On 4 September 1996, you directed me to head a team to consider and to make recommendations on issues raised in General (Ret.) Wayne A. Downing's report regarding how the Air Force organizes, trains, and equips to support forces deployed to U.S. Central Command. After an exhaustive review of all directives, documents, testimonies, additional interviews, and a site visit to Saudi Arabia, I am forwarding the attached report for your consideration and implementation as appropriate. You will find that the recommendations are relevant, not just to the CENTCOM AOR, but have application to deployments worldwide.

Additionally, you designated me as the disciplinary review and court-martial convening authority for actions or omissions by Air Force personnel associated with the bombing of Khobar Towers. As you would expect, this part of the tasking requires extensive review of action(s) or lack thereof, taken by each Air Force member in the chain of command, as well as those other personnel that contributed directly to the Khobar Towers environment. This part of my tasking will be forwarded under separate cover on or before 4 December 1996.

A more detailed description of specific actions to implement the above recommendations and other recommendations are included in the full report. Some of these actions have already been initiated. Included at Tab E is a synopsis of the Downing Task Force findings and recommendations, along with the DoD responses/actions already underway. As all of the aforementioned investigations, assessments and reviews have concluded, Force Protection requires the collective, proactive support of all involved in our national defense mission.

FOREWORD: Findings and recommendations of the Task Force led by General Wayne Downing are presented in italics, in order, and followed by proposed United States Air Force (USAF) Responses from the USAF Downing Report Review Team, led by Lieutenant General James F. Record.

FINDING 1: There are no published DoD physical security standards for force protection of fixed facilities.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. USAF will comply with the Military Department responsibilities as defined in DoD Directive 2000.12, embrace and put into action JCS Publications 3-07.2 and 3-10 for Force Protection by developing Service doctrine and directives. HQ USAF/XO/SP must develop doctrine to guide Force Protection actions/responsibilities inside and outside the perimeters of air bases and other USAF facilities. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) and HQ USAF/SP should publish prescriptive threat assessment and physical security instructions for commanders.

Designate a single agency within DoD to develop, issue, and inspect compliance with force protection physical security standards.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. The Chief of Staff USAF (CSAF) should designate an Air Staff organization, led by a general officer, to oversee Force Protection doctrinal, policy, and resource advocacy issues and to monitor compliance with DoD Force Protection standards. Due to the cross-cutting nature of Force Protection, this organization should be composed of personnel from operations, security police, civil engineers, medical, AFOSI, intelligence, logistics, and other technical agencies, as needed. Also, see Proposed USAF Response to Finding 17.

Provide this DoD agency with sufficient resources to assist field commanders on a worldwide basis with force protection matters. Consider designating an existing organization, such as a national laboratory, Defense Special Weapons Agency, or the Corps of Engineers, to provide this expertise.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. The Air Force has requested additional resources for Fiscal Year (FY) 1997 and programmed funds for Force Protection requirements for FY 1998 and beyond. HQ USAF/SP should continue efforts to identify Force Protection requirements and seek USAF Corporate Structure support for funding as priorities dictate. CSAF should establish an organization (squadron, agency, center) responsible for Force Protection activities. It should have functional area representatives assigned or attached from operations, security police, AFOSI, medical, civil engineer, communications, services, intelligence, transportation and supply. As an illustrative example, HQ USAF/SP could, through its Field Operating Agency (FOA), USAF Security Police Agency, expand its Force Protection doctrine and training by developing, in conjunction with Air Education and Training Command (AETC), a Center of Excellence, e.g. at Camp Bullis, TX. It is envisioned that this Center would train provisional SP deployment squadrons, manage and integrate Force Protection training, tactics, technology development, and vulnerability assessment programs.

Further, this Center should work with Major Command (MAJCOM) Inspectors General (IG), interface with the JCS and Unified Commands' Force Protection Divisions, and Numbered Air Forces (NAFs)/Combatant Commands on staff assistance visits and vulnerability assessments at USAF locations. Regardless of the ultimate structure, MAJCOMs/Agencies should establish the criteria for, and then conduct, evaluations/inspections of units, as appropriate. Also, see Proposed USAF Response to Finding 17.

Provide funds and authority to this agency to manage Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) efforts to enhance force protection and physical security measures.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. HQ USAF/SP and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) support as appropriate.

FINDING 2: Force protection requirements had not been given high priority for funding.

Establish priorities for force protection requirements in the Defense Planning Guidance and, as recommended by the Antiterrorism Task Force report, include force protection as a defense-wide special interest item.

Coordinate DoD priorities for force protection of noncombatant forces with the Department of State (See Finding 16).

Address force protection in the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process.

Implement the recommendations of the Antiterrorism Task Force on establishment of a separate Office of the Secretary of Defense-managed program element to fund high priority antiterrorism requirements.

Encourage combatant commanders to articulate and prioritize force protection requirements in their Integrated Priorities List.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Partially support. Given the existing higher headquarters guidance, and the understanding of the nature of the threat, field commanders gave appropriate priority to force protection requirements. In fact, the 4404th WG (P) had already implemented significant Force Protection initiatives and had submitted a first-ever five-year plan/program. Force Protection was an integral part of their programming; and was given priority based on the known threat. However, as a result of both the OPM-SANG and Khobar Towers terrorist events, all-encompassing Force Protection measures must be given a higher priority throughout the entire defense planning cycle. Force Protection in the ground environment is now an additional essential element of the equation that leads to mission accomplishment. Force Protection is an absolute requirement that must be addressed in all phases of the Defense Planning cycle and included in USAF basic doctrine. For example, Force Protection at the source of sortie generation is as essential to successful mission accomplishment as is Force Protection over the battle area. If the sortie never leaves the ground, then the force projection mission cannot be accomplished.

Air Force Planning and Programming guidance must specify the requirements for Force Protection during all phases of the planning cycle. Specifically: HQ USAF/XO/PE should ensure USAF Planning and Programming Guidance clarifies the dependence of ultimate mission accomplishment on Force Protection, both in the air and on the ground. It should further emphasize the need for all responsible MAJCOMs/Air Component Commanders to plan, program, and implement enhancements to Force Protection (pre-sortie generation, sortie generation, sortie execution, and sortie regeneration) as an essential element of force projection. Identified and validated Force Protection requirements should be programmed and budgeted as integral parts of force projection programs. Additionally, CSAF should direct Air Component Commanders to submit Force Protection requirements to their respective Unified Commanders for inclusion in CINC Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs). CSAF should further encourage them to seek access to CINC/JCS Initiative Funds to enhance Force Protection efforts, when appropriate.

FINDING 3: Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia and other U.S. Central Command units in the region were not structured and supported to sustain a long-term commitment that involved expanded missions, to include increased force protection from an emerging and viable terrorist threat.

