Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers
Stephen J. Blank 1 : "Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Proliferation in Russian
Russian Nuclear Forces: The Military-Strategic Dimension
Today Russia faces its greatest military crisis since June, 1941. 3 And if
the armed forces collapse, so too will the state. Chechnya revealed the
extent of Russia's conventional forces' degradation and confirmed Russia's
need to rely excessively on nuclear forces to achieve strategic military
and political goals. This reliance will likely continue into the next
decade and decisively shape Russian policies at home and abroad. Meanwhile
the overburdened and under-financed nuclear forces could disintegrate by
2007, leaving behind only about 10% of the current number of usable
warheads. Russia's C3I system is in comparably bad shape and worsening. 4
Current systems are decaying, and some 62% of missiles have outlived their
guaranteed service dates. 5
Yet Moscow is also building, albeit with difficulty, the Topol-M (SS-27)
land-based ICBM, new SLBMs and SSNs, and major C3I facilities in the Ural
Mountains. The 1993 military doctrine and subsequent policy statements
accept deterrence as the basis of Russian strategy and policy, and deny
that Moscow sees any state as its enemy. Moscow also openly announced a
first-strike use if attacked even by purely conventional means and has
unified its space and strategic nuclear forces. 6 These provisions
seemingly reversed the public Soviet disavowals of deterrence and of
striking first. In fact, Russia's deterrence contains three elements.
First, is Russia's readiness to launch first-strikes even against purely
conventional attacks on key targets. But this first-strike policy is
coupled with an extended deterrence against nuclear and conventional
attacks on the CIS to whom Russia offers an unsolicited and unwanted
extended deterrence. 7 That extended deterrence comprises the second
element of Russian deterrence and is linked to Russia' stated intention to
launch first-strike and even preemptive nuclear weapons if attacked. 8 In
fact, the prior secret intention to launch a first strike is now public
policy precisely because there is little or no usable conventional power
available to defend against threats above minor police actions.
But this first-strike policy linked to homeland and extended deterrence
goes still further. Russian military writers generally argue that these
weapons are no longer just weapons of mass destruction. Instead, they are
perfectly legitimate weapons capable of performing military missions.
Essentially there is no clear firebreak between conventional and nuclear
scenarios in the open sources. 9 This policy fundamentally contradicts the
notion that nuclear weapons are primarily for deterrence. Rather they
remain legitimate weapons of warfighting and of victory. Nor is it clear if
Moscow distinguishes between tactical or strategic missiles. Indeed, many
military-political analysts view NATO's enlargement as preparation for a
future military threat that can only be countered by the combat threat or
use of tactical, if not strategic, nuclear missiles. 10 Hence nuclear
warfighting and nuclear victory scenarios also now become or are thought to
be truly feasible options. 11 Nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, and policy
have become conventionalized, and are seen as no more than large, more
destructive conventional weapons that can be used in war. Russian planners
can then conceive of their use as if they were just particularly lethal
Accordingly, Russian writers openly speculate on how nuclear weapons might
be adapted for conventional use. 12 Doing so also implies incorporating a
new generation of lethal, highly accurate, third generation nuclear weapons
into Russia's arsenal. Russia can do this by reducing the number and yield
of nuclear warheads, and concurrently increasing the accuracy of delivery
to the military target and the effectiveness of target engagement. 13
The third aspect of deterrence is Russia's reliance, although this is
allegedly changing, on a Launch on Warning doctrine. Conventionalization of
nuclear weapons and of nuclear warfighting scenarios substantially lowers
the threshold for nuclear use and places enormous new stresses for
adaptiveness, and high quality upon Russia's decaying early warning and C2
systems to prevent unauthorized, and unintended nuclear strikes or
excessive nuclear responses to conventional attacks. This trend also adds
stress to an already overburdened, insufficient, and degraded C4I and Early
Warning system and heightens the chance for unauthorized, mistaken, or
The 1995 incident, when Moscow nearly launched a nuclear strike against a
Norwegian weather rocket, in the mistaken belief that it was a nuclear
attack, and other evidence shows continuing reliance on LOW to deter
against conventional and nuclear threats and Moscow's predisposition to
strike first. Since the decaying and overstressed control system's first
priority is to ensure that a launch occurs if the CINC is unavailable, not
to prevent unauthorized launches, LOW becomes much more likely. Preventing
unauthorized launches only comes second. The risk of accidental,
unauthorized, or mistaken launches, grows as Russian forces are
increasingly placed on a taut hair trigger. 14
These three points also raise issues about the use of nuclear weapons as
surrogates for new conventional weapons and information warfare
capabilities. Moscow argues that high-tech precision-guided missiles,
weapons, and information warfare could degrade strategic stability and
threaten the government's ability to command its armed forces or govern. 15
That threat justifies deterring an information, or electronic warfare, or
space-based attack by readiness to strike first and preemptively with
nuclear systems and forestall the degradation of functional parity with the
United States by even purely conventional attacks, even at conventional
targets like power plants. 16
Nuclear systems also are vitally important for Russian military policy.
They encouraged and allowed Russian leaders to delay costly major military
reforms. They remain a surrogate for reforming the regular army as well as
those forces' shield during reform. Therefore, as long as Russia lacks
quality armed forces, it must emphasize the nuclear deterrent against a
host of purely conventional and even low-level threats. Unfortunately,
given the bitter political struggles over military reform in Russia, this
continuing over-reliance on nuclear weapons may paradoxically help
undermine the revival of Russian conventional power and preserve the
current status quo, albeit at a much lower nuclear force structure and a
rather low threshold for nuclear use. 17
Until now Russia has assumed that nuclear weapons are cheaper than a large,
well-trained, competent, professional, and well-equipped army at a time of
economic crisis. Since the government cannot afford to create or maintain
such an army, or accomplish the military reform needed to do so anytime
soon, and is arguably not even truly serious or conceptually aware of what
must be done; nuclear weapons are a tempting surrogate. They seemingly
offer a cheaper, but equally reliable defense against foreign threats.
Finally because of the destructive Western and potentially Chinese
potential of high-tech conventional weapons and of IW and REW, nuclear
systems deter those threats to Russia. Until Russia overcomes its
technological backwardness and inability to compete in the evolution in
military affairs (RMA) or IW, nuclear weapons must stand in for the
advanced technologies and high-precision conventional weapons that
constitute the RMA's mainstays.
