Selected VNSA Incidents, Group Factors, and Attack Modalities
Overview

The Palace of Justice incident occurred on November 6th at 11:00hrs, and continued until 14:30hrs on November 7th. Approximately thirty-five to forty members of the Movimiento 19 de Abril (M19: April 19 Movement) [hereafter M19] assaulted the Palace of Justice building, intending to hold the judicial branch of government hostage until the president or a representative arrived to stand trial for crimes he committed in the breach of the peace accords between M19 and the Colombian government. M19 was a nationalistic socialist group that desired to mobilize the population of Colombia to overthrow or change the Colombian government and institute a more free and democratic society. With intent to negotiate, using the Supreme Court as a bargaining chip, they secured their hostages just before the military counter-attack at approximately 12:30hrs. The counter-attack recaptured the basement garage and main levels of the four story building, splitting the M19 force in half and capturing more than half of M19’s ammunition stores.

The military immediately focused on the larger of the two M19 guerrilla groups. In the seven hours following the counter-attack, the military would battle their way up the four stories of the building while M19 made repeated calls for a cease-fire and negotiations. At 17:30hrs military began bombarding the building using heavy weapons, including tank fire and anti-tank rockets. The bombardment consequently set the building ablaze, and the fire quickly spread. At 19:30hrs military operatives landed on the roof of the building and detonated shaped charges directly over the offices of the Chief Justice, where both M19 guerrillas and hostages had gathered. Through the breach, soldiers poured gunfire and grenades into the offices. A combination of fire, explosives and gunfire killed M19 guerillas and hostages both, totaling in about 57 or 58 casualties. Due to the fire’s growing intensity, the military retreated from the building until the fires could be controlled.

As the fires spread throughout the building, the smoke density in the bathroom where the remaining M19 guerrillas and hostages had gathered grew increasingly dangerous. Around 0:00hrs and at the request of the hostages, the entire group moved to a bathroom one level below to escape asphyxiation. Efforts by firefighters and torrential rains brought the blaze under control, and by 02:00hrs the military resumed its assault. M19 repelled the assault, and the military again retreated from the building. At 05:30hrs “Operation Rastillo” began to dislodge M19 with the use of any and all means. This time, to avoid being overrun, M19 was forced to retreat back to the bathroom they held one floor above. For the rest of the
morning the military pounded M19’s position with tank, rocket, and small arms fire. By 10:00hrs they had broken through to M19’s last position. At 12:00hrs they began breaching the east wall of the bathroom, using plastic explosives and shaped charges. By approximately 14:00hrs they broke through and fired a rocket into the bathroom, killing hostages. Hostages fled in desperation and some were killed by friendly fire. At 14:30hrs on November 7th, the siege was over, and 17-18 additional hostages were dead. At that point, all of the participating M19 guerrillas were dead.

I. Command and Control Analysis: Predetermined

In theory, M19 had a delegative system, in which subordinates are given the authority to make key decisions and react to changing circumstances without the need to attain approval from the top leader. Commanders Luis Otero and Andres Almarales assumed authority and had direct control over their units without input or interference from M19 leadership. In practice, however, the assault force never deviated from the original plans laid out by Alvaro Fayad, M19’s top military figure, even when evolving facts on the ground behooved the guerrillas to do so. Therefore, in the attack on the Palace of Justice, M19 acted under a “pre-determined” authority system, in which the protocols and instructions are laid out before beginning the operation and operatives strictly adhere to them.

II. Incident Details

Place and Time

- Date & Time: Began at 11:00hrs on Nov. 6 and ended at 14:30hrs Nov. 7, 1985
- Place: The Palace of Justice, Bogotá, Colombia

Target

- Assault the Palace of Justice and take hostages:
  - Main Targets:
    - Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Alfonso Reyes Echandia
    - Supreme Court Justices
  - Secondary Targets:
    - Lower Magistrates, clerks, lawyers, and any other civilians who could be leveraged.2

Perpetrators

- M19 assault force divided into 3 sections:
  - Infiltration Team – entered Palace of Justice at 11:00hrs
    - Commander: Alfonso Jaquin
    - 7 members (3 men and 4 women)
      - Professional dress
      - No armaments
    - Mission: Scout the building interior and give “Go” signal for main attack.3
  - Main Assault Force – entered Palace of Justice at 11:40hrs4
    - Commander: Luis Otero
    - Secondary Commander: Andres Almarales
    - 28 members (men and women)

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3 Ibid, p. 98.
Battle dress and body armor
- Heavily armed

- Mission: assault the building from underground garage, secure the hostages, and hold off the Colombian Military.\(^5\)

- Rear Vanguard – never entered the building as according to plan
  - Commander: Lazaro
  - 6 members (men)
    - Casual dress with body armor underneath
    - Lightly armed (Pistols only)
    - Explosives experts
  - Mission: Enter building before main assault force, secure the main level and rig the entrances with land mines and plastic explosives.
  - Mission failed because of a lack of communication between the main and rear forces, due to lack of radio contact.\(^6\)

**Reasons for Target Selection**

- **Public Appeal:** The Palace of Justice was chosen because of its prominence in the Colombian legal world, and it would be the perfect place to draw the public's attention.\(^7\)

- **Defensive Advantage:** The building itself was constructed to be a fortress, and if M19 could infiltrate the building and secure it, they would have a defensive advantage against a counter-attack by the Colombian Military.\(^8\) The architectural defensive advantages were necessary to the plan of attack, which required between 6 and 8 hours, of delaying the military.\(^9\)

- **Survivability:** Throughout the planning phase of the attack, the M19 leadership assumed that the military would have to exercise restraint, because they held the leadership of the judicial branch hostage and the lives of the judges would not be put in danger.\(^10\)

**Degree of Autonomy**

- During the course of the operation there were no communications between the Assault Force and M19 leadership.

- Alvaro Fayad, the movement’s top military figure, drafted the plan, and objectives were given to each of the three parts of the assault force.\(^11\) There were apparently no contingency plans in place if the original plans did not transpire as they were intended. However, it was not definitively stated in any of the sources that there would be no alternative plans if the primary plan failed. Instead, from eye-witness accounts of the behavior, the attackers clung to the original plan and made no attempt to deviate from it, even when operational prudence would have required a change in tactics.

- Once in the Palace of Justice, Luis Otero was supposed to have complete operational command.\(^12\) During the military’s counter-attack a portion of the main

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\(^6\) Ibid, p.102.
\(^8\) Carrigan, *The Palace of Justice*, p. 108.
\(^9\) Ibid, p. 194.
\(^10\) Ibid, p. 105.
\(^11\) Ibid, p. 83.
\(^12\) Ibid, p. 84.
force was separated from the rest. The ranking member in that group was the top negotiator, Andres Almarales, thus he assumed command of that group.13

- Radios were not distributed in the attack group. Further communication between Otero, Almarales, and M19 leadership from 12:30hrs until the attack ended the following day was impossible. Both men had complete autonomy over their respective groups.
- During the course of the siege, according to observations made by surviving hostages, neither Otero nor Almarales deviated from the original objective to negotiate with the Colombian Government, even when the outcome of the situation looked grim.

Armaments used by the Perpetrators
The guerrillas stockpiled their weapons in the lower levels of the building after the initial attack. It is unclear, however, which of these weapons the Colombian military captured during their counter-attack.14 However, M19 definitely maintained control of both the 50mm and 30mm revolving barrel machine guns.15

- 50mm and 30mm revolving barrel machine guns
- 7.62mm Galil rifles
- 7.36mm G-3 guns
- 5.56mm AR 15 rifles
- M16 rifles
- Mac 10 submachine guns
- 9mm Uzi submachine guns
- 9mm Revolvers
- Plastic Explosives, cables
- Land mines
- Home-made Claymore Mines
- Sacks of ammunition
- Grenades

Tactics Employed by the Perpetrators

Battle Tactics

- Standard defensive military tactics
  - M19 guerrillas massed fire at choke-points in the long corridors of the building. They strategically positioned the 30mm and 50mm machine guns at such key positions in order to halt the military advance throughout the building.
  - They also held the stairwells for as long as possible in order to buy more time for negotiations.

Negotiating Tactics

- There were several tactics used in order to coax the government into negotiating with the guerrillas:
  - Call to the Presidential Palace: Otero had Chief Justice Reyes call the President in order to request a cease-fire and negotiations.16 The president would never return this call.
Call to a Journalist: After the President refused to call Reyes back, Otero had Reyes call an influential journalist with a relationship with M19, Juan Rios, in order to get the message out that M19 wants to negotiate.\(^{17}\)

Radio Broadcast: Reyes was put on live radio to plead his case for a cease-fire directly to the public. Reyes’ address was cut off, almost immediately, by the government.\(^{18}\)

Further Calls: After no cease fire was declared, Reyes began calling everyone he could think of, including the President of the Senate and other influential individuals in order to get word to the President to call a cease-fire.\(^{19}\)

The Bluff: At around 17:00hrs General Mallarino finally spoke with Reyes and then Otero. The government demanded surrender and Otero refused, thinking the negotiations were only beginning. He failed to understand the military would not compromise further. Otero was not known for his negotiating skills nor for interpreting similar situations well.\(^{20}\)

Casualties

- All of the approximately 35 men and women who assaulted the Palace of Justice were killed.
- Civilian Casualties:
  - The Offices of the Chief Justice:
    - Chief Justice Reyes
    - 8 Supreme Court Justices
    - 6 associates from the Council of the State
    - Approximately 20 other civilians\(^{21}\)
  - Mezzanine Bathroom
    - 5 Supreme Court Justices
    - 12 or 13 other civilians\(^{22}\)
  - There is no verifiable evidence, despite claims made by the Colombian military, to prove the perpetrators caused any of the civilian casualties. Some evidence from interviews with survivors, suggests civilian casualties were caused by friendly fire due to the military’s assault. A critique of the events, by Rex Hudson, portrayed in Carrigan’s book, claims that the evidence could point to the M19 hostage-takers being the principal killers.\(^{23}\) But, further evidence of indiscriminate killing by the military has surfaced in the years since the atrocity, and Colonel Plazas Vega was sentenced, on June 11, 2010 to 30 years in prison because he ordered the killing of the Palace of Justice cafeteria staff in cold blood.\(^{24}\) Thus, due to the amount of contradictory evidence, it is not possible to accurately determine who perpetrated the majority of hostage deaths.

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\(^{17}\) Ibid, p. 132.
\(^{19}\) Carrigan, *The Palace of Justice*, p. 133.
\(^{20}\) Ibid, p. 147. According to a conflicting report, it could have been General Delgado (Hudson 1995,) pp. 113-14.
\(^{23}\) Hudson, “Colombia’s Palace of Justice,” p. 100.
\(^{24}\) Evans, “Landmark Conviction.” Available at: [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB319/index.htm](http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB319/index.htm).
• Total Casualty Count: 95
  ▪ This number cannot be confirmed because the military handled most of the cleanup of the incident. Accurate numbers were never provided to the public.

Perpetrator Objectives

• Mock Trial: In the wake of the collapse of the peace between M19 and the Colombian Government, M19 had fallen from public prominence. In an act of desperation, M19 would assault the Palace of Justice and bring enough ammunition to hold the building for no more than 8 hours. During this time, they would stall for negotiations with the government in which they would demand that the President, or a representative, would come to the Palace of Justice to stand “trial” for the crimes he committed in breaching the peace accords. This was intended to regain prominence and the public support M19 once had. At the conclusion of this trial, M19 would buy safe passage from the building using the safety of the Supreme Court as a bargaining chip.

• It is asserted by other research that M19 was acting at the will of the Medellin Cartel, which paid M19 to commit the attack in order to disrupt the evaluation of the Colombia–United States extradition treaty, but this claim is largely unsubstantiated.

Outcome

• The M19 Assault Force destroyed.
• Approximately 60 civilians killed.
• The Palace of Justice damaged irrevocably by the heavy fighting and fire damage.

I. Perpetrator Characteristics and Its Command and Control

Ideology

World Views

• M19 represented a populist/nationalistic/socialist revolutionary group which wished to mobilize the population of Colombia to fight for a new democratic governmental system.
• Their movement was based heavily on the Cuban Revolution and thus they sought assistance from Cuba, as well as Nicaragua, but they resisted forming permanent international ties.
• Although their ideas had socialist persuasions, they had no direct links with the Soviet Union and did not have Leninist ideas. Their mildly socialist

movement was infused with Colombian culture and history, in much the same way the Cuban Revolution was with Cuban culture.\textsuperscript{31}

- In past instances, robberies aside, M19 usually attempted to negotiate, even if negotiations ended in violence, as they did in several of the scenarios where M19 kidnapped prominent political figures.
- M19 viewed long-term armed resistance as an unviable strategy and wanted to push for peace eventually, even if they had to use armed resistance in the short term.\textsuperscript{32}

### Group Norms

- Ideology was very much at the core of this particular group, unlike groups such as FARC, criminality did not appear to be a principal motivation for this group.\textsuperscript{33}
- A tug of war between diplomacy and violence marked the decision making process of the upper echelons of the organization during the planning of the Palace of Justice attack.\textsuperscript{34} There is very little evidence available to evaluate decision-making processes and preferences for previous attacks.
- M19 was ethnocentric in its composition and pursuit of its goals; all of its members were of Colombian descent. There was also little distinction between the roles of men and women in this organization. Both men and women fought side by side.
- They sought to build ties with the urban population by carrying out “robin-hood type deeds,” which was new in terms of Colombian armed political movements.\textsuperscript{35}
- There was a sense felt by members of the group, especially Almaralez, that the group was fighting for the good of Colombia and for a brighter future.
- Colombian guerrillas, and M19 was no exception, live by a golden rule: never submit. This was due to several factors. One was “Machisimo,” which can be characterized as “being a man” about the situation and going down fighting. The second was the notion that even if the government offered to spare the lives of the attackers and give them a fair trial, it was a trick. Guerrillas could not believe the government would honor its promises and deals. They believed they would be betrayed and tortured upon surrender based on government actions during the year after the peace accords. During that year, anonymous death squads assassinated members of M19 leadership. It did not occur to Otero that he could have saved the lives of the hostages when the army closed in upon their position.\textsuperscript{37} Furthermore, when faced with the same option to surrender, Almarales, who was not a military man by any means, still refused to submit.\textsuperscript{38} The idea of “surrender is not an option” was prevalent throughout the group.

### Grand Strategy of M19

- The strategy of M19, based upon rhetoric and previous attacks, aimed to mobilize the Colombian people to join them in supporting a popular revolution to change or overthrow the government.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{34} Carrigan, The Palace of Justice, p. 82.
\textsuperscript{35} Duran, “M-19’s Journey,” p. 11.
\textsuperscript{36} Carrigan, The Palace of Justice, p. 247.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, p. 137.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid, p. 225.
They attempted to accomplish this not simply by killing, though they were willing to do so, but by forcing the government into negotiations. In negotiating, they appealed to popular support and often times got it.\(^{40}\)

- In 1979, at its 7\(^{th}\) conference, M19 further refined its goal to eventually establish a functioning democracy in Colombia. This is a distinct shift from its original socialist roots.\(^{41}\)
- At the Campo Reencuentro meeting in January of 1988, the focus was drawn away from the pursuit of armed struggle with the Colombian military and the organization set itself on a determined path for peace.\(^{42}\)

**Perceptual Filters**

- There are certain things that M19 guerrillas assumed when they planned and executed the attack of the Palace of Justice.
- **Distrust of the Government:** Due to the collapse of the peace accords, and the anonymous assassination of several M19 leaders throughout the course of 1984, M19 guerrillas had no reason to trust the government when offered a fair trial upon surrender.\(^{43}\) So they continued to fight even when the situation had deteriorated to the point in which escape was impossible. This perception of the government as a whole may be skewed because of the autonomous operations of the military during this period, M19 thought a unified government was undercutting the peace process. However, the civilian sectors of government often thought one thing and its military arm did another. The peace process, started by then-President Belisario Betancur, represented the first genuine and comprehensive effort by the Colombian government in a long time to stop the contest state of civil war. The military arm, however, disagreed with this effort and preferred a heavy-hand to deal with the armed guerrillas. This likely explains the death squads that were assassinating guerrilla leaders after they came out of hiding. The military was likely baiting them back into conflict.
- **Assumed Negotiations:** The guerrillas, incorrectly, believed that when they attacked the Palace of Justice, the government would have to negotiate. This assumption was based upon the government’s behavior during M19’s seizure and holding of the Dominican Republic’s Embassy for 61 days.\(^{44}\)
  - They did not understand, however, that in the case of the embassy seizure, it was the international diplomats involved, which prevented the Colombian military from using excessive amount force. It appears that M19 leadership assumed the values of the country’s judicial leadership equaled that of the diplomats. Supreme Court Justice Manuel Gaona observed the attackers disbelief to the relentless pressure put upon them by the military, and he concluded that M19 leadership had assumed the Supreme Court would be as worthy of protection as international diplomats.\(^{45}\)

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\(^{40}\) Country-data.com, “The 19\(^{th}\) of April Movement.”


Furthermore, M19 leadership did not take into account that some of the Supreme Court rulings had placed the court in direct confrontation with the military.\textsuperscript{46}

And, a third factor that M19 could not possibly have taken into account was the illusion of a unified civilian government. M19 leadership was in no position to understand the lack of command and control the President had throughout the peace process and during the Palace of Justice Siege. At every turn, the military was taking direct and calculated steps to handle the situation with violence. This also explains, in some capacity, why the President adopted a betrayed and emotional stance of refusing to negotiate at the beginning of the crisis. He was seriously committed to the peace process, but did not fully understand the military’s actions.\textsuperscript{47} Thus, with the military in charge of the situation instead of the President, there was little or no effort to protect the Justices’ lives.