Review the composition of Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia and other U.S. Central Command units to insure that they are structured and have resources appropriate for the mission and the conditions.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Partially support. The JTF-SWA and 4404th WG (P) were initially structured based on the national requirement for a short-term response to Iraqi aggression and for the policing of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 687 and 688. When additional USAF forces were required, the 4404th WG (P) facilitated the follow-on force beddown. Since August 1992, CENTCOM has reacted to increases in the Iraqi threat by deploying additional forces. VIGILANT WARRIOR, UNITED SHIELD, VIGILANT SENTINEL, and DESERT STRIKE are a few examples. In every case, the established command structure functioned very well, and there were lessons learned in each case. From these and other lessons learned, JTF-SWA, the 4404th WG (P) and its support elements adjusted their structure, primarily by extending tours for selected key billets. This evolution and deliberate adjustment will continue for the foreseeable future. This notwithstanding, MAJCOMs/NAFs, along with HQ USAF/XO, must develop/review/update AFIs that supplement JCS/DoD guidelines for determining the composition of Combatant Command staffs. Updated AFIs should include guidance on the Air Component Commander's contingency organization and structure, functional responsibilities, and billet structure. Whenever possible, the ideal staff template created by these guidelines should be applied to planned combatant staffs during their inception. These AFIs should also provide specific guidance to Air Component Commanders on deployment rotation policy recommendations they should make to their respective CINCs (recognizing that CINCs set rotation policy). Additionally, Air Component Commanders should review their command's compliance with the template on at least an annual basis, or whenever a significant change in the mission and/or operational environment occurs. Reviews should be submitted to HQ USAF/XO from/through the appropriate NAF and/or MAJCOM as required. If problems/shortfalls are identified the review should be presented to the USAF Corporate Structure. Joint issues identified during these reviews should be submitted simultaneously by the Air Component Commander to the appropriate CINC.

Review current manning and rotation policies, to include tour lengths for key leaders and Staff, with the aim of promoting continuity in the chain of command and unit cohesion.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Incorporated in response to the preceding recommendation.

FINDING 4: Current U.S. Central Command command relationships do not contribute to enhanced security for forces operating in the region.

RECOMMENDATION FOR FINDING 4: Assign operational control of all combatant forces operating in Saudi Arabia and Gulf region to one headquarters.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Partially support. Command relationships had no impact on this terrorist act. While assigning operational control of all combatant forces in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Region to one headquarters may be advantageous and provide standardization throughout the theater, there is no evidence the existing command relationships degraded security. Commanders at all levels recognized Force Protection as an inherent responsibility of command and acted accordingly. Those in the chain of command from the CINC to the security policemen on the Khobar Towers rooftop had consistently improved their Force Protection posture based on the known threat. The documentary evidence in the Downing Report, additional interviews, including interviews of top-level officials at the U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia, confirm that those in the chain of command were appropriately focused on Force Protection issues given the known threat. Further, the over 130 Force Protection measures taken at Khobar Towers alone, in the seven months preceding the terrorists bombing, may well have saved hundreds of lives.

This notwithstanding, HQ USAF/XO must develop USAF guidance, and/or supplement existing DoD/JCS guidance on Force Protection for the theater, region, base, unit and individual levels. Moreover, because not all commanders understand all the meanings and nuances of OPCON, tactical control (TACON), etc., Air Component Commanders must ensure command relationships are clearly established and explained in Operations Plans and Operation Orders, to include Force Protection issues. Additionally, they should insure these are reviewed on an annual basis, or whenever there is a significant change in mission and/or operational environment. Also, see Proposed USAF Responses for Findings 3 and 17.

FINDING 5: Force protection practices were inconsistent in Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf region.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. All concerned should have had the benefit of the DoS Accountability Review Board Findings and the DoD Antiterrorism Senior Assessment on the OPM-SANG 13 November 1995 bombing. These products identified many findings and recommendations that would have helped refine DoS/DoD procedures in the Force Protection area. As a result of lessons learned from both tragedies, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) has appointed the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as the focal point for Force Protection, and has directed that DoD 2000.12H, a handbook on combating terrorism, be directive. The HQ USAF/XO, along with other Services, must now write implementation directives to support the DoD standard. It should also be noted that Central Command (CENTCOM) has established a Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC), who is now the focal point for Force Protection throughout the CENTCOM theater. This response also applies to the third recommendation for this finding.

Assigning operational control of all combatant forces to one headquarters (Finding 4) will facilitate a common approach.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support in principle. However, OPCON requires a significant support staff. If specific OPCON responsibilities are given to the deployed commander, administrative/training burdens could be reduced, and the forward-deployed staff could be tailored.

Closely coordinate all antiterrorism countermeasures with host country agencies.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support, with comment. Testimony from key AFOSI, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DoS officials, USAF security police and commanders clearly demonstrated that major efforts were made to coordinate counterterrorism measures with the Saudis over the seven month period prior to the bombing at Khobar Towers (post-OPM-SANG). The USAF attempted to offset vulnerabilities within installation boundaries, and achieved additive host nation patrols outside the base perimeter. This was evident by the significant Force Protection measures directed by the 4404^th WG (P) Commander to deter terrorist attacks. Local Saudi Arabian officials had made it clear to U.S. personnel that security at any installation is primarily a Saudi responsibility; and that U.S. personnel are "guests" who are not allowed to extend force protection measures beyond the fence line. As highlighted by U.S. Embassy personnel during our 16-17 October 1996 visit and discussions, this subject remains a concern today.

Although an emergency deployment situation may not afford perfect Force Protection conditions, SECAF/CSAF should engage the DoD and the DoS to actively seek a SOFA as a precursor to deployment, whenever possible. If a deployment is to a theater/country without a SOFA, the JCS/CINC must provide specific guidance/exceptions, to the Standing ROE (CJCS Pub 3121.00) concerning operations, to include Force Protection, to the deployed commanders. This specific guidance must be coordinated with DoS and the appropriate U.S. Embassy/Consulate, and provided to the individual soldier/sailor/airman/marine.

FINDING 6: There is no theater-specific training guidance for individuals or units deploying to the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility.

Establish training qualification and certification procedures for all units, individuals, and civilians prior to deployment to and after arrival in the Area of Responsibility. This should include force protection measures and be applicable to service members on both permanent change of station and temporary duty assignment.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. SECDEF has now directed Combatant Commanders to identify specific pre-deployment training requirements that all units and individuals must receive prior to arrival in theater. HQ USAF/XO should develop AFI guidance that directs Air Component Commanders to provide and implement guidance regarding theater-specific training for all individuals deploying to contingencies. This guidance should also direct the Air Component Commanders to provide theater-specific training requirements to the CINC for inclusion in CJCS Deployment orders. Likewise, this guidance must include the requirement for theater-specific, pre-deployment training to be included in the line-item remarks for Contingency-Exercise-Mobility (CEM) orders. Guidance will direct wings to ensure theater-specific training includes current terrorism threat information. Theater-specific, pre-deployment training should be reinforced by "Right Start" or similar briefings/training as soon as feasible upon arrival in theater. If the schedule requires that this training be delayed, members must be given the essential briefing/training elements required for their protection upon arrival, and be made aware of any/all restrictions to their activities until they have been fully briefed/trained.

Conduct mandatory force protection and risk management training for all officers and senior non-commissioned officers deploying to high threat areas. Integrate this training into officer and non-commissioned officer professional military education to assure long-term development of knowledge and skills to combat terrorism at all levels.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. Force protection/antiterrorism must be imbedded in all levels of USAF education: precommissioning, commander training, officer and enlisted PME, and enlisted promotion fitness testing and study material. HQ USAF/XO guidance to Air Component Commanders should direct deploying JTF, wing and group commanders to attend the AFOSI Senior Officer Security Seminar. Also, see Proposed USAF Response to Finding 17.