Russian Nuclear Forces: The Political Dimension
Nuclear weapons also have critical political uses for Russia. They alone
ensure that Russia is a great power whose vital, secondary, and even
tertiary interests are taken seriously by foreign states. 18 On that basis
Russia can then take part in all issues of world affairs where it has or
expresses an important interest. Russian elites also assert, probably
rightly, that otherwise Moscow's interests would not be taken very
Possession of nuclear weapons has already let Russia proclaim extended
deterrence across the CIS, call for reuniting the CIS into a single defense
space, and deter CIS members from attacks upon each other, including
Russia. It also let Russia threaten outside states, e.g. Turkey, in 1993,
with nuclear war, if they intervened in the CIS for or against one of its
members. 20 As the sole heir of Soviet nuclear weapons Russia enjoys a vast
disparity in power between it and other "heirs" which it has exploited to
prevent Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan from going nuclear. 21
At the same time, nuclear weapons ensure Russia's standing as a major
player in international non-proliferation efforts. Russia can then help
define individual and multilateral non-proliferation outcomes to advance
its interests. Russia can strongly support non-proliferation while selling
high-quality conventional or even nuclear technology and weapons to clients
who are willing to buy them. Since it is vital for Washington to win
Russian assent and compliance to the many regimes it is constructing
against WMD proliferation, Russia can drive hard bargains even if it does
not then live up to its side of the deal, as with regard to Iran.
Russian Threat Assessments
Russia's new security blueprint states that its main threats are internal
and economic-political, not military. But actually it exudes a perception
of multiple threats on all axes. 22 Despite continuing crises and weakness,
Russia insists on its status as a major military power, covets
military-political equality with the United States, believes it is somehow
entitled to this status, and cannot otherwise accept the status quo. 23 As
one general wrote,
A number of political scientists are of the opinion that there
can be seen in relations between the West [note not just the
United States, but the West as a whole-SB] a "slow creeping into
a semblance of standoff which threatens serious losses both for
international security and security of individual countries, and
for Russia" It is caused by a whole number of factors. First,
there is the apparent incompatibility of Russia's and the United
States' current potentialities on the world scene which makes the
prospects of their relations on a parity basis illusory [and] for
which reason Russia is hardly going to settle for the role of
junior partner. 24
Hence global deterrence on all azimuths is necessary. Many Russian analysts
and officials contend that the armed forces must prepare for a wide range
of missions, including those that cannot now be discerned or clearly
defined. Those missions comprise the entire spectrum of conflict from
low-level conflicts to inter-continental nuclear war and everything in
between. e.g., small-scale conflicts, peace operations, warfare using
high-tech conventional weapons in an old-fashioned theater war across
several theaters, information warfare, and intercontinental nuclear war. 25
Military spokesmen consistently insist that the real threat is U.S. and
Western naval, air, and strategic superiority. And should deterrence fail,
"the task is to protect sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the other
permanent vital interests of the country." 26 Presumably first-strike or
even preemptive means are thereby justified. 27
Such thinking enroots itself in military policy as worst-case scenarios for
Europe and Asia. German defense analyst Reiner Huber recently noted that
Russian models of offense and defense in Europe are based on paranoid
calculations. Current models state that Russia, to feel secure in Europe,
requires a potential successful defense of at least 90% if NATO attacks in
a purely conventional war. And this calculation excludes Russia's nuclear
retaliatory capability! As Huber wrote,
This underscores the deep mistrust still prevailing in Russia
vis-a-vis NATO and the United States. For example, if we were to
assume that the success of defense is equivalent to the failure
of aggression, the defense sufficiency principle suggests that
the Russians believe NATO will attack even if the chances of
success were only about 10 percent. Obviously NATO and the United
States are perceived as being quite reckless. 28
Accordingly NATO enlargement is a threat because it forces Russia to move
troops from other theaters to the West against NATO even in peacetime. This
allegedly opens the way to attacks from the South and East although it is
hard to see who would be so rash. The definition of stability in this
analysis is simple. Nobody anywhere can threaten Russia. Absent a political
accord with NATO and other states that would banish fears of attack, Russia
must have conventional, if not nuclear, parity with all states along its
frontiers to create a "stability of force equilibrium." 29 Similar thinking
has dominated assessments in the Far East. 30 Nor is this outlook far
removed from the threat assessments that dominated Soviet planning.
Meanwhile the threat of nuclear use in a preemptive or first strike
capability is all Russia has to defend Russia and CIS. Virtually all
official threat assessments and Russian procurement policies since 1991 are
premised on multiple threats up to an including intercontinental nuclear
war! 31 New force deployments also suggest the ongoing primacy of
conventional, if not nuclear, warfighting in doctrine and policy. Russia is
building ever quieter nuclear powered attack submarines with conventional
ordnance and missiles to conduct strategic ASW with greater attack ranges
at a steady rate. They are tracking the U.S. fleet for the first time in
years and reflect continuing threat assessments based on premises of
intercontinental nuclear naval war. Russia is building new strategic sea
and land-based missile systems, and high-performance fighter aircraft, e.g.
SU-32, 34, 35, 37, MiG-29 and MiG-31. 32 Russian policy also stresses
dual-use technologies which biological and chemical warfare systems
Inasmuch as nuclear war and weapons substitute for the absent high-tech and
IW capabilities that Russia lacks, those capabilities are viewed as
particularly dangerous. Without them Russia faces the United States, NATO,
and China with glaring conventional inferiority. Therefore nuclear weapons
are the only feasible reply to attacks based on high-tech, REW, or IW
weapons. Influential elites also charge that Russia already is and for some
time has been fighting an information and psychological war with the United
States. This struggle occurs continuously since 1985 within and without
Russia, and Russia has been losing this war due to superior Western
technology and internal betrayal. 34 Moreover, IW undermines prospects for
strategic stability as it can degrade first strike capability by stealth
and surprise attacks on C4I. Those attacks negate Russian capability for
deterrence or surprise if Russia does not then preempt the IW attack e.g.
by nuclear means. 35 Some current IW scenarios suggest that key military
elements feel that Russia is already at war, but there is a more widespread
belief that the state, as such, is under siege from internal and external
enemies. IW and EW, as new forms of war occur all the time. 36 This outlook
updates Stalin's notion of a conjoined internal civil war and foreign
encirclement. Everything or everyone is an equal and compelling threat.
Hence strategy loses touch with its formative political reality. 37
As Alexei Zagorsky observed for the period 1991-97,
Compared with the late 1980s, the most fundamental change is that
instead of taking into account threat perceptions existing
outside Russia, the only factor considered is the minimum force
needed to defeat them. Evgeny Shaposhnikov stresses: `reasonable
sufficiency is the ability of a nation to ensure a loss that is
unacceptable for the offending side.' In accordance with this
interpretation, the composition and strength of the Russian armed
forces should be limited only by the subjective judgments of the
Russian military, not by international complaints and
Thus Russian threat assessments and planned procurements remain wedded to
the threat of a war with the United States and/or its allies as well as to
nuclear scenarios for that war even as Russia demands equality with the
Other WMD Capabilities
Russia's former Soviet biological and chemical warfare programs continue
despite adherence to international conventions and "decrees" from President
Yeltsin. The military has successfully disregarded domestic and foreign
admonitions and continued the programs despite their costs. 39 Russia now
claims it cannot afford to destroy its CW stocks and faces both
bureaucratic and local Russian opposition to building cleanup facilities.
