, personal, not just business, interests are also involved. Grachev, e.g. tried to establish autonomous sources of funding exclusively under his control. Thus in 1995 military space authorities sold three of Russia's most advanced upper-stage rocket engines to China in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime, but did not go through NPO Energiamash, the only legal entity licensed to sell this engine. 72 We still do not know who authorized the sale and pocketed the proceeds. Although everyone agrees on the need for friendship with China, analysts of Russian defense sales divide on whether Moscow fully controls its weapons and technology exports, especially to China. Pavel Felgengauer, Russia's leading defense correspondent, asserts that the number of subcontractors involved in any project and the government's close scrutiny, indicates that Russia can and does control this policy. He might also cite recent decrees placing all arms trading organizations under direct presidential and prime ministerial control and replacing its leadership. 73 However, analysts like this author argue that while there is considerable state control and certainly major efforts to extend it, the frequent repetition of decrees on arms sales and the pervasive official, military, official, and defense industry corruption, suggest many cases of unauthorized arms or technology transfer to China and elsewhere. The fact that state efforts to control arms sales began in 1992-93 also indicates the scope of the problem. 74 Nor was Grachev the only example of the problem. 75 The armed services are divided. Many officers see China as a future military threat, or as pursuing a dangerous course in Asia, and that inhibits the strategic modernization of Russia's Asian forces. 76 Others see China as a lucrative partner, potential ally, and counterweight to the United States. That view defeated the former view, opening the way to large-scale arms transfers to China. Russia has sold China nuclear technology, evidently control and guidance systems from the SS-18 and SS-19 series to China for its Dong Feng missiles (DF-31, and 41) and is upgrading many categories of China's conventional and nuclear submarines, including the Kilos it bought from Russia. 77 In addition whole factories have been transferred to China and are making parts for the Topol-M (SS-27) mobile ICBM. 78 Russia is also helping develop a new generation of Chinese SSN's and SSBN's, the new 093 and 094 attack and missile submarines. Russia is helping China cover the hulls of these submarines with a layer of anechoic tiles to improve their quieting capabilities and help them elude detection, i.e. U.S. and Japanese detection. These submarines will conduct missions related to daily activities of U.S. and Japanese warships, compare favorably with Victor III class SSN's, and should become operational in 2007. 79 There are also reports of Russia selling China parts for its mobile SS-24 and 25's TEL's and of plans to build up to 50 nuclear reactors for China. 80 As Bruce Blair reports, Russia has transferred blocking devices to China which facilitate its missiles' combat readiness. As he notes, this policy contradicts the idea that Russia dropped its no first use pledge because of fears of China's army. Such a fear should lead Russia to refine war plans against China to include more limited nuclear options. It would also lead to a policy to obstruct China's technological advances, not facilitate them. 81 The only logical answer is that there is no fear of China for the present and an attempt, as with Iran, to gain influence over the inevitable Chinese buildup irrespective of its outcomes, e.g. India's potential nuclearization. 82 But there is increasing evidence of China's nuclear buildup to threaten U.S. countervalue targets, its interests in nuclear warfighting scenarios, and rethinking of no first use as it moves towards deterrence, limited nuclear war ideas, etc. 83 Clearly Moscow's main enemy remains the United States and it is pushing China to confront us as well. Conclusions Russia is reverting, out of desperation as much as calculation, to Soviet strategies but without the controls and conventional wherewithal to sustain them. It also has revived the reckless Soviet policy to support nuclear proliferation. 