- **Situational Control**: Throughout the encounter, as in encounters previous, M19 believed the President would be in control, and thus a negotiation would take place eventually. This was not the case; the military was in control of the situation for most of the siege.\textsuperscript{48}

**Organizational Structure**

- Extrapolating from the information available, M19 was organized militarily, with ranks, titles and strict adherence to orders.\textsuperscript{49}
- Despite this rigid operational structure, at the upper echelons of the organization, decisions were made in a fairly democratic/oligarchic manner. The commander had the greatest say, but there could be dissention, which was not necessarily struck down with a heavy hand.\textsuperscript{50}
- At its peak in 1985, membership numbered 1,500-2,000, making them the second largest guerilla organization in Colombia.\textsuperscript{51}

**Demographics**

- Colombians exclusively comprised M19.
- Men and women were treated relatively equally in terms of combat ability. Both genders fought side by side and women were even considered for and given leadership positions.\textsuperscript{52}
- Age of combatants varied, they ranged from early twenties to fifties.
  - The majority of the group consisted of very young university-aged students and people from FARC and Communist Party. There were older elites who joined the group from Anapo as well.\textsuperscript{53}
- Most of the group’s members were from Bogotá, Cali and Santa Marta.\textsuperscript{54}
- In terms of professional background, M19 was composed of a variety, from military, legal, and medical backgrounds.

\textsuperscript{46} Carrigan, *The Palace of Justice*, p. 84.
\textsuperscript{47} Serrill, *Colombia: Mindless Violence*.
\textsuperscript{48} Carrigan, *The Palace of Justice*, p. 147.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, p. 26.
\textsuperscript{51} Country-data.com, “The 19th of April Movement.”
\textsuperscript{52} Duran, “M-19’s Journey,” p. 13.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid, p. 12.
Most came from a more economically downtrodden demographic early on, even if they became successful later in life.

Resources

Financial Base

- Overall, throughout the organization’s life funding and cash flow was a constant problem.\(^\text{55}\)
- Initially, when their operations began in about 1972, M19 conducted bank robberies to fund their activities.\(^\text{56}\) The majority of their funding was from kidnappings and ransoms.
- As drew on it appears that the group had dealings with Cuba and Nicaragua. Both these countries provided a great deal of support for M19 and it is possible some of their cash flow came from these nations.\(^\text{57}\) This cash flow was typically minimal.\(^\text{58}\)

Support Infrastructure

- Although specific information about sustaining M19 is limited, it is most likely that they concentrated specifically in urban areas, hiding in plain sight within a network of safe houses and sympathizers.
- There is also evidence of Cuban logistical support.\(^\text{59}\)

Material Resources

- M19 had a vast array of weapons available to them, which they obtained through illicit deals with drug cartels, seizures from government storehouses, and deals with governments.
- Although the government of Colombia accused the group of working with Cartels, if any deals were made they were simply business transactions. By this, I mean that any dealings M19 had with drug cartels were cases in which they were purchasing weapons or other materiel, and according to my analysis the cartels did not have any power or operational input into M19’s decision making. Before the Palace of Justice attack, M19 was supposed to receive anti-tank rockets from the Medellin drug cartel but the transaction was never completed and no rockets were delivered.\(^\text{60}\)
- Officials in Bogota believe some of the rifles used in the Palace of Justice siege had matching serial numbers to those from a weapons shipment from Venezuela to Nicaragua in 1979.\(^\text{61}\) However, due to a lack of corroborative evidence, this claim cannot be verified.

Human Resources

- The group seemed to have some explosives expertise, and the apparent military training likely provided by the Cuban government.\(^\text{62}\) Other guerrilla organizations in Colombia might have also trained future members prior to the formation of M19 in the early 1970s. Many M19 members came from other groups because they were attracted to the group’s political platform.\(^\text{63}\)

\(^{55}\) Ibid, p. 14; Uhlig, "Santo Domingo Journal."
\(^{56}\) Country-data.com, "The 19th of April Movement."
\(^{57}\) Ibid.
\(^{59}\) Country-data.com, "The 19th of April Movement."
\(^{60}\) Carrigan, The Palace of Justice, p. 175.
\(^{62}\) Carrigan, The Palace of Justice, p. 175.
Professional support was also present in the form of well-known ideological leaders through lawyers and other professionals who had been present on Colombia’s political scene before joining M19, such as Andres Almarales.

Organizational Life Cycle Status

- M19 was founded and began operating around 1972 and continued to grow in numbers, as well as political prominence, to a peak of operational capability in 1985.
- After the disastrous end of the Palace of Justice siege, the group’s activities began to decline.
- By 1988 the group negotiated its way into peace talks once again after they kidnapped a prominent conservative party member named Gómez Hurtado. At the conclusion of these peace talks, M19 laid down its arms and became a legitimate political party within Colombian politics.
- By the mid-1990s, however, they fell from prominence permanently because the public saw little difference between how they behaved politically and how the old liberal and conservative parties behaved.64

Operational Capabilities

- **Specialized Skills**: M19 possessed several skilled legal professionals who provided them with excellent negotiating talent. M19, over the course of its existence would tenaciously rely on negotiating, from a weakened position and with long odds of success if needs be, in order to achieve their goals.
- **Technical Skills**: M19 had skilled explosives experts and would often employ plastic explosives and even home-made mines if they could not obtain them from another source.65
- **Propensity to Innovate**: No evidence suggests that M19 was flexible in terms of innovating or trying new ideas. When put in a weakened position after the collapse of the peace accords in 1985, the answer was a spectacular attack very similar to the Dominican Republic Embassy seizure five years previous.66 The desired and expected effect was heavily based upon the results Embassy attack. Planning and execution of the Palace of Justice attack, and most other M19 attacks around that time featured conventional tactics and weapons.
- **Networking Abilities**: 
  - Ideological similarities allowed M19 to reach out to countries of similar persuasion. M19 had known ties to Cuba and Nicaragua from which they received training, financial and logistical assistance.67
  - They did not form permanent ties with anyone however and dealt with exterior entities on a case-by-case basis.68
- **Familiarity with the Target Environment**: In terms of tactics and geographic distribution, M19 was the premier urban guerrilla group in Colombia during the late 1970s and early 1980s. As such, they were highly capable of scouting out potential targets prior to attacking.
  - They had contacts with journalists and government officials throughout the country and often times used them to maneuver or plan attacks.
  - The lack of military contacts made them rely upon past encounters to judge how they might respond to an attack.

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64 Ibid, p. 30.
65 Carrigan, The Palace of Justice, p. 175.
66 Ibid, p. 83.
Organizational Dynamics

- **Leadership Style**: The overall characteristics of M19 depended greatly on who was in power at the time. As the military killed off leaders, it became more and more apparent to M19 that they had to push for peace.
  - Jaime Bateman, the hardliner who founded M19, died in 1984 in a plane crash.
  - The new Supreme Commander to succeed Bateman, Ivan Marino Ospina, was a hard-line leader who favored military operations to diplomacy as well.
  - Ospina was killed in August, three months before the attack, and Fayad was installed as the supreme leader at that point. He was a also hard liner like Ospina and was killed by March of 1986.
  - This death led to the installment of Carlos Pizzaro who decided that, with the recent string of deaths dealt to M19 leadership, a determined drive for peace had to be made. 
  - It is important to note that the sway from peace, to militancy, and then to peace again was defined directly by who was in power at the time. Most of the organization was in a position where they listened to whatever the current commander wanted. The paradigm that “the commander is never wrong” was very deeply rooted in the organization.

- **Social Isolation**: The leadership of M19 had to hide in the dense jungle regions of Colombia occasionally. Most of the organization’s members lived among the populous, hiding in plain sight.

- **Fractionalization**: When they planned the Palace of Justice attack in 1985, the organization was much divided in terms of what they wanted to do. There was pressure from all sides because of the targeting of M19 leaders who had come out of hiding and the loss of popular support from the people. Roughly half wanted to continue with peace talks, but the other half wished for an immediate return to military operations.
  - Ospina and his top people including Alvaro Fayad, Carlos Pizzarro, and Luis Ortero wished for war.
  - On the other side of the debate, Andres Almarales, Antonio Navarro, and at least 3 former congressmen wished to continue with peace talks.
  - This caused a significant amount of friction within the organization. Eventually, due to the pressure put on the organization from the killings and disappearances of their leaders, those in favor of maintaining peace were convinced otherwise.

General Planning Characteristics

- **Decision Maker Time-Horizon**: In December of 1984, when the National Directive of M19 met in Havana, Cuba to discuss what they would do next, time was not thought to be on their side. Despite the urgency put upon the organization, because their members were being assassinated even after peace accords with the Colombian government were signed and they were losing popular support, proper time was allocated to plan the attack on the Palace of Justice. Seven months would pass before the attack would be carried out.

- **Risk Threshold**: When planning any of their attacks, M19 sought to make a large public statement. The assault on the Palace of Justice needed a particular sense of spectacle because the group was desperate to reignite popular support. It was

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69 Country-data.com, “The 19th of April Movement.”


72 Carrigan, *The Palace of Justice*, p. 82.

73 Ibid, p. 67.
an extremely risky move, but it was made upon the assumption that the President would not allow any harm come to the judicial leadership of the country. Furthermore M19 would not innovate when it came to the execution of the assault. Standard military tactics and conventional weaponry would be used.  

**Operational Objectives**

- In the short term M19 hoped to re-establish their support base within Colombia. The failure of the peace accords was blamed on M19 and the population blamed them for its faltering. They needed to re-establish support in order to pursue their broader, overarching goal to motivate the people of Colombia to overthrow the oppressive government. They firmly believed that by holding a trial of sorts to convict the president of wrong-doing would give the people a reason to believe in them once again. Once they had support, they believed they could continue to pursue their long-term goals.

**Attack Modalities**

- **Choice of Weaponry:** The weapons employed by M19 were entirely restricted to conventional small arms weaponry. They also had no large-scale military hardware to employ in the field. There was no attempt to obtain and use otherwise exotic or CBRN weaponry to augment their arsenal. They would use small arms, plastic explosives and occasionally large belt-fed machine guns if they could obtain them.

- **Tactical Methods:** M19 would typically assault a position or kidnap a target using standard military tactics. Most of the upper echelons of their leadership was well trained and understood very well how to deploy their guerrilla fighters effectively in battle. In order to exit a combat situation, if they could not fight their way out, they would rely upon the government growing tired of the public spectacle created by one of their operations and then negotiate their way out. Unlike other more rural guerrilla groups, M19 tended to place a greater value upon life, and did not condone arbitrary executions.

**Target Selection**

- Aside from M19’s early bank robberies, targets were selected with the purpose of making a statement or obtaining something from the government. When M19 carried out an operation, the target was selected to have some sort of public message value. When a person was kidnapped, the individual taken would have some sort of importance in terms of advancing their agenda. If they took and held a building, such as the Embassy in 1980 and the Palace of Justice in 1985, they wanted constant media attention so that they could broadcast their message to Colombia and beyond.

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74 Ibid, p. 83.
Introduction & Overview

Summary

On September 5th, 1977 members belonging to the Siegfried Hausner Commando of the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF: Red Army Faction) abducted Dr. Hanns Martin Schleyer, a prominent capitalist, President of the Federal Association of German Industries, and the President of the Employers Association. Schleyer was abducted so that he could be exchanged for 11 RAF leaders, who were held by the West German government. When, 43 days later, four of the RAF prisoners attempted suicide, with three succeeding and one being hospitalized, the Siegfried Hausner Commando executed Schleyer and dumped his body in Mulhouse, France.

The Red Army Faction was a Marxist/Maoist group that succeeded the Baader-Meinhof group. RAF conducted a variety of attacks over the course of their existence, ranging from bombings to assassinations and kidnappings. Their stated goals were to fight international imperialism from Europe to the Third World.

I. Command and Control Analysis: Delegative

Based on organizational structure, operational procedures, and other group characteristics, it is clear that RAF relied on a delegative system to carry out attacks:

1. At any given time throughout RAF operational history a number of its leaders were in jail, including at the time of Schleyer’s abduction. According to hostage negotiators and law enforcement involved in RAF kidnappings, clear and consistent communication from the operatives implies their decisions were not reliant upon orders or authorization from jailed leaders. Furthermore, it is unlikely that captured operatives were able to facilitate their release from inside, suggesting that even lower level operatives were orchestrating missions.

2. Releasing their prisoners was a constant focus for the RAF throughout its existence, so much so that most RAF violence can be attributed to prisoner release operations and not to their ideological agenda. Because fellow members proved loyal and experienced with prisoner liberation operations, it is unlikely that captives would have felt the need to orchestrate their own release. Inter alia, this demonstrates the ability of various “commando groups” to carry out attacks without direct orders from leaders.

3. The breakdown of the hard core group into small commando groups that carried out their own missions suggests that each group had relative autonomy and did not follow orders from any other commando group. The entire core group itself was only 10-20 members, suggesting a very tight command and control, but this small size actually prevented a single leader from rising above subordinates. More than delegating significant decision making power to subordinates, these operatives actually established control for the simple reason that leaders were rendered ineffective by their arrest.
II: Incident Details

Date & Time
- The abduction took place at 17:50 hrs, on September 5, 1977.\textsuperscript{77}
- Schleyer was then held captive for 43 days.\textsuperscript{78}
- On October 18, 1977 Schleyer was executed.\textsuperscript{79}

Locations
- The kidnapping took place in Cologne.
- Schleyer was held in a high rise building in Erftstadt, near Cologne, for the duration of his captivity.
- Schleyer’s body was found in Mulhouse, France.

Target
- Dr. Hanns Martin Schleyer

Perpetrators
- The Siegfried Hausner Commando, composed of: \textsuperscript{80}
  - Known 5 assailants:
    - Christian Klar
    - Rolf Heisler
    - Willy Peter Stoll
    - Friedericke Krabbe
    - Angelica Speitel
  - Possible 6\textsuperscript{th} assailant could have been:
    - Adelheid Schulz
    - Silke Maier-Witt

Target Selection
- Schleyer was chosen because of his prominent status as the foremost capitalist in Germany, President of the Federal Association of German Industries, and President of the Employers Association led the RAF to believe he was valuable enough to leverage the secure release of RAF political prisoners.\textsuperscript{81}

Degree of Autonomy
- In the absence of conflicting data, it would appear that, given the RAF leadership's imprisonment at the time of the abduction and the stated demands by the perpetrators for the release of specific members of their leadership, the Siegfried Hausner Commando acted with almost complete autonomy.\textsuperscript{82}
- Communiqués between the commando and the West German government demonstrate that the people holding Schleyer captive were the ones doing the negotiating. Their demands remained clear and consistent.\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{80} “Case Study 1. The Kidnapping/Assassination of Hanns Martin Schleyer.”
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.
The last message from the commando, released prior to Schleyer’s execution, stated that the possibility of an exchange would expire on the October 16. However, the commando continued to hold Schleyer until the 18th, when they found out that their leadership had died in prison.

**Weapons**

- The following weapons were recovered from the scene of the abduction:
  - One Colt Combat Commander pistol, 45 caliber ACP with magazine and eight cartridges
  - One magazine for a PM 63 machine pistol
  - Forty-four expended cartridges and 22 projectiles and parts for a 9mm Makarov pistol
  - Fifty expended cartridges and 24 projectiles (.223 caliber) fired from a Heckler and Koch automatic weapon
  - Seven expended 12/70 caliber shotgun shells fired from two weapons

**Tactics**

- The Commando used a yellow Mercedes to block the convoy transporting Schleyer. A woman with a blue baby carriage walked out in front of Schleyer’s car as well on the opposite side of the Mercedes in order to prevent it from swerving around the Mercedes. The escort vehicle then slammed into Schleyer’s vehicle. Once the convoy was brought to a halt, 5 perpetrators emerged from surrounding vehicles and opened fire upon the escort and primary transport vehicles. Once the four escort officers were killed, the target was abducted.

**Casualties**

- September 5, 1977
  - The 4 law enforcement officers who were escorting Schleyer were killed in his abduction.
- October 18th, 1977
  - Dr. Hanns Martin Schleyer was executed.

**Objectives**

- The objective was to secure the release of 11 RAF prisoners, including:
  - Andreas Baader
  - Gudrun Ensslin
  - Jan-Carl Raspe
  - Verena Becker
  - Werner Hoppe
  - Karl-Heinz Dellwo
  - Hanna Krabbe
  - Bernd Rössner
  - Ingrid Schubert
  - Irmgard Möller
  - Günter Sonnenberg

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*History...* The Final Communiqué From The Red Army Faction (RAF), March 1998; A note regarding the current situation – by some who have been RAF members at various points in time, May 2010.

84 Ibid.
86 “Case Study 1. The Kidnapping/Assassination of Hanns Martin Schleyer.”
88 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
Each prisoner was to be released with 100,000 Deutsche Marks and be allowed to travel to the country of their choosing upon their release.

**Outcome**

- The following leaders committed suicide in jail when they believed there would be no hope for release:
  - Andreas Baader – self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head
  - Jan-Carl Raspe – self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head
  - Gudrun Ensslin – hanging
- Irmgard Möller attempted suicide via self-inflicted stab wounds but failed and was hospitalized.
  - She claimed she and the rest of the leadership were attacked, and upon hearing the news that their leadership was assassinated by the state, the commando holding Schleyer executed him en route to Mulhouse, France where his body was later discovered.

**III: Perpetrator Characteristics and Its Command and Control**

**Ideology**

**World View**

- The RAF is a liberal extremist group that focused on Marxist and Maoist ideologies. Born from the Baader-Meinhof group, they believe in conducting an armed struggle against international imperialism both in Europe and in the Third World. They also believe in cooperation with a myriad of other terrorist groups of a similar milieu.
- The RAF believed in armed class struggle and drew inspiration from the Chinese Civil War, which coincided with the group’s creation following WWII.

**Group Norms**

- Violence is often cited in RAF communiqués as a necessary means to achieve armed class struggle. Several senseless killings led to objections by supporters to this aspect of the RAF *modus operandi*. However, there are no objections within the RAF hardcore group to killing innocent people.
- Ideological loyalty is central to the RAF and over the years, RAF has published several position papers justifying their course of action.