40 Russia's huge but highly covert biological warfare (BW) program also
continues in spite of long-standing official statements and conventions. 41
Strangely the United States consistently refuses to discuss this program
openly and thereby pressure Russia, but undoubtedly the program continues,
as recent evidence from Ken Alibekov and Milton Leitenberg suggests. 42 The
Ministry of Defense is now trying to throw responsibility for chemical and
BW cleanup onto the public or private organizations, apparently with
Yeltsin's agreement, on the grounds that this is not a true responsibility
of or work for the Ministry. 43 This new campaign suggests that the
programs will continue despite "official" condemnation, but perhaps under
Russia's proliferation policies are either incoherent or, to be frank,
duplicitous, if not a mixture of both elements. On the one hand, Russia's
proximity to the Middle East and Asia requires Moscow to oppose any foreign
military presence in the former and nuclear proliferation in both regions.
These points should mandate very strict efforts to supervise arms sales and
nuclear transfers to the Middle East and Asia to prevent a recurrence of
past conflicts or the outbreak of new ones. Even critics of the orientation
to the United States concur that Moscow and Washington have a common
interest in preventing such conflicts and stopping proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction e.g. in Iran and Iraq. They also state that Russia will
not let Iran go nuclear. 44
Russian leaders also regard proliferation as a major threat. Foreign
Minister Evgeny Primakov repeatedly denies Russia's support for the
would-be proliferators and both he and the Ministry of Defense oppose
support for further nuclear proliferation. Officially Russia has opposed
Indian and North Korean nuclearization. 45 The Foreign Intelligence
Service's (SVR) 1995 report on the Nonproliferation Treaty, submitted by
Primakov, its then director, states,
For Russia the specific fate of the NPT will not only inevitably
affect its strategic course for enduring security, but will also
have a major impact on national security interests: The
appearance of new nuclear countries on RF [Russian Federation]
borders would create a real threat, destabilize the situation in
the "near abroad" zone, and force it to revise the guidelines of
Russian defense policy, including in terms of its nuclear
The SVR stated that the main threat to nonproliferation regime is states
like Israel, Pakistan, and India who are de facto nuclear powers but remain
outside the treaty. Their capability is dangerous in itself and can spread
to other countries, e.g. Pakistan's transfer of know-how to Iran. Since
these states are outside the NPT, they cannot rely on the international
community to compel their potential enemies to refrain from going nuclear.
Accordingly, their exclusion from the NPT regime is destabilizing because
it stimulates their enemies to follow suit. 47
Certainly Iran fulfills this designation vis-a-vis Israel. That alone
logically should lead Moscow to work against further nuclearization of the
Middle East. Furthermore the SVR report categorically states that Russia
cannot support states pursuing a double standard toward "unofficial"
nuclear countries or states, like Iran, who are on the nuclear threshold or
seeking to acquire weapons. Because such tactics allow both these sets of
states to nuclearize further and triggers arms races among them and their
enemies, supporting such states is a highly dangerous policy. 48
Yet the SVR then complains that states like Iran who criticize the NPT
regime provisions on access to certain nuclear materials rightly highlight
the purely political nature of such restrictions. U.S. anti-proliferation
efforts against Iran are purely politically motivated since Russia's sale
of a reactor cannot be used effectively for producing weapons. Russia also
denies that Iran has decided to go nuclear and is developing capabilities
beyond those of other possible "threshold states". 49 This conceals
Minatom's readiness to sell centrifuges to Iran without its government's
knowledge before Washington intervened. 50
Russia clearly downplays Iranian capability. And Iran's difficulties has
forced it to let Russia take over the Bushehr reactor project as a turnkey.
But U.S. and Israeli intelligence report that Iran is within 2-5 years of a
nuclear missile capability. 51 These and other sources cite great strides
in ballistic missiles with Chinese, DPRK, and potentially Russian help. 52
Recent reports detail the knowing participation and coordination of
Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), the high-level state commissions
on non-proliferation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and probably the
Ministry of Defense in projects to send Russian scientists to Iran to
transfer nuclear know-how as Iran aims at IRBM and then ICBM capability. 53
Already in 1992 officials argued that Russia must sell arms to prevent
Iranian support for Islam in the southern CIS and Russia and that it is
best to influence Iranian progress by these sales to limit the threat. 54
Russian-Iranian cooperation could be a unique testing ground
where the possibility and need for a member state of the "nuclear
club" to fulfill its obligations under Article IV of the NPT
whereby the participants in the Treaty must promote equitable,
nondiscriminatory cooperation in the field of peaceful atomic
power engineering but must, in doing so, prevent conditions for
the proliferation of nuclear weapons [and this] would be
meaningfully examined. Cooperation in the cause of replacing the
North Korean gas-graphite reactors with light water ones can also
be the same kind of example. 55
Clearly the issue here is an Iran-Russian security partnership on issues of
common concern: Azerbaijan's westward turn, control of Caspian Sea oil and
gas flows, stabilizing Central Asia, and policing Transcaucasia. This
resembles Russia's main aim in seeking access to the consortium to provide
North Korea with reactors, gaining leverage in Korea and Asia. 56 Russia
also supports the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Gulf, and aims to
create a bloc of pro-Russian forces against U.S. and Israeli interests to
compel Washington to admit Russia as an equal player with a veto into the
peace process or Gulf security. 57 That drive to resurrect the previous
Soviet policy of a bloc or entente among the former "rejectionist front" of
the late 1970s is the geostrategic factor driving support for Iran's,
Iraq's, Libya's, Sudan's, and Syria's rearmament. 58
The other motive for military and civilian transfers of weapons, and
technologies, civilian and military alike, is to save Russian civilian and
defense industry. Primakov recently listed that goal as one of the
foundations and main goals of Russian foreign policy. Arms sales which are
also a major domestic political money tree, is now a major state priority
and a factor in destabilizing critical areas. Apart from offering Syria
weapons, Russia is selling SAM's (SA-10s) to Cyprus, Iran, and offering
nuclear technology and reactors to India, China, Pakistan, Cuba, Syria and
Iran. There is talk of $5 billion in atomic reactor deals and even of 50-70
transfers of reactors for cash to China. 59 India has also tried to obtain
missile safeguards technology, obviously aiming to enhance control over its
weapons. And Iran apparently is seeking heavy water too. 60 We have long
known of factions who would sell arms to North Korea if it had the cash to
buy them, and there are reports that this argument extends to atomic
reactors as well. 61 Minatom strongly pushes nuclear exports to China and
