Over the Line
The Implications of China’s ADIZ Intrusions in Northeast Asia

Mercedes Trent
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ACRONYMS

ADIZ  Air defense identification zone
CCP  Chinese Communist Party (Chinese political party)
DPJ  Democratic Party of Japan (former Japanese political party)
EEZ  Exclusive Economic Zone
IDF  Indigenous Defense Fighter (Taiwan’s F-CK-1C fighter jet)
JASDF  Japan Air Self Defense Force
KADIZ  (South) Korea air defense identification zone
LDP  Liberal Democratic Party (Japanese political party)
PLA  People’s Liberation Army
PLAAF  People’s Liberation Army Air Force
PLANAF  People’s Liberation Army Naval Air Force
THAAD  Theater High-Altitude Area Defense
INTRODUCTION

When China established its first ADIZ in the East China Sea on November 23, 2013, the move was widely seen as a practice run before establishing one in the South China Sea to strengthen its controversial territorial claims. However, examining China’s use of its ADIZ the way its treatment of those of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan has evolved over the past seven years reveals that China’s East China Sea ADIZ has effectively given China new latitude to extend its influence in Northeast Asia.

Since 2013, China has committed more than 4,400 intrusions into the ADIZs of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Often, Chinese forces violate multiple countries’ ADIZs on their flights, flying routes that consecutively transgress South Korea’s and Japan’s ADIZs or Taiwan’s and Japan’s. While each country has so far managed the issue in its own way by scrambling jets, discussing the issue with China in bilateral meetings, and publicizing some information about the intrusions, the issue has become a regional one impacting all three countries.

China’s intrusions into the ADIZs of its neighbors has allowed it to pursue four clear objectives: to conduct training missions to prepare pilots for encountering foreign air forces during long-range flights; to probe and gather intel on Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese forces; to demonstrate air power capable of protecting its territorial and security interests; and to apply coercive pressure to decouple coalitions resistant to Chinese influence in the region. As much has already been written about China’s long-range bomber flights and other aerial training missions throughout Asia and it is difficult to assess from open-source information the scope of intel Chinese forces may get from probing, this report focuses more heavily on assessing how changes in its bilateral relationships affect China’s perception of its own influence power to assert its territorial claims and coerce its neighbors.

This report proceeds as follows: Chapter Two examines the history, legality, and function of ADIZs in Northeast Asia, as well as China’s creation of its own ADIZ in 2013 and the resulting regional implications. Chapter Three outlines the trends and significant developments in China’s intrusions to the ADIZs of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan with the aim of painting a cohesive, if not fully comprehensive, picture of China’s patterns of behavior toward each country. Chapter Four places the trends described in the previous chapter into the geopolitical context of the relevant timeframes to examine how China has used ADIZ intrusions to protect its territorial claims and regional credibility in response to perceived threats. Chapter Five discusses the reactions of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to China’s ADIZ violations in terms of the diplomatic and strategic initiatives undertaken to address the issue. This chapter also explores the long-term implications of China’s air harassment and degradation of ADIZ norms in Northeast Asia. Chapter Five offers some recommendations for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to blunt the impact of China’s intrusions.
METHODOLOGY & SOURCES

This data upon which this report is based was collected completely through open source reporting. Information released by Japan’s Ministry of Defense serves as the backbone for the analysis regarding intrusions into Japan’s ADIZ. The Ministry of Defense reports the number of Japanese scrambles to intrusions, rather than the number of intrusions themselves. However, since Japanese military officials have reported that Japan responds to each intrusion, the number of intrusions should correlate positively to the number of scrambles. This report bases its assessments upon this premise.

Additionally, while the yearly intrusion data released by the Ministry of Defense corresponds to the Japanese fiscal year, which runs from April 1 to March 30, this report has standardized the data by listing yearly totals under the year that correlates closest to the fiscal year for which it was reported. For example, the 675 Chinese intrusions listed for Reiwa 1, corresponding to April 1, 2019 to March 30, 2020, is attributed to the year 2019 throughout the report. Because of this, the actual counts for the calendar year given here may vary somewhat from the actual figures.

Assessments regarding intrusions into South Korea’s ADIZ rely upon local reporting. The yearly totals are drawn from the reporting of Andrew Jeong of the Wall Street Journal. The details of individual intrusions, including dates, flight paths, and aircraft, were collected from news reports, primarily from Yonhap News Agency, The Korea Herald, The Korea Times, and the Chosun Ilbo.

Comprehensive information on the number of yearly ADIZ intrusions or the number of yearly scrambles by Taiwanese forces are not made publicly available by the Taiwanese government. Information on select Chinese flight activities around Taiwan were previously published in the Ministry of National Defense’s annual defense report through 2017. In December 2017, Taiwanese Defense Minister Feng Shih-kuan announced that the Ministry of National Defense would no longer report on the activity of PLA aircraft near Taiwan unless something unusual occurred as the ministry did not want to engage with China’s “psychological warfare.” As a result, this report cannot quantify Chinese intrusions into Taiwan’s ADIZ or to make accurate comparisons with Japanese and South Korean data.

Instead, this report approaches Taiwan by using qualitative accounts to assess the patterns of China’s use of air power to aggravate Taiwan. This is possible in part because China’s increasingly provocative moves near and in Taiwan’s ADIZ in 2020 have resulted in the Ministry of National Defense more actively reporting the details of Chinese flights around Taiwan in recent months. Information on China’s air provocations around Taiwan are drawn from reporting by the Central News Agency, Taiwan’s state-

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1 Lu Hsin-hui, Chiang Chin-yeh, and Evelyn Kao, “Chinese military activity near Taiwan no longer to be reported,” Focus Taiwan, December 21, 2017.
owned media agency, as well as its English-language counterpart, *Focus Taiwan. Taiwan New* and *Taiwan Today* also provided important details for individual incidents.²

Analysis on Chinese perspectives rely on statements by PLAAF officials, such as spokesman Shen Jinke. Reports from the *Liberation Army Daily*, the PLA’s official newspaper, *Air Force News Network*, the PLAAF’s news site, as well as social media posts by the PLAAF’s official Weibo account, were additionally helpful.

To supplement open source reporting, a research trip to Tokyo and Seoul in summer 2019 helped gather regional perspectives. The author also spoke with a number of Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese defense experts, as well as U.S. military and intelligence officials in Washington, D.C. All conversations were on background to allow participants to speak candidly.

This report discusses number of disputed territories in Northeast Asia: the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands claimed by Japan, China, and Taiwan and currently administered by Japan; the island of Dokdo/Takeshima, which is claimed by South Korea and Japan and currently administered by South Korea; and the area around Ieodo, where South Korea and China disagree about where the maritime boundary delineating the two countries’ EEZs should be. This report will recognize each disputed territory by the name it is known by to the country which currently administers it. This report does not take a position on any territorial claims.

All translations and interpretations of foreign language sources, including any mistakes there within, are the sole responsibility of the author. The information in this report is current as of August 1, 2020.

² It is worth noting that public reporting on Taiwan’s ADIZ intrusions often mistakenly conflates the ADIZ with “airspace.”
OVERVIEW OF AIR DEFENSE IDENTIFICATION ZONES IN EAST ASIA

An air defense identification zone (ADIZ) serves as a buffer between international airspace and a country’s territorial airspace, which extends 12 nautical miles from a country’s coast. Establishing such a zone allows a country to better monitor air traffic flying near its airspace and respond to aircraft that fly close to its airspace before the aircraft actually enter the airspace. Although such zones are not recognized as sovereign airspace by international law, it is customary for foreign aircraft entering such zones to identify themselves and seek prior authorization from the country controlling the zone before entering. When unauthorized aircraft enter the zone, the country controlling the zone typically scrambles jets to identify the aircraft to ensure it is not heading toward territorial airspace.

The United States established the first official ADIZ in 1950 against the background of the Cold War and has been a driving force in the creation of ADIZs elsewhere. In the 1950s, the U.S. established four ADIZs in Asia over Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines to guard against Chinese and
Russian intrusions into those countries’ airspace. The U.S. eventually turned over its management of the ADIZs to their respective countries. Japan twice expanded its ADIZ—first, in 1972, to incorporate the Ryukyu islands, which had been recently reverted to Japanese control after extended U.S. administration, and again in 2010, to cover its western-most inhabited island of Yonaguni. Although the second extension caused Japan’s new ADIZ to overlaps with Taiwan’s (Yonaguni is only 108 km from Taiwan), the Taiwanese government did not contest the change.

Changes in international law over the past several decades have altered the parameters of the East Asian ADIZs and relevant jurisdictional claims. The Japanese and South Korean ADIZs were created before the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, which established that territorial waters/airspace extend 12 nautical miles (22 km) from a nation’s coast and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) 200 nautical miles (370 km).

Ieodo, a submerged rock in the Yellow Sea 149 km from the South Korean island of Jeju, falls into South Korea’s EEZ. However, through mere oversight, South Korea’s ADIZ did not cover Ieodo until South Korea extended its ADIZ in 2013, due to it having been in international waters and not South Korea’s EEZ at the time the ADIZ was established. Although South Korea’s extension then caused its ADIZ to overlap with Japan’s over Ieodo, there is no contention between Japan and South Korea over this area. However, while international law asserts that a submerged rock outside of a state’s territorial waters cannot be claimed as territory by any nation, China and South Korea have long disputed the maritime jurisdiction around Ieodo, which straddles the two countries’ overlapping EEZs.

On November 23, 2013, China sought an established degree of control over airspace in the East China Sea through the creation of its first ADIZ. China designed its ADIZ to overlap those of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan above disputed territorial and maritime jurisdictions such as the Japan-controlled Senkakus and the waters around Ieodo, provoking protests from Japanese, South Korean, and U.S. officials. South Korea reportedly requested that China redraw its ADIZ to remove the overlap but China refused. In December 2013, South Korea responded by expanding its ADIZ to include Ieodo. None of the three countries recognize China’s ADIZ. Taiwan, under the Beijing-friendly Ma Ying-jeou administration, was muted in its response to China’s move.

