France’s Choice for Naval Nuclear Propulsion: Why Low-Enriched Uranium Was Chosen

This special report is a result of an FAS task force on French naval nuclear propulsion and explores France’s decision to switch from highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU). By detailing the French Navy’s choice to switch to LEU fuel, author Alain Tournyol du Clos — a lead architect of France’s nuclear propulsion program — explores whether France’s choice is fit for other nations. Read or download now.

Event: Medical Isotope Production Without Nuclear Reactors or Uranium Enrichment

radiationsquareThe Federation of American Scientists and the Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy at the  American Association for the Advancement of Science are hosting  a luncheon briefing and discussion on medical radioisotope production without nuclear reactors or uranium enrichment on Thursday, June 13th at 12pm . The discussion will focus on a new CSTSP paper, Nuclear Medicine without Nuclear Reactors or Uranium Enrichment including issues relevant to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, as in the case of Iran.

Copies of the paper will be distributed at the briefing.


Thursday, June 13, 2013

12:00 PM- 1:30 PM


American Association for the Advancement of Science

Abelson/Haskins Room, 2nd Floor

1200 New York Avenue NW (Enter at corner of 12th and H Street)

Washington, DC 20005


Mr. Derek Updegraff, Program Associate, Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy, American Association for the Advancement of Science

Mr. Mark Jansson, Special Projects Director, Federation of American Scientists

Mr. David Nusbaum, Research Fellow, Managing the Atom Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University


Please RSVP by June 12, 2013 here.


Please contact Katie Colten via e-mail at [email protected] or phone at 202-454-4694.


Will Iran Give Up Twenty Percent Enrichment

Since February 2010, Iran has been enriching uranium to concentrations of 20 percent U-235. A stockpile of 130 kg of 20 percent enriched uranium would reduce, by more than half, Iran’s time to develop a bomb. A key unknown is whether Tehran will stop the higher enrichment and, if so, under what circumstances.

Download Full Brief