84 In the Middle East Moscow is undermining the peace process and renewing its dangerous and uncontrollable arms sales policies of the 1970s. The net result is a further weaponization of the area that enhances regional capabilities for protracted war. It sells weapons to Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, clearly aiming to incite trouble there. Moscow offers major systems to Iran and Arab states for use against Israel, yet its defense industry pursues deals with Israel's defense industry, e.g. to sell China an AWACS-like system. 85 In Asia, support for Chinese military modernization occurs as Moscow sells arms to all of China's most likely regional rivals: South Korea and North Korea (if it could pay for them), Taiwan, Japan, and ASEAN states. These policies can only gravely set back the cause of nonproliferation and conflict resolution. 86 At home too, Moscow increasingly employs or resorts to nuclear scenarios with a fraying control system and no usable conventional forces. This is not a Russian New Look. Rather it is Moscow's only look, but its new military reform is plagued with serious shortfalls of support and funding and may well fail. The conventional and the nuclear sectors will become a shadow of their past strength, but Russian policy fails to reflect strategic realities. "Foreign policy cannot unquestionably be considered a factor that sets the context and requirements for the military policy of Russia." 87 Goals, interests, and capabilities remain disconnected in Russian policy that pursues unattainable goals with the mindset of empire and cold war bipolarity. This gap between Russian means, and goals of equality with the United States could lead Russia into domestic or foreign conflicts as it remains overmilitarized and politically or strategically incoherent. That disparity between ends and means remains the greatest threat to both Russian and Eurasian security. Sadly, it appears the disparity will widen and worsen before it narrows and improves. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. Dr. Stephen Blank is the Douglas MacArthur Professor of Research, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, serving since 1989 as the Institute's expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world. Has written on Russian, CIS and East European security issues. His current research deals with proliferation and the revolution in military affairs, and energy and security in Eurasia. 2. The views expressed here do not in any way represent those of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or U.S. Government. 3. Alexei G. Arbatov, "Military Reform in Russia: Dilemmas, Obstacles, and Progress," International Security, XXII, No. 4, pp. 83-134. 4. David Hoffman, "Downsizing a Mighty Arsenal," Washington Post, March 16, 1998, p. 1, See the paper by Bruce Blair for the Commission, and Moscow, Pravda Pyat 5, in Russian, January 30-February 6, 1998, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Central Eurasia (Henceforth FBIS SOV), 98-084, March 25, 1998, Moscow, Segodnya, in Russian, February 5, 1998, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Central Eurasia, Military Affairs, (Henceforth FBIS UMA), 98-036 February 5, 1998. 5. FBIS SOV, March 25, 1998, David Hoffman, "Decline of Russia's Nuclear Forces," Washington Post, March 15, 1998, p. 1, Blair, Bruce Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1993, and Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995, pp. 18-23, pp. 43-72, and his interview with John Newhouse, Europe Adrift, New York, Pantheon Books, 1997, pp. 211-212, See Also Peter Pry's unpublished manuscript, War Scare. 