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4 Shih Hsui-chuan, “Japan extends ADIZ into Taiwan space,” *Taiwan Times*, June 26, 2010.
China’s Ministry of National Defense announced it would require aircraft entering the ADIZ to submit flight plans and identifying aircraft features to the PRC for pre-authorization, regardless of whether or not the aircraft intended to enter China’s territorial airspace. The ministry warned that China’s armed forces would respond with emergency defensive measures if aircraft entered the ADIZ without adhering to China’s requirements.9

Despite this, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been relatively restrained in enforcing its own ADIZ rules. Although the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) monitors foreign military aircraft entering its ADIZ, they have regularly opted not to scramble jets in response. Just days after the establishment of the ADIZ, on November 25, the U.S. flew two B-52 bombers through the zone near the Senkakus without pre-authorization to assert its right-to-flight, eliciting no response from the PLA.10 Japan and South Korea also sent surveillance aircraft through their respective claimed areas that now also fall within China’s ADIZ. The PLA also did not scramble jets to respond to these intrusions. It seems likely that the PLA did not expect the U.S., Japan, and South Korea to immediately begin probing its response to ADIZ intrusions and was thereby unprepared to confront them. Such a lack of preparedness likely stemmed from insufficient operational planning to execute the ADIZ through proper delegation of ADIZ enforcement operations, though it is also possible the PLA was constrained by a lack of sufficient surveillance capabilities or force readiness.

A PLAAF spokesperson announced on November 28, 2013 that the PLAAF would begin conducting defensive air patrols throughout the new zone.11 However, a U.S. Air Force assessment predicted in early 2014 that the PLA would rely on ground-based radar to monitor the ADIZ, rather than conducting continuous patrols with fighters or support aircraft.12 That assessment further suggested that management of the ADIZ would be responsibility shared by coastal units, command posts in the Nanjing Military Region on the east coast, and centralized commands in Beijing, with both PLAAF and People’s Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANAF) forces scrambling jets to respond to foreign intrusions.

In what was likely the first instance of China enforcing its ADIZ, on November 30, 2013, the PLAAF dispatched two fighters to respond to two U.S. reconnaissance planes and ten Japanese military aircraft flying near the Senkakus, flying alongside the foreign aircraft until they departed the ADIZ.13 In two

11 Denyer and Harlan, 2013.
separate incidents occurring in May and June 2014, two Chinese Su-27 fighters flew within 100 feet of Japanese military planes in the area near the Senkakus, eliciting strong protests from the Japanese government which warned that the maneuvers were dangerous.\textsuperscript{14} A Bloomberg news article published in October 2015 suggests that by then China had quietly stopped trying to enforce its ADIZ.\textsuperscript{15} Given the irregular enforcement, it is highly likely China never intended to fully enforce the ADIZ and it was created for another purpose.

Analysts have suggested China may have established its ADIZ as a way to extend the PLA’s training space. Though many discount that patrolling the newly established ADIZ provided much operational value in and of itself, a RAND study on China’s ADIZ states, “While we cannot determine the nature of [patrols] from open sources, it seems clear that the PLAAF is taking advantage of tactical training and flights that might otherwise be described as demonstrations by portraying them as having an ADIZ patrol dimension.”\textsuperscript{16}

The study cites a November 2015 mission as an example. During this mission, a PLAAF group of “dissimilar aircraft,” including H-6K bombers, flew through the Miyako Strait between Okinawa and Miyako Island and into western Pacific for bluewater training, roughly 1,000 kilometers past the first island chain. Simultaneously, a separate group of aircraft comprised of H-6Ks, several models of fighters, and several models of early warning aircraft reportedly patrolled the East China Sea ADIZ. As these flights were scheduled and not in response to any intrusions, the report suggests that “this type of tactical training has the potential to hone PLAAF pilot skills in a way that more routine ADIZ patrols cannot provide, but only if pilots are practicing more advanced tasks, like interacting with early warning aircraft and fighters of dissimilar types.”\textsuperscript{17}

Many analysts believe that a key motive behind China’s ADIZ establishment is aimed at exerting greater control over the East China Sea and strengthening its claims over the Japan-controlled Senkakus.\textsuperscript{18} China established its ADIZ roughly one year after tensions flared with Japan following Tokyo’s purchase of three of the disputed islands from their private owner.

While asserting greater control over its disputed territories is undoubtedly one of China’s goals, China’s ADIZ has primarily given it a justification for expanding the range of its flights, first into the overlapping area before gradually proceeding to unauthorized entries deep into the exclusive parts of Japan’s and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Ting Shi, “Quiet Air Zone Shows China’s Struggle to Control Contested Seas,” Bloomberg, October 28, 2015.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Burke and Cevallos, 2015.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Ian E. Rinehart and Bart Elias, \textit{China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)}, Congressional Research Service, January 30, 2015.
\end{itemize}
South Korea’s ADIZs. Establishment of the ADIZ was a first step to China’s gradual degradation of all ADIZs in Northeast Asia that then allowed China to pursue its regional objectives.
PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR

The PLA’s operations in and around the ADIZs of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are distinct to each country and bear individual examination. However, some broad generalizations can be drawn from the three cases. ADIZ intrusions occur at higher rates around the end of the month, suggesting they have become part of a standardized training schedule. Aircraft from both the PLAAF and the PLANAF commit ADIZ intrusions, but most operations into ADIZs are conducted by the PLAAF. The PLANAF has been known to primarily conduct operations around the Senkakus. Increases in the PLA’s use of more combative flight groups, such as those including fighters and bombers, over single aircraft such as Y-8s or Y-8s to intrude into a country’s ADIZ, tend to coincide with exacerbated bilateral tensions.
<table>
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<th>Taiwan</th>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>&gt;25</td>
<td>&gt;20</td>
</tr>
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</table>

"-" Data has not been released by national authorities.

Data on Japan have been collected from reports released annually by the Joint Staff at the Ministry of Defense. The data for South Korea is drawn from public media reports. See Andrew Jeong, “Chinese, Russian, Warplanes Test U.S. Patience in Skies Near South Korea,” Wall Street Journal, August 16, 2019. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense does not publicly release comprehensive data of ADIZ intrusions so yearly totals are not available. See Appendix I for detailed data sourcing on individual intrusions.

**JAPAN**

Unauthorized flights through Japan’s ADIZ are assertive, frequent, and stretch back at least as far as the early 2000s. Until 2010, Chinese aircraft usually entered Japan’s ADIZ less than 50 times a year, save for a spike to 107 intrusions in 2005. Intrusions began rising steadily from 2010, when they reached 98. Intrusions doubled from 156 in 2011 to 306 in 2012, after which the number each year continued to climb, peaking at 851 in 2016. Intrusions decreased substantially to 500 in 2017 and have stayed relatively consistent in recent years, with 638 intrusions in 2018 and 675 in 2019.

Over the last decade, Chinese flights in the East China Sea have become increasingly more sophisticated. Intrusions in the early 2010s often featured single Y-8 early warning aircraft flying near the Senkakus to the Miyako Strait. By the late 2010s, Chinese flights evolved into more specialized training missions featuring multiple independent flight groups of various aircraft packages conducting increasingly long-range flights to the Pacific.
The PLA operates a number of different aircraft in its missions through Japan’s ADIZ. Y-9 reconnaissance aircraft and H-6K bombers are used most frequently, often together. Through 2016, flight groups consisting of one Y-8 or Y-9, two to four H-6K bombers, one Tu-154 electronic warfare aircraft, and two fighters were common. Until 2016, the fighter contingent for the flight groups consisted of Su-30s; after 2016, J-11s began to appear. These large flight groups are often used to fly multiple simultaneous routes around the Senkakus, likely to assess the response capacity of the Japan Air Self-Defense Forces (JASDF).

The PLA operates along three main flight paths in its missions through Japan’s ADIZ, though there are often small variations. The most common routes flown are around the Senkakus, which fall in the overlapping ADIZ area claimed by both China and Japan. These flights are the most varied of any route the PLA flies, making the route difficult to characterize. The PLA often conducts short-range roundtrip flights around the Senkakus and while also folding flights around the Senkakus into other long-range flights through the Pacific Ocean. On the second route, Chinese aircraft depart from southern China and fly through the Bashi Channel before circling northward through the Miyako Strait and returning to China, essentially encircling Taiwan while also converging near the Senkakus. Though Japan’s ADIZ does not extend into the Bashi Channel, Chinese forces operate exclusively in Japan’s ADIZ while approaching the Miyako Strait before entering the overlapping zone.

The final route sends Chinese forces through the Tsushima Strait. Chinese aircraft first enter the KADIZ either from the Yellow Sea or through the East China Sea before quickly proceeding to the overlapping area. Chinese aircraft then leave the KADIZ to cross into Japan’s ADIZ while the aircraft travel north through the Tsushima Strait. The aircraft later re-enter the KADIZ to fly near Ulleungdo and Dokdo before looping back and retracing its route to return to China. This route is distinct because it does not take the Chinese aircraft near any areas over which China has territorial disputes.
The PLA uses more threatening aircraft such as bombers and fighters on the missions that fly exclusively through Japan’s ADIZ, which take Chinese aircraft over the Senkakus. Asserting air power over the disputed Senkakus, which China has no other means to control, is an essential component of these flights. Reclamation of the Senkakus is widely recognized as one of China’s long-term strategic objectives. While not as important to China as unification with Taiwan or exerting influence in the South China Sea, reclaiming the Senkakus still features in China’s defense white papers. China’s flights over the islands sustained over more than two decades also speak to the ongoing importance of the issue. While a Chinese operation to occupy the Senkakus does not appear to be imminent, these flights likely also serve a secondary purpose as training missions for a potential conflict.