**Grand Strategy**

- The overall “functioning” strategy of the RAF is difficult to identify. Their stated goals are to conduct an armed revolutionary struggle against global imperialism, however many of their attacks were conducted in response to government crackdowns, arrests, or in the case of kidnappings and the takeover of the German embassy in Stockholm, to exchange their captive(s) for political prisoners held by the West German government.
- Their stated strategy as communicated by Ulrike Meinhof, one of the group’s initial leaders, is to fight and ultimately destroy the “system of imperialist domination, on the

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92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
95 Moncourt and Smith, “The Red Army Faction, A Documentary History Projectiles for the People.”
97 Moncourt and Smith, "The Red Army Faction, A Documentary History Projectiles for the People"
98 "A Brief History of the Red Army Faction."
political, economic, and military planes.” RAF carried out this strategy by conducting bombings, kidnappings and assassinations of prominent figures in West Germany.99

Perceptual Filters
- Due to the extremist political stance against the government structure it can be inferred that over ideology, the RAF is not willing to negotiate.100 Their stated goals are the overthrow of various governments and the destruction of the system of imperialist domination as they so call it. These do not represent clear and defined goals of a nationalist group and thus negotiations for absorption into the greater political system are unlikely.
- On the point of political prisoners, which was a constant focus during the time RAF operated, negotiations for their release was constantly attempted through various forms of kidnapping.101

Organizational Structure
- The RAF is organized into two distinct groups:
  - Hard Core Group: This group was made up of the 10 to 20 people who actually carried out terrorist attacks. This group was sometimes subdivided into “commando” groups of around 3 to 5 operatives who would carry out a particular operation. Commando size varied according to the sophistication of the operation being carried out.102
  - Support Group: This group was composed of the several hundred RAF supporters. These people provided propaganda and logistical support to the hardcore group.103

Demographics
- The RAF was made up of men and women who began their struggle against the West German government when they were college students and continued their dedication to the cause after graduating from school.104
- Professions represented in the membership of the RAF included lawyers, legal clerks, teachers, artists, photographers, and others.105

Resources

Financial Resources
- Funding for RAF operations was secured primarily through bank robberies.106

Logistical & Human Resources
- The logistical support network for the RAF was considerable in both size and scope:
  - The support group of the RAF provided logistical and propaganda support for the small group of operatives.
  - More impressive, were the many connections the RAF had to terrorist groups of similar liberal ideological orientation. These connections provided RAF an avenue to secure training for their members as they did with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and to secure weaponry as well.107

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99 Ibid .
100 “A Brief History of the Red Army Fraction;” "Case Study 1. The Kidnapping/Assassination of Hanns Martin Schleyer.”
103 “A Brief History of the Red Army Faction,” “Red Army Faction (RAF).”
105 “Case Study 1. The Kidnapping/Assassination of Hanns Martin Schleyer.”
107 "Case Study 1. The Kidnapping/Assassination of Hanns Martin Schleyer."
• Groups the RAF had good contacts with included: \textsuperscript{108}
  o PLFP
  o Red Brigades
  o Movement of 2 June
  o Baader-Meinhof Gang
  o Japanese Red Army
  o Irish Republican Army
  o Carlos Group
  o Petra Kraus Group
  o Red Help

Physical Resources
  o The RAF had considerable access, through its many international connections, to various
types of automatic weaponry and explosives. Furthermore they had adequate training,
provided by other terrorist organizations, to handle and deploy said weaponry. \textsuperscript{109}

Organizational Life Cycle Status
  - In March of 1998, what remained of the Red Army Faction, issued a final official communiqué as
an organization. In a lengthy document entitled “The Urban Guerrilla is History…” the RAF
announced its cessation of terrorist activities and the disbandment of the group as a whole. In this
document the RAF went over its history as an organization and their failure to meet their
objective. They concluded that due to changing times and their inability to bring about the
revolution they fought for 28 years for that they would end hostilities and dissolve the organization
of their own accord. \textsuperscript{110}

Operational Capabilities

Technical Capabilities
  o RAF operatives were very well trained in the handling and deployment various types of
exploables both of military grade and homemade. They have used mechanical, electrical
and timed methods of detonating devices. After the kidnapping of Schleyer evidence was
discovered in safe houses that pointed to experimentation with remote detonated
devices. \textsuperscript{111}
  o RAF operatives had been known to train with the PLO, which undoubtedly gave them
access to not only explosives training but other forms of military training as well. \textsuperscript{112}
  o RAF was very adept in producing forged identification documents. \textsuperscript{113}

Propensity to Innovate
  o With respect to two different kinds of innovation the RAF innovated and then they did not
    ▪ Technical innovation was perused due to the fact that the group made efforts to
      increase their ability to deploy explosives in new ways, such as for its time
      period, the use of radio detonators. \textsuperscript{114}
    ▪ Tactical innovation was lacking. Over the course of its existence, the RAF
      behaved predictably, much like other groups that came into existence during that
time period. They used similar tactics over and over again, even though they did
      not seem to work. An example of this failure to innovate was the repeated
attempts at kidnappings or hostage-taking scenarios (such as the German embassy in Stockholm) in order to secure the release of prisoners.\textsuperscript{115}

Knowledge of the Target Environment

\begin{itemize}
  \item The RAF, being of both German cultural and lingual background, was able to blend into the target environment with relative ease. They would regularly conduct reconnaissance on the target area as they did prior to the kidnapping of Schleyer. Their ability to produce falsified documentation assisted in this endeavor.\textsuperscript{116}
\end{itemize}

Organizational Dynamics

Fractionalization

\begin{itemize}
  \item Throughout most of its existence, the RAF remained unified on what they wanted as an organization. This meant the unquestioning loyalty to the ideology established at the outset of its founding. Where it appears supporters and the hard core group disagreed was with the unmitigated use of violence from time to time. One operation in particular illustrates this divide:
    \begin{itemize}
      \item In January 1985, the RAF conducted an operation with a French group called Action Directe, in which they killed a GI and stole his ID card in order to attack an air force base. A subsequent discussion broke out among the support base of the organization whether or not it was necessary to kill the GI.
      \item The RAF then proceeded to justify the action to relatively little avail. The mere fact this discussion was had is evidence enough that violence had some sort of boundary the support base of the RAF expected not to be crossed by the action of the hard core group.\textsuperscript{117}
    \end{itemize}
\end{itemize}

Leadership Style

\begin{itemize}
  \item Due to the small size of the hard core group, and the emergence of several people who could be identified as leaders, command and control within a group of this size would probably have been fairly tight. It is difficult to understand the true group dynamics because in most cases, even now that the group has been dissolved for over 15 years, former members still refuse to disclose information.\textsuperscript{118}
\end{itemize}

Social Isolation

\begin{itemize}
  \item Isolation didn’t appear to be the mode of operation for the hard core group of the RAF. While they conducted operations covertly, it appears they attempted to “hide in plain sight” through the use of falsified identification.\textsuperscript{119}
\end{itemize}

General Planning Characteristics

Decision Maker Time Horizon

\begin{itemize}
  \item In the days leading up to the actual abduction, neighbors reported suspicious activity to West German police regarding the vehicles used in the abduction. RAF’s surveillance of Schleyer was never spotted by law enforcement, despite obvious interest in understanding the target and the abduction site. The commando group clearly took its time investigating the area and planning the abduction of Schleyer before they actually committed to carrying out their plans.\textsuperscript{120}
\end{itemize}

Risk Threshold

\begin{itemize}
  \item Ibid; Arm the Spirit 2004; Moncourt and Smith, “The Red Army Faction, A Documentary History Projectiles for the People.”
  \item GlobalSecurity.org.
  \item “A Brief History of the Red Army Faction.”
  \item “Case Study 1. The Kidnapping/Assassination of Hanns Martin Schleyer;” Moncourt and Smith, “The Red Army Faction, A Documentary History Projectiles for the People.”
  \item “A Brief History of the Red Army Faction.”
  \item “Case Study 1. The Kidnapping/Assassination of Hanns Martin Schleyer.”
\end{itemize}
Although RAF operations were often risky, plots were extensively prepared and members were quite confident of their success. Despite extensive preparation and standing their ground at the embassy attack, RAF operatives were frequently arrested, suggesting multiple operational failures and the willingness to lay down arms.\textsuperscript{121}

**Operational objectives**
- It is difficult to understand the broad operational objectives of the RAF when one compares their propaganda with their attacks. Although their stated objectives are to fight against international imperialism, their attack patterns don’t seem to fit any particular visible agenda to forward that goal, other than the act of killing prominent capitalists, attacking court/federal buildings and conducting bombings.
- Specific operational objectives are a little bit easier to ascertain. They fit two general modalities:
  - Ransom: Prominent figures are generally taken hostage for the express purpose of using them as a bargaining chip to secure the release of political prisoners.\textsuperscript{122}
  - Retaliation: Prominent figures or landmarks are eliminated through assassination or bombing as punishment for perceived wrongdoing.\textsuperscript{123}

**Attack Modalities**

**Weapons**
- The weaponry chosen and deployed by the RAF was entirely conventional in nature. They relied upon automatic firearms and conventional explosives. They never deployed any unique or CBRN devices.\textsuperscript{124}

**Tactical Methods**
- The RAF relied on three primary methods of attack:\textsuperscript{125}
  - Bombings of symbolic targets
  - Assassinations of prominent figures
  - Kidnapping/Hostage taking in order to leverage the release of captured RAF operatives

**Insiders/Outsiders**
- It would appear, given the ability to smuggle weapons and other contraband into prison (even though they were high value terrorist suspects), and there being no cultural or lingual difference between the perpetrators and the government, their ability to blend in and even work the inside of some institutions seems viable. It is unclear as to how often this sort of thing occurred though.\textsuperscript{126}

**Target Selection**
Over the course of its existence, the RAF targeting habits remained fairly consistent. Targets were selected for assassination/kidnapping primarily for their prominence in the capitalist community or their status as a high-ranking official in the federal government. RAF operatives believed these targets represented the most promising bargaining chips in their effort to release fellow operatives. Targets of the structural variety were prominent as well, ranging from police stations, to courthouses, to a U.S. air base, or even an embassy. Targets appear to have been


\textsuperscript{122} “Case Study 1. The Kidnapping/Assassination of Hanns Martin Schleyer;” Moncourt, André; Smith J. “The Red Army Faction, A Documentary History Projectiles for the People;” “A Brief History of the Red Army Faction.”

\textsuperscript{123} “A Brief History of the Red Army Faction.”


\textsuperscript{125} “Red Army Faction (RAF);” “A Brief History of the Red Army Faction.”

\textsuperscript{126} Noe, “The Baader Meinhof Gang: A Kidnapping and A Countdown.”
chosen on the basis that their damage would make some sort of impact on the government/economy's ability to continue functioning.\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid; “Case Study 1. The Kidnapping/Assassination of Hanns Martin Schleyer;” Moncourt and Smith, “The Red Army Faction, A Documentary History Projectiles for the People.”
Overview

In 1973, four members from the nationalist terrorist group Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA: Basque Homeland and Freedom) [hereafter ETA] planned and executed the assassination of the Prime Minister of Francisco Franco’s fascist government, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, in Madrid, Spain at 09:36hrs. After almost a year of planning, the commando cell dug a tunnel underneath the road where the Admiral’s car would pass, planted approximately 80 kilograms of explosives, and waited for him to leave mass. When Carrero Blanco’s car drove over the target area, the perpetrators detonated the explosives, and the vehicle was hurled five stories over a church. The Admiral and his bodyguard detail were killed and the four perpetrators escaped un molested. There was no collateral damage.

ETA is a nationalist group dedicated to the liberation of the Basque homeland, which consists of seven provinces, four in Spain and three in southern France. Born in 1958-59 under the rule of Francisco Franco, the group has continued to operate in some capacity up until 2010 when it called another cease fire in an attempt to negotiate with the Spanish government. ETA is Europe’s oldest terrorist organization and has committed hundreds of attacks including assassinations, kidnappings and bombings to further their cause.

I. Command and Control Analysis: Assertive

ETA’s command and control structure can be characterized as assertive for three reasons:

1. While Commando cells have creative license to devise attacks, they are beholden to approval from the governing council before carrying out operations. This includes dependence on the governing council to approve, fund and arm any Commando missions. Additionally, this approval is required regardless of the degree of the attack. In the case of the Admiral’s assassination for example, the plot required authorization even in its preliminary design as a kidnapping.

2. While Commando cells are given autonomy to develop operations in their regional locations, members are limited in their assimilation to the environment by a cultural barrier. Accents distinguish the Basque ETA from the Castilian Spanish inhabitants of say, Madrid, and the Commandos therefore rely on the leadership cadre located in the Basque homeland for resources, support, etc.

3. Despite operational cells and an extensive peripheral network of supporters, the ETA is known to have a rigidly hierarchical structure.

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II. Incident Details

Date & Time: December 20, 1973 at 09:36hrs

- Location: Calle Claudio Colleo (between Calle Juan Bravo and Calle Diego de Leon), Madrid, Spain

Target

- Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco

Perpetrators

- 4 ETA operatives of college student age, code named:
  - Txabi – Cover: Technical engineer
  - Jon – Cover: Economist
  - Iker – Cover: Industrial Designer
  - Mikel – Cover: College student

Target Selection

- Admiral Blanco was selected as a target because information regarding his church going habits came into ETA's hands in the fall of 1972. Also, Blanco himself was, at the time, the one man in Francisco Franco’s regime that could succeed Franco. He was also the Prime Minister of Franco’s government at the time of his assassination. As a hostage, Carrero Blanco represented very important bargaining chip for the release of imprisoned ETA militants. Having investigated and verified the information, ETA decided it would take advantage of the fact that the Admiral followed a set schedule for going to mass, from which he rarely deviated. ETA originally planned on kidnapping Carrero Blanco but the plot later evolved into an assassination.

Degree of Autonomy

- The terrorist cell, or “Commando” as ETA refers to them, was tasked by ETA leadership to:
  - Investigate and verify the information they received about Carrero Blanco;
  - Based on information collected by the Commando, the four men on the ground in Madrid were to devise a plan to kidnap Carrero Blanco;
  - Confirms their plan with ETA leadership and discusses additional support required during the Sixth Assembly of ETA;
  - Upon their return to Madrid, the Commando discovers that Carrero Blanco’s guard detail had significantly increased, ruling out the possibility of kidnapping. This is when the Commando communicated with ETA that instead of a kidnapping, an assassination would be the best use of the opportunity they had to get close to Carrero Blanco;
  - Devise a new plan to assassinate Carrero Blanco with explosives, communicated their plan to ETA leadership, and received permission to proceed.

Throughout this process:

1. ETA would task the Commando, giving them an objective(s) they would like to see accomplished.
2. The Commando, having scouted the target area, would plan the attack based upon the information they obtained. They had complete creative control over the planning process.
3. The Commando would communicate with ETA what the plan was, and what they needed from the organization.

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130 Agirre, pp. 5, 101
131 Ibid, pp. 22-23
132 Ibid, pp. 4-5
133 Ibid, p. 55
4. ETA leadership would review the plan, and clear its execution, while providing
the Commando with the weapons and financial means to carry out the mission.

**Weapons**
- 9mm Parabellum Pistols (Luger)\(^{134}\)
- Approximately 80 Kilograms of explosives stolen from the Hernani Powder Magazine
  - 50 kilograms of “Goma two” grade explosives
  - Remaining 30 kilograms were a variety of weaker explosives
- 2 rolls of cable for the detonators – 100 meters a piece
- 12 detonators, both electric and traditional\(^{135}\)

**Tactics**
- **Target Surveillance**: The four members of the Commando regularly shadowed the
  Admiral when he went to mass. They would do this in different shifts, so that the Admiral
  or his guard detail would not get suspicious\(^{136}\)
- **Environment immersion**: The Commando’s members did their best to blend into their
  target environment by changing their clothes and carrying fake documentation to mask
  their Basque identity. However, the Basque language of Euskara differs noticeably from
  Castilian Spanish and the Commandos’ accents were a persistent problem\(^{137}\)
- **Targeted Bombing**: The blast that hurled the automobile five stories over the church and
  into the courtyard behind it was meant to kill only Carrero Blanco and his bodyguards.
  The bombing was conceived and executed specifically with the desire to avoid collateral
  damage in mind\(^{138}\)

**Casualties**
- Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco
- Bodyguard detail assigned to the Admiral

**Perpetrator Objectives**
- **Original Objective**: Kidnap Admiral Carrero Blanco while he attended mass in the
  morning at the Church of San Francisco de Borja. ETA would then leverage him to
  secure the release of political/militant prisoners held by the Spanish government\(^{139}\)
- **Amended Objective**: An assassination plot was adopted after an increase in the Admiral’s
  security detail precluded a kidnapping\(^{140}\). Further, the perpetrators reasoned that while
  the Admiral’s kidnapping and the following exchange of prisoners appeared tempting,
  they calculated that the Admiral’s survival could cause more hardship for ETA and the
  Basque people in the future. Also, in the event the Spanish government took a hard line
  and refused to negotiate, they would have to kill the Admiral anyway. Thus, to deal a
  devastating blow to Francisco Franco’s government they elected to use the information
  they had acquired to kill the Admiral, with as little collateral damage as possible\(^{141}\)

**Ideology**
- **World View**: ETA is an ethno-nationalist group dedicated to establishing an independent state
  composed of the historically Basque regions of Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, Araba, and Nafarroa provinces
  of Spain and the Lapurdi, Nafarroa Behera, and Zuberoa provinces of France. ETA represents an

\(^{134}\) Ibid, p. 63
\(^{135}\) Ibid, pp. 99-100
\(^{136}\) Ibid, pp. 10-11, 27
\(^{137}\) Ibid, p. 24
\(^{138}\) Ibid, p. 73
\(^{139}\) Ibid, p. 3
\(^{140}\) Ibid, p. 73
\(^{141}\) Ibid, p. 18
extreme expression of pride in Basque culture, and desire to express that through the establishment of an independent Basque nation.\textsuperscript{142}

- **Group Norms:** In Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, Araba, which comprise the autonomously run BAC (Basque Country Autonomous Community), the ancient language of Euskera is still the primary language taught in schools and used in day-to-day interactions. This is the primary area in which ETA operates.\textsuperscript{143}
  
  - The people who comprise this group are viciously loyal to the culture, language, and vision of statehood of the Basque people.
  - Commitment to the cause is high among the very small “hard core” group of individuals who actually carry out attacks, which range from assassinations, to bombings, to kidnappings.\textsuperscript{144}
  - The vast majority of ETA is composed of men and women who have an interest in the political side of the organization and provide only non-violent support for the militant side of the organization.\textsuperscript{145}

- **Grand Strategy:** The strategy of ETA has changed three times over the course of its existence.
  