6. "Osnovnye Polozhenii Voennoi Doktriny Rossiiskoi Federatsii," Rossiyskie Vesti, in Russian, November 19, 1993, FBIS SOV 93-222-S, November 19, 1993, pp. 1-11, Col. General I.D. Sergeev, "Improving Combat Readiness of Strategic Rocket Forces Under Conditions of Implementation of Strategic Offensive Weapons Treaties," Voennaya Mysl', No. 6, November-December, 1995, pp. 16-21, Lt. General N. Ye. Solovtsov, Major General V.T. Nosov, "The role and Place of Strategic Rocket Forces in Russia's Armed Forces,", Voyennaya Mysl', No. 11-12, November-December, 1994, pp. 71-76, Moscow, Krasnaya Zvezda, in Russian, March 13, 1998, FBIS UMA, 98-075, March 17, 1998. 7. Ibid., Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in Russian, January 22, 1997, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia (Henceforth FBIS SOV) 97-015, January 24, 1997, Andrei Kokoshin, "Reflections on Russia's Pat, present, and Future," Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June, 1997, p. 31. 8. Ibidem., See Also Peter Pry's unpublished manuscript, War Scare. 9. Pry, Ibid. 10. Col. V. Kruglov, and Colonel. M. Ye. Sosnovskiy, "[The]Role of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear Deterrence," Voennaya Mysl' (Military thought), No. 6, 1997, pp. 12-16, Moscow, Voprosy Bezopasnosti, in Russian, December, 1997, FBIS SOV, 98-064, March 5, 1998, examines debates over tactical nuclear weapons, see also Anton Surikov, "Some Aspects of Russian Military Reform," European Security, VI, No. 3, Autumn, 1997, pp. 49-65. 11. Kruglov and Sosnovskiy, pp. 12-16, Kruglov and Sosnovskiy, pp. 12-16, Andrei Kokoshin, "Reforming Russia's Armed Forces, Voyennaya Mysl', No. 5/6, 1996, p. 18, Lt. General (Ret) Ye. B. Volkov, "Start II and the Security of Russia," Voennaya Mysl', No. 1, January-February, 1996, pp. 17-21, Major General V.A. Ryaboshapko (Ret.), "Nuclear Conditions: conditions of Possible Resort to Nuclear Weapons," Voyennaya Mysl', No. 4, July-August, 1996, pp. 10-14, Col. O.A. Kobelev, N.N. Detinov, "Upgrading the Nuclear Arms Proliferation Control System, Voennaya Mysl', No. 9-10, September, October, 1994, p. 3, Sevastopol Flag Rodiny, in Russian, December 10, 1997, FBIS SOV, 98-009, January 12, 1998, Moscow, Itogi, in Russian, December 16, 1997, FBIS SOV, 98-020, January 23, 1998, Stephen Blank, "Russia, Ukraine, and European Security," European Security, III, No. 1, Spring, 1994, pp. 192-198, Mary Fitzgerald, "The Russian Shift Toward Nuclear War-Waging," Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C., 1993. 12. Ibidem, all. 13. Personal Communication from Mary Fitzgerald, see also, Fitzgerald, pp. 6-13. 14. Pry, passim., Blair, Ops. Cits., Yuri Golotyuk, "President Retains Control of Nuclear Button," RIA Novosti, March 24, 1998, from Johnson's Russia List, No. 2118, March 25, 1998, [email protected] 15. Fitzgerald, p. 5, Moscow, Argumenty i Fakty, in Russian, November, 1997, FBIS SOV, 97-334, December 7, 1997, and the following works by Timothy Thomas, Timothy L. Thomas, "Deterring Information Warfare: A New Strategic Challenge," Parameters, XXV, No. 4, Winter, 1996-97, 81-91, Timothy L. Thomas, "Russian Views on Information-Based Warfare," Airpower Journal, Special Issue, 1996, pp. 25-35, Timothy L. Thomas, "Dialectical Versus Empirical Thinking: The Key elements of the Russian Understanding of Information Operations," Paper Presented to the U.S. Army War College, Annual Strategy Conference, April 22-24, 1997, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 16. FBIS SOV, November 19, 1993. 17. There is a loud and public military opposition to the reforms in the Duma and among serving military personnel and it is likely that one reason why Yeltsin sacked his Minister of Interior, General Anatoly S. Kulikov, in march, 1998 is because Kulikov had come out in support of some of this opposition's arguments. Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta in Russian, February 10, 1998, FBIS UMA, 98-041, February 10, 1998. 18. Moscow, Vooruzhenie, Politika, Konversiya, in Russian, No. 3 (10), 1995, FBIS UMA, 96-119-S, June 19, 1996, p. 33 Ibid., p. 27. 19. Axel W. Krohn, "European Security in Transition:' NATO Going East', the `German Factor', and Security in Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea Region," European Security, IV, No. 4, Winter, 1995, p. 582. 