Due to China’s preference for using a route that traverses Japan’s ADIZ to conduct exercises in the KADIZ, the majority of unauthorized KADIZ entries lead to unauthorized entries in Japan’s ADIZ. However, the campaign against Japan is substantially more targeted; at the height of intrusions, South Korea scrambled jets monthly, perhaps even weekly, whereas Japan scrambles jets nearly daily.
The majority of scrambles are conducted by the JASDF’s Southwestern Air Defense Force regional headquarters based at Naha Air Base in Okinawa. The Ministry of Defense has consistently shifted assets to southwestern Japan to improve its capability to respond to increasing Chinese intrusions. In April 2014, the JASDF re-stationed four E2-C early warning aircraft and 130 personnel from Misawa Air Base in northern Japan to Naha, creating the 603rd Squadron of the Airborne Early Warning Surveillance Group to bolster surveillance capabilities in southwestern Japan. In 2016, the number of F-15s at Naha Air Base was increased to 40, a 1.5x increase made possible by transferring fighters from Tsuiki Air Base in Fukuoka. This boost in fighter aircraft also led to the creation of the new 9th Air Wing at Naha.

Despite these changes, the PLA is still likely to win its peacetime war of attrition against the JASDF. The JASDF relies primarily on its fleet of about 215 F-15Js for scrambles. The JASDF generally uses four F-15Js per sortie. The PLA has a fighter fleet roughly six times that of the JASDF, giving the PLA a much higher capacity to cycle through aircraft engaging in air missions to distribute the strain on its fleet. The imbalance between the two forces means that the JASDF, which also has to respond to hundreds of Russian intrusions into the northern portion of its ADIZ each year as well, runs a high risk of wearing out its fighters if it continues to respond to every ADIZ intrusion. Japan announced in late 2018 that it would upgrade 98 of its fighters while also purchasing a few hundred F-35s to fill out its fighter force.

It is unclear if Japan will use the F-35s in its ADIZ responses, but it is a less than ideal solution. The F-35 has several operational issues that make it ill-suited for ADIZ enforcement missions, particularly its lack of endurance, limited maneuverability, and high operational costs. In early July 2020, Japan’s Ministry of Defense announced plans to begin production on an indigenous sixth-generation stealth fighter in 2031 to replace its aging fleet of F-2 jets.

Recent changes in the PLA’s operational strategy are likely to exacerbate the demand on Japan’s fighters. The Japanese government announced in July 2020 that JASDF aircraft have begun flying above the East China Sea every day from sunrise to sunset in order to better monitor the moves of PLA aircraft around the Senkakus. Japan has taken these extreme measures in light of Chinese forces moving the take-off point for its fighter jets flying East China Sea operations from Zhejiang to a base in Fujian, allowing a J-11 to reach the Senkakus in roughly 20 minutes. The shortened travel time for Chinese forces presented a problem for the JASDF, which need about 25 minutes for its F-15s to reach the area from their base.

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20 Staff report, “F-15s transferred to Okinawa base to strengthen defense against China,” Mainichi Shimbun, February 1, 2016.
in Okinawa. This move is likely to further strain Japan’s fighter force until it fields significant numbers of its sixth-generation of fighters more than a decade from now.

SOUTH KOREA

Chinese aircraft first entered the Korean air defense identification zone (KADIZ) without advance notice on January 31, 2016. Two military aircraft entered the overlapping area between the KADIZ and Japan’s ADIZ area near Ieodo but exited some minutes later by crossing into Japan’s ADIZ and flying north through the Tsushima Strait following a warning from the South Korean military via wireless communications that they had violated the zone. South Korea placed fighter jets on standby but did not attempt to intercept the Chinese aircraft.25

Unauthorized Chinese entries into the KADIZ steadily increased from 2016 to 2018. While the South Korean Ministry of National Defense does not release details of every incursion, available data from press supports suggests incursions usually occur at the end of the month and that most KADIZ intrusions lead to intrusions into Japan’s ADIZ. KADIZ Incursions remained confined to the overlapping area until 2018 when Chinese aircraft began entering only the KADIZ during some intrusions.26

Chinese aircraft frequently fly two shorter routes into the KADIZ. The first route begins with the PLA entering the KADIZ southwest of Ieodo, flying through the overlapping area, and then turning toward mainland China and flying northwest into the Yellow Sea before looping around and returning the way the aircraft came.27 Chinese aircraft flew this route 65 times in 2018. On the second route, the PLA aircraft enters the KADIZ from the south and flies diagonally north toward Ieodo, then turns and exits the KADIZ just south of Ieodo. This route is the least provocative, as it keeps the Chinese aircraft within the overlapping ADIZ area claimed by South Korea, Japan, and China, allowing China to claim it is simply patrolling its own ADIZ. The PLA flew this route 70 times in 2018.

On February 27, 2018, China began flying a new route into the East Sea, bringing Chinese aircraft much deeper into the KADIZ and closer to Korean territory. The aircraft entered the KADIZ from the west and flew south past Ieodo into the overlapping area. The aircraft then continued south until the aircraft exited the KADIZ, traveling exclusively through Japan’s ADIZ before turning sharply northeast. The aircraft then remained in Japan’s ADIZ, flying parallel to the KADIZ and ultimately re-entering it near Pohang by veering northwest. This flight path is a variation of the route through the Tsushima Strait the PLA has flown in Japan’s ADIZ for years. Chinese forces have grown increasingly bolder with these flights, since introducing the KADIZ component to this route, aircraft continued to fly progres-

26 Seung-sik Yang, “Chinese military entered South Korean airspace 140 times last year (中군용기, 이젠 우리 영공 턱밑까지... 작년 140회 무단진입조선일보 양승식 기자),” Chosun Ilbo (조선일보), February 1, 2019.
27 Ibid.
sively closer to the South Korean coastline at the KADIZ re-entry point near Pohang throughout 2018, coming in as close as 66 kilometers from Pohang on the December 27 flight, 44 km from South Korean airspace. Throughout 2018, the midpoint of this flight occurred when Chinese aircraft flew between Ulleungdo and mainland South Korea. Following that, the aircraft looped back to retrace its flight path, exiting near the same western point where it entered. According to public reports, the PLA followed this flight path 7 times in 2018.28

The flights grew more provocative in 2019. Chinese aircraft flew between Ulleungdo and Dokdo, the South Korean-controlled island which Japan also claims, rather than to the west of Ulleungdo, for the first time on February 23, 2019. Chinese forces continued to fly this route throughout 2019, bringing it closer to South Korean airspace around Ulleungdo and Dokdo than previous routes.

The most provocative flight to date remains the first and thus far only joint Sino-Russian incursion occurring on July 23, 2019. Two H-6K bombers flew a path similar to that of its February intrusion, traversing between Ulleungdo and Dokdo. Three Russian aircraft—two Tu-95 bombers and one A-50 early warning and control aircraft—joined the Chinese bombers. The Tu-95s flew directly south between Ulleungdo and Dokdo, while the A-50 flew southwest before looping north to pass between Ulleungdo and Dokdo. The A-50 breached South Korea’s territorial airspace twice near Dokdo, marking the first such violation since the Korean War. South Korea scrambled 18 jets that attempted to make contact with the Russian aircraft through radio calls, wing waggles, close approaches, and flare launches before resorting to firing 80 warning cannon rounds.29 About half an hour later, the A-50 returned and South Korea again responded by firing 280 more cannon rounds to pressure the aircraft to leave South Korean airspace.

Despite the increased provocativeness of intrusions in 2019, Chinese aircraft breached the KADIZ on “more than 25 occasions,” according to South Korean press reports.30 Although the Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff have not released more exact numbers for 2019, this reporting suggests the rate of incursions has dropped precipitously.

However, despite the decreased KADIZ intrusion rate, the increased provocativeness of the incursions along with the unprecedented coordination with Russia hints that the PLA has perhaps grown comfortable with its ability to operate deeper into the airspace over the East China Sea. In recent months, Chinese military aircraft have twice taken the unusual step of identifying itself to South Korean forces before entering the KADIZ, as is typically expected of foreign aircraft entering another country’s ADIZ.

28 Ibid.
Chinese aircraft identified themselves before entering the KADIZ on October 29, 2019 and March 25, 2020, although it seems China did not follow this procedure on its KADIZ flights immediately succeeding the October and March flights.31

When Chinese aircraft first began its intrusions into areas of the KADIZ not overlapping with China’s ADIZ in 2016, the publicly available data suggests H-6K bombers accompanied by Y-8 or Y-9 reconnaissance aircraft were frequently used until the end of 2017. From 2018 onward, all publicly reported data shows that Chinese forces flew primarily Y-9 reconnaissance aircraft on KADIZ-violating missions, save for the joint Sino-Russian intrusion in July 2019. As Y-9s are less threatening than bombers, the PLA is able to operate more provocatively in the KADIZ without overly alarming South Korea. Y-9s suggest to the South Koreans that the missions are probing, rather than coercive.

The decision in 2018 to proceed beyond Ieodo into the northern area of the KADIZ, where China asserts no territorial or maritime claims, suggests there is an extra element to the operational objectives beyond simply asserting an air presence over disputed territory. It is possible that China uses this route to gather additional intelligence. According to press reports, South Korean intelligence officials in 2018 assessed that the new flight paths were intended to probe the reaction and readiness of the South Korean military. Additional media reports cite unnamed analysts as suggesting China may also be trying to get information about South Korea’s military radar frequencies that could be used for jamming operations if conflict were to break out.

South Korean analysts differ on their interpretations of the China’s actions, with some suggesting the intrusions have military utility in that they allow the PLA to probe South Korean defenses and test its responses as a means of gathering intelligence, while others suggest China simply wants to remind South Korea of its capabilities to keep South Korea from stepping too far out of line politically. Because the intrusions occur nearly monthly around the end of the month, South Korean military officials believe these routes have become a standard part of PLA training. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs argues that the KADIZ is not territorial airspace and therefore Chinese aircraft are not obligated to respect it.