Iran, India, and more recently Syria and Cuba, all ostensibly for civilian
use. 62 Minatom claims it must market its reactors aggressively to survive
and other arguments do not move it for good reason. 63
The known technology transfer of WMD to Iran involve SS-4 technology and
the reactor at Bushehr as well as exchange of scientific know-how with
Iranian scientists and training in Russia for them. Russia also wants to
build another "research' reactor there. 64 We do not know in open sources
the extent of scientists' exchange of knowledge either on temporary or on
permanent basis to China, Iran, and any other state. But many Middle
Eastern states also have either biological or chemical warfare capability
or are developing those capabilities and buy what they need abroad,
including missiles for these systems' warheads. 65 The Bushehr reactor
comprises four reactors plus turbines that Russia is now expected to
provide along with more military technology and weapons since Ukraine
dropped out under American pressure. 66
Russia is also helping Iran develop a national communications satellite
which also will have an earth monitoring capability. The firm doing this
work, the Spurt Science and Production Center is known for its work on
classified space programs. The space apparatus itself is being developed by
the Reutov Mashinostroyenie Science and Production Association which used
to develop ballistic and cruise missiles and most important military space
systems. The Izhevsk radio plant and the Aksion Joint Stock Company
invariably took part in Soviet space programs. Russia clearly knows this is
a dual-use system, that Iran will have exclusive control over once it is
designed, and that it will take 2-3 years from signing the contracts to
finish the satellite. 67
Although officials argue that Russia's vital interests demand strategic
partnership with China, particular interests, like the defense industry,
depend on sales to China and lobby strongly for China. 68 Without foreign
arms sales neither they nor the Russian army would survive with an adequate
domestic conventional weapons base. Therefore the government has reportedly
encouraged defense industry to sell even state of the art systems abroad
until 2005. At that time it expects to rejoin the conventional arms market
for its own troops and reduce industry's need to sell abroad. But until
then there is a virtual Carte Blanche for conventional and dual-use
platforms, weapons, and technologies. 69 Defense industrialists also claim
that, "the active promotion of Russian armaments in the Asia-Pacific Region
is leading to a new balance of power taking shape there, in which the
United States will no longer play the decisive role." 70 Defense industry
and the Ministry of Defense under Pavel Grachev reportedly felt that
China's need for military technology to keep pace with Taiwan and Southeast
Asia will lead it to buy Russian systems which "could become not only a way
for our hapless military-industrial complex to preserve jobs and earn
money, but also the start of a long-range strategic partnership and a new
balance of forces in Asia that would favor Russia." 71
Given the lucrative benefits deriving from arms sales and because Moscow
has neither devised a viable defense program, anticipated its arsenal's
impending block obsolescence, nor controlled defense industry, the latter's
captains and state organizations and ministries often conduct their own
policies towards China and other Asian states regardless of the outcome.
Given the pervasive corruption among military officers that prevails in
arms sales, personal, not just business, interests are also involved.
Grachev, e.g. tried to establish autonomous sources of funding exclusively
under his control. Thus in 1995 military space authorities sold three of
Russia's most advanced upper-stage rocket engines to China in violation of
the Missile Technology Control Regime, but did not go through NPO
Energiamash, the only legal entity licensed to sell this engine. 72 We
still do not know who authorized the sale and pocketed the proceeds.
Although everyone agrees on the need for friendship with China, analysts of
Russian defense sales divide on whether Moscow fully controls its weapons
and technology exports, especially to China. Pavel Felgengauer, Russia's
leading defense correspondent, asserts that the number of subcontractors
involved in any project and the government's close scrutiny, indicates that
Russia can and does control this policy. He might also cite recent decrees
placing all arms trading organizations under direct presidential and prime
ministerial control and replacing its leadership. 73 However, analysts like
this author argue that while there is considerable state control and
certainly major efforts to extend it, the frequent repetition of decrees on
arms sales and the pervasive official, military, official, and defense
industry corruption, suggest many cases of unauthorized arms or technology
transfer to China and elsewhere. The fact that state efforts to control
arms sales began in 1992-93 also indicates the scope of the problem. 74 Nor
was Grachev the only example of the problem. 75
The armed services are divided. Many officers see China as a future
military threat, or as pursuing a dangerous course in Asia, and that
inhibits the strategic modernization of Russia's Asian forces. 76 Others
see China as a lucrative partner, potential ally, and counterweight to the
United States. That view defeated the former view, opening the way to
large-scale arms transfers to China. Russia has sold China nuclear
technology, evidently control and guidance systems from the SS-18 and SS-19
series to China for its Dong Feng missiles (DF-31, and 41) and is upgrading
many categories of China's conventional and nuclear submarines, including
the Kilos it bought from Russia. 77 In addition whole factories have been
transferred to China and are making parts for the Topol-M (SS-27) mobile
ICBM. 78 Russia is also helping develop a new generation of Chinese SSN's
and SSBN's, the new 093 and 094 attack and missile submarines. Russia is
helping China cover the hulls of these submarines with a layer of anechoic
tiles to improve their quieting capabilities and help them elude detection,
i.e. U.S. and Japanese detection. These submarines will conduct missions
related to daily activities of U.S. and Japanese warships, compare
favorably with Victor III class SSN's, and should become operational in
2007. 79 There are also reports of Russia selling China parts for its
mobile SS-24 and 25's TEL's and of plans to build up to 50 nuclear reactors
for China. 80
As Bruce Blair reports, Russia has transferred blocking devices to China
which facilitate its missiles' combat readiness. As he notes, this policy
contradicts the idea that Russia dropped its no first use pledge because of
fears of China's army. Such a fear should lead Russia to refine war plans
against China to include more limited nuclear options. It would also lead
to a policy to obstruct China's technological advances, not facilitate
them. 81 The only logical answer is that there is no fear of China for the
present and an attempt, as with Iran, to gain influence over the inevitable
Chinese buildup irrespective of its outcomes, e.g. India's potential
nuclearization. 82 But there is increasing evidence of China's nuclear
buildup to threaten U.S. countervalue targets, its interests in nuclear
warfighting scenarios, and rethinking of no first use as it moves towards
deterrence, limited nuclear war ideas, etc. 83 Clearly Moscow's main enemy
remains the United States and it is pushing China to confront us as well.