20. FBIS SOV, November 19, 1993, Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, September 23, 1995, FBIS-SOV-95-188, September 28, 1995, pp. 19-22, Dmitry Volsky, "The Explosive Karabakh Conflict," New Times, No. 16, 1993, p. 24, J.D. Crouch II, William van Cleave, et al., "The Politics of Reform in Russia," Global Affairs, VII, No. 3, Summer, 1993, p. 197. 21. Stephen J. Blank, "Proliferation and Non-Proliferation in Ukraine: Implications for European and U.S. Security," Raju G.C. Thomas Ed., The Nuclear Non- Proliferation Regime: Prospects for the 21st Century, Basingstroke: Macmillan, 1997, pp. 159-182, Idem., "Russia, Ukraine, and European Security," European Security, III, No 1, Spring, 1994, pp. 182-207. 22. Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, December 26, 1997, FBIS-SOV, 97-364, December 30, 1997. 23. Christoph Bluth, Arms Control and Proliferation: Russia and International Security After the Cold War, London Defence Studies, No. 35, 1996, pp. 12-13, Sergey M. Rogov, "Russia and NATO's Enlargement: The Search for a Compromise at the Helsinki Summit," Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA. CIM 513/ May, 1997, p. 10, E-mail Letter from Darrell Hammer, Johnson's Russia List, February 5, 1997, Dmitry Trenin, "Transformation of Russian Foreign Policy: NATO Expansion Can Have Negative Consequences for the West," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 5, 1997, E-Mail Transmission, J. Michael Waller, "Primakov's Imperial Line," Perspective, VII, No. 3, January-February 1997, pp. 2-6, "Primakov, Setting a New, Tougher Foreign Policy," Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, XLIX, No. 2, February 12, 1997, pp. 4-7. 24. Major General A.F. Klimenko, "International Security and the Character of Future Military conflicts," Voyennaya Mysl', No. 1, January-February, 1997, p. 6. 25. Moscow, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, in Russian, January 9-15, 1998, FBIS SOV, 98-040, February 10, 1998, Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in Russian, October 15, 1997 FBIS UMA 97-290, October 20, 1997, FBIS UMA, June 19, 1996, p. 27, FBIS UMA, February 10, 1998, Surikov, pp. 49-65, Anatoly Sergeevich Kulikov, "Russian Policy in the Sphere of National Security: The Essence and Magnitude of Internal Threats to Stability and Order," European Security, VI, No. 3, Autumn, 1997, pp. 16-37, Stephen J. Blank, Why Russian Policy Is Failing in Asia, Carlisle Barracks, Pa: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1997, pp. 27-32. 26. Klimenko, p. 10. 27. FBIS SOV January 24, 1997. This draft of that then upcoming military reform stated that first-strike or preemptive nuclear use was justified in the event of a local war expanding to a large-scale war and would restore the status quo and escalation dominance. 28. Reiner Huber, "NATO Enlargement and CFE Ceilings: A Preliminary Analysis in Anticipation of a Russian Proposal," European Security, V, No. 3, Autumn, 1996, p. 400. 29. Ibid. and V. Tsygichko and Reiner Huber, "Assessing Strategic Stability in a Multi-Polar International System: Two Approaches, Robert Lowe Trans., Unpublished Paper, Foreign Military Studies office, Fort Leavenworth, Ks. 1997. 30. Blank, Why Russian Policy Is Failing in Asia, pp. 27-32. 31. FBIS SOV, November 19, 1993, FBIS SOV, December 30, 1997. 32. U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Submarine Challenges, Washington D.C., USGPO, 1996, passim, Moscow, Russkiy Telegraf, in Russian, March 19, 1998, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Arms Control (Henceforth FBIS TAC), 98-078, March 20, 1998, Paris, Le Monde, in French, March 13, 1998, FBIS TAC, 98-072, March 13, 1998, Bluth, p. 12, Moscow, Interfax, in English, March 31, 1998, FBIS UMA, 98-090, April 1, 1998. 33. Moscow, RIA, in English, March 14, 1998, FBIS SOV, 98-073, March 14, 1998, lists among other industries missile and aviation technologies, and nuclear power engineering. All of these are taken from a speech by Secretary of the Security Council, Andrei Kokoshin. 