  - **Franconian Era:** Under the rule of Francisco Franco, ETA most closely resembled a revolutionary terrorist group, even though its mission statement was that of a nationalist group wishing to secede and form its own state. Their mode of operation was to use violence in order to elicit an overreaction by the state to the terrorist violence. This overreaction would in turn cause an escalation of violence to the point where the population would turn on the state, eventually leading to a popular revolution. They were basing a lot of their ideas off of the anti-colonial experiences of the 1950s and 1960s, such as that in Algeria.\textsuperscript{146}
  
  - **Democratic Spain:** With the end of Franco’s rule over Spain and the introduction of democracy, ETA could no longer follow the failed strategy of provocation. They turned to a more nationalistic strategy of war-of-attrition for the better part of the next twenty years. This strategy entails using violence in order to place cost upon the state, until it reaches a threshold in which it no longer has any desire for conflict, and gives in.\textsuperscript{147}
  
  - **Nationalist Front:** After the fall of ETA’s leadership in 1992, what was left of the organization had to again re-think its strategy. This time their targets changed. For the first time, they began targeting non-nationalist politicians within Basque territories. The idea this time was that by killing non-nationalists, they would create a division within the BAC, forcing moderate nationalists to side with the extremists. This event would hopefully polarize the population and create a popular movement for independence.\textsuperscript{148}

**Perceptual Filters**


\textsuperscript{144} Ibid, pp. 9-10

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid, p. 17

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid, pp. 9-10

\textsuperscript{147} Sánchez-Cuenca, “The Persistence of Nationalist Terrorism: The Case of ETA,” p. 9


\textsuperscript{148} Sánchez-Cuenca, “The Persistence of Nationalist Terrorism: The Case of ETA,” p. 20
Liberalation of the Basque People

- ETA's members believe that every action the group takes is done to further the goal of liberating the Basque country. All killings, bombings, and other operations are meant to eventually achieve this goal. They perceive themselves as an oppressed people deserving of complete independence.

Public Image Conscious

- At the time of the Admiral's assassination, ETA believed very much in maintaining its public image. While planning this assassination, collateral damage was a large consideration, because they were conscious of the damage it would inflict on their image among the general population in Spain and in the Basque region. Great pains were taken during the planning and execution of the bombing to make sure innocent civilians were not killed.

Organizational Structure

- The structure of the organization can be divided into two primary groups:
  - **Hardcore Group:** This group houses the leadership of the organization, the governing council and the armed commandos that carry out the attacks.
    - Estimated at 500 members at its peak but has declined steadily since 1978 to less than 100 members today.
    - **Executive Committee:** There is no singular leader of the ETA but there is a ruling council known as the Executive Committee. Although the group lacks a figurehead, the structure of the organization is rigidly hierarchical, relying on the council to hand down decisions regarding the military arm, politics of the organization, logistics, management of border crossings, and financing. Due to the underground nature of the leadership cadre, they rarely have direct interaction with the rest of the organization and most often operate in hiding within one of the three French Basque provinces.
  - **Periphery Group:** Support structure of the organization consisting of financing, intelligence, housing, border crossing, etc. This sector of the organization is much larger than the hardcore group and has little or no participation in actual violence.

Demographics

- ETA is an ethno-nationalist terrorist organization. Thus, their membership is drawn exclusively from Basques within the Basque Country Autonomous (BAC) community, composed of the three provinces of Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, Araba. New recruits for the hardcore group are identified through street violence in their youth and, because ETA provides underground protection for its members, many youth join to avoid arrest.

Resources

Financial Resources

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149 Ibid, p. 5; Barros and Gil-Alana, "The timing of ETA terrorist attacks", p. 96
150 Agirre and Solomon, Operation Orgo: The Execution of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, pp. 4-6
151 Ibid, p. 74
152 Ibid, p. 12
153 Ibid, p. 9
154 Ibid, p. 9
Bank Robberies: An early source of income for ETA but ultimately abandoned because of high risk and tendency toward collateral damage, two factors that ETA preferred to avoid.\textsuperscript{156}

Kidnappings: Also an initial source of income for ETA but an unpopular tactic with the public and an unpredictable source of funds. Thus the ETA forwent kidnapping for ransom in 1996.\textsuperscript{157}

Extortion: The largest and most stable source of funding for ETA operations comes from a “revolutionary tax” solicited from BAC businesses. This “tax” is maintained by a network of supporters who belong to the peripheral group of the organization. ETA has killed 8 people over the course of their history to make the threat of violence for refusal to pay credible.\textsuperscript{158}

Logistical Resources

- ETA has maintained an elaborate underground network over the course of its history that ferries people back and forth across the French-Spanish border in order to keep the hardcore militants of the group hidden. The peripheral members of ETA maintain this underground network.\textsuperscript{159}

Physical Resources

- ETA has secured various grades of explosives and other small arms weaponry by theft throughout its history.\textsuperscript{160}

Human Resources

- At its peak, ETA maintained an extensive support network of people that carried out various tasks such as maintaining the extortion racket, hiding operatives, ferrying people across the border to France and back, as well as other politically oriented operations to further ETA goals in the realm of politics.

Organizational Life Cycle Status

- Currently, ETA has declared another cease-fire with the Spanish government as a way to possibly open up dialogue for peace. However, the Spanish government has not taken this attempt seriously because ETA violated the last cease-fire with a bombing at Madrid’s airport in 2006.\textsuperscript{161}

Operational Capabilities

Technical Skills

- ETA operatives possess some general knowledge of explosives but tend to improvise more often than not. Members understand how to handle, assemble, and detonate explosives but their operatives lack advanced training.\textsuperscript{162}


\textsuperscript{158} Ibid, p. 14

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid,p. 9


\textsuperscript{162} Agirre and Solomon, Operation Orgo: The Execution of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, p. 103
Propensity to Innovate

- The propensity to innovate in this particular assassination was immense. Imagination is what defined this particular event. The idea to detonate a bomb from underneath the street in order to mitigate collateral damage, but kill the intended target was born of the imagination, and after that the four men set about actually figuring out how to make it happen without any prior technical knowledge about what they were trying to do.\textsuperscript{163} They obtained books and read them in order to get a better idea of what they were trying to do. The reading and learning they did was not directly applicable, such as the book on mining construction they read so they could better understand the tunnel they were building. The information was clearly meant for large scale mining and not applicable to the small tunnel they were building, but it did put their minds at ease about the structural integrity of the tunnel. So although they did not get to apply the knowledge they got from that source, they still learned something.\textsuperscript{164}

Networking Abilities

- The ETA network within the BAC was extensive and provided a great deal of support to ETA operatives during its heyday, including shelter, weapons, money, and transportation.\textsuperscript{165}
- ETA is also said to have ties with other revolutionary groups in Europe, including the Irish terrorist group IRA.\textsuperscript{166} These relationships produced an exchange of tactics, weapons, and ideology.

Familiarity with the Target Environment

- Ethnic Basques are Spanish citizens and can therefore travel freely throughout the country. Despite freedom of movement, ETA operatives struggled to blend in with Spaniards outside of the BAC due to differences in language, culture, and dress.

Organizational Dynamics

Leadership Style

- Although lead by an executive committee and not a single individual, the ETA is a structurally hierarchical organization. For the greater part of its history ETA structure can be characterized as an oligarchy. Although ruled by an executive committee and not a single individual, cases of clear charismatic leaders such as Domingo Iturbe of the early 1980s are not uncommon.\textsuperscript{167}

Social Isolation

- The hard-core sector of the organization, which consisted of the leadership and militants, lives underground. At any given time the leadership itself lives in hiding within the three Basque provinces of France, and has very little direct physical interaction with the rest of the group.\textsuperscript{168}

Fractionalization

- Following the Café bombing in 1974, an internal argument was had and by the end of that year ETA split into two groups. The majority of the group became ETAp\textsubscript{m} (political-military ETA) and the minority of the group became ETAm (Military ETA). The principal disagreement was over the use of violence. ETAp\textsubscript{m} was more restrained in their attack modality and wanted to move toward participating in politics. ETAm believed any

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid, p. 75
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid, pp. 91–93
\textsuperscript{165} Sánchez-Cuenca, “The Persistence of Nationalist Terrorism: The Case of ETA,” pp. 9, 11
\textsuperscript{167} Sánchez-Cuenca, “The Persistence of Nationalist Terrorism: The Case of ETA,” p. 12
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid, p. 12
participation in politics would jeopardize their ability to operate. By 1984 ETAm became the dominant of the two groups.\textsuperscript{169}

General Planning Characteristics

Time Horizon Threshold
- Careful planning appears to take place before ETA acts upon its targets, at least within the context of the target environment in 1973. The planning of Operation Orgo took almost a year and during this period the Commando Cell scouted the target area, planned a kidnapping and then an assassination, and then carried it out. There was urgency toward the end to carry out the attack sooner rather than later, but this was within the context of spacing out that assassination from other operations that ETA was planning in order avoid increasing the security risk within the target environment.
- Furthermore, the increase in the Admiral’s security detail and the visit of high level U.S. officials around the time of the attack made it very pressing that the Commando carry out the attack urgently but effectively.\textsuperscript{170}

Risk Threshold
- ETA operatives have a large risk threshold. They are prepared to die for their cause and yet, at no point in their history have they resorted to martyrdom. There has always been an exit strategy component to their operations.\textsuperscript{171}
- The change from a kidnapping to an assassination was not due to the fact that the operation had become riskier for the men involved. The change was carried out because the probability of success with such a high level target was low with a kidnapping after the increase in security detail. The Commando Cell and ETA leadership decided that the intelligence they had was best used to ensure the target was killed, thus the operation changed to an assassination.\textsuperscript{172}

Operational Objectives
- The overarching and long term objective of ETA has always been the establishment of a Basque state. Violence has been used in various ways to achieve this consistent objective:
  - During Francisco Franco’s reign, bombings and assassinations were carried out in order to provoke the government to over-respond, inciting the civilian population to rise up to face the government. Attacks carried out during this period were marked by a higher concern for Spanish civilian casualties, because the objective was to get the whole of Spain to rise up against Franco.\textsuperscript{173}
  - With the advent of democracy to Spain, ETA turned to a war of attrition strategy in which more bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations took place. During this period, there was less concern for avoiding Spanish civilian causalities because the group no longer needed them as a part of their strategy. Concern did remain for Basque civilians, so as to not aggravate ETA’s support base.\textsuperscript{174}
  - During the last two decades of ETA’s existence, targets have become non-nationalist (people not wishing to secede from Spain) politicians in order to create more division between them and the nationalist politicians within Basque country.\textsuperscript{175}
- Throughout ETA’s existence, violence has been the means to achieving the same goal of establishing a Basque state; only the targets have changed.

Attack Modalities

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid, p. 8  
\textsuperscript{170} Agirre and Solomon, Operation Orgo: The Execution of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, pp. 125-126  
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid, p. 74  
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid, p. 57  
\textsuperscript{173} Sánchez-Cuenca, “The Persistence of Nationalist Terrorism: The Case of ETA,” p. 17  
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid, pp. 17-18  
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid, p. 20
Weapons Selection
- Explosives of various types\textsuperscript{176}
- Small Arms, pistols, rifles, etc.

Tactical Methods
- **Bombings**: ETA has used bombings as a tactical method since the birth of the organization, ranging from car bombings to café bombings\textsuperscript{177}. Explosives have been an easy way for them to approach the target, leave behind the bomb, and walk away before detonating it. This tactic represents relatively little risk to the operatives carrying out the attack because it gives them the opportunity to walk away.
- **Assassinations**: When an assassination needed to take place and a more precise targeting was needed, ETA would turn to the simple tactic of gunning down the target and then fleeing the scene\textsuperscript{178}.
- **Kidnapping**: ETA has kidnapped people for ransom or to negotiate for political objectives, however the former is more frequent than the latter\textsuperscript{179}.

Insider/Outsider
- Due to a cultural barrier, particularly related to linguistic differences, it is difficult for ETA militants to blend in with the Spanish population outside the BAC. Thus, infiltrating the structures of government within Spain is not an option. They have however managed a limited degree of assimilation with surrounding civilian populations\textsuperscript{180}.

Target Selection
- Of the about 834 people killed by ETA over the course of its existence, various targets have been selected for different purposes:
  - First, 42\% of all ETA attack victims belong to the Spanish police services and 11\% to the military\textsuperscript{181}. This can be attributed to the fact that in Spain the police, not the military, handle counter-terrorism operations. These targets are typically chosen to scare or take retaliatory measures against ETA’s primary adversary of the Spanish Government.
  - Second, 35\% of all fatalities are civilians\textsuperscript{182}. This percentage can be attributed to the war-of-attrition phase of ETA’s history when the strategy was to bleed the Spanish until they reached a threshold where they would negotiate with ETA for the secession of Basque country. Because Spain was a democracy during this point in time, Spanish civilians become a logical target because they are the body that elects Spanish officials.
  - Third, about 6\% of fatalities have been politicians\textsuperscript{183}. These targets were selected during ETA’s third strategic phase for the purpose of creating division within the political scene in Basque country itself. These politicians were non-nationalists, not seeking secession from Spain. They were selected to cause direct conflict between the national and non-nationalist political parties in Basque country.

\textsuperscript{176} Agirre, 99
\textsuperscript{177} Sánchez-Cuenca 2008, p. 8
\textsuperscript{178} Barros 2006, p. 97
\textsuperscript{179} Sánchez-Cuenca 2008, 13; Barros 2003, p. 402
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid, p. 30
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.
D. Chechen Nord Ost Siege (jihadist ideology)\textsuperscript{184}

VNSA Command and Control Group Profile

полк специальной цели исламский (Special Purpose Islamic Regiment)

Nord Ost Siege, 2002
Group Type: Nationalist/Separatist, Religious
Command and Control Type: Assertive

Overview

The Nord Ost Siege, also known as the October 2002 Moscow theater hostage crisis, occurred on October 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 2002 and continued until October 26\textsuperscript{th}, 2002. Mosvar Barayev led forty-one members of полк специальной цели исламский (Special Purpose Islamic Regiment, hereafter SPIR) assaulted the Palace of Culture of the Podshipnikov Zavod in Moscow, Russia and took 850 hostages. SPIR's objective was to pressure Russian into a full military pullout from Chechnya and recognition of an independent Chechen state in exchange for the release and return of the hostages. SPIR is a nationalist/separatist and religious organization formed in 1996 by Abri Barayev with a primary goals being the liberation of Chechnya from Russia and the creation of an independent Chechen state. Increasingly after its founding as a nationalist/separatist organization, SPIR became increasingly Islamic in both membership and goals. Islamic militants were welcomed into SPIR because they provided more manpower as well as funding from Islamic terrorist organizations. The Nord Ost Siege was the first Chechen terrorist attack using tactics and imagery akin to al Qaeda.\textsuperscript{185} Unlike previous SPIR operations, the Nord Ost Siege was a jihadist attack. Chechen terrorists seized the theater at 9:05 PM on the 23\textsuperscript{rd} during a performance of the play Nord Ost, taking the performers and spectators hostage. At approximately 5:30 AM in the morning on October 26\textsuperscript{th}, Russian Special Forces assaulted the theater, and ended the hostage crisis.

The siege began at 9:05 PM on October 23\textsuperscript{rd}, the Chechens began their assault right before the play's intermission and used the noise of the show cover their initial entry into the theater lobby. After securing the lobby and hallways, the Chechens entered the theater itself and took those inside by surprise. Early into the siege, the Chechens released approximately 150 hostages, most of whom were children, Georgian citizens, foreigners, or Muslims. Russian security forces and officials stated at the onset of the hostage crisis that an assault on the theater would not take place unless the Chechen terrorists began executing hostages. The SPIR terrorists were led by Movsar Barayev and consisted of 22 men and 19 women. The men patrolled the theater's foyer while the women remained in the theater itself, guarding the hostages and on command, would detonate the explosives strapped to their bodies. All but one of the terrorists were Chechen natives, one of the men was an Arab volunteer who served as one of Barayev's two lieutenants. On October 24\textsuperscript{th}, the Chechens allowed some Russian members of parliament and two doctors inside the theater. The two doctors were not allowed to treat any of the hostages, and were made to carry out the body of a woman who broke through the police barricade the previous night and was executed by SPIR. Two days into the siege, the Russian Federal Security Service's (FSB) elite counterterrorism unit, Alpha Group, began planning a rescue operation.

On the 25\textsuperscript{th}, Barayev announced that they would begin executing hostages starting at midnight in order to speed up a response from the Russian government. An hour before the midnight deadline, one of Barayev's lieutenants received a call from the Russian government's special envoy to Chechnya, who said that he would fly to Moscow to meet face to face with Barayev in the theater to negotiate. Barayev

\textsuperscript{184} For a discussion of changing Chechen Rebel ideology from the Nord Orst Siege (1995) to the Budyonnovsk hospital hostage crisis, please see footnote XX [John, this is the footnote that begins: "At this point in time Chechen rebels were acting..."