TAIWAN

Chinese air provocations against Taiwan manifest in three ways: circumnavigational flights of Taiwan, ADIZ intrusions, and violations of the cross-strait median line. Circumnavigational flights are the most common provocation, followed by ADIZ intrusions. Violations of the median line are widely seen as the most provocative action and as a result are rare.

As Taiwan’s ADIZ roughly corresponds to its EEZ, it theoretically extends across the entire 180 km-wide Taiwan Strait. However, while both China and Taiwan agree the strait is part of one EEZ belonging to a single “China,” the two countries dispute which nation holds that moniker. This means in practice that Taiwan and China have instead traditionally observed what is known as the “median line,” a theoretical central line delineating the Chinese and Taiwanese sides of the strait. The line was established in 1955 by a U.S. official. Both China and Taiwan seemingly came to a tacitly accept the line in 1958, even though

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32 Yang, 2019.
34 Author interviews, Seoul, 2019.
35 Author interviews, Seoul, 2019; Yang, 2019
China has never explicitly recognized the line, maintaining that Taiwan is part of its own territory.37 On the map accompanying the Chinese government’s official announcement of its new ADIZ, the ADIZ is not depicted as covering Taiwan. Furthermore, the map depicts China’s territorial waters in order to strengthen its claim that new ADIZ naturally flows into what would be China’s EEZ. Notably, China’s depiction of its territorial waters in the Taiwan Strait adhere to the median line.

Due to the historic superiority of Taiwanese forces, Chinese aircraft strictly adhered to the median line delineation until the balance of military power began to shift in the 1990s. In July 1999, Chinese aircraft intentionally crossed the median line following what China perceived to be pro-independence remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui. Contemporary reports indicate this was the first intentional intrusion since the line was established in the 1950s.

Public accounts suggest the next intentional crossing came twenty years later. On March 11, 2019, two PLAAF J-11 fighters crossed 43 miles over the median line in the southwestern area of the Taiwan Strait.38 The fighters stayed on Taiwan’s side of the line for 12 minutes, which was unusual as most violations of the line in recent history have been accidental violations due to poor weather or pilot error.39 Taiwan scrambled jets in response and the Chinese aircraft retreated to the west side of the line following

37 Chiayi Ho, “Median line issues raise question over Beijing’s agenda,” Taiwan Today, July 17, 2009.
38 Ralph Jennings, “China’s Jets that Crosses into Taiwan Airspace: Not a First; Maybe not the Last,” Voice of America, April 3, 2019.
39 Ibid.
a radio warning by the Taiwanese. Analysts suggest the unusually long timespan the aircraft violated the median line indicate it was an intentionally provocative move rather than an accidental incursion.

Chinese aircraft again crossed the median line nearly a year later. On February 10, 2020, a Chinese flight group that included an unspecified number of H-6K bombers and escort aircraft conducted a training mission in the Pacific, passing through the Bashi Channel. While flying south toward the channel, the fighter jets accompanying the flight group crossed the median line, returning to the west side of the line after responding Taiwanese military aircraft issued multiple radio warnings. The intrusion came a day after Taiwan scrambled fighters to shadow another Chinese flight group of J-11 fighters, KJ-500 early warning aircraft, and H-6K bombers that flew close to the median line but did not cross it.

The circumnavigational flights, the most common provocation, began in 2016. China refers to its circumnavigational flights as “island encirclement patrols,” a phrase previously used in reference to Chinese Coast Guard activities around the Senkakus before PLAAF spokesman Shen Jinke repurposed it to refer to the Taiwan flights in 2017. At a 2018 press conference, Ministry of National Defense Spokesperson Wu Qian claimed the flights were part of combat training “to improve the ability [of China] to maintain national sovereignty and territorial integrity” and that they were aimed at the activities of “Taiwanese independence forces.”

When conducting circumnavigational flights of Taiwan, Chinese flight groups are often made up of H-6Ks, J-10s, and Y-8s, similar to those that fly missions through Japan’s ADIZ. The majority of circumnavigational flights of Taiwan to also lead to violations of Japan’s ADIZ, as the most common flight path has Chinese forces returning to China via the Miyako Strait in Japan’s ADIZ. Flight groups usually approach Taiwan from the southwest and pass through the Bashi Channel before turning northeast. Since 2017, circumnavigational flights have become more sophisticated and missions have evolved from a single plane flying clockwise from the Bashi Channel to complex flight groups capable of flying multi-directional routes, including counterclockwise from the Miyako Strait through the Bashi Channel.
Although most of the flights remain just outside Taiwan’s ADIZ, Taiwan does scramble jets to shadow these aircraft as they fly around Taiwan. Despite flying close to the ADIZ, China seems to have actively avoided frequent ADIZ intrusions of Taiwan until recently, perhaps out of concern the move could be misinterpreted as an imminent attack given the precarious nature of the cross-strait relationship. Even though H-6K bombers are often used in the flight groups circumnavigating Taiwan as well as the flight groups violating Japan’s ADIZ, China tends to use fighter jets or Y-8s to violate Taiwan’s ADIZ, again perhaps out of caution.

In 2020 however, intrusions into Taiwan’s ADIZ have become an increasingly more common air provocation, with more intrusions publicly reported in the first half of 2020 than total intrusions of any previous year. At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic between January 23 and May 8, Chinese aircraft violated Taiwan’s ADIZ seven times. An intrusion on March 16 is notable for being the first time China is known to have intruded into an ADIZ at night, showing that China is growing increasingly comfortable with both the operations.\(^47\) The pace of intrusions has continued to accelerate into the summer of

2020 when Chinese aircraft intruded into Taiwan’s ADIZ ten times between June 9 and July 4, with the bulk of intrusions coming over a two-week span in mid-June.48 Amidst Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang military exercises, a Chinese warplane entered Taiwan’s ADIZ during live-fire artillery exercises on July 16, coming within 333 km of the shooting range.49 This intrusion marks the 20th ADIZ intrusion released to the public so far in 2020, although according to Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu, intrusions “happened almost every day” in June and were “much more frequent” than what the government publicly disclosed.50

Taiwan, which has 289 combat aircraft, will likely be unable to match China’s current operational tempo if the escalated intrusion rate continues into the mid- to long-term. Not only is Taiwan’s combat fleet a fraction of China’s 1,700, but Taiwan’s aircraft are rapidly aging. Taiwan does maintain a fleet of 103 indigenously produced fighter jets, the F-CK-1C, also known as the Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF), but all were produced by 1999. Additionally, Taiwan faces unique procurement challenges. After the United States and France faced economic and diplomatic backlash from China for selling military equipment to Taiwan in the 1990s, Taiwan has been unable to purchase new combat aircraft from any country until the Trump administration agreed to sell it new F-16s in 2019. As a result, Taiwan’s ability to calibrate an acceptable operational cost for scrambles will always be limited by the complications it faces in expanding or modernizing its fleet.

48 You Kaixiang, “For the eighth time in two weeks, J-10s and H-6Ks violate Taiwan’s ADIZ (兩週內第8度 共軍殲10轟6再犯台灣防空識別區),” Central News Agency (中央通訊社), June 22, 2020.
CHINA’S VIEWS OF REGIONAL SECURITY

As discussed below, the timing of the ADIZ entries, the rate of intrusions, the type of aircraft used, and the flight paths all offer evidence to examine how China now uses its air assets in Northeast Asia’s ADIZs to assert its power within its complicated regional relationships. China’s ADIZ intrusions are carefully calibrated to exert maximum impact on the target country and the use of ADIZ intrusions over the years reflects China’s evolving views of its regional security environment. While China does not face a traditional military threat in Northeast Asia, China’s concerns when assessing its regional security environment center on a fear of losing coercive influence over its interests.

Each section explores this view through examination of variations in ADIZ intrusions within the context of China’s bilateral relationships. Significant variations in the rate of intrusions, type of aircraft, and flight paths correspond to shifts in China’s geopolitical environment, showing that despite the obvious training benefits gained from these flights, China’s ADIZ intrusions have also become punitive and coercive.

JAPAN

Intrusion rates increased during years of diplomatic strife between Japan and China and decreased during years of improved relations. Until 2010, China engaged in fewer than 50 intrusions per year, save for 2005 when intrusions jumped to 107, a substantial increase from 13 in 2004. The increase in 2005 coincided with strained relations that led to wide-spread anti-Japanese demonstrations in China and other parts of East Asia after Japan approved a new history textbook that Japan’s East Asian neighbors claimed whitewashed Japanese aggressions during World War II; developed a proposal for the G4, of which Japan is member, to seek permanent membership status on the United Nations Security Council; and released a joint U.S.-Japan statement addressing issues with the Taiwan Strait. Once Shinzo Abe took over the prime ministership in 2006, he made a concentrated effort to strengthen relations between China and Japan and ADIZ intrusions dropped to 22 that year. Relations remained strong under Abe and his successor, Yasuo Fukuda, and intrusions remained low.

Throughout this time, most ADIZ intrusions were the result of PLA aircraft conducting flights near the Senkakus. China, which does not maintain administrative control over any part of the disputed Senkakus, uses these flights to project some degree of power over the islands to back up its territorial claim. Moves China has perceived as threatening to its claim of the Senkakus have consistently preceded the largest increases in intrusion rates.

On September 7, 2010, a Chinese fishing trawler collided with two Japanese coast guard ships while operating in the disputed waters around the Senkakus. Japanese officials took the captain of the fishing
vessel into custody. China protested the arrest, summoning Japan’s ambassador twice in 24 hours while the *China Daily* warned that “a wave of indignation is brewing in Chinese society, which might snowball into a major public outcry if the Japanese authorities continue to take a hardline stance.”\(^{51}\) China’s unauthorized ADIZ flights hit 96 that year, with the bulk of intrusions (34) coming in the second quarter of the year, which includes the month of September.