34. Moscow, Armeyskiy Sbornik, September, 1996, FBIS-UMA-96-241-S, September 1, 1996, Col. E.G. Korotchenko, "Informatsionno-Psikhologicheskoe Protivoborstvo v Sovremennykh Usloviakh," Voennaya Mysl', No. 1, January-February, 1996, pp. 22-27, FBIS SOV, September 1, 1996. 35. Thomas, Ops. Cits., FBIS SOV, February 10, 1998, FBIS SOV, December 7, 1997, Fitzgerald, p. 5. 36. Korotchenko, pp. 212-27, "Russia's National Interests," Obshchaya Gazeta, August 14, 1997, from Johnson's Russia List, [email protected], FBIS SOV, December 30, 1997, and for some other examples (by no means all), Moscow, Granitsa Rossii, in Russian, September, 1995, FBIS UMA, 95-239-S, December 13, 1995, pp. 41-44, Moscow, Voyennaya Mysl', in Russian, No. 2, 1997, March-April, 1997, pp. 13-17, V.P. Gulin, "Strategy," FBIS UMA, 97-097-S, May 21, 1997, Moscow, Russian Security council Report in Russian, August 13, 1997, "RF Draft Doctrine on Information Security," FBIS SOV, 97-246, September 8, 1997, and FBIS UMA, September 1, 1996. 37. Vladimir I. Ivanov, "Russia's New Military Doctrine: Implications for Asia," Michael D. Bellows Ed., Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities, Washington, D.C. Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University, 1994, p. 223. 38. Alexei V. Zagorsky, "The Security Dimension," Tsuneo Akaha, Ed., Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East: Changing Ties With Asia-Pacific, London and New York: Routledge, 1997, p. 37. 39. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1997, p.44, D.L. Averre, "The Mirzoyanov Affair: Russia's `Military-chemical' Complex," European Security, IV, No. 2, Summer, 1995, pp. 273-305. 40. Derek Averre and Igor Khripunov, "Russian Chemdemil: Coaxing communities," Jane's Intelligence Review, June, 1997, pp. 257-259. 41. Ken Alibekov, "Russia's Deadly Expertise," New York times, March 27, 1998, Richard Preston, "Annals of Warfare: The Bioweaponeers," The New Yorker, March 9, 1998, pp. 52-65, Milton Leitenberg, "Biological Weapons Arms Control," Contemporary Security Policy, XVII, No. 1, April, 1996, pp. 1-79. 42. Ibidem. 43. The Associated Press, March 12, 1998, Reprinted in The Moscow Times, "In Brief: Arms Stockpile Plan," March 12, 1998. 44. Alexei Vassiliev, Russian Foreign Policy in the Middle East: From Messianism to Pragmatism, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1993, p. 360 London, Al-Sharq-Al-Aswat, in Arabic, June 18, 1996, FBIS SOV, 96-119, June 19, 1996, p. 24. 45. Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, February 13, 1998, FBIS UMA, 98-044, February 13, 1998, Moscow, Interfax, in English, March 30, 1998, FBIS SOV, 98-089, March 31, 1998. 46. The report is found in Joint Publications Research Service Arms Control (Henceforth JPRS TAC), 95-009-L, April 6, 1995, p. 1. 47. Ibid., pp. 5-6, Jim Hoagland, "Briefing Yeltsin on Iran", Washington Post, May 17, 1995, p. 23. 48. JPRS TAC, April 6, 1995, pp. 5-6. 49. Ibid., p. 6. 50. Ibid., p. 7. 51. Bill Gertz, "Pentagon Confirms Details on Iranian Missiles," Washington Times, March 27, 1998, p. 10, "Iran's Nuclear Programme: Scary or Not?," the Economist, March 14, 1998, p. 50. 52. Ibid. 53. Moscow, ITAR-TASS World Service, in Russian, March 16, 1998, FBIS UMA, 98-075, March 17, 1998, Moscow, Novaya Gazeta Ponedelnik, in Russian, March 16-22, 1998, FBIS TAC, 98-076, March 17, 1998. 54. London, The Guardian, in English, May 31, 1995, FBIS SOV, 95-105, June 1, 1995, p. 16, Stephen Blank, "Russia and Iran in a New Middle East", Mediterranean Quarterly, III, No. 4, Fall, 1992, pp. 124-127. 55. JPRS TAC, 95-009-L, April 6, 1995 p. 7. 56. Stephen Blank, Russian Policy and the Korean Crisis, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 1994, p. 15. 57. Stephen J. Blank, "Russia and the Gulf," Perspectives, (Ankara), I, No. 4, December, 1996-February, 1997, pp. 30-55. 58. For the 1970s policy of trying to create a united Arab and Iranian front see, Oleh S. and Bettie M. Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, The Soviet Quest for Influence, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991, for the current policy see Stephen J. Blank, "Russia and the Gulf," Perspectives, (Ankara), I, No. 4, December, 1996-February, 1997, pp. 30-55, and Idem., "Russia's Return to Mideast Diplomacy," Orbis, XL, No. 4, Fall, 1996, pp. 517-535. 