Support development of antiterrorism training and education supporting materials, using innovative media methodologies, as recommended by the Antiterrorism Task Force and directed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Conduct refresher training for installation/unit antiterrorism officers immediately prior to assignment in the theater, as outlined in DoD Instruction 2000.14.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. CINC-directed theater-specific training must include Force Protection in the ground environment, to include a refresher in antiterrorism measures for individuals. Whenever possible, theater-specific unit training should be initiated or updated as soon as practical after an Alert order is issued and prior to beginning the deployment for planned rotations. Ancillary training programs must include Force Protection and antiterrorism instruction. Also, see response above and Proposed USAF Response to Finding 17.

FINDING 7: Intelligence provided warning of the terrorist threat to U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia. No Recommendation.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support, with comment. In its broadest context, intelligence provided non-specific terrorist warnings to U.S. combatant and non-combatant personnel. However, by the very nature of the environment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), threat specificity to the tactical level was not available. Notwithstanding this lack of specificity, commanders at all levels were proactive and had initiated directives, specific guidance, and physical security measures that substantially improved Force Protection for assigned personnel.

FINDING 9: The ability of the theater and national intelligence community to conduct in-depth, long term analysis of trends, intentions and capabilities of terrorists is deficient.

RECOMMENDATION FOR FINDING 9:Allocate sufficient analytic resources to conduct in-depth, detailed analysis of trends, intentions, and capabilities of terrorists.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. The newly created DIA Counterterrorism Center is the DoD focal point for fusion and dissemination of all-source intelligence and counterintelligence information pertaining to terrorist threats against DoD interests. SECAF should direct AFOSI to review their current capabilities to collect, analyze, and disseminate terrorist related all-source intelligence and counterintelligence information. This will ensure that those responsible/accountable for Force Protection are provided the best possible description of the terrorist threat with recommended counter measures.

FINDING 10: The Department of State and elements within DoD ascribe different Threat Level assessments for countries of the same region, causing confusion among recipients of this information.

RECOMMENDATION FOR FINDING 10: Institute one interagency methodology for assessing and declaring terrorist Threat Levels, allowing commanders to determine Threat Conditions in a local area.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. DoD has been designated the focal point for assessing and declaring terrorist Threat Levels. This should eliminate the identified dichotomy regarding Threat Level declaration within a country. Furthermore, USAF supports allowing appropriate commanders to determine and apply various local Threat Conditions to different locations in their area of responsibility.

FINDING 11: The lack of an organic intelligence support capability in the U.S. Air Force Security Police units adversely affects their ability to accomplish the base defense mission.

RECOMMENDATION FOR FINDING 11: Provide U.S. Air Force Security Police units assigned an air base defense mission an organic intelligence capability.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Partially support. The lack of organic intelligence capability did not inhibit the 4404th WG (P) internal base defense mission. After extensive review of documentation and additional interviews, this Review Team found that AFOSI, Intelligence, and SP operations were in very close and constant contact on Force Protection issues. Unlike the U.S. Army structure, in the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy the responsibility for intelligence and counterintelligence is lodged in separate organizations because the two missions, while related, are distinctly different. USAF intelligence units target enemy order of battle, indications and warning of military attack, weapon system types and capabilities, war plans, etc. By DoD definition, counterintelligence personnel target hostile intelligence services which are employing espionage, sabotage, terrorism and subversion against U.S. forces. In the USAF, AFOSI is organized, trained, and equipped to do the counterintelligence mission.

Because the U.S. Army may not provide protection outside Air Force installations overseas, Army ground order of battle experts may not be available. Therefore, recommend AF/IN and AFOSI assign intelligence personnel to SP units to support Force Protection activities in contingency operations. The AFOSI counterintelligence special agents should be OPCON to the installation commander (i.e., OPCON to WG/CC, attached to SP Squadron), to act as liaison among AFOSI, SP, U.S. and foreign security/police agencies charged with antiterrorism missions. At all times, a close working relationship, such as existed in the 4404th WG (P), should be maintained among AFOSI, intelligence, and the security police.

FINDING 14: While the communications architecture in the US Central Command Area of Responsibility supported the flow of intelligence throughout the upper echelons of the chain of command, field units had limited access due to classification restrictions.

RECOMMENDATION FOR FINDING 14: Make collateral versions of systems such as Intelink, Defense Intelligence Threat Data System, and the Community Automated Counterterrorism Information System, available to the lowest appropriate level.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Partially support. The Combat Intelligence System (CIS) is the USAF standard automated intelligence work station. It operates at the SECRET level and provides access to

INTELINK-S (a SECRET-level version of the more highly classified worldwide intelligence dissemination network, known as INTELINK). It is deployed at the 4404th WG (P) and its subordinate flying and operational support squadrons. A TOP SECRET Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence (SCI) version of CIS is under development. This will allow access to INTELINK. HQ USAF/IN should make arrangements for SECRET-level information from the Defense Intelligence Threat Data System to be received and displayed on CIS. The Community Automated Counterterrorism Information System (CACTIS) is an SCI/TK/G system. It is composed of a dedicated network of work stations from which users can access the CACTIS repository of DoS, DIA, CIA, and National Security Agency data. The AFOSI Investigative Operations Center has CACTIS workstations. While CACTIS is not currently available on INTELINK, CIA has indicated it should be available within a year, once required security features are installed on and approved for INTELINK. Furthermore, AFOSI should program for CIS terminals to be placed with their agents in deployed locations.

Distribute compartmented intelligence, as a minimum, in sanitized form to all key force protection officials, as well as coalition partners.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. Key USAF officials responsible for the security and protection of people, equipment, and facilities, in deployed locations, require access to the best available intelligence regardless of classification or compartmented controls. Consequently, HQ USAF/XO guidance should include the requirement for deployed USAF wing commanders to request TOP SECRET/SI/TK/G access for key staff members, e.g., wing commander, support group commander, wing intelligence officer, security police squadron commander, AFOSI detachment commander and medical group commander. The personnel security process should fully support the commander's requirements, not hinder them. In addition, HQ USAF/IN should aggressively seek the promulgation of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Directive 1/7, Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information and DCI Directive 5/6, Intelligence Disclosure Policy at the earliest possible date. Maximum use of "tear-line" reporting must be encouraged. HQ USAF/IN must then disseminate to all MAJCOMS, NAFs and wings, clear guidance and simple procedures for the proper sanitization and release of intelligence at the lowest possible levels to appropriately cleared U.S. and host nation Force Protection personnel.

FINDING 15: The division of responsibility between U.S. and host nation police and military forces for security at facilities throughout Saudi Arabia and Arabian Gulf is clear.

a. Promulgate memorandums of understanding (MOU) between host nation and U.S. forces, delineating responsibilities for protecting U.S. operated facilities, to include procedures for upgrading security when threat levels change.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support the need for a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), versus an MOU. An MOU does not have the status of an "agreement" in international affairs parlance. A strong, cohesive effort is needed by both DoD and DoS to influence nations to accept U.S. Force Protection requirements. As pointed out in Finding 5, a single point of contact must be established within each agency to oversee Force Protection agreements. As noted earlier, SECDEF has appointed the CJCS to perform this function.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. CENTCOM is reviewing its requirements for interpreters. (Note: There is a difference between translators and simultaneous interpreters. Interpreters have to be much more adept at language skills, versus translators who have more time to react.) HQ USAF/XO should determine worldwide requirements for interpreters. HQ USAF/DP should then determine the availability/qualification of potential interpreters within the existing force. This comparison of need versus availability should illuminate the need to contract for interpreters and/or adjust accessions.

