





~~TOP SECRET~~

AFSPC

UNCLASSIFIED

33

C  
C  
O  
O  
O  
C  
C

(U) ~~(S)~~ During the first half of 1968 SAC operations planners showed renewed interest in the use of nuclear bursts to black out enemy radar and enhance penetration of his defenses. This could be done by putting a high altitude fuse on some Minuteman missiles and bursting them in the exoatmosphere. Radar blackout might also occur as a result of Soviet ABX bursts. Development of a high altitude fuse for the MX 11B/C had been directed in December 1967, but by June 1968 it was more likely that it would be developed for MX 12. Although the development of such a radar blackout technique would be expensive, SAC favored development of a fuse and further study of radar blackout as a penetration tactic. <sup>311</sup>

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

AFSPC

UNCLASSIFIED

Sentinel Integration

(U) ~~(S)~~ In addition to the hazards posed by Soviet offensive and defensive systems, SAC's ICBMs would face a new threat in the early 1970s, the U. S. Sentinel ABM system. For two years SAC had been cooperating with Continental Air Defense Command (CCAD) and Army Air Defense Command (AADC) to determine the amount of interference between U. S. ICBMs and ABMs, and to develop an integration concept for them. Minuteman/Sentinel integration would have serious impacts on the SIFT. Sentinel integration would affect the already serious timing limitations imposed by the CBI concept. Defense suppression and damage limitation sorties were very sensitive to the possibility that the offensive force might be prevented from firing as soon as possible. Hardened communications links and full incorporation of PACCS/AICS were essential to the integration concept. <sup>314</sup>

(U) ~~(S)~~ By the end of 1967 it was clear that there would be considerable interference between the Spartan high altitude area defense missiles and the unclassified ICBMs. In December SAC, CCAD, and AADC developed a broad integration concept similar to one already forwarded by SAC to the Air Staff. The key to this concept was the use of a continuously updated National Defense Priority List, which would assign relative values to all potential targets in the U. S., to determine whether to inhibit our offense or defense in the event of an unavoidable confrontation.

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED





~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Titan II or Minuteman but it had backed the defense of WS-120A if  
Soviet CEPs approached .2 m. 330

0 3 4

UNCLASSIFIED

Best Copy  
AVAILABLE

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~