\textsuperscript{185} Gordon M. Hahn, Russia's Islamic Threat, (Yale University Press, 2007), p. 49; Gordon M. Hahn in discussion with Charles P., July 2012.
and his fellow rebels felt this to be a great victory and tensions were lowered. However, at 11:25 PM, a man whose son was taken hostage broke through the police barricade around the theatre. The trespasser was executed, which led to a hostage panicking who then ran towards a large bomb that was situated in the middle of the theater. One of the gunmen fired on the panicked hostage, missed, and hit two other hostages, killing one and injuring another. Under Barayev’s orders, an ambulance was allowed to take the injured hostage away for treatment. Barayev made it clear to the Russians that the hostages were shot by accident, and that there were no executions taking place.

At 5:30 AM on October 26th, the Russian commandoes launched their rescue operation, the Russian Chechen envoy’s phone call was a ruse to buy more time. Before Russian troops entered the theater, an unknown sedative agent was pumped into the theater through the ventilation system in an effort to render the Chechens unconscious so they would not be able to fight back or set off their explosives. The Chechen men fled from the gas, leaving the women, who were rendered unconscious, inside the theater. The Russian commandoes held off on entering the theater until the gas had taken effect. The sedative agent had little effect on some of the hostages, some of whom were able to escape the auditorium and the theatre to safety. A few minutes later, the Russian commandoes stormed the theater, killing Barayev in a shootout. All of the Chechens were either killed fighting the Russian commandoes or executed at the end of the Russian assault. None of SPIR’s explosives were detonated during the raid. All 41 terrorists were killed; however, the sedative agent used by the Russians in the rescue attempt led to the deaths of 129 hostages.

I. Command and Control Analysis: Assertive

SPIR’s command and control for the Nord Ost Siege was highly assertive. Assertive command and control means that the leadership maintains control (either in person or through subordinates) over relevant aspects of the operation. An assertive command and control posture allows for the leadership to make changes “on the fly.” All of SPIR’s major decisions and actions during the hostage crisis were either taken or ordered by Mosvar Barayev himself. Five major actions during the hostage crisis highlight Barayev’s assertive command and control over the situation. First, Barayev made no attempts to contract anyone higher up in the chain of command outside the theater during the siege. Second, none of the female suicide bombers who were not rendered unconscious by the sedative agent detonated their explosives during the Russian rescue attempt because they did not receive orders from Barayev telling them to do so. Third, after one hostage was injured by gunfire the night of October 15th and the terrorists wanted to let the hostage die from her wound, Barayev ordered that an ambulance take the injured hostage away for treatment, despite opposition from his followers who obeyed Barayev’s orders regarding the ambulance without hesitation. Fourth, all contact between the terrorists and reporters and Russian negotiators was through Barayev; although other terrorists were questioned or shown on camera, Barayev was the primary point of contact. Finally, the only two people killed by the terrorists during the hostage crisis were only killed based on Barayev’s orders to do so.

II. Incident Details

Place and Time

- Date & Time: Event began at 9:05 PM on October 23rd and ended a little after 5:50 AM on October 26th.
- Place: Palace of Culture of the Podshipnikov Zavod in Moscow, Russia.

Target

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187 Reed, *Terror in Moscow*.
188 “Chechen gunmen seize Moscow theatre.”
A total of 850 Russian civilians were in the theatre for the evening performance of Nord Ost\(^{189}\)
- 150 civilians were released early into the siege, the released hostages were mostly children, Georgian citizens, foreigners, or Muslims\(^{190}\)

**Perpetrators**
- Chechen rebels of the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR) led by Mosvar Barayev\(^{191}\)
  - 22 men patrolled the theater’s lobby and corridors\(^{192}\)
  - 19 women guarded the hostages in the theater with suicide belts strapped to their bodies to detonate on Barayev’s orders\(^{193}\)
    - Many of the women were educated and joined SPIR because of personal losses of family members at the hands of the Russian military\(^{194}\)
  - All but one Arab volunteer who was one of Barayev’s lieutenants were Chechen\(^{195}\)
  - All were very religious\(^{196}\)

**Reasons for Target Selection**
- Information is limited because all SPIR members involved were killed by Russian commandoes
- It appears that other theaters were investigated as possible targets
- It is likely that a theater was chosen because it created a situation where the Chechens would be holding many Russian lives in their hands, which would force the Russian government negotiate or be severely punished\(^{197}\)

**Degree of Autonomy**
- Barayev was in charge for the entirety of the siege
  - Barayev was assisted by two lieutenants
  - Barayev conducted all negotiations personally and did not attempt to contact anyone else above him in the chain of command during the siege\(^{196}\)
  - The decisions to kill the two Russian civilians who broke through the police barricades were made by Barayev\(^{199}\)
  - The decision to call an ambulance for the hostage who was accidentally shot was made by Barayev over opposition from other Chechens\(^{200}\)
  - A lack of orders from Barayev prevented the women from detonating their explosives during the Russian rescue attempt\(^{201}\)

**Armaments used by the Perpetrators**
- The terrorists were armed with pistols and assault rifles\(^{202}\)

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\(^ {189}\) Reed, Terror in Moscow.
\(^ {190}\) “Chechen gunmen seize Moscow theatre.”
\(^ {192}\) Reed, Terror in Moscow.
\(^ {193}\) Ibid.
\(^ {194}\) Ibid.
\(^ {195}\) Ibid.
\(^ {196}\) Ibid.
\(^ {197}\) Ibid.
\(^ {198}\) Ibid.; Traynor; Cf. in the case of command and control for the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks where there was constant communication between the attackers and more senior coordinators.
\(^ {199}\) Ibid.
\(^ {200}\) Ibid.
\(^ {201}\) Ibid.
\(^ {202}\) “Chechen gunmen seize Moscow theatre.”
Each woman wore a suicide belt packed with high explosives. One larger military grade explosive was situated in the center of the theater.

**Tactics Employed by the Perpetrators**
- The terrorists took the theater by surprise, entering right before intermission to let the noise of the show cover their initial entry into the theater lobby.
  - After securing the surrounding the lobby and corridors, they entered the theater, surprising the spectators, who thought it was part of the show.
- Barayev used the threat of executing hostages in an attempt to force the Russian government to take them seriously.
- Barayev and his followers were committed to using suicide bombings if it became necessary.
  - In an interview with BBC, Barayev stated that if Russian commandoes launched a rescue attempt, they would not hesitate to blow up the building, killing themselves and the hostages.
  - Interviewed hostages stated that the woman suicide bombers were afraid of dying, but were still committed to detonating their suicide belts if Barayev gave the order.

**Casualties**
- By the Perpetrators
  - Two were executed by the terrorists under Barayev’s orders.
- By the Russians
  - Russian commandoes killed all 41 terrorists in the rescue attempt.
  - 129 hostages died as a result of the unknown sedative agent pumped into the theater by the Russian commandoes.

**Perpetrator Objectives**
- SPIR’s objective for the siege was to pressure the Russian government into a full military withdrawal from Chechnya and recognition of an independent Chechen state.

**Outcome**
- Barayev and all of his followers were killed during the Russian rescue attempt.
  - Barayev and his two lieutenants were killed in a gunfight in a first floor storeroom with Russian commandoes.
  - The remaining terrorists were either killed in the gunfight or were executed by Russian commandoes after they were rendered unconscious by the sedative agent.
  - 129 hostages died as a result of the unknown sedative agent used by Russian commandoes.

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203 Reed, *Terror in Moscow*.
204 Ibid.
206 Reed, *Terror in Moscow*; “Hostage-takers ‘ready to die.’”
207 Ibid.
208 Reed, *Terror in Moscow*.
210 Reed, *Terror in Moscow*.
211 Ibid.; Traynor, “Troops bring freedom and death.”
212 Reed, *Terror in Moscow*. 
• Then Russian President Vladimir Putin gave the Russian military the authority to attack terrorist threats across international borders and the Russian military launched a major offensive to crush the Chechen rebellion.\(^{213}\)

### III. Perpetrator’s Characteristics

#### Ideology

**World Views**

- SPIR was a nationalist/separatist group that fought for the liberation of Chechnya from Russian control and the formation of an independent Chechen state.\(^{214}\)
- SPIR allied itself with other Chechen resistance organizations as well as foreign Islamic groups.\(^{215}\)
- After the start of the second Russo-Chechen War in 1999, SPIR became increasingly influenced by the ideals of foreign Islamic militants.\(^{216}\)

**Group Norms**

- In its early years, SPIR was similar to other Chechen resistance groups in that it was a nationalist organization, religion was not an ideological factor.\(^{217}\)
- It was not until SPIR began accepting foreign Islamic militants and monetary aid from foreign Islamic terrorist organizations did SPIR become more Islamic in nature.\(^{218}\)
  - While the population of Chechnya is largely Muslim, the population has not embraced radical Islam.\(^{219}\)
- As more foreign Islamic militants joined SPIR, SPIR’s ideology became more religious, promoting a more radical strain of Islam and to establish a fundamentalist Islamic republic governed by Sharia law in Chechnya.\(^{220}\)
  - Islamic goals were integrated into SPIR’s original nationalist objectives
- As aid and militants from Islamic groups reached SPIR, its members began training in Afghanistan and became indoctrinated in the Wahhabi creed in camps throughout Chechnya.\(^{221}\)

#### Grand Strategy

- SPIR’s strategy has been to engage in armed resistance against Russian security forces both in Chechnya and in Russia itself to secure Chechen independence and an end to armed conflict with Russia.\(^{222}\)
- The Nord Ost Siege marked a shift in SPIR’s grand strategy in that it was the first time SPIR made use of terrorist tactics reminiscent of al Qaeda.\(^{223}\)
- Despite many changes in leadership, SPIR has remained committed to armed conflict and terror tactics against Russian forces and Chechens who

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\(^{214}\) START, “Terrorist Organization Profile.”  
\(^{215}\) Ibid.  
\(^{216}\) Ibid.  
\(^{217}\) Ibid; Author’s interview with Gordon M. Hahn.  
\(^{218}\) START, “Terrorist Organization Profile.”  
\(^{219}\) Ibid.  
\(^{220}\) Ibid.  
\(^{221}\) Ibid.  
\(^{222}\) Ibid.  
\(^{223}\) Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat, p. 49.
collaborate with the Russians in order to liberate Chechnya in the long term. Barayev and his followers hoped that taking several hundred Russian civilians hostage that they would be able to coerce the Russian government into giving into his demands for an immediate withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya. In interviews from inside the theater, Barayev made it clear that they were ready and willing to detonate their explosives and die if the Russian government did not meet their demands. Barayev stated that “We have nothing to lose. We have already covered 2,000 kilometers (1,240 miles) by coming here. There is no way back… We have come to die.” Barayev also stated that they did not come to Moscow to kill hostages or fight with Russian security forces but “to put an end to the war.” Barayev’s communication strategy and Islamist propaganda visible in the theater during the hostage crisis show that Barayev and his followers were operating under a jihadist stance.

Perceptual Filters

- Available evidence suggests that while SPIR has a clear leader, its members have ties to and work with various other Islamic Chechen terrorist groups. SPIR is believed to be over 1,000 members in strength. Barayev’s unit had a clear command structure. Barayev held overall command for the entirety of the siege and was assisted by two lieutenants. All orders and communication with reports were controlled or conducted by Barayev himself. When unable to communicate with Barayev, the female terrorists did not detonate their suicide vests during the Russian rescue attempt because Barayev had not given them the order to do so. While there was dissent over what to do with the hostage who was accidentally shot, none of the terrorists protested or questioned Barayev’s order that an ambulance be called.

Organizational Structure

- At its founding in 1996, SPIR was a purely Chechen organization. As SPIR expanded its operations against Russia in 1999, it turned to foreign organizations for manpower and resources, which led to foreign Islamic militants joining and influencing SPIR. Barayev’s SPIR unit during the hostage crisis was comprised of both men and women. All but one member of Barayev’s unit were Chechen. One of Barayev’s lieutenants was an Arab man who volunteered.

Demographics

- When unable to communicate with Barayev, the female terrorists did not detonate their suicide vests during the Russian rescue attempt because Barayev had not given them the order to do so.
- While there was dissent over what to do with the hostage who was accidentally shot, none of the terrorists protested or questioned Barayev’s order that an ambulance be called.

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224 START, “Terrorist Organization Profile.”
225 Reed, Terror in Moscow.
226 “Hostages-takers 'ready to die.' “
227 Hahn, Russia's Islamic Threat, p. 39.
229 START, “Terrorist Organization Profile.”
230 Reed, Terror in Moscow.
231 Ibid.
232 Ibid.
233 Ibid.
234 Reed, Terror in Moscow.
• Many of the female terrorists were well educated joined SPIR after losing loved ones at the hands of the Russian military.\textsuperscript{235}
• All 41 terrorists were very religious.\textsuperscript{236}

\textit{Resources}

• SPIR is suspected to receive funding for its operations from foreign mujahedeen groups as well as through extortion and kidnapping.\textsuperscript{237}
• SPIR has had close ties to other Islamic Chechen terrorist organizations, including the Islamic International Brigade (IIB) and the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM) as well as al Qaeda.\textsuperscript{238}
• Amir al-Khattab, a Muslim terrorist and financier, provided funding to SPIR to promote separatism from Moscow as well as Wahhabism.\textsuperscript{239}

\textit{Organizational Life Cycle Status}

• SPIR has been active since its founding in 1996
• The October 2002 Nord Ost Siege is regarded as SPIR’s most infamous and well-known operation
• Since 2002 SPIR has continued to take action against the Russians but none of its more recent operations have had the same prominence as the Nord Ost Siege
• SPIR has undergone several changes in leadership since 1996
  • Arbi Barayev, SPIR’s founder, was killed in 2001. He was replaced by his nephew, Mosvar Barayev, who led the Nord Ost Siege.\textsuperscript{240}
  • After Mosvar Barayev’s death during the Nord Ost Siege, Khamzat Tazabayev led SPIR until his death in 2004.\textsuperscript{241}
    ➢ After Tazabayev, the next few leaders of SPIR were short-lived until the current leader Amir Kazbek came into power.\textsuperscript{242}
• Two of SPIR’s most recent attacks occurred in 2006, when a small number of SPIR fighters attacked a Russian Interior Ministry post in the Chechen capital and the killing of five Chechen police officers deemed to be Russian sympathizers.\textsuperscript{243}

\textit{Operational Capabilities}

\textit{Specialized Skills}

• SPIR members possess weapons training and a practical knowledge of explosives, given their capabilities and weapons during the Nord Ost Siege

\textit{Technical Expertise}

• SPIR members are known to have received terror training in Afghanistan with assistance from Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda.\textsuperscript{244}

\textit{Propensity to Innovate}

• The Nord Ost Siege was a break from the strictly nationalist/separatist lens SPIR had operated under during its early years
  ➢ The willingness to use suicide bombing, the method of communication, and the Islamist propaganda SPIR used during the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{235} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{236} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{237} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{238} START, "Terrorist Organization Profile."
\textsuperscript{239} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{240} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{241} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{242} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{243} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{244} Ibid; United Nations Security Council, "Security Council Committee pursuant."
\end{footnotesize}
Siege highlighted SPIR’s transition into a more jihadist organization.\(^{245}\)

**Networking Abilities**
- SPIR has had very close ties to other Islamic Chechen terrorist groups, such as IIB and RSRSCBM as well as al Qaeda.\(^{246}\)
- Under Kazbek’s leadership, SPIR has been able to mobilize support from Ingushetia, Ossetia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan against Russia.\(^{247}\)

**Familiarity with the Target Environment**
- Barayev and his followers were able to travel 2,000 kilometers from Chechnya to Moscow undetected in order to carry out the Nord Ost Siege.\(^{248}\)

**Knowledge of the Target**
- Barayev and his followers chose to attack a theater because it allowed them to take several hundred Russian civilians hostage.\(^{249}\)
  - Evidence suggests that Barayev observed other theaters before making a decision on where to attack.

**Organizational Dynamics**

**Leadership Style**
- Changes in leadership have become characteristic for SPIR, meaning that it is difficult to discern how important leadership style is for SPIR.\(^{250}\)
- During the Nord Ost Siege, Mosvar Barayev maintained direct control, while he did have two lieutenants, no action was taken unless it was decided on or approved by Barayev himself.\(^{251}\)
- SPIR's current leader, Amir Kazbek, is known to be very charismatic.\(^{252}\)

**Social Isolation**
- SPIR is known to operate an actual headquarters and have a strong presence in Chechnya.

**Factionalization**
- Despite having a total of seven commanders in seven years, SPIR has remained fully committed to its primary objective of driving Russia out of Chechnya and the creation of an independent Chechen state in the long term.\(^{253}\)

**General Planning Characteristics**

**Decision-Maker Time Horizon**
- Since all 41 terrorists, including Barayev, were killed during the Siege, it is unknown how much planning went into the Nord Ost Siege.

**Risk Threshold**
- The Nord Ost Siege was a high-risk and bold attack, taking place in the Russian capital, Moscow.

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\(^{245}\) Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat, pp. 39, 49.
\(^{247}\) START, “Terrorist Organization Profile.”
\(^{248}\) “Hostage-takers ‘ready to die.’ ”
\(^{249}\) Reed, Terror in Moscow.
\(^{250}\) “Hostage-takers ‘ready to die.’ “
\(^{251}\) Reed, Terror in Moscow.; “Hostage-takers ‘ready to die.’ “
\(^{252}\) START, “Terrorist Organization Profile.”
\(^{253}\) START, “Terrorist Organization Profile.”
Statements made by Barayev and other terrorists to reporters during the hostage crisis indicated that they knew they would not be leaving the theater alive and were more than willing to die.\textsuperscript{254}

In the months before the hostage crisis, the citizens of Moscow were reassured by Russian government officials that Chechnya was gradually being brought under Russian control.\textsuperscript{255}

**Operational Objectives**

- The operational objectives for the Nord Ost Siege were to use the hostages as leverage to force the Russian government to give into SPIR's long term objectives of Russian military withdrawal and Chechen independence.\textsuperscript{256}

**Attack Modalities**

**Choice of Weaponry**

- SPIR's weaponry is limited to small arms such as the assault rifles and pistols used during the Nord Ost Siege as well as the suicide vests and larger explosive device that were also used during the hostage crisis.
  - SPIR's operations have not necessitated the use of larger weapons, exotic, or CBRN weaponry.