The following year, the Tokyo governor began mounting a campaign for the Tokyo metropolitan government to purchase three Senkaku islets from their private owner, from whom the Japanese national government had been leasing the islands for the past decade. China and Japan met in May 2012 to discuss the issue. Following the meeting, Chinese officials reportedly believed the Japanese central government would stop the Tokyo governor while maintaining the current status of the islands. Japan however believed China’s objections were primarily based in the Tokyo governor’s harsh rhetoric toward the issue. In September 2012, the Japanese government announced it had purchased the three Senkaku islets. This move became the most fracturing event in decades of China-Japan relations and led to a doubling of ADIZ intrusions from 156 in 2011 to 306 in 2012. The bulk of ADIZ intrusions in 2012 came in the third quarter (91 intrusions) and fourth quarter (146 intrusions), after the Japanese government announced its purchase and nationalization of the islets.

From China’s perspective, its regional security has been further upended by Japan’s push to revise its pacifist constitution in favor of an expanded view of self-defense. The move to revise Japan’s pacifist constitution has largely been drive by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who was reelected as prime minister in 2012. China has opposed the Abe government’s Article 9 reform since the beginning. China has constantly criticized Japan’s pursuit of constitutional revision, arguing that Japan’s Asian neighbors should feel uneasy with any broadening of Japan’s military power given its “imperialist history.”\(^{52}\) China has been particularly vocal about the LDP’s claim that the “China threat” justifies the need for Japan to have greater latitude in executing its defense. “China opposes the Japanese fabricating the China threat to promote its domestic political agenda,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said in 2014.\(^{53}\)

The perceived dedication to remilitarization coupled with the previous years’ assertiveness over the Senkakus and Japan’s denigration of China as a regional threat likely all drove China’s increasing aerial assertiveness. From 2013 to 2016, ADIZ intrusions increased each year, peaking at 851 in 2016. China’s aggressive aerial posturing is likely a subtle recognition of its inability to exert any real power over

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the territory it claims as well as of the threat presented by a possible future quantitative challenge to its regional military power by a nation that already maintains a qualitative edge.

Another dimension of China’s ADIZ intrusion strategy is to exploit friction between Japan and South Korea in order to decouple the support structure of its biggest adversaries—Japan itself, as well as the United States. China’s flight path taking PLA aircraft through both Japan’s and South Korea’s ADIZs and around Dokdo, the center of a territorial dispute between Japan and South Korea, provides a recurring opportunity for miscalculation or miscommunication between responding Japanese and South Korean forces.

China seems to have seized on one such opportunity in 2019. Following a nearly year-long dispute between Japan and South Korea over historical issues and trade, China conducted its first ever joint intrusion with Russia. The July 23 intrusion led to violations of the airspace around Dokdo. As is typical for any intrusion that spans both the KADIZ and Japan’s ADIZ, both South Korea and Japan scrambled jets to respond to the Chinese and Russian aircraft. Afterward, both South Korean and Japanese officials launched public complaints against the other, arguing that the other nation had no standing to respond to the aircraft and became further fuel for their animosity.54

Despite the increasing provocativeness of China’s intrusions into Japan’s ADIZ in the last two years, the total intrusion rate has decreased by about 25% since 2016. This is roughly reflective of improved China-Japan relations over the last few years. In 2017, China and Japan seemed to reach a tentative détente as the two rapidly expanded their trade relationship, with Japanese exports rising to 20.5%. CCP General Secretary Xi and Prime Minister Abe also met on the sidelines of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in November and agreed to a “fresh start.”55

China and Japan also drew closer throughout 2018 and 2019 as both countries found themselves on the same side of the U.S.’s trade war. “Japan-China relations have been moving in the direction of great improvement,” Prime Minister Abe said in September 2018.56 Prime Minister Abe was even reported to have given CCP General Secretary Xi advice on negotiating with U.S. President Donald Trump as they sought to find a resolution to the trade war.57

54 Kiyoshi Takenaka and David Dolan, “Japan says it, not South Korea, should have taken action on Russian plane,” Reuters, July 23, 2019.
57 Catherine Wong, “Shinzo Abe’s advice to Xi Jinping on talking tariffs with Donald Trump at their G20 trade war dinner,” South China Morning Post, December 6, 2018.
While China will likely always feel the need to assert its air power over the Senkakus and to generally flex its military might at its greatest potential regional rival, the ADIZ intrusions remain symptomatic of China’s threat perception. China has demonstrated its willingness to lessen its air harassment when it can benefit from cooperation with a traditional adversary like Japan and it is also willing to escalate when it feels its power is threatened.

**SOUTH KOREA**

Beginning in early 2015, the United States began putting increasing pressure on South Korea to agree to accept deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system, arguing it was necessary in light of North Korea’s developing ballistic missile capabilities.58 China immediately signaled its displeasure, with then-Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan reportedly expressing concern to his South Korean counterpart during a bilateral meeting in early February 2015.59

On February 7, 2016, hours after North Korea launched a satellite into space, a show of its progress toward developing intercontinental ballistic missile technology, Seoul announced it would begin negotiations with Washington on THAAD deployment.60 A week later, then-Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi argued that the range of the THAAD system’s X-band radar extended beyond the Korean Peninsula and into China which could jeopardize “China’s legitimate national security interests,” insinuating the move to deploy THAAD was a deceptive move by the U.S. to track Chinese missile launches.61 China likely initiated flights into the KADIZ, which began on January 31, 2016, as part of its broader coercion campaign to intimidate Seoul into backing out of THAAD deployment. South Korean analysts immediately speculated that the incursion was a show of force to dissuade South Korea from agreeing to THAAD deployment.62 China also employed other coercive means to dissuade South Korea, including attacking South Korea’s economy through imposing import controls, restricting tourism to South Korea, encouraging boycotts of South Korean products, and closing South Korean businesses in China through arbitrary regulations.

Even after Seoul pushed forward with its commitment to deploy THAAD, which went online in May 2017, Chinese ADIZ intrusions did not ebb. In late October 2017, South Korean president Moon Jae-in

issued the “three no’s,” bringing the THAAD dispute to an end.63 This decrease in tensions and the stated intent on both sides to repair relations coincides with the PLA shifting from flying heavy flight groups with H-6K bombers to primarily sending single reconnaissance aircraft for KADIZ overflights from 2018 onward.

However, despite the shift to more benign aircraft, KADIZ intrusions continued, with the number of intrusions increasing from 80 in 2017 to 140 in 2018. Despite seemingly reaching a détente over THAAD, friction continued between Beijing and Seoul amidst closer U.S.-ROK cooperation over diplomatic engagement with North Korea in 2018.64 Chinese leadership, which has historically prioritized opportunities to decouple the United States from its regional allies, may have sought to escalate the ADIZ intrusions after its efforts to sway Seoul toward working together on a “freeze-for-freeze” proposal failed. By escalating ADIZ intrusions, China forces Seoul to recognize its ability to exert power over South Korea, just as it did with its previous economic coercion campaign. At the same time, despite cooperation over North Korea issues, President Trump had frequently made statements about U.S.-South Korean burden-sharing issues that seemed to undermine the U.S.-ROK alliance. China may have also seen an escalation of ADIZ intrusions as another measure to remind South Korea of the retreating U.S. commitment, underscoring concerns in Seoul that the United States is no longer a reliable security partner. Finally, continuing the intrusions allows China to consolidate a new normal, forcing Seoul to acclimate to the flights.

However, geopolitical shifts in late 2018 seems to have altered China’s strategy. As discussed in the previous section, relations between Japan and South Korea became strained in late 2018, escalating into a diplomatic row that lasted throughout 2019. The spike in tensions between Japan and South Korea coincides with China changing its approach to KADIZ intrusions. In October 2018 and March 2019 Chinese aircraft sought authorization before entering the KADIZ, in line with normal ADIZ procedures, in the first instances since 2016. The aircraft subsequently proceeded into Japan’s ADIZ during both missions, but did not offer Japan advance notice.

China also cut the number of intrusions in 2019 which fell to “over 25 intrusions,” according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.65 Given that the number of incursions into Japan’s ADIZ did not decrease by the same drastic rate in 2019, it is unlikely that Chinese forces have faced a decrease in capability to execute such missions, suggesting that China intentionally scaled back its KADIZ incursions. Chinese leadership may have considered decreasing KADIZ intrusions and seeking entry authorization as a way to signal its good

63 The “three no’s” are pledges Moon made to Chinese president Xi Jinping to end the THAAD dispute. The three no’s are: 1) no additional THAAD deployment on the Korean Peninsula; 2) no participation in a global missile defense network; and 3) no joining a trilateral alliance with the U.S. and Japan.
65 Jeong, 2019.
intentions toward South Korea and draw it closer amid strained relations with Japan and the U.S., which failed to intervene in the dispute despite Seoul’s request.

However, although China deescalated the number of KADIZ intrusions in 2019, the flights the PLA did make into the KADIZ were more provocative. In February 2019, Chinese aircraft flew between Ulleungdo and Dokdo for the first time, having previously flown to the west of Ulleungdo throughout 2018. Dokdo is significant within the context of Japan-South Korea relations, as the island is currently administered by South Korea but claimed as Takeshima by Japan. China may have chosen this flight path because operating around the disputed island offers more opportunity to exacerbate friction between South Korea and Japan, as it did on July 23 when China and Russia operated a joint exercise that led to Russian aircraft violating South Korean airspace around Dokdo.

Seoul summoned the Russian defense attaché, who attributed the incursion to technical glitches. Moscow, however, denied that the defense official had made any such excuse and maintained that no intrusion of South Korean airspace occurred. China’s Ministry of National Defense defended the exercise by arguing that both forces “strictly abided by the relevant regulations of international law” and denied that the aircraft entered any nation’s airspace. Instead of collectively pursuing the incident with China and Russia, South Korea and Japan publicly expressed their ire at the other for scrambling jets in response, claiming the other had no jurisdiction to do so, even though both have scrambled jets to similar incursions that span both ADIZs dozens of times before. The dispute over which country had the right to respond became another point of contention in gradually worsening relations.