59. "Russia Plans New Reactor in Iran, official Says," Washington Post Foreign Service, April 7, 1998, p. 18, Matthew Brzezinski, "U.S. Frets Over Plan to complete Reactor in Cuba," Wall Street Journal, April 1, 1998, pp. 14, Chennai Dinamani (Internet Version) in Tamil, March 25, 1998, Foreign Broadcast Information Service Near East and South Asia (Henceforth FBIS NEA), 98-084, March 27, 1998, Moscow, Moskovskiye Novosti, in Russian, March 8-15, 1998, FBIS SOV, 98-070, March 12, 1998, Moscow, Interfax, in English, March 17, 1998, FBIS SOV, 98-076, March 18, 1998, Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta in Russian, March 17, 1998, FBIS SOV, 98-077, March 19, 1998. 60. Moscow, Izvestiya, in Russian, February 27, 1998, FBIS TAC, 98-057, March 2, 1998. 61. Alexander Zhebin, "Russia-DPRK Treaty: Is the Inherited Agreement Applicable," Northeast Asian Peace and Security Network, August 17, 1995, Eugene and Natasha Bazhanov, "The Evolution of Russian-Korean Relations: External and Internal Factors," Asian Survey, XXXIV, No. 9, September, 1994, pp. 795-796, Seoul, Chungang Ilbo, in Korean, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, (Henceforth FBIS EAS), 95-194, October 6, 1995 p. 62. 62. See the sources cited in Note 57. 63. Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Cote Jr., Richard A. Falkenrath, and Steven E. Miller, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material, Cambridge, Ma.: CSIA Studies in International Security No. 12, MIT Press, 1996, pp. 123-126, 162-166. 64. "Russia Plans New Reactor in Iran,", p. 18, FBIS TAC, March 17, 1998, "Russia and Missile Proliferation," Statement by Richard H. Speier before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, June 5, 1997, The Monitor: Nonproliferation, Demilitarization, and Arms Control, University of Georgia, Athens Ga..., III, No. 3, Summer, 1997, pp. 31-34, Yossef Bodansky, "Iran's New Ballistic Missiles," Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, May-June, 1997, pp. 6-8. 65. Proliferation: Threat and Response, pp. 23-40, "Assessing the Cruise Missile Threat," Strategic Survey 1996/97, pp. 16-31, Duncan Lennox, "Threats and Their Development," Abdullah Toukan, "Threats and Developments in the Middle East," and Uzi Rubin, "Missiles and Missile Defence in the Middle East," Robin Ranger Ed., Extended Air Defence & the Long-Range Missile Threat, Bailrigg Memorandum No. 30, Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Lancaster University in Association with the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1997, Jeremy Stocker and David Wieneck, Rapporteurs, pp. 17-19, 29-31, and 35-37 respectively. 66. Moscow, Russian Public Television, First Channel Network in Russian, February 25, 1998, FBIS SOV, 98-056, March 2, 1998, Moscow, Kommersant-Daily, in Russian, March 7, 1998, FBIS SOV, 98-068, March 10, 1998. 67. Moscow, Russkiy Telegraf, in Russian, February 25, 1998, FBIS SOV, 98-056, March 2, 1998. 68. Kent E. Calder, Pacific Defense: Arms, Energy, and America's Future in Asia, New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1996, pp. 38-39. 69. This was revealed by Alexei Arbatov at a conference on Russian Defense Decision-Making at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., March 25-27, 1997. 70. Moscow, Krasnaya Zvezda, in Russian, July 2, 1996, FBIS SOV, 96-129, July 3, 1996, p. 34. 71. "Taiwan Crisis and Russian-Chinese Ties," Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, (Henceforth CDPP), XLVIII, No. 11, April 10, 1996, p. 11. 72. "Russian Military Sells Rocket Engines to China," Military Space, August 21, 1995, p. 1, Bill Gertz, "Russia Sells Rocket Motors to China," Washington Times, February 13, 1995, p. 4, Moscow, Kommersant-Daily, in Russian, July 18, 1996, FBIS SOV, 96-140, July 19, 1996, pp. 20-21 73. Pavel Felgengauer, "Selling Russian Arms and Transferring Arms-Building Technology to China - A Short-Term Policy with Long-Term Consequences," Paper Presented to the CAPS and RAND-CAPP Joint Conference on Foreign Military Assistance to the PRC and ROC, Oxford, England, June 27-29, 1997, and Rajan Menon, "The Strategic convergence Between Russia and China," Survival, XXXIX, No. 2, pp. 109-111. 