**Choice of Tactical Methods**

- Barayev and his followers entered the theater by surprise and secured the lobby and corridors before entering the theater itself.
  - SPIR used the element of surprise so well that when they did storm the theater, the spectators thought that it was part of the performance.\textsuperscript{257}
  - The 22 men patrolled the lobby and corridors while the women with explosives strapped to their bodies remained in the theater itself guarding the hostages, prepared to detonate their explosives in case of a Russian rescue attempt.\textsuperscript{258}

**Target Selection**

- SPIR's attacks have been concentrated against Russians.
- With the exception of the Nord Ost Siege, SPIR's attacks have been directly against Russian military forces or against Chechens believed to be collaborating with the Russians.
- Although not against the Russian military or Chechen collaborators, the Nord Ost Siege still targeted only Russians.
  - Early in to the hostage crisis, Barayev released 150 hostages who were foreigners, Muslims, children, or Georgian citizens.\textsuperscript{259}

\textsuperscript{254} "Hostage-takers 'ready to die.' "


\textsuperscript{256} Reed, *Terror in Moscow*.

\textsuperscript{257} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{258} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{259} "Chechen gunmen seize Moscow theatre."
E. Chechen Budyonnovsk Hospital Hostage Crisis (nationalist separatist ideology)

VNSA Command and Control Group Profile

Chechen Rebels
Budennovsk Hospital Hostage Crisis, 1995
Group Type: Nationalist/Separatist
Command and Control Type: Assertive

Overview

The Budennovsk (also spelled Budyonnovsk) hospital hostage crisis occurred on June 14th, 1995 and continued until June 19th, 1995. Shamil Basayev led many handpicked Chechen fighters on a raid into Russia in order to take a large number of Russians hostage. Basayev and his fighters raided the town of Budennovsk in southern Russia, eventually seizing control of Budennovsk’s hospital and taking an estimated 1,000-2,000 Russians hostage. The Chechen rebels’ objective was to use the hostages as leverage to coerce the Russian government into suspending hostilities in Chechnya and to begin peace talks with Dzhokhar Dudayev’s separatist government. The rebels were led by Shamil Basayev, an infamous Chechen warlord, terrorist, and guerilla leader. The Budennovsk hospital hostage crisis was a watershed moment for the Chechen struggle against Russia, the Russians launched two rescue attempts to free the hostages, both of which failed. Russia was forced to negotiate with Basayev in order to release the hostages and eventually agreed to a cease-fire in Chechnya. The handling and aftermath of the hostage crisis created a serious political disaster for then Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

The Budennovsk hospital crisis occurred at a time when Russia was gaining the upper hand in its war in Chechnya. During the First Chechen War (1994-1996), Chechen leaders vowed to bring the war to Russian territory. On June 14th, 1995, Shamil Basayev and his fighters crossed the Chechen border into Russia’s Stravopol District. Basayev and his fighters traveled hidden in coffin-filled trucks that were supposedly carrying Russian war dead and led by a fake Russian police vehicle. Basayev was also able to bribe Russians guarding border checkpoints to ensure that the Chechen rebels safely crossed the border. After a routine stop, Russian police escorted Basayev’s convoy to the police headquarters in Budennovsk, at which point the Chechen rebels poured out of their trucks and opened fire on the Russian police officers and attacked the city of Budennovsk, firing rockets at cars, setting a bank on fire, attacking the main market, and raising the Chechen flag over Budennovsk’s town hall. Eventually, Basayev and his fighters gained control over Budennovsk’s hospital, sealing off the exits and taking approximately 1,500 patients, family members, and hospital staff hostage. 91 Russians, including 20 police officers and wounded Russian soldiers in the Budennovsk hospital, were killed by the Chechens in their initial attack.

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260 At this point in time Chechen rebels were acting as nationalist/separatist as opposed to jihadists. As Chechen expert Gordon Hahn explains, “[Shamil] Basayev had already been to Khost [Afghanistan] in April 1994 but to little effect. All [of Basayev’s entourage] got sick and they flew home without training. Even if Basayev had funding from [al-Qaeda] already, it’s not clear that he had already become a convert. [Emir] Khattab came to the North Caucasus probably after 1995 and even if before he would have had little time to spread much jihadi thought. So in general the Sufi nationalist interpretation of Basayev would be correct in 1995... "The [Chechen Republic of Ichkeria]was still overwhelmingly Sufi and Chechen nationalist at the time.” Gordon Hahn in telephone interview with Charles P. Blair.

261 The exact number of fighters that accompanied Basayev is unknown, estimates range from 50-150

262 Estimates of the total number of hostages varies, START and CNN list the number of hostages at 2,000 while The Washington Post and Raymond Finch state that there were approximately 1,000 or 1,500 hostages respectively. Valetin Eliseenko claimed that the number of hostages could have been as high as 2,500
Once in control of the hospital, Basayev issued the Russian forces that surrounded the hospital three demands: that Russia withdraw immediately from Chechnya, that President Yeltsin of Russia would immediately begin talks with General Dudayev of Chechnya, and that the Chechen rebels would be allowed to meet with reporters. Before Basayev’s first press conference from the hospital basement on the morning of June 15th, Basayev ordered the execution of five hostages because the journalists did not arrive on time. During Basayev’s first press conference, Basayev added two new demands in addition to his original three, amnesty for all Chechen fighters and free elections for Chechnya. Basayev also made it clear that more hostages would be killed if any of Basayev’s fighters were harmed. Five hostages would be executed if a Chechen rebel was wounded while ten would be executed if a Chechen rebel was killed. From the morning of June 15th to the morning of June 17th, negotiations between Basayev and the Russians were held hourly to no success and sporadic gunfire.

On June 17th, Russian Special Forces launched two attempts to retake the hospital, both of which were disastrous failures. The first rescue attempt began at 5:30 AM and the second attempt was launched at 2:00 PM. Over 100 hostages were killed as a result of both failed attempts by the Russian military. While exact numbers are not known, it is believed that more hostages were killed during the rescue attempts by Russian soldiers than by Chechen rebels. In between the two failed rescue attempts, Basayev released 150 children and pregnant women who were being held hostage. It was not until the fifth day of the crisis, June 18th, that the Russian government began considering negotiating with Basayev to end the hostage crisis.

Negotiations between Barayev and the Russian government were handled personally by the Russian Prime Minister, Victor Chernomydrin, by phone and were broadcast on Russian television channels nationally. Negotiations continued through the 19th and ended on the 20th. Over the course of the negotiations, the Chechens released some of their hostages, with a total of 400 being released by 4:30 PM on the 18th. In the end, Prime Minister Chernomydrin agreed to Basayev’s demands for a cease-fire in Chechnya and for peace negotiations. It was also agreed that the Russian government would provide Basayev and his fighters with safe transportation back to Chechnya. In order to guarantee the safety of his rebels traveling back to Chechnya, Basayev demanded “volunteer hostages,” mostly journalists and Russian Duma deputies, to travel in the convoy with the rebels back to Chechnya as protection. On June 20th, a convoy of six buses and a refrigerated truck (to carry the bodies of dead Chechens) transported the Chechen rebels as well as approximately 100-120 “volunteer hostages” safely away from Budennovsk back to Chechnya.

I. Command and Control Analysis: Assertive

Available evidence of Shamil Basayev’s actions during the Budennovsk hospital hostage crisis indicates that Basayev’s command and control during the crisis was highly assertive. Assertive command and control means that the leadership maintains control (either in person or through subordinates) over relevant aspects of the operation. An assertive command and control posture allows for the leadership to make changes “on the fly.” All of the major decisions and actions during the hostage crisis were taken or ordered by Shamil Basayev himself. The clearest indication of assertive command and control was that Basayev was the only Chechen to negotiate with Prime Minister Victor Chernomydrin, only the most senior member of the Chechen forces in the hospital would likely speak to the Russian Prime Minister. Basayev also had an extensive history of being a competent military leader in Chechen circles. No evidence suggests that Basayev made contact with any other Chechen leaders such as Dudayev during the crisis. Furthermore, Basayev was the only Chechen who held press conferences from inside the hospital and was the only Chechen to be interviewed by journalists.

II. Incident Details

Place and Time
- Date & Time: Event began approximately at noon on June 14, 1995 and lasted until the night of June 20th, 1995.
- Place: City of Budennovsk, Budennovsk hospital.

Target
- Basayev's primary target was any large concentration of Russian civilians that could be taken hostage. Budennovsk had a population of approximately 100,000.

Perpetrators
- 50-150 Chechen fighters led by Shamil Basayev.

Reasons for Target Selection
- Budennovsk was a small town with a population of 100,000 and was only approximately 120 kilometers north of the border with Chechnya.
- One reason given for Basayev choosing to remain in the hospital aside from the large number of potential hostages is that several of his rebels were wounded in the initial fighting in Budennovsk.

Degree of Autonomy
- Shamil Basayev was in charge for the entirety of the hostage crisis.
  - Basayev was a senior leader in Chechen resistance against the Russians.
  - Basayev handled all contact with the press during the crisis.
  - Basayev spoke directly with Russia’s Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrin in negotiations.

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266 In interviews during the crisis, Basayev claimed that the original target was Moscow but the price of bribing Russian officials was too high; Finch, “A Face of Future Battle: Chechen Fighter Shamil Basayev.”; Fred Hiatt, “Hostage Crisis Further Damaging Yeltsin’s Already Low Popularity,” The Washington Post, June 18, 1995. Available at: http://w3.nexis.com/new/docview/getDocForCuiReq?lni=3S7T-4W50-0088-P4WH&csi=8075&oc=00240&perma=true.
268 Finch, “A Face of Future Battle: Chechen Fighter Shamil Basayev.”
269 Ibid.
Armaments Used by the Perpetrators

- Automatic rifles, machine guns, and grenade launchers

Tactics Employed by the Perpetrators

- The terrorists snuck across the Chechen-Russia border in trucks disguised as carrying the coffins of Russian war dead, bribed their way past Russian border checkpoints.
- Budennovsk’s police station was the terrorist’s first target.
- Basayev used the hostages to coerce the Russian government into meeting his original demands as well as to comply with new demands made during the hostage crisis.
- Hostages were used as human shields throughout the hostage crisis, including during both of the failed rescue attempts.

Casualties

- 129-154 civilians were killed.
- 415 people were wounded, although 18 of these later died from their wounds.

Perpetrator Objectives

- Basayev’s three original primary objectives were to coerce the Russian government into withdrawing its military from Chechnya immediately, that President Yeltsin would immediately begin peace negotiations with Chechnya’s General Dudayev, and that the rebels would be allowed to meet with reporters.
  - In his first press conference from the hospital, Basayev listed two additional objectives, amnesty for all Chechen fighters and free elections for Chechnya.

Outcome

- Basayev’s operation was a tremendous success.
- The Russian government agreed to the immediate cessation of combat in Chechnya and to begin peace negotiations with the Chechens in exchange for the release of all remaining hostages.
  - Basayev held on to approximately 100-120 “volunteer hostages” as protection from Russian military reprisals on their return to Chechnya to be released after Basayev and his fighters crossed the border safely.
- Shamil Basayev became a hero in Chechnya and became one of if not the central figure in the Chechen war effort.

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273 Sumner, “Success of Terrorism in War: The Case of Chechnya.”
275 Ibid.
277 Ibid.
278 Gazeta, “History of Chechen rebels’ hostage taking.” Available at: http://www.gazeta.ru/2002/10/24/HistoryofChe.shtml; Sumner, “Success of Terrorism in War: The Case of Chechnya.”
279 Gazeta, “History of Chechen rebels' hostage taking.”
280 Specter, “Chechen Rebels Said to Kill Hostages at Russian Hospital.”
281 Ibid.
284 Sumner, “Success of Terrorism in War: The Case of Chechnya.”
President Yeltsin of Russia suffered a political disaster from the two botched rescue operations and from directly negotiating with a terrorist.  

III. Perpetrator's Characteristics

Ideaology

World Views

- The Chechen independence movement of the mid 1990s was primarily nationalist/separatist, fighting a war of independence against Russia.

Group Norms

- Although some Chechen independence groups would later become Islamic and religious in nature, throughout the 1990s, Chechen organizations were secular.

Grand Strategy

- Chechen resistance organizations were committed to armed resistance against Russian security forces.
- After the Budennovsk hostage crisis, Basayev and other Chechen groups increasingly used terrorist tactics against Russia.

Perceptual Filters

- At the time of the Budennovsk hostage crisis, the Russian military was gaining the upper hand in Chechnya.
  - Russian military leaders were claiming that the war was almost over.
- Dzhokhar Dudayev, the leader of the independent Chechen government, remarked that “the struggle is not over, it assumes new forms,” hinting at a shift in Chechen tactics to attacks such as Budennovsk.

Organizational Structure

- The Chechen independence movement had its own government, led by Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former Soviet Air Force General.
- Shamil Basayev was one of Dudayev’s top lieutenants.
  - Basayev had a force of Chechen fighters very loyal to him known as the “Abkhaz battalion.”

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286 Specter, “Chechen Rebels Said to Kill Hostages at Russian Hospital.”
287 START, “Terrorist Organization Program: Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR).” Available at: http://start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3732.
288 Ibid.
289 Ibid.
290 Sumner, “Success of Terrorism in War: The Case of Chechnya.”
291 Finch, “A Face of Future Battle: Chechen Fighter Shamil Basayev.”
292 Ibid.
293 Ibid.
294 Ibid.
295 Specter, “Chechen Rebels Said to Kill Hostages at Russian Hospital.”
296 Finch, “A Face of Future Battle: Chechen Fighter Shamil Basayev.”
Demographics

- Coverage of and evidence from the Budennovsk hostage crisis indicates that all of the Chechen fighters were men.
- While most Chechens are Muslims, militant Islam was not a guiding principle of the Chechen independence movement in the mid 1990s.
- Chechen fighters were largely veterans of the Soviet War in Afghanistan or were once mercenaries in Abkhazia and Azerbaijan.

Resources

- In the Budennovsk operation, Basayev was able to acquire two large trucks to transport 50-150 terrorists into Russia as well as create an improvised dummy police vehicle to escort them through Russia.
- Basayev also had enough funding to bribe Russian border checkpoint guards.
- At the onset of the First Chechen War in December 1994, Chechen forces raided several Russian arms depots and were able to acquire artillery, armored vehicles, and anti-tank weapons.

Organizational Life Cycle Status

- The Chechen independence movement began in October 1991 during the collapse of the Soviet Union with the election of Dudayev to the Chechen presidency.
  - After the election, President Yeltin declared a State of Emergency in Chechnya, which led to Dudayev declaring martial law in Chechnya.
- Full scale war in Chechnya did not begin until the Russian military invaded in December 1994.
- By the time of the Budennovsk crisis, the Chechen independence movement appeared to be close to defeat, the resistances’ final stronghold was under siege by the Russians.

Operational Capabilities

Technical Expertise

- Chechen fighters were much better trained than their Russian counterparts as they were largely veterans of the Soviet War in Afghanistan or were once mercenaries in Abkhazia and Azerbaijan.

Propensity to Innovate

- The Budennovsk crisis was the first time Chechen rebels used terror tactics against Russian civilians.
  - After Budennovsk, Basayev and other Chechen rebels increasingly used terrorist tactics against Russian civilians.

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297 START, “Terrorist Organization Program: Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR).” Available at: http://start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3732.
299 Sumner, “Success of Terrorism in War: The Case of Chechnya.”
300 Finch, “A Face of Future Battle: Chechen Fighter Shamil Basayev.”; Specter, “Chechen Rebels Said to Kill Hostages at Russian Hospital.”; Sumner, “Success of Terrorism in War: The Case of Chechnya.”
301 Finch, “A Face of Future Battle: Chechen Fighter Shamil Basayev.”; Hiatt, “Hostage Crisis Further Damaging Yeltsin’s Already Low Popularity.”
302 Sumner, “Success of Terrorism in War: The Case of Chechnya.”
303 Ibid.
304 Ibid.
305 Finch, “A Face of Future Battle: Chechen Fighter Shamil Basayev.”
306 Sumner, “Success of Terrorism in War: The Case of Chechnya.”
create political strife in Russia as well as demoralize the Russian military.

Organizational Dynamics

Leadership Style
- Basayev was a very charismatic leader, he was well respected as an excellent leader in combat. Basayev also demonstrated care for his fighters, one of the reasons given for why Basayev chose the hospital was because some of the Chechen rebels

Social Isolation
- Chechen rebel groups operated throughout the entirety of Chechnya

Factionization
- General Dudayev never had control over all of the Chechen armed forces. However, Basayev was very loyal to him.

General Planning Characteristics

Decision-Maker Time Horizon
- By early June, the Chechens were growing very desperate; with Russian forces closing in on the final remaining Chechen stronghold, Basayev did not have a lot of time to plan the attack.

Risk Threshold
- The Budennovsk hostage crisis was a high-risk operation as it took place on Russian territory.
- In televised press interviews, Basayev was seen wearing a green ribbon, which identified him as a Chechen suicide fighter, indicating that he was willing to die for his cause if necessary.

Operational Objectives
- Basayev’s three original primary objectives were to coerce the Russian government into withdrawing its military from Chechnya immediately, that President Yeltsin would immediately begin peace negotiations with Chechnya’s General Dudayev, and that the rebels would be allowed to meet with reporters. These objectives are similar to those of other Chechen resistance organizations, which were all fighting for the creation of an independent Chechen state.

Attack Modalities

Choice of Weaponry

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307 Ibid.
309 Ibid.
310 Ibid.
311 Finch, “A Face of Future Battle: Chechen Fighter Shamil Basayev.”
312 Ibid; Cf. Finch notes that despite statements from Chechen leaders warning of attacks into Russia, Russian border security was highly inadequate.
313 Ibid.
314 Ibid, “Chechen Rebels Said to Kill Hostages at Russian Hospital.”
While Basayev's force in the Budennovsk hostage crisis only used automatic rifles, machine guns, and grenade launchers (likely because anything larger would be too noticeable), the Chechen resistance had access to armored vehicles, anti-tank weapons, and artillery due to successful raids on Russian arms depots.