TAIWAN

Although China frames both its claims of the Senkakus and Taiwan as unresolved territorial disputes, China’s air campaign against Taiwan is more complex than its campaign against Japan. The Senkakus are uninhabited islands under administrative control of China’s historical adversary. Taiwan, on the other hand, is an independently functioning democracy that China claims to see not just as territory but also inhabited with its own citizens. China has long publicly expressed its desire to reunify peacefully with Taiwan and often frames the fractured relationship as the result of the activities of a few “Taiwan independence separatists.”

66 “Russia and South Korea spar over airspace ‘intrusion,’” BBC, July 24, 2019.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
However, despite China’s stated preference for peaceful reunification, it has not renounced the use of force. According to assessments by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), “The PLA continues to prepare for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait to deter, and if necessary, compel Taiwan to abandon moves toward independence.” China often uses military signaling, including aerial provocations, against Taiwan when it perceives its leaders to be pushing toward Taiwanese independence. China’s decision to cross the median line in 1999 came after then-Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui drew China’s fury by commenting that Taiwan and China have a special “state-to-state relationship.” Although Lee meant that Taiwan and China simply had a unique relationship, China interpreted the remark as amounting to a declaration of independent statehood. The shocking median line violation served as reminder the cross-strait military balance was shifting and ideas of independence would not be tolerated.

Relations between Beijing and Taipei have reached their tensest point in modern history since the election of Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen in January 2016. President Tsai drew the CCP’s ire during her failed 2012 presidential bid for refusing to acknowledge the 1992 Consensus, which holds that both Taiwan and the mainland believe they are part of “one China,” but allows for both sides to interpret the meaning according to their principles. President Tsai is also a member of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which maintains that Taiwan is already an independent state governing itself and thus does not need to formally declare independence.

Despite this background, President Tsai has advocated a more moderate cross-strait policy since the 2016 election focused on preserving the status quo. China, however, has not been assuaged by President Tsai’s more moderate public stance and remains suspicious that she is determined to move Taiwan in an increasingly pro-independence direction. President Tsai’s 2016 election coincides with the beginning of regular circumnavigational flights by the PLA, part of a broader military pressure campaign that the CCP admits is a coercive show of force to deter any declarations of independence from the Tsai government. Although many analysts have suggested China’s aerial harassment activities around Taiwan are for the operational benefit of the PLA, China’s air activities notably spike alongside official rhetoric decrying actions by Taipei and Washington it perceives to undermine the CCP’s position. For example, the first median line violation in 20 years, coming on March 31, 2019, seems to have been prompted in part by

72 Ho, 2009.
reports that the Trump administration was preparing to approve the sale of F-16V fighters to Taiwan, which China vocally opposed. Beijing was further frustrated by Taipei and Washington when President Tsai was allowed to transit Hawaii on March 24 despite strong protests from Beijing that it violated the “one China” policy.

China is likely also aware that Taiwanese citizens are gradually moving further away from ever accepting reunification. In the 2020 election, Taiwanese roundly rejected Beijing’s preferred candidate who championed greater cooperation with Beijing. Additionally, polls show China’s actions in Hong Kong have furthered complicated Taiwanese feelings toward reunification.

As recently as 2019, China offered Taiwan a path to peaceful reunification through a “one country, two systems” compromise, similar to the way mainland China and Hong Kong have operated for the last two decades, which the Tsai administration rejected. China likely realizes that its violent crackdowns on Hong Kong pro-democracy protesters over the last year and half, culminating in forcing new national security law signed in Beijing onto the people of Hong Kong, has undermined that offer in the eyes of already skeptical Taiwanese citizens. As a result, China may feel increasingly that military pressure and the reminder of possible war is the only means it has left to shape attitudes toward reunification in Taiwan.

In this context, China’s intrusions into Taiwan’s ADIZ reached a fever pitch in 2020, particularly in the summer leading up to Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang military exercises. In July 2020, Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu said China’s flights are a source of major concern for the Taiwanese government, suggesting, “What [China] is doing now is unceasingly preparing to use force to resolve the Taiwan problem.” Foreign Minister Wu further argued that China is feeling emboldened following its introduction of the new national security law in Hong Kong that allowed the CCP to further crackdown on pro-democracy activities and that only clear signals from the international community could deter China from further escalating.

77 Yimou Lee, “Taiwan leader rejects China’s ‘one country, two systems’ offer,” Reuters, October 9, 2019.
80 Ibid.
REACTIONS & IMPLICATIONS

Reactions to China’s ADIZ intrusions are as distinct to the country to which they occur as the nature of the intrusions themselves.

Japan has worked to publicize China’s intrusions into its ADIZ, releasing quarterly and yearly reports on scramble, increasingly in English. In recent months, the social media accounts of the JASDF and Defense Minister Taro Kono have begun reporting on intrusions, sometimes showing off flashy videos of the JASDF’s quick response time. Japan has also sought to address the issue in bilateral diplomatic settings, to little effect. Japan primarily treats the issue as a military matter and has focused on ensuring it maintains the capability to respond to Chinese intrusions and protect the Senkakus by investing in its tactical air forces.

South Korea selectively publicizes some intrusions and does so without any standardized frequency. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will periodically release intrusion information to the media, including detailed information such as the flight path, time spent in the KADIZ, and aircraft used. South Korea has addressed the issue through diplomatic channels several times and frequently summons Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials to answer for the more egregious intrusions. Seoul, which has increasingly found itself trying to walk a tight diplomatic line between China and the U.S., seems unsure whether to embrace the issue as a security concern and instead largely treats it as a diplomatic affront.

Until the last few months, Taiwan was particularly reserved about China’s intrusions to its ADIZ. In December 2017, Taiwanese Defense Minister Feng Shih-kuan announced that the Ministry of National Defense would no longer report on the activity of PLA aircraft near Taiwan unless something unusual occurred as the ministry did not want to engage with China’s “psychological warfare.”81 However, the nearly daily air provocations the island has been experience at the hands of the PLA in the summer of 2020 seems to have risen to the standard of “unusual” as the Ministry of Defense

has been increasingly vocal about China’s aerial actions. The Tsai government has largely tried to appear strong domestically in its response to China’s air harassment. When China crossed the median line in February 2020, President Tsai called out China’s increasingly provocative air behavior as irresponsible during the COVID-19 pandemic and used it to highlight her administration’s efforts in Taiwan to serve its people. Foreign Minister Wu’s recent plea for the international community to send a clear deterrence signal to China regarding its air harassment of Taiwan suggest the Taiwanese government is likely to be more vocal about intrusions in the future as it seeks to focus international attention on the issue.

U.S. officials occasionally reference Chinese ADIZ intrusions as an example of China’s degradation of respectable norms but have not publicly addressed the issue in reference to intrusions into the ADIZs of Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan. Although the U.S. has never explicitly connected subsequent military flights with preceding Chinese provocations, the U.S. has responded to increased intrusions into Taiwan’s ADIZ by sending its own military aircraft near Taiwan, often through the Bashi Strait, more than a dozen times as of May 2020.

China’s continued intrusions in the ADIZs of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have several negative implications. First, an accidental collision is more a matter of when, not if. This is particularly true when the PLA conducts operations that cross into multiple ADIZs, resulting in multiple countries scrambling in response. This can mean that in some intrusions that cross between Japan’s and South Korea’s ADIZs, there may be between a half dozen to a dozen aircraft operating in close coordinates. Media reports have suggested that “tangling” between Japanese and South Korean forces simultaneously responding to intrusions has previously been a problem. Both South Korean and Japanese officials have expressed concern that the air congestion caused by unauthorized intrusions may someday lead to an escalatory inadvertent collision.

Second, because some intrusions may span multiple ADIZs, namely the route that enters both Japan’s and South Korea’s ADIZ and the route between the Bashi Channel and the Miyako Strait than can span Taiwan’s and Japan’s ADIZs, there are more opportunities for countries to miscommunicate over jurisdictional issues or response methods that may create or aggravate tensions between the responding countries. This has already occurred at least once. Following the July 23 joint Sino-Russia intrusion, Japan and South Korea lodged complaints against each other arguing that the other did not have the jurisdiction to respond to the intrusion. The friction generated from such instances could escalate to a degradation of cooperation between affected nations, such as when the Japan-South Korea dispute escalated to consid-

82 Tsai Ing-wen, National military vigilantly guarding the homeland, Facebook, February 10, 2020.
84 Yang, 2019.
eration of scraping a military intelligence sharing agreement. Tensions between U.S. security partners has also traditionally complicated their relations with the United States. Such successes will likely embolden China to continue decoupling efforts in this manner.

Third, scrambles will inevitably affect force readiness, training opportunities, and the lifespan of fighter fleets. Japan is already at risk of wearing down its fighter force by near daily scrambles. Given China’s recent escalation, Taiwan’s combat fleet may face a similar issue within the next few years if air provocations continue at this level. Monitoring how many flight hours are being spent on scrambles is also important for both countries to avoid decreased readiness. Since the bulk of scrambles are conducted from Naha Air Base, pilots at Naha are likely sacrificing other training that may be more impactful in actual conflict, such complex interoperability exercises, to constant ADIZ intercepts. Taiwan’s IDF jets from the Tainan Air Base spent half their time in June 2019 monitoring Chinese jets.**86** Additionally, as financial resources are not infinite, the budgetary impact of these flight hours as well as the costs to maintain and replace worn aircraft mean there is less available to support other training and procurement needs.