74. Stephen Blank, "Russian Arms Sales to China; Issues and Outcomes," Paper Presented to the CAPS and RAND-CAPP Joint Conference on Foreign Military Assistance to the PRC and ROC, Oxford, England, June 27-29, 1997. 75. Stephen J. Blank, Challenging the New World Order: The Arms Transfer Policy of the Russian Republic, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993, FBIS SOV, July 19, 1996, pp. 20-21. 76. For instance, "Far East: China," CDPP, Vol. XLVIII, No. 30, August 21, 1996, pp. 20-22. It should be noted that among the articles in this section are some alleging that Chinese military men still view Russia as the enemy, a view which hardly jibes with official proclamations or with the logic behind Russian arms. sales. Boris Rumer, "Disintegration and Reintegration in Central Asia: Dynamics and Prospects," Boris Rumer Ed., Central Asia in Transition: Dilemmas of Political and Economic Development, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe & Co. Inc., 1996, pp. 14-15, Oksana Reznikova, "Transnational Corporations in Central Asia," in Rumer, pp. 82-83, "The Geopolitical Sleuth," The Economist, January 3, 1998, p. 19, Vladimir Miasnikov, "Russia and China, Robert D. Blackwill and Sergei A. Karaganov, Eds., Damage Limitation or Crisis? Russia and the Outside World, Washington, DC: Brassey's (USA) Inc., 1994, CSIA Studies in International Security, No. 5, pp. 232-233. 77. Blank, Russian Arms Sales to China, Issues and Outcomes, "Top Secret Arms and Nuclear Deals," Asia Times, June 30, 1997, From Johnson's Russia List, [email protected], July 1, 1997, Bill Gertz, "Russia Sells China High-Tech Artillery," Washington Times, July 3, 1997, p. 1, Strategic Survey, 1996-97, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1997, p. 170, Richard D. Fisher, Jr., "Foreign Arms Acquisition and PLA Modernization,' Unpublished Paper, November, 1997, pp. 4-5. 78. Personal communication from Peter Pry of the House National Security Committee staff, March, 1998. 79. Beijing, Jianchuan Zhishi, No. 10, 1997, in Chinese, Foreign Broadcast Information Service China (Henceforth FBIS CHI), 98-065, March 9, 1998. 80. Fisher, pp. 4-5. 81. Bruce G. Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, PRAC Paper, No. 13, December, 1994, Project on Rethinking Arms Control, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland at College Park, p. 7. 82. This point was raised in the commission's discussions by Dr. Stephen Cambone, but one should also see Dmitri Trenin, "Russia and the Emerging Security Environment in Northeast Asia," Security Dialogue, XXIX, No. 1, 1998, p. 83. For the contrary point of view see Bluth, p. 48 and Stephen J. Blank, the dynamics of Russia Weapon Sales to China, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1997. 83. Bill Gertz, "China's Nukes Could Reach Most of U.S.," Washington Times, April 1, 1998, p. 1, Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New "Old Thinking": the Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security, XX, No. 3, Winter, 1995-96, pp. 5-42, Banning S. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, "Chinese Perspectives on Arms Control," International Security, XX, No. 3, Winter, 1995-96, pp. 43-78. 84. William C. Potter, "The New Suppliers," Orbis, XXXVI, No. 2, Spring, 1992, pp. 206-209. 85. Fisher, pp. 9-12. 86. As Michael Mazarr points out, virtually any successful nonproliferation policy must be multilateral to succeed and if Russia is able to frustrate multilateralism, e.g. in Iran , it will permit Iran to evade any kind of foreign sanction for going nuclear and fatally compromise our efforts to get Tehran to desist from proliferation. Michael J. Mazarr, "Going Just a Little Nuclear," International Security, X, No. 2, Fall, 1995, pp. 106-107. 87. Ivanov, p. 223.


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