FINDING 16: (a)U.S. Embassy security resources are insufficient to adequately protect large numbers of noncombatant forces in selected countries.

(b) The U.S. Defense Representative has insufficient resources to adequately protect large numbers of noncombatant military forces in selected countries.

(c) The U.S. Defense Representative does not have directive authority over selected "stovepipe" organizations.

Assign all DoD personnel to the unified combatant commander, except those whose principal mission supports the Chief of Mission.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. The recent MOU between DoD and DoS addresses this issue. This MOU addresses the respective combatant/non-combatant security responsibilities between the two departments in the countries of Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. HQ USAF/XO should develop guidance to comply with this MOU.

Provide the U.S. Defense Representative directive authority for force protection matters over ALL DoD personnel not assigned to the unified combatant commander.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. The MOU between DoS and DoD corrects this deficiency.

Provide the U.S. Defense Representative with appropriate Staff to assist the Chief of Mission in the execution of force protection responsibilities, to include conducting vulnerability assessments, identifying funds for force protection, and developing force protection standards.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support DoD initiatives. HQ USAF/XO should work in conjunction with SAF/IA to delineate responsibilities and forward to appropriate DoD staff.

FINDING #17: U.S. Forces and facilities in Saudi Arabia and the region are vulnerable to terrorist attack.

a. Conduct vulnerability assessments for every site within the Area of Responsibility and repeat them on an appropriate schedule. Each site must be examined individually and in-depth.

c. Assign all security force members a weapon. Rifles and machine guns must be zeroed and fired for sustainment training. Identify special weapons requirements early and train to meet requirements. Stress weapons maintenance.

d. Examine and prioritize terrorist threats for both potential of occurrence and degree of vulnerability at each site. Prepare defenses accordingly.

e. Coordinate with host nation police and military forces to develop and maintain a combined ability to counter the surface-to-air missile threat from terrorist elements.

f. Employ integrated technology, including intrusion detection systems, ground sensors, closed circuit television, day and night surveillance cameras, thermal imaging, perimeter lighting, and advanced communication equipment, to improve the security of all sites.

i. Develop guidance on required stand-off distances and the construction of blast walls and the hardening of buildings.

j. Relocate and consolidate units at vulnerable facilities to more secure, U.S.-controlled compounds or bases.

k. Reinforce the entry control points to U.S. facilities and provide defense in depth.

m. Use enhanced barriers, similar to those designed by United Kingdom and Israel, to shield and protect vulnerable compounds and structures.

n. Establish threat based stand-off or exclusion areas around compounds and bases.

o. Procure personal protective equipment suitable for extreme hot weather operations.

q. Harden or procure armored buses to transport service members between housing areas and work sites.

r. Provide armed guards, at a minimum in pairs, on buses and provide armored escort vehicles.

s. Ensure host country military and police are actively involved in securing routes of travel.

t. Provide and maintain communications for all modes of transportation and centrally control and monitor transportation movements.

u. Provide personal protection anti-terrorism training to all deployed service members and their families.

v. Conduct training exercises to rehearse responses to a terrorist attack, including building evacuation and re-assembly procedures.

w. Develop and use an extensive list of potential terrorist scenarios to assist force protection measures at each site in the area of responsibility.

x. The Task Force could not physically survey all locations in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility within the time frame of this Report. Locations in the theater which the Task Force did not survey should be assessed as soon as possible. These include Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Pakistan, Oman, Sudan, and Yemen. The Task Force had only limited opportunity to assess force protection in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain. Urgent priorities to improve force protection have been identified at U.S. facilities in these countries. A follow-on assessment team should conduct a more in-depth survey of these sites.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: The Air Force supports the Downing Report recommendations, which were extracted from Joint Pub 3-07.2. Due to the evolutionary nature of terrorism, U.S. Air Force personnel and facilities will always be vulnerable to a widening range of terrorist attacks. No amount of Force Protection measures will prevent a determined terrorist from executing an attack if he/she chooses to do so. Appropriate Force Protection measures may, however, deter an attack and, if deterrence fails, mitigate damage and casualties, as occurred at Khobar Towers. However, this review revealed evidence of certain mind-sets and institutional shortcomings that need to be addressed to enhance Force Protection. These are addressed below:

a. "Saudi Arabia is safe." The Saudi government exercises extremely tight control of its population. Crime and terrorism are dealt with by strict and often harsh Islamic law. Resultant crime rates and terrorist incidents are historically very low. The Saudis and many U.S. residents considered the bombing of OPM-SANG as an unprecedented and isolated event; and that beheading the perpetrators would deter future terrorist activity. This feeling persisted despite evidence that agents of other Middle Eastern nations were known to be operating in the KSA and in particular in the eastern province.

PROPOSED SOLUTION: USAF must develop/expand Force Protection training and education at all levels within the service to instill a "nowhere is totally safe" mentality and create an environment where Force Protection is as much a way of life as safety is today.

b. "The Saudis are extremely proud and sensitive to any possible 'loss of face' in dealing with any visible situation, especially when foreigners are involved." This is a cultural reality. As a result, information flow (including intelligence information) and decision making is very stratified within the KSA. This drove a policy/mind-set that "U.S. forces must maintain a low profile, or risk an international incident and/or possible expulsion from the country." U.S. contingency commanders were, therefore, very careful how they requested support of any kind from the Saudis. Requests for Force Protection measures might have been taken to mean that the Saudis did not control their own country--hence, a loss of face. Force Protection measures around the Khobar Towers perimeter created the dilemma of calling attention to the presence of U.S. forces on the one hand, but served to separate and hide them from the general Saudi populace on the other. Therefore, Saudi officials routinely did not respond immediately/completely to most U.S. requests, including Force Protection measures, to avoid appearing to be servants/puppets of the U.S. This left U.S. commanders with the impression that the harder they pushed, the more reluctant the Saudis would be to act. All of these factors served to influence, consciously or subconsciously, what, when, and how commanders requested support from the Saudis for Force Protection measures.