Russia is reverting, out of desperation as much as calculation, to Soviet
strategies but without the controls and conventional wherewithal to sustain
them. It also has revived the reckless Soviet policy to support nuclear
proliferation. 84 In the Middle East Moscow is undermining the peace
process and renewing its dangerous and uncontrollable arms sales policies
of the 1970s. The net result is a further weaponization of the area that
enhances regional capabilities for protracted war. It sells weapons to
Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, clearly aiming to incite trouble there. Moscow
offers major systems to Iran and Arab states for use against Israel, yet
its defense industry pursues deals with Israel's defense industry, e.g. to
sell China an AWACS-like system. 85 In Asia, support for Chinese military
modernization occurs as Moscow sells arms to all of China's most likely
regional rivals: South Korea and North Korea (if it could pay for them),
Taiwan, Japan, and ASEAN states. These policies can only gravely set back
the cause of nonproliferation and conflict resolution. 86
At home too, Moscow increasingly employs or resorts to nuclear scenarios
with a fraying control system and no usable conventional forces. This is
not a Russian New Look. Rather it is Moscow's only look, but its new
military reform is plagued with serious shortfalls of support and funding
and may well fail. The conventional and the nuclear sectors will become a
shadow of their past strength, but Russian policy fails to reflect
strategic realities. "Foreign policy cannot unquestionably be considered a
factor that sets the context and requirements for the military policy of
Russia." 87 Goals, interests, and capabilities remain disconnected in
Russian policy that pursues unattainable goals with the mindset of empire
and cold war bipolarity.
This gap between Russian means, and goals of equality with the United
States could lead Russia into domestic or foreign conflicts as it remains
overmilitarized and politically or strategically incoherent. That disparity
between ends and means remains the greatest threat to both Russian and
Eurasian security. Sadly, it appears the disparity will widen and worsen
before it narrows and improves.
1. Dr. Stephen Blank is the Douglas MacArthur Professor of Research,
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania, serving since 1989 as the Institute's expert on the Soviet
bloc and the post-Soviet world. Has written on Russian, CIS and East
European security issues. His current research deals with proliferation and
the revolution in military affairs, and energy and security in Eurasia.
2. The views expressed here do not in any way represent those of the U.S.
Army, Department of Defense, or U.S. Government.
3. Alexei G. Arbatov, "Military Reform in Russia: Dilemmas, Obstacles, and
Progress," International Security, XXII, No. 4, pp. 83-134.
4. David Hoffman, "Downsizing a Mighty Arsenal," Washington Post, March 16,
1998, p. 1, See the paper by Bruce Blair for the Commission, and Moscow,
Pravda Pyat 5, in Russian, January 30-February 6, 1998, Foreign Broadcast
Information Service Central Eurasia (Henceforth FBIS SOV), 98-084, March
25, 1998, Moscow, Segodnya, in Russian, February 5, 1998, Foreign Broadcast
Information Service Central Eurasia, Military Affairs, (Henceforth FBIS
UMA), 98-036 February 5, 1998.
5. FBIS SOV, March 25, 1998, David Hoffman, "Decline of Russia's Nuclear
Forces," Washington Post, March 15, 1998, p. 1, Blair, Bruce Blair, The
Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press, 1993, and Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 1995, pp. 18-23, pp. 43-72, and his interview
with John Newhouse, Europe Adrift, New York, Pantheon Books, 1997, pp.
211-212, See Also Peter Pry's unpublished manuscript, War Scare.
6. "Osnovnye Polozhenii Voennoi Doktriny Rossiiskoi Federatsii," Rossiyskie
Vesti, in Russian, November 19, 1993, FBIS SOV 93-222-S, November 19, 1993,
pp. 1-11, Col. General I.D. Sergeev, "Improving Combat Readiness of
Strategic Rocket Forces Under Conditions of Implementation of Strategic
Offensive Weapons Treaties," Voennaya Mysl', No. 6, November-December,
1995, pp. 16-21, Lt. General N. Ye. Solovtsov, Major General V.T. Nosov,
"The role and Place of Strategic Rocket Forces in Russia's Armed Forces,",
Voyennaya Mysl', No. 11-12, November-December, 1994, pp. 71-76, Moscow,
Krasnaya Zvezda, in Russian, March 13, 1998, FBIS UMA, 98-075, March 17,
7. Ibid., Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in Russian, January 22, 1997,
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia (Henceforth FBIS
SOV) 97-015, January 24, 1997, Andrei Kokoshin, "Reflections on Russia's
Pat, present, and Future," Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project,
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June, 1997, p. 31.
8. Ibidem., See Also Peter Pry's unpublished manuscript, War Scare.
9. Pry, Ibid.
10. Col. V. Kruglov, and Colonel. M. Ye. Sosnovskiy, "[The]Role of
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear Deterrence," Voennaya Mysl'
(Military thought), No. 6, 1997, pp. 12-16, Moscow, Voprosy Bezopasnosti,
in Russian, December, 1997, FBIS SOV, 98-064, March 5, 1998, examines
debates over tactical nuclear weapons, see also Anton Surikov, "Some
Aspects of Russian Military Reform," European Security, VI, No. 3, Autumn,
1997, pp. 49-65.
11. Kruglov and Sosnovskiy, pp. 12-16, Kruglov and Sosnovskiy, pp. 12-16,
Andrei Kokoshin, "Reforming Russia's Armed Forces, Voyennaya Mysl', No.
5/6, 1996, p. 18, Lt. General (Ret) Ye. B. Volkov, "Start II and the
Security of Russia," Voennaya Mysl', No. 1, January-February, 1996, pp.
17-21, Major General V.A. Ryaboshapko (Ret.), "Nuclear Conditions:
conditions of Possible Resort to Nuclear Weapons," Voyennaya Mysl', No. 4,
July-August, 1996, pp. 10-14, Col. O.A. Kobelev, N.N. Detinov, "Upgrading
the Nuclear Arms Proliferation Control System, Voennaya Mysl', No. 9-10,
September, October, 1994, p. 3, Sevastopol Flag Rodiny, in Russian,
December 10, 1997, FBIS SOV, 98-009, January 12, 1998, Moscow, Itogi, in
Russian, December 16, 1997, FBIS SOV, 98-020, January 23, 1998, Stephen
Blank, "Russia, Ukraine, and European Security," European Security, III,
No. 1, Spring, 1994, pp. 192-198, Mary Fitzgerald, "The Russian Shift
Toward Nuclear War-Waging," Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C., 1993.