Fourth, the inability of any country to deter China’s ADIZ intrusions may contribute to internal pressure for leaders of affected countries to take a harder line against China. Prime Minister Abe has spent much of the last few years working to warm relations with China, culminating in a CCP General Secretary Xi’s visit to Japan for a summit that was to take place in early 2020.**87** But despite his success in improving relations, Prime Minister Abe has come under increasing pressure by the opposition party as well as members of his own party to cancel the summit as long as China’s intrusions into Japan’s ADIZ continue. China’s escalated air harassment of Taiwan also aims to create domestic friction by dividing Taiwanese citizens from the Tsai government through creating a sense of helplessness among the populace. It is unclear if this maneuver will be successful, but it at least has created pressure on the Tsai government to proactively respond the China’s provocations.

Fifth, China has successfully used the creation of its own ADIZ to gradually degrade the norms governing unofficial airspace in Northeast Asia. China has recently hinted heavily that it may establish a South China Sea ADIZ. “Every nation has the right to set up an ADIZ and will determine whether to do so based on the level of security threats it faces in the air, which is also the case with China,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian asserted in July 2020.**88** “We will take into account various factors, including the security threats we face above the relevant waters in the South China Sea and meticulously and prudently study the relevant issue.” Given that the United States recently took a stronger position Chi-

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**87** The summit was indefinitely postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

na’s claims in the South China Sea, determining some of them to be “unlawful,” China may seek to establish a South China Sea ADIZ to, if not assert air power over its territorial claims, then at least provide justification for more assertive operations in the area. Considering China’s lack of commitment to enforcing its East China Sea ADIZ, it seems unlikely China would consistently enforce an ADIZ in the South China Sea.

Sixth, once China develops competent aerial refueling capabilities and its next generation long-range aircraft enter service, the PLA may increase their training and probing activities into the ADIZs around Guam and Hawaii. Although China has been practicing long-range bomber runs near Guam since 2017, it is unclear if the U.S. has considered how it might address consistent and sustained intrusions into the ADIZs around Guam and Hawaii.89

RECOMMENDATIONS

The governments of all affected countries should publish and publicize data related to intrusions on a consistent basis. Special emphasis should be placed on making the data available in English so that it can be more widely accessible. Being transparent about the intrusions will allow governments the chance to explain the intrusions while also reassuring citizens by explaining the measures they are taking to address the provocations—an opportunity that is lost when the information is filtered through a speculative and sometimes partisan media. This particularly important for Taiwan since China is actively working to create uncertainty to decouple the Taiwanese people from their government. The United States should amplify this data through its own reports and official statements in order to signal to China as well as its security partners that it is tuned in to the scale of the problem.

Where appropriate, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines should expand relevant intelligence sharing, including sharing radar data that would give each country additional information about the activities of Chinese aircraft, such as advanced warning of possible incoming ADIZ intrusions. Japan has set a precedent for this by announcing in July 2020 that it was considering sharing its radar data with the Philippines due to the frequency with which Chinese aircraft often transited Japan’s ADIZ before proceeding to violate the ADIZ of the Philippines.90 Although this may be a politically difficult recommendation to enact given the complex relationships between the countries involved, no one country is capable of perfectly monitoring all relevant aspects of China’s ADIZ intrusions throughout Northeast Asia.

Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States should press for comprehensive agreements on how to conduct air-to-air encounters, both with China and with each other. While standards for air-to-air encounters already exist in international law, it is worth each country clarifying how it expects to respond to intrusions into its ADIZ as well as how it expects to interact with other tertiary forces it may encounter.91 In 2015, the United States and China concluded one such agreement, although it has been criticized for being an empty agreement that failed to create any new norms.92 Now is an ideal time to discuss establishing new standards because each country has now experienced enough ADIZ intrusions by China to understand its patterns of behavior that will better inform each country’s understanding of its own expectations and needs when responding to intrusions. Such agreements would ideally help avoid tangling and similar incidents to the one that occurred between Japan and South Korea on July 23.

90 “Sharing data on Chinese military movements with the Philippines will strengthen monitoring in the East and South China Seas (中国軍機の動向をフィリピンと共有 政府、東・南シナ海で監視強化), Sankei News (産経新聞), July 11, 2020.
Each country should consider not responding to every intrusion. By responding to every intrusion, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are allowing China’s peacetime activities to significantly impact their defense budgets, procurement decisions, and force readiness. Each country faces real security threats that could someday lead to armed conflict and must be able to dedicate appropriate resources to preparation for those battles. Former Director of National Intelligence and PACOM commander Admiral Dennis Blair suggests countries adopt new policy guidelines to determine when to undertake intercept and escort operations, based in part on pre-determined budget limits specifically allocated for such missions. This is important, Blair argues, because intercepting every intrusion is expensive, both in terms of financial cost and opportunity cost, and is therefore unsustainable. Blair further argues, “Under these new concepts, [countries] would not automatically intercept and escort all Chinese flights…. They would be selective and unpredictable, not revealing their full capabilities but demonstrating that they are closely following Chinese activity and can intercept it if they choose to do so.” While some countries, particularly Japan, may argue that choosing not to scramble to every intrusion is ceding de facto air control over its territory, countries must recognize that the perception of ceding control is meaningless in a context in which actual control is lost in conflict because a country’s military effectiveness was worn down through a preemptive attrition campaign.

Finally, to further alleviate the burden on any one combat fleet while also signaling resolve and cooperation, affected countries and the United States should consider conducting joint intercepts. The United States, which maintains air bases in both Japan and South Korea, should consider occasionally joining scrambles. This could be particularly impactful in the case of joining Japanese patrols over the Senkakus, which under Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. security treaty the United States is expected to help defend.

Additionally, in the case of routes that traverse two ADIZs, countries could establish agreements under which only one country responds. For example, when Chinese aircraft enter the KADIZ, it is essentially guaranteed they will proceed into Japan’s ADIZ. Given the strain on Japan’s combat fleet as well as the fact these flights do not usually go near the Senkakus, Japan may consider reaching an agreement with South Korea under which only South Korean forces respond to these intrusions. In such an agreement, the South Korean military may agree, with Japan’s permission, to continue escorting Chinese aircraft even once it leaves the overlapping zone and enters Japan’s ADIZ, with the expectation that South Korean fighters still identify themselves before entering on each intercept. An agreement may also be considered in which joint U.S.-South Korean intercepts are conducted and the U.S. fighters are allowed to continue escorting the Chinese aircraft through Japan’s ADIZ. Either arrangement would take some strain off Japan’s combat fleet while also reducing air congestion and the chance of accidental collision.

93 Dennis Blair, “Commentary: Japan, Taiwan must re-evaluate how they’re intercepting Chinese threats,” Military Times, August 26, 2018.
94 Ibid.
Japan and Taiwan may also consider a similar arrangement. Since a number of intrusions into Taiwan’s ADIZ are now coming from the east after Chinese aircraft have flown through the Miyako Strait, Japan, which will already have aircraft in the area once Chinese forces entered the Miyako Strait, might consider continuing to escort Chinese aircraft as it circumnavigates Taiwan, sparing Taiwanese forces a scramble. This is perhaps the most difficult proposal, as so blatantly cooperating with Taiwan in the security realm is likely to draw severe economic and diplomatic backlash from China. Still, an occasional flight like this could perhaps be defended as an extended training exercise for the JASDF and would likely knock China severely off-balance.
CONCLUSION

After establishing its own ADIZ in 2013 to strengthen its territorial claims, China exploited the new ADIZ to slowly expand its active missions into other nations’ ADIZs. The objectives of these missions are fourfold: to conduct training missions to prepare pilots for encountering foreign air forces during long-range flights; to probe and gather intel on Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese forces; to demonstrate air power capable of protecting its territorial and security interests; and to apply coercive pressure to decouple coalitions resistant to Chinese influence in the region. On this last point it is important to remember that China not only seeks to decouple security partners like Japan, South Korea, and the United States from one another, but to also manipulate possible domestic political cleavages to its advantage, such as those potentially between Taiwanese citizens and the Tsai government and between Japan’s hardline security establishment and more cautious partners like the Komeito.

It should be expected that China will not only continue its ADIZ intrusions for the foreseeable future, but that China will escalate and deescalate its current intrusive operations in line with its own view of its regional security environment to both enhance its coercive leverage over its neighbors and to support its efforts to reconfigure the regional national security order. Affected countries may be able to anticipate increases or decreases intrusion rates as well as the type of aircraft likely to be involved by evaluating the push and pull factors in their relationships with China through the criteria described in this report. The United States in particular should decide now if it wants to take a more vocal stand against Chinese air provocations in the Northeast Asian ADIZs considering China will eventually strengthen its capabilities to regularly violate the ADIZs around Guam and Hawaii.

