

Recommendations of the Non-Partisan Nuclear Verification Capabilities Independent Task Force Regarding Effective Monitoring and Verification of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran

Summary of Recommendations from First Task Force Report

Six Elements of an Effective Agreement

1. The agreement should require Iran to provide, prior to the next phase of sanctions relief, a comprehensive declaration that is correct and complete concerning all aspects of its nuclear program both current and past.
2. The agreement should provide the IAEA, for the duration of the agreement, access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the IAEA, as currently required by UN Security Council Resolution 1929.
3. The agreement should provide that any material acts of non-cooperation with inspectors are a violation of the agreement.
4. The agreement should provide for the establishment of a consultative commission, which should be designed and operate in ways to maximize its effectiveness in addressing disputes and, if possible, building a culture of compliance within Iran.
5. The agreement should provide that all Iranian acquisition of sensitive items for its post-agreement licit nuclear program, and all acquisition of sensitive items that could be used in a post-agreement illicit nuclear program, must take place through a designated transparent channel.
6. The agreement should include provisions designed to preclude Iran from outsourcing key parts of its nuclear weapons program to a foreign country such as North Korea.

Three Proposed U.S. Government Actions to Facilitate Effective Implementation of an Agreement

1. The U.S. Government should enhance its relevant monitoring capabilities, invest resources in monitoring the Iran agreement, and structure its assessment and reporting of any Iranian noncompliance so as to maximize the chances that significant anomalies will come to the fore and not be overlooked or considered *de minimis*.
2. The U.S. Government and its allies should maintain the current sanctions regime architecture so that it can be ratcheted up incrementally in order to deter and respond commensurately to any Iranian non-compliance with the agreement.
3. The U.S. Government should establish a joint congressional/executive branch commission to monitor compliance with the agreement, similar to Congress having created the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to monitor the implementation of the 1975 Helsinki Accords.

Summary of Recommendations from the Second Task Force Report

1. Ensure that the Joint Commission Works Effectively Among the P5+1 and Iran to Facilitate Compliance and Communication
2. Organize Executive Branch Mechanisms to Create Synergy and Sustain Focus on Implementation Over the Long-Term
3. Support and Augment the IAEA in the Pursuit of its Key Monitoring Role
4. Create a Joint Executive-Congressional Working Group (JECWG) to Facilitate Coordination Across the Legislative and Executive Branches of the USG
5. Prepare a Strategy and Guidebook for Assessing and Addressing Ambiguities and Potential Noncompliance
6. Exploit New Technologies and Open Source Tools for Monitoring a Nuclear Agreement with Iran

Summary of Recommendations from the Third Task Force Report

1. An independent Network of Centers of Nonproliferation Authentication (NCNA) — a distributed network consisting of four to five separate institutions worldwide should be created and funded outside of government and advocacy channels.
2. The P5+1 and Iran should seek opportunities for public ceremonies, press coverage, and diplomatic events to mark important implementation steps.
3. There should be periodic public updates on monitoring measures and U.S. support to the IAEA and the Joint Commission.
4. There should be a priority diplomatic push by members of the P-5+1 and other interested states, supported by the international business community, toward encouraging Iranian openness and more public release of data concerning implementation and compliance steps by Iran.
5. A trusted body of outside experts should be created for the Iranian nuclear agreement to review monitoring efforts and build confidence even among skeptics that serious and appropriate monitoring steps were being taken.
6. NGOs in the nonproliferation and nuclear arms control sectors that are collecting, handling, processing, and storing sensitive personal information should take the necessary actions and use appropriate tools to protect this information from those seeking to censor or persecute the people or entities that have provided it.
7. Funders of nonproliferation NGOs should consider robust funding for upgrades in cyber security in order to protect key data and should insist that fundees adopt a culture of maintaining good “cyber hygiene” by their personnel as a condition of receiving grants.