PROPOSED SOLUTION: Experts on the language and culture of the area must be provided to the wing/base commander. The number required will be determined by the size of the base, proximity to and amount of contact required with the local populace. But as a minimum, USAF must provide 24-hour-a-day interpreter support to the security forces. Further, USAF should provide cultural and language orientation to wing/base, support group, security police commanders and AFOSI detachment commanders (those personnel most likely to come into contact with host nation security forces and/or intelligence agencies). This should enhance relations with host nation officials, and facilitate communication and approval of support requests.

a. "The Air Force is responsible for Force Protection inside the fence." Air base ground defense (ABGD) doctrine, developed during the cold war gives responsibility for external defense of USAF bases to the U.S. Army. The USAF has historically expected to operate from bases reasonably far behind enemy lines in friendly territory, and expected the U.S., allied, or host nation's Army/police force to protect them in the unlikely event they came under attack. The emergence of the terrorist threat has erased the concept of "battle/enemy lines" and "friendly territory" but has not cause any significant change to this doctrinal mind-set. Additionally, as a result of post cold war force reductions, the Army modified its response to this doctrine to say they would not provide continuous external base defense, but would respond if required, and if their forces were not involved with higher priority missions. This change was not well advertised in the USAF at large, and did not result in any significant change to USAF base defense practices. This doctrinal mind-set placed an artificial limit on the range of options a USAF wing commander and staff might consider, if they were not completely satisfied with the external response forces' capabilities outside the fence line.

PROPOSED SOLUTION: HQ USAF/XO must develop/modify/ expand ABGD doctrine, policy and tactics to extend well beyond the fence line to ensure defense in depth. Security police must deploy as Unit Type Codes (UTCs) with their assigned weapons fully "sighted." Weapons qualifications must be current and complete prior to deployment. Consideration must be given to how the USAF will provide for protection of aircraft from surface-to-air threats by terrorists operating in proximity to U.S. bases.

PROPOSED SOLUTION: To provide the proper focus and to institutionalize Force Protection at every level within the USAF, the following organizational changes and training initiatives should be instituted:

a. CSAF should designate a general officer-led organization on the Air Staff that would be responsible for:

b. CSAF should establish a field organization (squadron, agency, center) responsible for Force Protection activities. It should have functional area representatives assigned or attached from operations, security police, AFOSI, medical, civil engineer, communications, services, intelligence, transportation and supply. It would be responsible for:

c. Force Protection training must be started early and be reinforced regularly so that Force Protection actions and reactions become second nature. The following topics should be taught in addition to those mentioned immediately above in subparagraph b.

d. CSAF should consider establishing a primary deployment source for highly trained Force Protection UTCs, dedicated to providing rapid response to contingencies. Further consideration should be given to collocating these forces with the organization proposed in paragraph b, above.

FINDING 18: While intelligence did not provide the tactical details of the date, time, place, and exact method of attack on Khobar Towers, a considerable body of information was available that indicated terrorists had the capability and intention to target U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia, and the Khobar Towers was a potential target.

(The first two recommendations for Finding 18 are classified. They and the proposed U.S. Air Force responses are omitted.)

Provide commanders of units operating in a high threat air base defense environment direct access to a dedicated intelligence analytic capability.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. Counterintelligence analytic capability is centrally provided by AFOSI, and the national counterintelligence community, and the results are disseminated through the InteLink system. Products are currently available to commanders through unit intelligence and the AFOSI.

Findings 19 and 20 are addressed in PART B, Accountability Assessment, provided under separate cover.

FINDING 21: Funding for force protection requirements was not given a high priority by the 4404th Wing (Provisional).

RECOMMENDATION FOR FINDING 21:Separately identify force protection requirements in budget submissions and assign funding priorities based on specific threats to service member and facilities.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support recommendation, in part. (Elaboration of this Finding is addressed in the PART B, Accountability Assessment.) Force Protection is an integral element of all successful missions. For example, adequate Force Protection is just as essential at the source of sortie generation as it is over the battle area. Hence, Air Force considers Force Protection from pre-sortie generation, to sortie generation, to sortie execution, to sortie regeneration, as essential to mission accomplishment. Therefore, resources for Force Protection should be planned and programmed as essential elements of the force structure they support, instead of being planned and programmed as a separate action. SECAF/CSAF should direct all USAF commanders to assign funding priorities for Force Protection based on specific threats, vulnerability assessments, and DoD/USAF Force Protection guidance. The USAF Corporate Structure should support planning and programming of Force Protection resources as essential elements of the force structure. HQ USAF/PE and SAF/FM should ensure USAF Program and Budget Submissions contain exhibits that aggregate Force Protection resources across mission program element codes.

Finding 22: (a)The division of responsibility for the protection of Khobar Towers was clearly understood by both U.S. and Saudi officials.

(b) Saudi security forces were unable to detect, deter, and prevent the truck bomb attack outside the perimeter fence at Khobar Towers.

Establish and maintain regular working relationships between senior commanders and appropriate host nation officials that promote honest exchanges of opinions on key issues.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. Liaison relationships are, in part, a function of the duration of that relationship. Commanders and key personnel with job-related requirements to interact with host nation personnel on Force Protection matters, should be assigned on one-year tours. HQ USAF/XO/PE/DP should work through the NAF with CENTCOM to examine tour type and length to support extended, multiyear, JTF/contingency operations. Interviews revealed that UTCs instead of individuals are preferred for SP and medical units. HQ USAF/XO/SP/SG should support these requirements as redefined by the Air Component Commander. CSAF should direct AETC to make available culture/language orientation courses for key personnel. HQ USAF/XO guidance should require Air Component Commanders to designate which billets/individuals require this training prior to deployment. Additionally, HQ USAF/XO guidance should require Air Component Commanders to identify interpreter requirements for key Force Protection functions to their Unified Commander.

Raise critical force protection issues to the chain of command, if unable to resolve them at local level.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support the intent of this finding. Those assessed critical Force Protection issues were forwarded from the local level, all the way to the CINC. The additive military working dog teams is but one example. Senior echelons of command should have visibility of Force Protection programs and resource shortfalls. To this end, CSAF should recommend to CJCS that his staff expand the existing Vulnerability Assessment Rating System (Joint Pub 3-07.2) in order to keep commanders informed on the Force Protection status where forces are assigned or deployed, and to facilitate Force Protection resource allocation.

Finding 23: The medical care provided to the victims of the June 25 bombing at Khobar Towers was outstanding; however, mass casualty procedures could be improved.

a. Continue emphasis on first aid, bandaging and splinting, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) training for all individuals. Initiate similar training for all services, where appropriate.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. As highlighted by the Downing Report, self aid/buddy care and medical support were OUTSTANDING. Further, interviews taken by the Downing team indicated some shortfall in this type of training for some deployed personnel. CSAF should direct emphasis on ensuring that ALL USAF PERSONNEL are trained in self aid/buddy care as a core competence. HQ USAF/SG should develop a CPR training program that exposes all personnel to the elements of CPR as part of self aid/buddy care training. HQ USAF/SG should establish an Integrated Process Team (IPT) that addresses the total self-aid/buddy care program.

b. Continue emphasis on realistic mass casualty training and exercise scenarios, and increase Advanced Trauma Life Support training for medical providers.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. CSAF should ensure that installation commanders conduct mass casualty exercises at contingency beddown locations, as well as home station and should include simulated BW/CW casualties. Installation commanders should stress command and control, casualty response, evacuation, medical logistics, and casualty intransit visibility. Further, HQ USAF/SG should ensure USAF physicians on mobility, at a minimum, are trained in advanced trauma life support.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Do not support. Adequate prepositioned ambulance assets exist in SWA; they should be re-positioned based on new beddown locations. HQ USAF/LG should ensure the priority "in commission" of emergency response vehicles is followed. Installation commanders should identify vehicle augmentation requirements, as appropriate.

d. Make the wearing of identification tags mandatory in contingency operations.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. HQ USAF/LG should implement/enforce DoD mandated wear of identification tags and reflect this in appropriate directives.

e. Provide a patient on-line data base at all medical facilities in contingency plans for mass casualties.

f. Include requirements for patient administration in contingency plans for mass casualties.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. HQ USAF/SG should review patient administration capabilities for mass casualty events.

g. Establish contingency contracting for local translator support in a crisis.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. HQ USAF/SG should include the requirement for interpreter support in the medical planning process.