**Choice of Tactical Methods**

- The Chechens resorted to terror tactics like those used in Budennovsk at first seemingly out of desperation when Russian military forces had the upper hand before the hostage crisis.
- The use of the so-called “volunteer hostages” guaranteed that once Basayev and his fighters left the hospital to head back to Chechnya that the Russian military would not attack them.

**Target Selection**

- Basayev's primary target was any large concentration of Russian civilians that could be taken hostage. Budennovsk had a population of approximately 100,000.
- Any large concentration of Russian civilians would have sufficed.

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315 Sumner, “Success of Terrorism in War: The Case of Chechnya.”
316 Finch, “A Face of Future Battle: Chechen Fighter Shamil Basayev.”
317 Agentura, “Budennovsk.”; Sumner, “Success of Terrorism in War: The Case of Chechnya.”
318 In interviews during the crisis, Basayev claimed that the original target was Moscow but the price of bribing Russian officials was too high; Finch, “A Face of Future Battle: Chechen Fighter Shamil Basayev.”; Hiatt, “Hostage Crisis Further Damaging Yeltsin’s Already Low Popularity.”
F. Aldo Moro Assassination

VNSA Command and Control Group Profile
Brigate Rosse (BR: The Red Brigades)
Assassination of Spanish Prime Minister Aldo Moro
Group Type: Communist Socialist
Command and Control Type: Assertive

Overview

On March 16, 1978 the leftist group, The Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse in Italian) ambushed the two vehicles escorting the former Prime Minister, Aldo Moro, while he was on his way to conclude a power sharing agreement between the Democratic Christian Party and the Italian Communist Party that would unify government for the first time in decades. The Red Brigades sought to stop this from occurring and to show the Italian government they were powerful enough to strike at its heart.

After 55 days in captivity, the government continued to refuse to negotiate for Moro’s life, and at that time Mario Moretti, the leader of the Rome Column of the Red Brigades, decided to take Moro’s life. His body was discovered later that day in Rome.

The Red Brigades were born out of the protest movements in the 1960s. They believed they could bring about a popular revolution to unseat the capitalist democratic government in Italy and replace it with a purely socialist one, as had been done in both Russia and China.

They grew in size and strength and reached the pinnacle of their existence until they kidnapped and murdered Moro. The murder of Moro shocked the Italian public and they hemorrhaged support from their base. This was the beginning of the end, and the group would lose power quickly and eventually fizzle out by 1988.

I. Command and Control Analysis: Assertive

Commander of the Rome Column, Mario Moretti displayed a strictly assertive command system, in which Moretti had sole authority over the direction of the mission. Not only did he interrogate Moro and preside over his trial, Moretti made every decision regarding Moro over the course of the 55 days. It is also likely, though unconfirmed, that Moretti was in charge of the precise planning of the kidnapping.

At the end of the 55 days, it was Moretti, undeterred by the discontent from some of his fellow Red Brigades members, who executed Moro, believing that his death would spark the beginning of a socialist revolution.

II. Incident Details

Date, Time, Location
- March 16, 1978\(^{319}\)
- Time of Kidnapping: Approximately 09:00 hrs.\(^ {320}\)

Moro would be held for 55 days\textsuperscript{321}

- **Locations:**
  - Kidnapping took place on via Fani\textsuperscript{322}
  - Moro was held in Rome, at an apartment, for the duration of his captivity\textsuperscript{323}
  - The body of Moro was located on via Caetani, in the trunk of a car.\textsuperscript{324}

**Target**

- **Aldo Moro**

**Perpetrators\textsuperscript{325}**

- Kidnapping, all dressed in Alitalia uniforms.
  - Mario Moretti
  - Aliesso Casimirri
  - Alvaro Loiacono
  - Rita Algranati
  - Bruno Seghetti
  - Barbara Balzerani
  - Franco Bonisoli
  - Raffaele Fiore
  - Prospero Gallinari
  - Valerio Morucci
- Captivity in the “People’s Prison”\textsuperscript{326}
  - Anna Laura Braghetti
  - Prospero Gallinari
  - Germano Maccari
  - Mario Moretti

**Target Choice Reasoning**

- Moro was chosen because he had brokered a power-sharing deal between the Christian Democrats and the Communist party. This enraged people on both the right and left sides of the political spectrum. The Red Brigades in particular viewed Moro, and the deal, a compromise between both ends of the political spectrum, as threatening to the successful beginning of their armed socialist revolution and so they kidnapped him.\textsuperscript{327}

**Degree of Autonomy**

- It is unclear what kind of connection there was between the Rome Column and the central leadership of the Red Brigades but, Mario Moretti, the man in charge of the Rome Column, was completely in control of “Operation Fritz” from beginning to end. Moretti undertook the principal planning for the operation, and claims that he was the only man to interrogate and was eventually responsible for pulling the trigger on the firearm(s) that killed Moro.\textsuperscript{328}

**Weapons**

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\textsuperscript{320} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{321} Ibid, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{324} Crettez, “An Economic Analysis of the Aldo,” p. 23.
\textsuperscript{325} Ibid, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{326} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{327} Ibid, 21; Drake, *The Aldo Moro Murder Case*, pp. 118-119.
The actual weapons used are unknown. Though, they are described as a combination of automatic sub-machine guns and semi-automatic pistols.329 There is a minor discrepancy with who actually killed Moro. Moretti claims he was the sole shooter, but rounds from two distinct weapons were recovered from Moro’s body during the autopsy.

Tactics

Kidnapping

- A tactic used several times by the Red Brigades, who would take a prominent figure hostage and then negotiate with the government to either concede a political point in the media as a public spectacle or for prisoner exchange.330

Surprise

- As usual with Red Brigade attacks, the emphasis on surprise was paramount. They wanted to give their targets as little time to react as possible and thus planned accordingly to achieve surprise.331

Reconnaissance

- The perpetrators carefully observed Moro’s activities in the weeks leading up to the attack. This information was then used to orchestrate the final plan to kidnap Moro. They even slashed the tires of a flower vendor who frequently sold on that street the day before to ensure there wouldn’t be any witnesses.332

Casualties

- 5 Bodyguards escorting Moro333
  - Oreste Leonardi
  - Domenico Ricci
  - Raffaele Iozzino
  - Giulio Rivera
  - Francesco Zizzi
  - Survived the initial attack but later died of his wounds in the hospital

Objectives

- They wished to hold a mock trial as they had in previous kidnappings to reveal the government’s wrongdoings. During his 55 days in captivity Moro would give up little information of use to Moretti. They went forward with the mock trial anyway, finding Moro guilty and sentencing him to death.
- Eventually, despite the declared death sentence, the Red Brigades offered to exchange Moro for the following political prisoners:334
  - Sante Notarnicola
  - Mario Rossi
  - Giuseppe Battaglia
  - Augusto Viel

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The government subsequently refused to release these prisoners. Moretti feared discovery and realized there would be no negotiation for Moro’s life, he decided to execute Moro on May 9. Moretti said he killed Moro in an attempt to ignite the communist revolution of the Red Brigades.

**Outcome**

- 5 bodyguards are slain during the kidnapping
- Moro is slain after 55 days in captivity
- Due to Moro’s murder, the support base of the Red Brigades begins to fall apart, with people on both right and left sides of the political spectrum denouncing Moro’s murder.\(^{335}\)

### III. Perpetrator Characteristics and Its Command and Control

**Ideology**

**World View**

- The members of the Red Brigade like to think of themselves as true Marxists. They believed in setting up a socialist state like Lenin in Russia and Mao in China. In order to do that, they advocated an armed revolution to challenge the capitalist government of Italy.\(^{336}\)

**Group Norms**

- The Red Brigades believed in an extremist form of Marxism. They were uncompromising in their pursuit of ideological goals. They possessed a high disposition toward violence and truly believed their fight with the Italian state was inevitable and would eventually result in victory for communism. The group itself was formed from students who were part of the world wide protest movement surrounding the Vietnam war in the 1960s.\(^{337}\)

**Grand Strategy**

- The end goal for the Red Brigades was to ignite a popular revolution, similar to ones that took place in Russia and China, with the goal of establishing a socialist government in place of the current capitalist government. Their strategy can be divided into four periods:
  - 1969 – 1972: During this phase they operated primarily in Milan, participating in propaganda activities and firebombing private industry.\(^{338}\)
  - 1972 – 1974: Operations expanded to Turin and Genoa. During this period they focused on kidnappings and using them to attract.\(^{339}\)

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\(^{336}\) Smith, “The Italian Red Brigades,” p. 20; Sundquist “Political Terrorism,” p. 60; All-art.org “Italy Since 1945.”


\(^{338}\) Ibid, 19.

\(^{339}\) Ibid.
1974 – 1976: Attacks expanded past private businesses and focused more so on government. During this period the group re-aligned itself into a more nationalistic movement that supported the worker's movement in Italy, expanding its brutal operations.

1977-1978: Strategy of Liquidation, in which attacks were carried out almost daily. It was during this time period that Moro was kidnapped. While he was held hostage Red Brigade members carried out various attacks.

**Perceptual Filters**

- As stated above, the Red Brigades truly believed they were in the right in fighting the Italian government. They thought themselves to be more than just a protest movement. They thought it was, as stated by Marx natural, that the people would rise up against a capitalist government and replace it with a socialist one.

**Organizational Structure**

Degree of Centralization and Bureaucratic Sophistication

- At the top of the organization sat the Strategic Directorate
  - This group was responsible for forming the political organization’s programming. It was also supposed to be a hub of information between the different columns, or groups operating in different regions of Italy.
  - Below the Strategic Directive sat the Executive Committee, which managed the columns.
  - Below the Executive Committee, the group was arranged into six columns at the time Moro was kidnapped. They were located in:
    - Milan
    - Genoa
    - Turin
    - Rome
    - Naples
    - Vento
  - Columns were also divided into cells. Each column had a specific agenda, such as the Rome Column’s directive to attack the Italian government, and they reported vertically up the chain of command to the Strategic Directorate. The columns themselves appear to have been run in a very militaristic manner, with the power residing exclusively with the leader of a column, who was in turn commanded by the Strategic Directorate. The command structure, and division of the columns allowed for compartmentalization, which prevented other arms of the organization from being able to compromise the rest if captured.
  - There was also a group sympathizers who assisted in maintaining the Red Brigades’ network of people.

**Group Size**

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340 Ibid.
341 Sundquist, “Political Terrorism,” p. 58.
343 Ibid, p. 16.
344 Ibid, p. 18; Sundquist “Political Terrorism,” p. 57.
345 Ibid.
In 1978 group size was between 400 and 500 members living underground. There were approximately 1000 people who supporters or sympathizers but not active participants.349

**Demographics**

- The membership of the Red Brigades was at its beginning, composed of idealistic university students who believed in the teachings of Karl Marx.350 As the group grew they began to recruit students in other parts of Italy. They also began recruiting the unemployed and anyone else who exhibited desires for revolution. By the assassination of Moro, most members were in their 30s and 40s, as many members had their roots and ties in the 1960s protest movements.351 Men and women were represented in membership, however, the exact proportion is unknown.

**Resources**

**Financial Resources**

- The group procured funds through kidnappings and bank robberies. It is unclear how large their resource pool actually was, but they retained enough funds to pay a salary to each of its 400-500 active members of approximately $400 per month.352

**Logistic Resources**

- Like many other aspects of the group, the size and scope of its operational capacity was considerable. Its exact structure is unclear, however, there appears to have been a large network of safe houses and hiding places, as well as a vast communication network to keep all 500 members in touch with their column's command.

**Physical Resources**

- The Red Brigades had access to automatic and semi-automatic small arms, as well as some explosives, even though it appears explosives were not the preferred weapon of the group. They also had access to vehicles.

**Human Resources**

- The Red Brigades occasionally had contacts with other “red” organizations around Europe, specifically the German Red Army Faction. It is also thought that they had some contact with the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The group is thought to have been fairly self-sufficient and the contact with outside organizations is believed to be relatively limited.353

**Organizational Life Cycle Status**

- The organization went into decline following the Moro murder and General Dozier kidnapping.354 The group then split into two smaller groups in 1984. They continued to exist, but barely, conducting few attacks, until the group finally came to an operational halt in 1989. There were small hints of resurgence in the 1990s and again in 2002-2003, but they were snuffed out by Italian authorities.355

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351 Ibid, 16; “Brigate Rosse.”


355 Sundquist, "Political Terrorism," pp. 61-62; "Brigate Rosse."
Information on the Red Brigades operational capabilities is limited but the following can be derived:

Specialized skills
- Members were proficient in the use of various firearms.

Technical skills
- There was some limited understanding of explosives, as many of the group’s first attacks were fire bombings.

Propensity to Innovate
- Like many other groups that operated in Europe during that time period, propensity to innovate was fairly low. The weapons used were all standard small arms or minor explosives. The tactics employed generally stayed the same from operation to operation and led to ineffectiveness after some time, as it did with the governments unwillingness to negotiate for Moro, after it negotiated with the Red Brigades twice before for prominent men they had kidnapped.

Familiarity With the Target Environment
- The Red Brigades were very familiar with the target environment because, as native Italians, they lived, worked, and hid in it. They were the same cultural and lingual demographic as most Italians.

Knowledge of the Target
- The Red Brigades typically shadowed their target, which was most often human targets, learning as much as they could before they acted. They did this to ensure an element of surprise.356

Organizational Dynamics

Leadership style
- Relatively little is known about how the leadership functioned after the first round-up of the founding members. Though little information is available on Mario Moretti, it is clear that he was authoritarian in his command over the Rome Column of the Red Brigades. He made all the decisions regarding Moro during the 55-day ordeal; he was the only one to interrogate Moro, and he was ultimately the man who killed Moro, or so he claims.357

Social Isolation
- The leadership of the Red Brigades lived underground like the rest of the hardcore members of the organization, so contact was fairly direct in that sense. Contact with the less involved support network surrounding the hardcore members may have been lacking, but the secret sympathies or supporters of the Red Brigades had no part in the execution of operations.358

Fractionalization
- It is suggested, in some of the testimony given during the second trial for the murder of Moro, that some of the members advocated for his release.359 It is unknown how much of that is fact or fabricated to obtain lesser prison sentences.

Regardless of discontent, the group for the most part was unified under Moretti throughout the ordeal and made little effort to stop him from killing Moro.360

General Planning Characteristics

Decision Maker Time Horizon
- According to testimony given at the second murder trial, the Rome Column meticulously planned out every detail possible for the kidnapping of Moro.361 They needed to intercept Moro before the compromise made between the Democratic Christian and Communist parties was ratified. So despite being pressed for time, they still remained detail oriented.

Risk Threshold
- The risk threshold for this group was fairly high, at least while things were going well. During the lead up to the Moro Kidnapping, Red Brigades members grew increasingly bold in their attacks on various prominent figures.362 They were obviously aware of the threat to life and limb but acted anyway. After the Moro murder, and the foiled Dozier kidnapping, members increasingly sought to secure reduced prison sentences by turning on their fellow members.363

Operational Objectives

Broad
- The overarching goal of the group was to ignite a popular revolution that would replace the capitalist government of Italy with a socialist one.

Strategic
- They planned on igniting that revolution by targeting prominent figures (whether that meant kidnapping or killing them) in private business and government during their Strategy of Liquidation phase of operation in 1978. This thought process was derived from the Russian experience in the early 1900s.364

Attack Modalities

Weapons
- Small arms, Automatic and Semi-automatic
- Occasional explosives

Tactics
- Surprise: the group planned in the most detailed manner possible to catch their targets by surprise, minimizing their ability to react.
- Kidnapping: The group used kidnapping as a means to make a political point, secure funds, or attempt to secure the release of prisoners.365 They would also use these kidnappings to garner media attention, as they did with the Moro kidnapping.366
- Assassinations and wounding targets: During the Strategy of Liquidation period they would kill or wound (“knee-capping” – shooting a target in the leg) targets to make examples of them.367

360 Kratz, “The Man Who Killed.”
362 Ibid.
363 Ibid, p. 22.
Insiders and Outsiders

- Supposedly, the members of the group who supported the Red Brigades, but lived normal lives held positions in government and private industry. They could have provided information to the hardcore elements of the group.

Target Selection

- Targets were selected due to their prominence in government, in private business or in the Democratic Christian party of Italy.\textsuperscript{368} Moro was specifically targeted due to his prominence in government, but also due to the power sharing deal he was about to make between the Democratic Christian and Communist party. The Red Brigades did not want compromise, they wanted armed revolution, so they had to stop him. The prominent targets were selected and attacked in an effort to ignite revolution like the Marxists did in Russia.

\textsuperscript{368} O’Leary, “Dead Man Walking,” p. 35.
G. Mumbai

VNSA Command and Control Group Profile

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT: Army of the Pure)
The Mumbai Attacks, 2008
Group Type: Nationalist/Sepratist/Religious
Command and Control Type: Assertive

Overview

The Mumbai attacks began at 21:30hrs on November 26, 2008 when 10 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) militants arrived at Mumbai’s coast from the Pakistani port city of Karachi. The attack on Mumbai continued for 62 hours until the last of the attackers were killed by Indian commandos at the Taj Hotel at 08:00 on November 29, 2008. While the militants had predetermined targets, their ultimate goal was to kill as many people as possible, specifically targeting foreigners in the city. Ultimately, they sought to maximize the chaos inflicted on India’s commercial and entertainment capital.