12. Ibidem, all.
13. Personal Communication from Mary Fitzgerald, see also, Fitzgerald, pp.
14. Pry, passim., Blair, Ops. Cits., Yuri Golotyuk, "President Retains
Control of Nuclear Button," RIA Novosti, March 24, 1998, from Johnson's
Russia List, No. 2118, March 25, 1998, [email protected]
15. Fitzgerald, p. 5, Moscow, Argumenty i Fakty, in Russian, November,
1997, FBIS SOV, 97-334, December 7, 1997, and the following works by
Timothy Thomas, Timothy L. Thomas, "Deterring Information Warfare: A New
Strategic Challenge," Parameters, XXV, No. 4, Winter, 1996-97, 81-91,
Timothy L. Thomas, "Russian Views on Information-Based Warfare," Airpower
Journal, Special Issue, 1996, pp. 25-35, Timothy L. Thomas, "Dialectical
Versus Empirical Thinking: The Key elements of the Russian Understanding of
Information Operations," Paper Presented to the U.S. Army War College,
Annual Strategy Conference, April 22-24, 1997, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
16. FBIS SOV, November 19, 1993.
17. There is a loud and public military opposition to the reforms in the
Duma and among serving military personnel and it is likely that one reason
why Yeltsin sacked his Minister of Interior, General Anatoly S. Kulikov, in
march, 1998 is because Kulikov had come out in support of some of this
opposition's arguments. Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta in Russian, February
10, 1998, FBIS UMA, 98-041, February 10, 1998.
18. Moscow, Vooruzhenie, Politika, Konversiya, in Russian, No. 3 (10),
1995, FBIS UMA, 96-119-S, June 19, 1996, p. 33 Ibid., p. 27.
19. Axel W. Krohn, "European Security in Transition:' NATO Going East', the
`German Factor', and Security in Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea
Region," European Security, IV, No. 4, Winter, 1995, p. 582.
20. FBIS SOV, November 19, 1993, Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian,
September 23, 1995, FBIS-SOV-95-188, September 28, 1995, pp. 19-22, Dmitry
Volsky, "The Explosive Karabakh Conflict," New Times, No. 16, 1993, p. 24,
J.D. Crouch II, William van Cleave, et al., "The Politics of Reform in
Russia," Global Affairs, VII, No. 3, Summer, 1993, p. 197.
21. Stephen J. Blank, "Proliferation and Non-Proliferation in Ukraine:
Implications for European and U.S. Security," Raju G.C. Thomas Ed., The
Nuclear Non- Proliferation Regime: Prospects for the 21st Century,
Basingstroke: Macmillan, 1997, pp. 159-182, Idem., "Russia, Ukraine, and
European Security," European Security, III, No 1, Spring, 1994, pp.
22. Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, December 26, 1997, FBIS-SOV,
97-364, December 30, 1997.
23. Christoph Bluth, Arms Control and Proliferation: Russia and
International Security After the Cold War, London Defence Studies, No. 35,
1996, pp. 12-13, Sergey M. Rogov, "Russia and NATO's Enlargement: The
Search for a Compromise at the Helsinki Summit," Center for Naval Analyses,
Alexandria, VA. CIM 513/ May, 1997, p. 10, E-mail Letter from Darrell
Hammer, Johnson's Russia List, February 5, 1997, Dmitry Trenin,
"Transformation of Russian Foreign Policy: NATO Expansion Can Have Negative
Consequences for the West," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 5, 1997, E-Mail
Transmission, J. Michael Waller, "Primakov's Imperial Line," Perspective,
VII, No. 3, January-February 1997, pp. 2-6, "Primakov, Setting a New,
Tougher Foreign Policy," Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, XLIX, No.
2, February 12, 1997, pp. 4-7.
24. Major General A.F. Klimenko, "International Security and the Character
of Future Military conflicts," Voyennaya Mysl', No. 1, January-February,
1997, p. 6.
25. Moscow, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, in Russian, January 9-15,
1998, FBIS SOV, 98-040, February 10, 1998, Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in
Russian, October 15, 1997 FBIS UMA 97-290, October 20, 1997, FBIS UMA, June
19, 1996, p. 27, FBIS UMA, February 10, 1998, Surikov, pp. 49-65, Anatoly
Sergeevich Kulikov, "Russian Policy in the Sphere of National Security: The
Essence and Magnitude of Internal Threats to Stability and Order," European
Security, VI, No. 3, Autumn, 1997, pp. 16-37, Stephen J. Blank, Why Russian
Policy Is Failing in Asia, Carlisle Barracks, Pa: Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1997, pp. 27-32.
26. Klimenko, p. 10.
27. FBIS SOV January 24, 1997. This draft of that then upcoming military
reform stated that first-strike or preemptive nuclear use was justified in
the event of a local war expanding to a large-scale war and would restore
the status quo and escalation dominance.
28. Reiner Huber, "NATO Enlargement and CFE Ceilings: A Preliminary
Analysis in Anticipation of a Russian Proposal," European Security, V, No.
3, Autumn, 1996, p. 400.
29. Ibid. and V. Tsygichko and Reiner Huber, "Assessing Strategic Stability
in a Multi-Polar International System: Two Approaches, Robert Lowe Trans.,
Unpublished Paper, Foreign Military Studies office, Fort Leavenworth, Ks.
30. Blank, Why Russian Policy Is Failing in Asia, pp. 27-32.
31. FBIS SOV, November 19, 1993, FBIS SOV, December 30, 1997.
32. U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Submarine Challenges,
Washington D.C., USGPO, 1996, passim, Moscow, Russkiy Telegraf, in Russian,
March 19, 1998, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Arms Control
(Henceforth FBIS TAC), 98-078, March 20, 1998, Paris, Le Monde, in French,
March 13, 1998, FBIS TAC, 98-072, March 13, 1998, Bluth, p. 12, Moscow,
Interfax, in English, March 31, 1998, FBIS UMA, 98-090, April 1, 1998.
33. Moscow, RIA, in English, March 14, 1998, FBIS SOV, 98-073, March 14,
1998, lists among other industries missile and aviation technologies, and
nuclear power engineering. All of these are taken from a speech by
Secretary of the Security Council, Andrei Kokoshin.
34. Moscow, Armeyskiy Sbornik, September, 1996, FBIS-UMA-96-241-S,
September 1, 1996, Col. E.G. Korotchenko, "Informatsionno-Psikhologicheskoe
Protivoborstvo v Sovremennykh Usloviakh," Voennaya Mysl', No. 1,
January-February, 1996, pp. 22-27, FBIS SOV, September 1, 1996.
35. Thomas, Ops. Cits., FBIS SOV, February 10, 1998, FBIS SOV, December 7,
1997, Fitzgerald, p. 5.