FINDING 25: Technology was not widely used to detect, delay, mitigate, and respond to acts of terrorism.

a. Provide professional technical assistance and information on force protection from the DoD to units in the field.

b. Designate a DoD element to rapidly acquire and quickly field integrated force protection technology to deployed forces.

d. Develop and train military leaders on an integrated systems approach to physical security and force protection technology.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. DoD has directed that the CJCS serve as the focal point for Force Protection. The JCS will ensure professional technical assistance is provided through the Joint Staff to deployed forces. The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology has been tasked with the responsibility to integrate Force Protection technology for deployed forces. HQ USAF/XO should identify and direct USAF Force Protection UTC managers to review their design operational capabilities and logistics details for requirement for and inclusion of high-tech equipment. This will integrate Force Protection technology into existing readiness reporting systems, i.e. Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), as well as existing inspection processes, Operational Readiness Inspections (ORIs), and provide oversight/visibility to senior leaders.

The base emergency warning systems and appropriate responses need to be a focus during vulnerability assessments. A rapid and reliable wide-area notification system is needed to alert personnel in emergency situations. For example, commercially available, number-only pager systems are small, relatively inexpensive and would allow notification of personnel within seconds. HQ USAF/SC/LG/XO should explore this potential application of off-the-shelf equipment. Pagers can be programmed for multiple groupings, permitting notification of individuals, flights, units, buildings, an entire wing or any other desired combination. The use of codes (i.e. 111 = squadron recall, 222 = building evacuation to point X, or 223 = building evacuation to point Y) would allow the transmission of messages from fairly simple (one to three digit codes) to quite complex. Additionally, depending on signal strength, terrain, and availability of repeaters, personnel could be recalled/alerted from several miles away.

Drawbacks to this alerting method include frequency availability in the theater for pre-purchased systems or availability of systems purchased on site; pager loss or theft; and ensuring individuals change batteries regularly. More complex (and more expensive) voice, alpha-numeric, satellite, and response-capable systems are available and should also be investigated.

Similarly, security forces should incorporate 24-hour video recording capability covering perimeter, entry points, and other critical locations Additionally, they should have audio recording capability at control centers to record incoming transmissions.

HQ USAF/SP should task MAJCOMs to develop a requirement for, and to program funding for, installation and operation of a combination of fixed and mobile surveillance systems at all USAF installations. These systems should have the capability of transmitting/recording video images back to control centers. Fixed video systems should have remotely controlled telephoto, pan and tilt, and date/time features. Night (low light) detection capability is also essential. Similarly, all incoming communications to control centers (includes both radio and telephone calls) should be recorded (voice activated). Caller ID capability, where available, should also be included. Recordings should be preserved for a period to be determined and recycled if not needed for further investigative purposes. HQ USAF/SP should incorporate these requirements/capabilities in appropriate directives.

FINDING 26: U.S. allies have an extensive experience and have accumulated significant lessons learned on force protection applicable to the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility.

a. Develop and implement an integrated systems approach to force protection planning using lessons learned from U.S. allies.

Strengthen cooperative efforts between the United States and allies on terrorism and force protection matters.

b. Develop a means of sharing information obtained during cooperative exchanges with other force protection professionals in the United States.

PROPOSED USAF RESPONSE: Support. DoD is undertaking extensive consultations with U.S. allies on Force Protection issues, including "lessons learned," technology sharing, and information exchanges. CSAF should task the designated Air Staff organization for Force Protection to ensure this DoD information is passed to field units and also incorporated into USAF operations, equipment acquisition initiatives, and training programs. It should be noted that the 4404th WG (P)/CC engaged coalition members from Great Britain and France, residing at Khobar Towers, to review and make recommendations regarding security measures. They provided valuable inputs and assisted in security measures at the installation.

a. CSAF direct the USAF Corporate Structure to establish an IPT co-chaired by HQ USAF/XO/SG to review current USAF policies, directives, and programs designed to maximize warfighter performance. This review must evaluate, at a minimum, the issues of: high noise, circadian rhythm, maximum working hours per month, temperature extremes and acclimatization factors. The IPT should provide recommendations to USAF Corporate Structure on standards, policies, training programs, employment procedures, and deployment requirements necessary to meet the human performance demands of continuous and sustained Force Protection operations.

b. This review found instances where the casualty reporting process did not function in an accurate and timely manner in this particular mass casualty disaster. Coupled with this was the fact that USAF no longer has dedicated personal affairs individuals that are knowledgeable on the notification process. HQ USAF/DP should review the casualty reporting system and training to ensure it will meet AF Quality of Life expectations.

We are forwarding for your review a copy of the report submitted by General Wayne A. Downing (USA, Ret) regarding the bombing of Khobar Towers and the adequacy of security arrangements in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility. We have not evaluated this report nor formed any conclusions based upon its findings and recommendations. We also enclose for your consideration a staff report on this matter issued by the House National Security Committee entitled "The Khobar Towers Bombing Incident," dated 14 August 1996.

You are directed to consider and to make recommendations on issues raised in General (Ret.) Downing's report regarding how the Air Force organizes, trains and equips to support forces deployed to U.S. Central Command. Your focus should be on matters of force protection. You are authorized to interview witnesses, obtain documents, conduct site visits, and take whatever additional steps you deem necessary to review fully the issues raised. This is a critical task. You are to identify the Air Force resources you require in support of it, and they will promptly be made available to you.

If during the course of your review you identify matters of concern relating to another service or the unified command, please advise us so that we may refer those matters to the Secretary of Defense.

Additionally, as the Commander, Twelfth Air Force, you are hereby designated as the disciplinary review authority and General Court-Martial Convening Authority regarding any actions or omissions by Air Force personnel, associated with the bombing of Khobar Towers at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on 25 June 1996. The Commander, Air Combat Command, remains the appellate authority for any disciplinary action initiated by the Commander, Twelfth Air Force. Air Force personnel will be assigned or attached to Twelfth Air Force for these purposes as necessary.

Appropriate disposition regarding any individual, whether consisting of no action, administrative action, nonjudicial punishment, court-martial, or otherwise, is entirely within your discretion as Commander, Twelfth Air Force, under applicable directives. No inferences whatsoever should be drawn from this transfer of disciplinary authority or attachments of personnel to your command.

Please submit a written report of your findings and recommendations within 90 days.

Lieutenant Gen James F. Record is the Commander, 12^thAir Force and U.S. Southern Command Air Forces. The command is comprised of eight active wings, a communications group, a heavy engineering squadron, and an air support group with more than 35,000 active duty and civilian personnel and 450 aircraft. The command also consists of over 21,000 people and 360 aircraft in units of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. His responsibilities also include the air component command USAF assets provided to U.S. Southern Command.