Once on shore, the ten men split into four action teams, three with two men each and one with four men. One two man team departed from the arrival point for Mumbai’s main train station, Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST), where they randomly opened fire on commuters. This attack continued for 90 minutes until the arrival of well-armed police units forced the militants to leave the station. The team then headed to the Cama and Ablless hospital, where they continued their rampage. After escaping with a police car, these two militants continued towards the Trident-Oberoi Hotel. Then, having been forced to turn back, they hijacked another vehicle, but were finally subdued by the police. Unlike other targets, which sought to kill foreigners, this particular attack team seemed to focus on killing regular Indian citizens because it is suspected that this would strike greater fear in the thousands of Indians that travel through this rail hub on a daily basis.

The second team traveled to Nariman House, a complex that was run by the Jewish Chabad Lubavitch movement. Along the way to Nariman House, they also lobbed several grenades at a petrol pump and indiscriminately opened fire. Once at Nariman House, the terrorist took 13 people hostage, out of which five were executed. The last two man team headed to the Trident-Oberoi Hotel, where they also fired

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371 Binnie “In the Line of Fire: Could Mumbai Happen Again?”
372 Ibid.
375 Ibid, pp.5-6.
376 Ibid.
377 Ibid, pp.5-6.
378 Ibid, pp. 5-6.
indiscriminately. By the time the two militants at the Oberoi Hotel were killed 17 hours later, they had murdered 30 people.\textsuperscript{380}

The last team, which was composed of four men, began its rampage by opening fire in Leopold Café, a popular hangout for both the city’s elite and foreigners alike.\textsuperscript{381} Next, the terrorists walked about 100 meters into a back entrance of the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, a historical icon of Mumbai, and resumed their killing spree.\textsuperscript{382} The militants then traveled through the hotel killing guests and setting multiple fires to further confuse the responding police. The Taj Hotel siege lasted for another 60 hours until commandos stormed the hotel, killing the remaining terrorists.\textsuperscript{383}

India has argued that LeT needed cooperation from Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to carry out the Mumbai attacks.\textsuperscript{384} LeT was developed with the support of ISI officers as a proxy force to challenge Indian forces that control a Muslim majority Kashmir. However, at the time of the Mumbai attacks, the exact nature of the relationship between the ISI and the LeT could not be unconfirmed.\textsuperscript{385}

I. Command and Control Analysis: Assertive

Based on the organizational structure, operational procedures, and other characteristics, it is clear that LeT primarily relies on an assertive system to carry out attacks.

LeT is known to possess a hierarchic organizational structure, with a focus around its central leadership, which includes Hafeez Mohammed Saeed.\textsuperscript{386} The group also has a charitable branch called, Jamaat-ud-Dawah, that is believed to be a front for the organization.\textsuperscript{387} LeT and its charitable front currently have multiple branches across Pakistan, which are thought to facilitate recruitment, fundraising, and delivery of social services.\textsuperscript{388} Furthermore, LeT has a military like structure where a hierarchy of leadership exerts influence over a particular geographic area.\textsuperscript{389}

This organizational structure was also demonstrated in the Mumbai attacks because the terrorists were known to have been in constant communication using satellite phones, and blackberries with their handlers back in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{390} Transcripts obtained by Indian investigators indicate that these handlers would urge the terrorist to continue the rampage, insisting that the honor of Islam was at stake, and they also provided the terrorists with tactical guidance, some of which they obtained from following live news

\textsuperscript{380} Ibid, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{381} Ibid, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{382} Ibid, p.6.
\textsuperscript{383} Ibid, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{384} This command and control analysis focuses on LeT and not that of the ISI. However, it is important to note that ISI involvement has been critical for LeT. The ISI has been known to provide funding for LeT and also provides protection for the organization and its leadership. For example, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, LeT’s leader, currently lives freely in Pakistan. At the same time, it is plausible that LeT carried out this operation on its own. It is well known for its high operational capability. LeT is a member of Usama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front (IIF) for Jihad against the Crusaders and the Jewish people and as a result it is well connected financially and also in terms of resources such as safe houses. \textsuperscript{386} Tellis, “The Lessons of Mumbai,” pp. 15-17. Charles Blair, “Anatomizing Non-State Threats to Pakistan’s Nuclear Infrastructure: The Pakistani Neo-Taliban,” Federation of American Scientist, June 2011. p. 94. Available at: http://www.fas.org/pubs/ docs/Terrorism_Analysis_Report_1-lowres.pdf
\textsuperscript{385} Ibid, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{386} Ibid, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{387} Ibid, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{388} Ibid, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{389} Ibid, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{390} Ibid, p. 13.
Because of the frequent communication and continued guidance from the handlers, it is clear to understand that the Mumbai attack was not entirely preplanned.

II. Incident Details

Place and Time

- Date & Time: Event began at 21:30hrs on Nov. 26 and ended at 08:00hrs Nov. 29 1985

- Place: Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, Cama & Albless Hospital, Nariman House, Leopold Café, Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, and the Trident-Oberoi Hotel - all located in South Mumbai, Maharashtra, India

Target

- Assault South Mumbai and maximize number of deaths
  - Main Targets:
    - Chahatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST)
    - Nariman House
    - Leopold Café
    - Taj Mahal Palace Hotel
    - Trident-Oberoi Hotel
  - Secondary Targets:
    - Cama & Albless Hospital
    - Nariman Point Petrol Pump

Perpetrators

- 10 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) militants divided into 4 teams:
  - Attack Team 1 – two person team that attacked CST
    - 2 men (one was Azam Amir Kasab, the sole surviving terrorist)
    - Mission: Inflict maximum number of casualties at CST and Cama & Albless Hospital
  - Attack Team 2 – two person team that attacked Nariman House
    - 2 men
    - Mission: Take foreigners hostage at Nariman House and execute them
  - Attack Team 3 – two person team that assaulted Trident-Oberoi Hotel
    - 2 men
    - Mission: Maximize number of casualties at Trident-Oberoi Hotel
  - Attack Team 4 – four person team that fired at Leopold Café and Taj Mahal Palace Hotel
    - Mission: Inflict most number of deaths at these two sites and to also cause chaos to confuse police responders

Reasons for Target Selection

- Public Appeal: South Mumbai is considered the cultural and economic heart of Mumbai and an area popular with the Indian elite as well as foreigners. Attacking

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393 Ibid, pp. 1-3.
both legendary sites such as the Taj Hotel, Leopold Café, and Trident-Oberoi would evoke the emotional response that terrorist seek. At the same time, attacking the CST demonstrated that even everyday Mumbaikars would not be spared from the terrorist's wrath. Based on intercepted communication between the terrorists and their handlers, it is suspected that the attack on Nariman House was to “spoil relations between India and Israel.”

- **Accessibility:** All of the sites attacked were soft targets and security forces that were present tended to be lightly armed and thus easy to overcome. At the same time, the general area of South Mumbai was easily accessible from the sea.

**Degree of Autonomy**

- During the course of the operation there was significant communication between the terrorists and their handlers in Pakistan.

**Armaments used by the Perpetrators**

The weapons brought by perpetrators during the initial attacks are listed below. Weapons were listed as being brought with the perpetrators during the initial attack area below. The perpetrators possibly took weapons marked with * from dead India police forces.

- AK-56 assault rifle
- Seven AK-56 assault rifle magazines with 30 rounds each
- Heckler & Koch MP5 machine guns*
- 9-mm pistols with two clips of ammunition
- 8-10 hand grenades each
- 5 Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
  - Each device contained high explosive RDX, ball bearings, a digital timer, and a 9-volt batter

**Tactics Employed by the Perpetrators**

**Battle Tactics**

- Armed assaults
- Building takeover
- Drive-by shootings
- Hostage situations
- Prefabricated IEDs
- Targeted killings
- Carjackings

**Negotiating Tactics**

- **Call to the news media:** terrorists contacted news media using mobile phones to make demands in return for the release of hostages at the Nariman House.

**Casualties**

- Nine of the ten terrorists were killed during the attacks
  - Azam Amir Kasab, who assaulted CST, was captured alive
- **Civilian Casualties:**
  - Indians: 138
  - Policemen and Commandos: 17
  - Foreigners: 28
- **Total Casualty Count:** 166

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396 Ibid, p. 5.
397 Ibid, pp. 5-8.
Perpetrator Objectives

- Kill as many people as possible
  - Specifically target foreigners
- Create chaos in Mumbai
- Take hostages at Nariman House and execute them

Outcome

- All but one of the terrorist is killed
- Approximately 166 people are killed
- Taj Mahal Palace hotel is severely damaged by assault and subsequent fires

III. The Group’s Characteristics

Ideology

- LeT’s ideology is multifaceted. On the one hand, LeT is dedicated to a nationalist objective to oust Indian forces from the predominantly Muslim region of Kashmir on the India-Pakistan Northeastern Border in order to secure the territory for predominantly Muslim Pakistan. On the other hand, LeT is an Islamist organization bent on reestablishing the caliphate and absorbing Kashmir into a global Muslim community (umma). Specifically, LeT espouses fundamentalist Wahhabi tenets of Islam. As a result of the religio-political conflict in Kashmir, LeT considers India to be part of a perceived alliance with Zionists and the West that constitutes an existential enemy of Islam. It should be noted that the group’s ideology is convoluted by Pakistani state sponsorship. Although Pakistan denies a relationship, it is widely believed that the Pakistani external intelligence service (ISI) and/or members of the military establishment that operates largely unchecked by the toothless civilian government have instructed LeT to carry out missions against India to further their own objectives. This includes the November 26, 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai.

Perceptual Filters

- Organizational Structure
  - Group Size
    - When LeT was established in 1987 it had access to a steady supply of Pakistani and Indian volunteers and now recruits from as far away as the Middle East. The current size of the group is unknown but it is suspected that membership is in the thousands.
  - Degree of Centralization
    - LeT is characterized by a unified hierarchical organizational structure capable orchestrating attacks at the same time as it provides social services to the community.
    - LeT was founded by Hafiz Saeed (current emir), Zafar Iqbal and Abdullah Azzam.
  - Mechanisms of Control
    - Unlike other terrorist groups native to South Asia which are loose and disorganized, LeT employs a rigid hierarchical structure resembling military ranks. LeT is led by emir Hafiz Mohammad Saeed. Under him, various deputies oversee functional and charitable operations which are

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then implemented by numerous satellite offices across Pakistan. These offices are responsible for fundraising, recruitment, and delivery of social services such as health care, religious education, and emergency services.\footnote{Ibid.}

- LeT’s military arm is controlled by a “supreme commander” and his deputy, both of whom report directly to Saeed. These commanders enlist “divisional commanders” in charge of operations in a specific geographic location. Under them, “district commanders” control battalions that operate within particular districts.\footnote{Ibid.}

- **Bureaucratic Sophistication**
  - LeT is the militant wing of the Islamist organization Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad and relies on its front organization, Jamaat-ud-Dawa to run a number of charities and spearhead humanitarian relief throughout Pakistan.\footnote{Bajoria, “Backgrounder: Lashkar-e-Taiba.”} LeT reportedly operates sixteen Islamic institutions, 135 schools, seminaries, blood banks, and mobile clinics.\footnote{Institute for Conflict Management: South Asia Terrorism Portal, "Lashkar-e-Toiba ‘Army of the Pure’." Available at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba.htm.}

- **Demographics**
  - LeT has been composed of Pakistani Punjabis since its inception. Because of its ties to al Qaeda, it has seen a wave of Libyans, Sudanese and Central Asians into the group but these non-Pakistani participants have always operated on the periphery with the core of LeT always being Pakistani.
  - LeT is strongest in poor urban neighborhoods in southern Punjab and in areas where the Pakistani government is conspicuously absent.\footnote{Tellis, “The Menace That Is Lashkar-e-Taiba.”}
  - While LeT is primarily composed of highly motivated volunteers, LeT is also known to have formed a group called ‘Ibn-e-Tayamiah.’ This group consists of men suffering from incurable diseases.\footnote{Bajoria, “Backgrounder: Lashkar-e-Taiba.”}

**Resources**

- **Financial**
  - When LeT was established in 1987 it had access to a steady supply of funding, thanks in no small part to alleged support from the Pakistani government, routed through the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI).\footnote{Ibid.} LeT has also fundraised in the United States, Europe, Australia, the Middle East.\footnote{Ibid.}
  - LeT receives funding from charities run by Jamaat-ud-Dawa. This source of income which comes from Mosques, businesses and other charities across the Middle East and Pakistan allows LeT to maintain a level of autonomy from ISI in spite of the significant financial assistance that it provides to LeT.
  - According to Pakistani Ambassador Husain Haqqani, LeT also receives funding from Saudi Arabia, presumably through ISI.\footnote{Ibid.}

- **Logistical**
  - LeT’s headquarters is a 200-acre estate located in Muridke, 30 kilometers outside Lahore, and is rumored to have been financed by...
Osama bin Laden.\textsuperscript{411} LeT also maintains 2200 field offices throughout Pakistan.

**Physical**

- LeT received "operational funding, specialized weapons, safe havens for leadership, shelter and operational bases for individual cells, intelligence on targets and threats, campaign guidance, infiltration assistance, and fire support from the military when crossing the border into India" from ISI headquarters and field stations in Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.\textsuperscript{412}
- LeT has procured weapons (including explosives) and communications equipment from both international arms markets and official Pakistani state suppliers such as the ISI.\textsuperscript{413}

**Human**

- The American David Coleman Headley was charged in connection to the LeT Mumbai attack, suggesting that LeT is surprisingly effective in recruiting human resources.
- LeT relies on affiliates and supporters to maintain an impressive network of front organizations that facilitate licit and illicit funding from Islamic NGOs, private financiers, and organized crime.\textsuperscript{414}
- While LeT does receive remarkable state support, a diversified organization equipped at mobilizing resources, expanding internationally, and recruiting volunteers frees it from dependence on ISI.\textsuperscript{415}

**Organizational Lifecycle Status**

- Considering that LeT is a heavily funded and protected state sponsored organization that raises its own funds on the side, with membership numbering in the several thousands, it appears that LeT is enjoying a comfortable period in its life cycle. Ambassador Haqqani dubbed the group one of the most formidable terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia and Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the U.S. State Department, Ambassador Daniel Benjamin confirmed this belief.\textsuperscript{416} There is no reason to believe LeT is on their way out, despite being briefly cut off by ISI in 2002, which was probably more for show than an actual suspension of the relationship.

**Operational Capabilities.**

**Specialized Skills**

- Careful planning, vast resources, commitment to a mission thousands of miles away, and the knowledge of sea-land operations were required for the Mumbai attack and demonstrate LeT’s sophistication.\textsuperscript{417}

**Technical Expertise**

- LeT is known to possess technological and scientific proficiency. In fact, it is committed to exploiting modern technology to further its ideological

\textsuperscript{412} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{413} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{414} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{415} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{416} Bajoria, "Backgrounder: Lashkar-e-Taiba."
Militants receive two months of weapons training on the operation of various guns, rocket launchers, and hand grenades. Volunteers also participate in a three-month long advanced combat course known as Daura-e-Khas and a three-week basic skills program known as Daura-e-Aam.419

Propensity to Innovate

- LeT is skilled at adapting its methods when faced with new strategic situations. For example, LeT has focused principally on attacking coalition forces and disrupting reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. There, operations have employed mines, primitive air defense systems, and suicide bombings.420

Networking Abilities

- LeT is known to exploit extra-national relationships and is adept at planting and sustaining roots internationally.421 LeT also has loose affiliations with other terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda in Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban, and Jamiat al-Dawa al-Quran wal-Sunna.422 LeT is also suspected of establishing sleeper cells in the United States and United Kingdom and runs a network from Southeast Asia through Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and into Saudi Arabia.423

Organizational Dynamics

Leadership Style

- The hierarchic command and control structure of the organization developed in part because of the charismatic leadership of LeT’s three founders.
- LeT provides training for both its militants and its religious leaders (Ulema) as well as abundant social services, effectively weaving itself into the fabric of everyday life and cementing itself as a leading organization in all aspects of Pakistani security.

Social Isolation

- Thanks to ISI protection, LeT enjoys considerable freedom of operation within Pakistan. While the group does practice operational security, it avoids the need to operate underground by submitting to ISI guardianship.

Factionalization

- Some experts propose that the group splintered when it was forced underground. According to K. Alan Kronstadt at the Congressional Research service, LeT is now known by the name of its front organization, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (the Society for Preaching) and India asserts that the group split into two factions, al-Nasirin and al-Mansurin.424

General Planning Characteristics

418 Ibid.
419 Institute for Conflict Management, "Lashkar-e-Toiba 'Army of the Pure'."
421 Ibid.
422 Ibid.
423 Institute for Conflict Management, "Lashkar-e-Toiba 'Army of the Pure'."
424 Bajoria, "Backgrounder: Lashkar-e-Taiba."
Decision-maker Time Horizon
- The Mumbai attack required months of training in Pakistan and painstaking reconnaissance in India.

Risk Threshold
- Although a hierarchic structure typically renders organizations vulnerable, it is appropriate for covert activities. ISI insists on high effectiveness, plausible deniability, severe brutality, and control, and mitigates the risk that would otherwise befall LeT.

Operational Objectives (broad/strategic)
- Mentioned multiple times elsewhere

Attack Modalities (general attacks)

Choice of Weapons
- LeT favors AK series assault rifles, both light and heavy machine guns, pistols, mortars, mines, hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenades, plastic explosives, remote control devices, and occasionally suicide car bombs.\(^{425}\) LeT has also been known to use sophisticated communications systems as well as satellite and cellular telephones, print media, and internet communications.

Choice of Tactical Methods
- The Mumbai attack represents LeT’s modus operandi. The group disperses small but heavily armed commandos of two-four highly motivated men to conduct suicidal (but not suicide) missions. These small groups work independently but in concert with one another to inflict the highest number of casualties possible on symbolic sites.\(^{426}\) Missions are complex, and intended to highlight India’s vulnerability and embarrass its government. LeT is focused on the killing of non-muslims, including Hindus, Sikhs, Jews, and Westerners.\(^{427}\)

Insiders and Outsiders
- LeT has had success in recruiting others to support their cause, including American David C. Headley

Target Selection (general targeting)
- Already mentioned

\(^{425}\) Ibid.
\(^{427}\) Ibid.