36. Korotchenko, pp. 212-27, "Russia's National Interests," Obshchaya
Gazeta, August 14, 1997, from Johnson's Russia List, [email protected],
FBIS SOV, December 30, 1997, and for some other examples (by no means all),
Moscow, Granitsa Rossii, in Russian, September, 1995, FBIS UMA, 95-239-S,
December 13, 1995, pp. 41-44, Moscow, Voyennaya Mysl', in Russian, No. 2,
1997, March-April, 1997, pp. 13-17, V.P. Gulin, "Strategy," FBIS UMA,
97-097-S, May 21, 1997, Moscow, Russian Security council Report in Russian,
August 13, 1997, "RF Draft Doctrine on Information Security," FBIS SOV,
97-246, September 8, 1997, and FBIS UMA, September 1, 1996.
37. Vladimir I. Ivanov, "Russia's New Military Doctrine: Implications for
Asia," Michael D. Bellows Ed., Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic
Priorities, Washington, D.C. Institute for National Security Studies,
National Defense University, 1994, p. 223.
38. Alexei V. Zagorsky, "The Security Dimension," Tsuneo Akaha, Ed.,
Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East: Changing Ties With
Asia-Pacific, London and New York: Routledge, 1997, p. 37.
39. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response,
Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1997, p.44, D.L. Averre, "The Mirzoyanov Affair:
Russia's `Military-chemical' Complex," European Security, IV, No. 2,
Summer, 1995, pp. 273-305.
40. Derek Averre and Igor Khripunov, "Russian Chemdemil: Coaxing
communities," Jane's Intelligence Review, June, 1997, pp. 257-259.
41. Ken Alibekov, "Russia's Deadly Expertise," New York times, March 27,
1998, Richard Preston, "Annals of Warfare: The Bioweaponeers," The New
Yorker, March 9, 1998, pp. 52-65, Milton Leitenberg, "Biological Weapons
Arms Control," Contemporary Security Policy, XVII, No. 1, April, 1996, pp.
43. The Associated Press, March 12, 1998, Reprinted in The Moscow Times,
"In Brief: Arms Stockpile Plan," March 12, 1998.
44. Alexei Vassiliev, Russian Foreign Policy in the Middle East: From
Messianism to Pragmatism, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1993, p. 360 London,
Al-Sharq-Al-Aswat, in Arabic, June 18, 1996, FBIS SOV, 96-119, June 19,
1996, p. 24.
45. Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, February 13, 1998, FBIS UMA, 98-044,
February 13, 1998, Moscow, Interfax, in English, March 30, 1998, FBIS SOV,
98-089, March 31, 1998.
46. The report is found in Joint Publications Research Service Arms Control
(Henceforth JPRS TAC), 95-009-L, April 6, 1995, p. 1.
47. Ibid., pp. 5-6, Jim Hoagland, "Briefing Yeltsin on Iran", Washington
Post, May 17, 1995, p. 23.
48. JPRS TAC, April 6, 1995, pp. 5-6.
49. Ibid., p. 6.
50. Ibid., p. 7.
51. Bill Gertz, "Pentagon Confirms Details on Iranian Missiles," Washington
Times, March 27, 1998, p. 10, "Iran's Nuclear Programme: Scary or Not?,"
the Economist, March 14, 1998, p. 50.
53. Moscow, ITAR-TASS World Service, in Russian, March 16, 1998, FBIS UMA,
98-075, March 17, 1998, Moscow, Novaya Gazeta Ponedelnik, in Russian, March
16-22, 1998, FBIS TAC, 98-076, March 17, 1998.
54. London, The Guardian, in English, May 31, 1995, FBIS SOV, 95-105, June
1, 1995, p. 16, Stephen Blank, "Russia and Iran in a New Middle East",
Mediterranean Quarterly, III, No. 4, Fall, 1992, pp. 124-127.
55. JPRS TAC, 95-009-L, April 6, 1995 p. 7.
56. Stephen Blank, Russian Policy and the Korean Crisis, Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 1994, p. 15.
57. Stephen J. Blank, "Russia and the Gulf," Perspectives, (Ankara), I, No.
4, December, 1996-February, 1997, pp. 30-55.
58. For the 1970s policy of trying to create a united Arab and Iranian
front see, Oleh S. and Bettie M. Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, The Soviet
Quest for Influence, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991, for the
current policy see Stephen J. Blank, "Russia and the Gulf," Perspectives,
(Ankara), I, No. 4, December, 1996-February, 1997, pp. 30-55, and Idem.,
"Russia's Return to Mideast Diplomacy," Orbis, XL, No. 4, Fall, 1996, pp.
59. "Russia Plans New Reactor in Iran, official Says," Washington Post
Foreign Service, April 7, 1998, p. 18, Matthew Brzezinski, "U.S. Frets Over
Plan to complete Reactor in Cuba," Wall Street Journal, April 1, 1998, pp.
14, Chennai Dinamani (Internet Version) in Tamil, March 25, 1998, Foreign
Broadcast Information Service Near East and South Asia (Henceforth FBIS
NEA), 98-084, March 27, 1998, Moscow, Moskovskiye Novosti, in Russian,
March 8-15, 1998, FBIS SOV, 98-070, March 12, 1998, Moscow, Interfax, in
English, March 17, 1998, FBIS SOV, 98-076, March 18, 1998, Moscow,
Nezavisimaya Gazeta in Russian, March 17, 1998, FBIS SOV, 98-077, March 19,
60. Moscow, Izvestiya, in Russian, February 27, 1998, FBIS TAC, 98-057,
March 2, 1998.
61. Alexander Zhebin, "Russia-DPRK Treaty: Is the Inherited Agreement
Applicable," Northeast Asian Peace and Security Network, August 17, 1995,
Eugene and Natasha Bazhanov, "The Evolution of Russian-Korean Relations:
External and Internal Factors," Asian Survey, XXXIV, No. 9, September,
1994, pp. 795-796, Seoul, Chungang Ilbo, in Korean, Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, (Henceforth FBIS EAS), 95-194, October 6, 1995 p. 62.
62. See the sources cited in Note 57.
63. Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Cote Jr., Richard A. Falkenrath, and Steven
E. Miller, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, Containing the Threat of Loose Russian
Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material, Cambridge, Ma.: CSIA Studies in
International Security No. 12, MIT Press, 1996, pp. 123-126, 162-166.
64. "Russia Plans New Reactor in Iran,", p. 18, FBIS TAC, March 17, 1998,
"Russia and Missile Proliferation," Statement by Richard H. Speier before
the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal
Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, June 5,
1997, The Monitor: Nonproliferation, Demilitarization, and Arms Control,
University of Georgia, Athens Ga..., III, No. 3, Summer, 1997, pp. 31-34,
Yossef Bodansky, "Iran's New Ballistic Missiles," Defense & Foreign Affairs
Strategic Policy, May-June, 1997, pp. 6-8.