He has commanded three fighter wings (to include Kunsan, ROK,) and an air division, served as J-3 for U.S. Central Command, served as the first deputy of Joint Task Force Middle East operating in South West Asia (SWA) area, served as Air Component and Joint Force Air Component Commander of Operation Uphold Democracy, and senior U.S. member to the United Nations Command at Panmunjom, ROK, and as Commander, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia.

Colonel Robert H. Baskett is the Chief, Contingency and Joint Matters Division, Directorate of Military Personnel Policy, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, HQ USAF. He has held that position since August, 1993. Colonel Baskett was commissioned in 1968 and has served on active duty since 1970. He is a command pilot with more than 3600 flying hours, has flown four different aircraft, but logged most of his time in C-130s. While stationed in the Philippines, he flew missions in the Pacific, Thailand, North and South Vietnam, including the Saigon Evacuation in April, 1975. He has flown in Europe, the Middle East; served as Operations Officer in the C-130 CCTS and the Tactical Airlift Instructor School, as well as Commander of the C-130 RTU Squadron. Additional tours include Assistant Professor of Aeronautical Engineering at USAFA, Senior Airlift Controller in the Military Airlift Command (MAC) Command Center, Director of Personnel Plans, Systems, and Readiness in the MAC Crisis Action Team (CAT) during OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and Chief of Assignments for Air Mobility Command.

Colonel William H. Booth is the Chief, Manpower Program Development Division, Directorate of Programs and Evaluation, HQ USAF/PE. Colonel Booth has over 22 years experience in a wide variety of Manpower Management positions at all echelons within the Air Force command structure. Early in his career he was a base level management engineering officer and management engineering detachment commander. His four most recent positions before his current assignment were as Chief, Manpower Resources Branch, HQ TAC/XP; Chief, Manpower Budget Development Team, HQ USAF/PE, Chief, Manpower Requirements Division, HQ SAC/XP, and Chief, Manpower and Organization Division and Deputy Director of Manpower and Personnel, United States Strategic Command/J1.

Colonel Thomas Leo Cropper is the Chief of Public Health, AF Medical Operations Agency. He has twenty-three years experience in disease prevention and control, medical readiness, training, plans, and exercise evaluation. He was stationed at RAF Upper Heyford, UK from 1978-1981. His overseas TDY's include Germany, Portugal, and Korea. He served as director of Battlefield Medical Operations, School of Aerospace Medicine from 1986-1990. He was responsible for the Brooks AFB exercise evaluation team from 1986-1992. He served on numerous AF and DoD panels to improve medical readiness and plans, disease and injury prevention, and operational medical support from 1985-1996. He has special training and expertise in nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare defense.

Colonel Robert A. Ferguson, USAF, BSC, is the Associate Director, Medical Readiness Doctrine and Training, Office of the Surgeon General, HQ USAF, Bolling AFB, DC. He has over nineteen years military service, the last nine of which have been as a medical readiness officer, serving at HQ TAC, USCENTAF, Joint Staff, and Air Staff. His experience includes serving as deliberate planner, crisis action planner, and SWA theater planner during OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM, focusing on operational and strategic levels of war. In his current billet he is responsible for managing Air Force medical readiness, organization, training, and equipping as the Medical Service re-engineers its medical capabilities.

Colonel James M. Holt has been assigned to HQ USAF/XOFC to work special projects for XOF since 6 Aug 96. A command pilot with over 3000 flying hours, he entered the AF in Feb 1970. He has extensive experience in operations and command relations both as a commander and as a war planner. He was Support Group Commander, 354th Fighter Wing, Eielson AFB, AK from Aug 94 to Jul 96, 673rd Air Base Group Commander, Eareckson AFS, AK from Sep 93 to Aug 94 and Squadron commander of the 25th Tactical Air Support Squadron, Eielson AFB, AK from May 88 to Oct 89. He served as a plans officer from Jul 85 to May 88 at Headquarters Alaskan Air Command.

Colonel David W. Madsen is the Chief, Appellate Defense Division, Air Force Legal Services Agency. He is a judge advocate with over 22 years experience in military justice. While assigned to the HQ USAF Military Justice Division, he was the Air Force representative on the working group of the Joint Services Committee on Military Justice. This committee is responsible for recommending changes to the Manual for Courts-Martial and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. He served as staff judge advocate at Mountain Home AFB, ID and served on the headquarters staffs at 17 AF, TAC, SAC and USAFE, where he served as the deputy MAJCOM staff judge advocate.

Colonel Thomas J. McDonald is the Director of Operations for the Directorate of The Civil Engineer. Colonel McDonald has over 23 years of experience in a variety of Civil Engineer assignments at all levels of command. Prior to that he was the Chief of Programs for the Civil Engineer directorate at HQ AETC, Randolph AFB, TX. He also served as the commander of the 375 Civil Engineer Squadron at Griffiss AFB, New York. He was the Chief of the Programs Requirements branch for the Civil Engineer directorate at HQ PACAF and was an evaluator on the HQ USAFE Inspector General team.

Colonel Gerald E. Reynolds is the Director of Plans, Policy and Evaluation, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington, DC. Colonel Reynolds has 29 years experience in intelligence operations as a photo interpreter, targeting officer, nuclear and conventional weapons, regional and counterterrorism analyst, financial programmer, special security officer and trainer. He commanded an imagery and electronic intelligence exploitation squadron at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska (SAC, 16 months) and the 3480^th Technical Training Wing at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas (ATC, 26 months), where he provided basic and advanced intelligence training to over 8000 students per year from all four United States military services. He was the senior United States intelligence officer at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Belgium, and the Director of Intelligence at Air Combat Command, the Air Force's largest major command.

Colonel James R. Silliman is the Vice Commander, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC. He was commissioned in April 1967 and has spent his entire career in AFOSI, serving in command and staff positions at all echelons within AFOSI. His various tours of duty have included base level counterintelligence collections, theater-wide responsibility for USAF counterintelligence in Europe, counterintelligence input to security police for air base ground defense in the United Kingdom, and oversight of the Air Force counterespionage double agent program.

Colonel Frank M. Willingham is the Deputy Chief of Security Police for the Air Force. Colonel Willingham has over 20 years experience in security and law enforcement and has a diverse range of experience which is unique among Air Force security policemen. He directed security operations at Ramstein Air Base in the aftermath of a terrorist attack on HQ USAFE. In a follow-on assignment, Colonel Willingham directed security operations in protecting air crews after the Libyan air strikes at RAF Lakenheath. While there, Colonel Willingham pioneered the use of thermal imagery technology in security which was later used in the Philippines and Panama. His field experience was followed by assignments to the USAFE IG Team and the Air Staff where he managed the AF Air Base Ground Defense program. In a Joint Service capacity, he managed research and development of new nuclear security systems while assigned to the Defense Nuclear Weapons Agency. After his tour in Washington, Colonel Willlingham was sent to HQ USEUCOM in Germany where he oversaw the largest shipment of nuclear weapons back to the United States from an overseas location.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Woods is presently the Chief of the Air Force Central Labor law Office (CLLO), Civil Law and Litigation Directorate, Air Force Legal Service Agency. He has served as Assistant Staff Judge Advocate, McGuire AFB, NJ; Staff Judge Advocate, San Antonio Real Property Maintenance Agency, San Antonio, TX; Trial Attorney, CLLO, Washington DC; and Staff Judge Advocate, RAF Alconbury, UK. Lt Col Woods attended law school under the sponsorship of the Air Force Funded Legal Education Program and has 13 years of litigation experience.