The status quo cannot and should not continue. China’s ADIZ intrusions strain affected countries’ air forces, increase the possibility of air accidents, and embolden China to further extend its area of air operations. The best method for confronting China’s ADIZ intrusions is to expand cooperation between affected countries by sharing intelligence on PLA flights, creating comprehensive agreements on intrusion response measures, publicly calling out China’s activities, and cooperating where possible. The United States also has a role to play in supporting its security partners in these endeavors and publicizing this issue.
APPENDIX A: LIST OF PUBLICIZED PLA ADIZ INTRUSIONS FROM 2016-2020

※Gray entries indicate aircraft approached the ADIZ but it is unclear if the ADIZ was violated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Flight</th>
<th>ADIZs Violated</th>
<th>Aircraft Involved</th>
<th>Route</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 31, 2016</td>
<td>Japan, South Korea</td>
<td>1 Y-9, 1 KJ-200</td>
<td>Roundtrip between the East China Sea to the East Sea via the Tsushima Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 20, 2016</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1 Y-8</td>
<td>Roundtrip between the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean via the Miyako Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 18, 2016</td>
<td>Japan, South Korea</td>
<td>1 Y-8, 2 H-6K</td>
<td>Roundtrip between the East China Sea to Ulleungdo/Dokdo via the Tsushima Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 19, 2016</td>
<td>Japan, South Korea</td>
<td>1 Y-8, 2 H-6K</td>
<td>Roundtrip between the East China Sea to Ulleungdo/Dokdo via the Tsushima Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 25, 2016</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1 Y-8, 2 H-6K, 1 Tu-154, presumably 2 fighters</td>
<td>Roundtrip between the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean via the Miyako Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 27, 2016</td>
<td>Japan, Taiwan</td>
<td>1 Y-8, 1 Y-9</td>
<td>Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Bashi Channel through the Miyako Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Aircrafts and Details</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 25, 2016</td>
<td>Japan, Taiwan</td>
<td>2 Su-30, Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Miyako Strait through the Bashi Channel (roundtrip)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Y-8, 2 H-6K, 1 Tu-154, Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Bashi Channel through the Miyako Strait</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 10, 2016</td>
<td>Japan, Taiwan</td>
<td>2 Su-30, Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Miyako Strait through the Bashi Channel (roundtrip)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Y-8, 2 H-6K, 1 Tu-154, Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Miyako Strait through the Bashi Channel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 25, 2016</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1 Z-9, Flight near Miyakojima</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 9, 2017</td>
<td>Japan, South Korea</td>
<td>1 Y-8, 1 Y-9, 6 H-6K, Roundtrip between the East China Sea to Ulleungdo/Dokdo via the Tsushima Strait</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2, 2017</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1 Y-8, presumed 6 H-6K, presumed 6 fighters, Roundtrip between the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean via the Miyako Strait</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 18, 2017</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1 small unidentified aircraft, likely a drone, Flew within the airspace of the Senkakus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>Activity Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 13, 2017</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2 H-6K</td>
<td>Roundtrip flight between the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean via the Miyako Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan, Taiwan</td>
<td>4 H-6K</td>
<td>Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Miyako Strait through the Bashi Channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 20, 2017</td>
<td>Japan, Taiwan</td>
<td>1 Y-8, 1 Y-8 EW, 4 H-6K</td>
<td>Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Bashi Channel through the Miyako Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan, Taiwan</td>
<td>4 H-6K</td>
<td>Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Miyako Strait through the Bashi Channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 24, 2017</td>
<td>Japan, Taiwan</td>
<td>4 H-6K</td>
<td>Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Bashi Channel through the Miyako Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 5, 2017</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1 Y-8, 1 H-6</td>
<td>Flew near Taiwan’s ADIZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 9, 2017</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1 Y-8</td>
<td>Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Bashi Channel through the Miyako Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 12, 2017</td>
<td>Japan, Taiwan</td>
<td>1 Y-8 EW, 2 H-6K</td>
<td>Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Bashi Channel through the Miyako Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>Activity Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 13, 2017</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1 Y-8, 1 Y-8 EW</td>
<td>Circumnavigated Taiwan between the Bashi Channel and the Miyako Strait; Y-8 EW entered Taiwan’s ADIZ from west</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 14, 2017</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1 Y-8</td>
<td>Circumnavigated Taiwan between the Bashi Channel and the Miyako Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 24, 2017</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>6 H-6K</td>
<td>Flew through the Miyako Strait before turning north to the Kii Peninsula (roundtrip)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 11, 2017</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Y-8, H-6K, Tu-154, Su-30, Il-78</td>
<td>Flight near Taiwan’s ADIZ from the South China Sea to the Pacific Ocean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 18, 2017</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1 Tu-154</td>
<td>Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Miyako Strait to the Bashi Channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 19, 2017</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1 Y-8, 4 H-6K, 1 Tu-154</td>
<td>Roundtrip between the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean via the Miyako Strait; Y-8 turned back</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 23, 2017</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1 Y-8</td>
<td>Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Bashi Channel through the Miyako Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>4 H-6K</td>
<td>Roundtrip between the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean via the Miyako Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location 1</td>
<td>Location 2</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 7, 2017</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1 Y-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Miyako Strait through the Bashi Channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 H-6K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Flew to the Pacific Ocean via the Miyako Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 9, 2017</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Y-8, 4 H-6K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Roundtrip between the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean via the Miyako Strait; Y-8 turned back</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 11, 2017</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1 Y-8, 4 H-6K, 1 Tu-154, fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Miyako Strait through the Bashi Channel; fighters turned back</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 17, 2017</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Y-8, 1 Y-8 EW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Bashi Channel to the Miyako Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 18, 2017</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1 Y-8, 2 H-6K, 1 Tu-154, 2 Su-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Roundtrip between the East China Sea to Ulleungdo/Dokdo via the Tsushima Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 20, 2017</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Y-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Long-range flight over the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Y-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Long-range flight over the East China Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Aircrafts</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 29, 2018</td>
<td>Japan, South Korea</td>
<td>1 Tu-154</td>
<td>Roundtrip flight from the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Y-9</td>
<td>Roundtrip between the East China Sea to Ulleungdo/Dokdo via the Tsushima Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 27, 2018</td>
<td>Japan, South Korea</td>
<td>1 Y-9</td>
<td>Roundtrip between the East China Sea to Ulleungdo/Dokdo via the Tsushima Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 23, 2018</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1 Y-8, 4 H-6K, 1 Tu-154, 2 Su-30</td>
<td>Roundtrip flight from the East China Sea to a point between Okinawa and Miyakojima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 10, 2018</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Presumed 1 BZK-005</td>
<td>Flew over the East China Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 18, 2018</td>
<td>Japan, Taiwan</td>
<td>2 H-6K</td>
<td>Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Miyako Strait through the Bashi Channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 19, 2018</td>
<td>Japan, Taiwan</td>
<td>1 Y-8, 2 H-6K, 1 Tu-154, Su-30, J-11</td>
<td>Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Miyako Strait through the Bashi Channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 20, 2018</td>
<td>Japan, Taiwan</td>
<td>2 H-6K</td>
<td>Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Miyako Strait through the Bashi Channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location 1</td>
<td>Location 2</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 26, 2018</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1 Y-8, 2 H-6K, 1 Tu-154, fighters Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Miyako Strait through the Bashi Channel; fighters did not circumnavigate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 28, 2018</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1 Y-9 Roundtrip between the East China Sea to Ulleungdo/Dokdo via the Tsushima Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 11, 2018</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>4 H-6K Two aircraft: Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Miyako Strait through the Bashi Channel Two aircraft: Circumnavigated Taiwan from Bashi Channel through the Miyako Strait; fighters did not circumnavigate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Y-9, 1 Tu-154 Circumnavigated Taiwan from Bashi Channel through the Miyako Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 fighters Roundtrip flight from the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 25, 2018</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1 Y-9 Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Bashi Channel through the Miyako Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Country 1</td>
<td>Country 2</td>
<td>Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 4, 2018</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1 Y-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 27, 2018</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1 Y-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 29, 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Country 1</td>
<td>Country 2</td>
<td>Type(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>December 27, 2018</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1 Y-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 23, 2019</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1 Y-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 19, 2019</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>2 Y-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 30, 2019</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 H-6K, 1 Tu-154, fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1, 2019</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Y-9, 2 H-6K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 15, 2019</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1 Y-8, 4 H-6K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 29, 2019</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Y-8</td>
</tr>
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<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1 Y-9</td>
</tr>
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<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 16, 2019</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1 Y-9</td>
<td>Roundtrip from the East China Sea through the Miyako Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 23, 2019</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2 H-6Ks</td>
<td>Roundtrip between the East China Sea to Ulleungdo/Dokdo via the Tsushima Strait; joint operation with Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 29, 2019</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1 Y-9</td>
<td>Roundtrip between the East China Sea to Ulleungdo/Dokdo via the Tsushima Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 29, 2019</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1 Y-9</td>
<td>Roundtrip between the East China Sea to Ulleungdo/Dokdo via the Tsushima Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 27, 2019</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1 Y-9</td>
<td>Roundtrip between the East China Sea to Ulleungdo/Dokdo via the Tsushima Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 20, 2020</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1 Tu-154</td>
<td>Flew over the Senkakus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 23, 2020</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>H6-K, KJ-500</td>
<td>Roundtrip through the Bashi Channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 9, 2020</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>4 H-6K, J-11</td>
<td>Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Bashi Channel through the Miyako Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location 1</td>
<td>Location 2</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 10, 2020</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>H-6K, J-11, KJ-500</td>
<td>Circumnavigated Taiwan from the Bashi Channel through the Miyako Strait; aircraft briefly crossed the median line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 28, 2020</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>H-6K</td>
<td>Flew through the Bashi Channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 16, 2020</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>J-11, KJ-500</td>
<td>First night flight near Taiwan’s ADIZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 25, 2020</td>
<td>Japan/South Korea</td>
<td>1 Y-9</td>
<td>Roundtrip between the East China Sea to Ulleungdo/Dokdo via the Tsushima Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 10, 2020</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>H-6K, J-11, KJ-500</td>
<td>Flew through the Bashi Channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 8, 2020</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1 Y-8</td>
<td>Entered Taiwan’s ADIZ near the southwest coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 9, 2020</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Su-30s</td>
<td>Entered Taiwan’s ADIZ near the southwest coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 12, 2020</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1 Y-8</td>
<td>Flew through the Bashi Channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 16, 2020</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1 J-10</td>
<td>Entered Taiwan’s ADIZ near the southwest coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 17, 2020</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1 J-10, 1 Y-8</td>
<td>Entered Taiwan’s ADIZ near the southwest coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Country 1</td>
<td>Country 2</td>
<td>Aircraft(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>June 18, 2020</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
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<td>J-10, J-11</td>
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<tr>
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<td>J-10</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 22, 2020</td>
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<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1 Y-9</td>
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<td>Taiwan</td>
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<td>1 H-6K, 1 J-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 24, 2020</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1 Y-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 28, 2020</td>
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<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>2 H-6K</td>
</tr>
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<td>July 4, 2020</td>
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<td>fighters</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 16, 2020</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
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<td>fighters</td>
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</table>
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