65. Proliferation: Threat and Response, pp. 23-40, "Assessing the Cruise
Missile Threat," Strategic Survey 1996/97, pp. 16-31, Duncan Lennox,
"Threats and Their Development," Abdullah Toukan, "Threats and Developments
in the Middle East," and Uzi Rubin, "Missiles and Missile Defence in the
Middle East," Robin Ranger Ed., Extended Air Defence & the Long-Range
Missile Threat, Bailrigg Memorandum No. 30, Centre for Defence and
International Security Studies, Lancaster University in Association with
the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1997, Jeremy
Stocker and David Wieneck, Rapporteurs, pp. 17-19, 29-31, and 35-37
66. Moscow, Russian Public Television, First Channel Network in Russian,
February 25, 1998, FBIS SOV, 98-056, March 2, 1998, Moscow,
Kommersant-Daily, in Russian, March 7, 1998, FBIS SOV, 98-068, March 10,
67. Moscow, Russkiy Telegraf, in Russian, February 25, 1998, FBIS SOV,
98-056, March 2, 1998.
68. Kent E. Calder, Pacific Defense: Arms, Energy, and America's Future in
Asia, New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1996, pp. 38-39.
69. This was revealed by Alexei Arbatov at a conference on Russian Defense
Decision-Making at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., March
70. Moscow, Krasnaya Zvezda, in Russian, July 2, 1996, FBIS SOV, 96-129,
July 3, 1996, p. 34.
71. "Taiwan Crisis and Russian-Chinese Ties," Current Digest of the
Post-Soviet Press, (Henceforth CDPP), XLVIII, No. 11, April 10, 1996, p.
72. "Russian Military Sells Rocket Engines to China," Military Space,
August 21, 1995, p. 1, Bill Gertz, "Russia Sells Rocket Motors to China,"
Washington Times, February 13, 1995, p. 4, Moscow, Kommersant-Daily, in
Russian, July 18, 1996, FBIS SOV, 96-140, July 19, 1996, pp. 20-21
73. Pavel Felgengauer, "Selling Russian Arms and Transferring Arms-Building
Technology to China - A Short-Term Policy with Long-Term Consequences,"
Paper Presented to the CAPS and RAND-CAPP Joint Conference on Foreign
Military Assistance to the PRC and ROC, Oxford, England, June 27-29, 1997,
and Rajan Menon, "The Strategic convergence Between Russia and China,"
Survival, XXXIX, No. 2, pp. 109-111.
74. Stephen Blank, "Russian Arms Sales to China; Issues and Outcomes,"
Paper Presented to the CAPS and RAND-CAPP Joint Conference on Foreign
Military Assistance to the PRC and ROC, Oxford, England, June 27-29, 1997.
75. Stephen J. Blank, Challenging the New World Order: The Arms Transfer
Policy of the Russian Republic, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993, FBIS SOV, July 19, 1996, pp. 20-21.
76. For instance, "Far East: China," CDPP, Vol. XLVIII, No. 30, August 21,
1996, pp. 20-22. It should be noted that among the articles in this section
are some alleging that Chinese military men still view Russia as the enemy,
a view which hardly jibes with official proclamations or with the logic
behind Russian arms. sales. Boris Rumer, "Disintegration and Reintegration
in Central Asia: Dynamics and Prospects," Boris Rumer Ed., Central Asia in
Transition: Dilemmas of Political and Economic Development, Armonk, New
York: M.E. Sharpe & Co. Inc., 1996, pp. 14-15, Oksana Reznikova,
"Transnational Corporations in Central Asia," in Rumer, pp. 82-83, "The
Geopolitical Sleuth," The Economist, January 3, 1998, p. 19, Vladimir
Miasnikov, "Russia and China, Robert D. Blackwill and Sergei A. Karaganov,
Eds., Damage Limitation or Crisis? Russia and the Outside World,
Washington, DC: Brassey's (USA) Inc., 1994, CSIA Studies in International
Security, No. 5, pp. 232-233.
77. Blank, Russian Arms Sales to China, Issues and Outcomes, "Top Secret
Arms and Nuclear Deals," Asia Times, June 30, 1997, From Johnson's Russia
List, [email protected], July 1, 1997, Bill Gertz, "Russia Sells China
High-Tech Artillery," Washington Times, July 3, 1997, p. 1, Strategic
Survey, 1996-97, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London,
1997, p. 170, Richard D. Fisher, Jr., "Foreign Arms Acquisition and PLA
Modernization,' Unpublished Paper, November, 1997, pp. 4-5.
78. Personal communication from Peter Pry of the House National Security
Committee staff, March, 1998.
79. Beijing, Jianchuan Zhishi, No. 10, 1997, in Chinese, Foreign Broadcast
Information Service China (Henceforth FBIS CHI), 98-065, March 9, 1998.
80. Fisher, pp. 4-5.
81. Bruce G. Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, PRAC Paper, No.
13, December, 1994, Project on Rethinking Arms Control, Center for
International and Security Studies at Maryland, School of Public Affairs,
University of Maryland at College Park, p. 7.
82. This point was raised in the commission's discussions by Dr. Stephen
Cambone, but one should also see Dmitri Trenin, "Russia and the Emerging
Security Environment in Northeast Asia," Security Dialogue, XXIX, No. 1,
1998, p. 83. For the contrary point of view see Bluth, p. 48 and Stephen J.
Blank, the dynamics of Russia Weapon Sales to China, Carlisle Barracks,
Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1997.
83. Bill Gertz, "China's Nukes Could Reach Most of U.S.," Washington Times,
April 1, 1998, p. 1, Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New "Old Thinking":
the Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security, XX, No. 3,
Winter, 1995-96, pp. 5-42, Banning S. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser,
"Chinese Perspectives on Arms Control," International Security, XX, No. 3,
Winter, 1995-96, pp. 43-78.
84. William C. Potter, "The New Suppliers," Orbis, XXXVI, No. 2, Spring,
1992, pp. 206-209.
85. Fisher, pp. 9-12.
86. As Michael Mazarr points out, virtually any successful nonproliferation
policy must be multilateral to succeed and if Russia is able to frustrate
multilateralism, e.g. in Iran , it will permit Iran to evade any kind of
foreign sanction for going nuclear and fatally compromise our efforts to
get Tehran to desist from proliferation. Michael J. Mazarr, "Going Just a
Little Nuclear," International Security, X, No. 2, Fall, 1995, pp. 106-107.
87. Ivanov, p. 223.