RANK	ORGANIZATION
TSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
CMSgt	377th Security Police Squadron
Maj	58th Fighter Squadron
Capt	58th Fighter Squadron
Maj Gen	JTF-SWA
TSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
SSgt	741st Maintenance Squadron
SMSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Lt Gen	Third Army, USA CENTCOM
SrA	41 Rescue Squadron
Col	SAF/IG
Col	4404th Vice Commander
Lt Col	USCENTCOM, Provost Marshal
Maj	220th 3d Army Provost Marshal, USA
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
MSgt	71st Rescue Squadron
Col	4409th Operations Group
SSgt	71st Rescue Squadron
SSgt	71st Rescue Squadron
SrA	45th Security Police Squadron
MSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Col	4404th Support Group
TSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Capt	71st Rescue Squadron
TSgt	45th Security Police Squadron
Amn	741st Maintenance Squadron
Brig Gen	USMC, Dir. Of Operations
CIV	58th Fighter Squadron
Sgt	71st Rescue Squadron
Lt Col	CENTCOM, USA
TSgt	33d Fighter Wing
CIV	Deputy Consul, Dhahran
SrA	76th Security Police Squadron
CIV	RSO, U.S. Embassy, Rihyad
CIV	POL MIL, U.S. Embassy Rihyad
MSgt	33d Fighter Wing
Amn	58th Fighter Squadron
TSgt	33d Fighter Wing
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Lt Col	58th Fighter Squadron
Maj	USCENTCOM, JAG
CIV	DIA
Lt Col	91st Security Police Squadron
Capt	91st Security Police Squadron
Lt Col	USCENTCOM, J3
Amn	71st Rescue Squadron
A1C	58th Fighter Squadron
SrA	Robins AFB, GA
CIV	4404th Wing
SSgt	58th FS/IN
Lt Col	US Liaison Office, Doha
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Maj	HQ Third Army
SA	Det 241, OSI
Maj	325th Security Police Squadron
Brig Gen	4404th Wing (P)/CC
Col	USCENTCOM
SrA	41st Rescue Squadron
MSgt	96th Security Police Squadron
Sgt 1 Class	HQ Third Army
SrA	4404th Security Police Squadron
LCDR	VP1, US
Maj	Advisor OPM/SANG
Lt Col	4404th Medical Group
Vice Adm	Naval Central, USN
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Col	Fwd HQ Element, USA
Lt Col	ARCENT, QUATAR
MSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Gen	58th Fighter Squadron
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
SA	AFOSI, Det 241
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
SSgt	741st MSS
Capt	89th Security Police Squadron
Maj	341st Medical Group
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
A1C	4404th Wing
Lt Col	355th Air Wing
SSgt	4404th Wing
Maj Gen	OMC, USAF
SSgt	45th Security Police Squadron
Lt Col	4409th Operations Group
Lt Col	4404th Wing
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
TSgt	71st Rescue Squadron
SSgt	28th Test Squadron
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
TSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
MSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
TSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
SrA	75th SECURITY POLICE SQUADRON
Maj Gen	USCENTCOM, J3
Lt Col	JTF-SWA
TSgt	71st Rescue Squadron
SA	AFOSI, Det 624
SSgt	321st Security Police Squadron
Lt Gen	HQ USAF/XO
CIV	Dep Chief of Mis, U.S. Embassy Riyadh
MSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
TSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Col	USCENTCOM, Dep Surgeon
GS-15	Joint Intelligence Center
SrA	741st Maintenance Squadron
MSgt	HQ AFOSI/DFO
Lt Col	USACOM
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Maj	ARCENT
A1C	71st Rescue Squadron
SrA	96th Security Police Squadron
SrA	Beale AFB, CA
Maj	Misawa AB, Japan
A1C	96th Security Police Squadron
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Maj	Lackland AFB
SMSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
MSgt	75th Medical Group
Rear Adm	USCENTCOM, J-5
CMSgt	4404th Civil Engineering Squadron
Sgt	71st Rescue Squadron
Lt Col	58th Fighter Squadron
Col	18th Wing
1st Lt	MEDAC, Ft. Lee, VA
SA	AFOSI, Det. 110
SrA	71st Rescue Squadron
Maj	Third Army, Provost Marshal, USA
Capt	71st Rescue Squadron
Capt	58th Fighter Squadron
Lt Gen	USCENTCOM, USMC
Col	DAO, U.S. Embassy Riyadh
SrA	71st Rescue Squadron
Lt Col	HQ, Third United States Army
Col	CCJ-2, USCENTCOM
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Lt Col	4404th Wing
Maj	HQ AFOSI
Maj	Force Protection Intel Officer, USA
Gen	USCENTCOM
Capt	4404TH Medical Group
TSgt	45th Security Police Squadron
SrA	41st Rescue Squadron
Col	Third Army Engineer
Vice Adm	JCS, DJ5
SA	AFOSI, Det 241
TSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
MSgt	4404th Civil Engineering Squadron
Maj Gen	Chief, Mil Trng Mis to Saudi Arabia
Brig Gen	Office of Military Cooperation
SrA	71st Rescue Squadron
Col	Dir of Intel, AU, Maxwell AFB, Al
Maj	AFOSI
Col	USCENTCOM
SSgt	71st Rescue Squadron
Amn	91st Security Police Squadron
A1C	Beale AFB, CA
MSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
SSgt	741st Maintenance Squadron
SSgt	71st Rescue Squadron
LCDR	Joint Intel Center, USCENTCOM
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Sgt	71st Rescue Squadron
SrA	377 SPS
Col	140th Wing
Brig Gen	4404th Wing (P)/CC
Lt Col	71st Rescue Squadron
Lt Col	19th Air Force
SrA	58th Fighter Squadron
Col	ARCENT-KUWAIT
A1C	71st Rescue Squadron
Brig Gen	AEF Free, US Army
Brig Gen	US Army Security Assistance Agency
SSgt	741st Maintenance Squadron
MSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
CIV
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
CDR	USCENTCOM, US NAVY
Maj Gen	Commander, Eastern Province
Lt Col	4404th Intelligence Squadron
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
MSgt	AFMC, Kirtland AFB
Maj	436th Air Wing
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Lt Col	USCENTAF, A-1
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
SSgt	60th Fighter Squadron
Maj	HQ AFOSI
SA	4404th Wing
Col	US Army, Cmdr, CENTCOM
Lt Col	Macdill, Fl
CIV	DCM, Saudi Arabia
SSgt	41st Rescue Squadron
Capt	Joint Intel Analysis
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
SrA	41st Rescue Squadron
MSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
SSgt	58th Fighter Squadron
1st Sgt	58th Fighter Squadron
Capt	71st Rescue Squadron
CIV	Consul General, Dharhan
Lt Col	FORSCOM, Provost Marshall
Col	USCENTCOM - Operations, planning
A1C	58th Fighter Squadron
SrA	1st Security Police

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