Department of Defense
ANNUAL POLYGRAPH REPORT TO CONGRESS
Fiscal Year 2000 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I DoD Use of Polygraph Examinations II Fiscal Year 2000 Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph (CSP) Examinations CSP Refusals Specific CSP Examination Results Significant Information Developed III Utility of the Investigative Polygraph IV Training and Qualification Standards for Department of Defense Forensic Psychophysiologist (Polygraph Examiners) V Polygraph Research
EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe Department of Defense (DoD) uses the polygraph in criminal investigations, counterintelligence cases, foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations, and for requests for exculpation. This report contains numerous examples of polygraph utility in resolving counterintelligence and security issues as well as criminal investigations. The polygraph is clearly one of our most effective investigative tools.
The Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) trains all federal polygraph examiners. The basic polygraph courses are taught at the Masters Degree level. The Institute also offers specialized courses in forensic psychophysiology through their continuing education program. In addition, DODPI conducts on-going evaluations of the validity of polygraph techniques used by federal examiners as well as research on new polygraph techniques, instrumentation, analytic methods, and polygraph countermeasures.
The Department published a handbook for all federal polygraph examiners which sets forth standardized techniques and procedures for conducting polygraph examinations. The handbook also outlines a Quality Assurance Program (QAP) wherein DODPI inspects federal polygraph programs to ensure compliance with both those techniques and procedures taught at DODPI and the continuing education requirements established by the polygraph community for polygraph examiners.
Approximately 71 percent of our polygraph tests are conducted as a condition for access to certain positions or information under the DoD Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph (CSP) Program. The DoD CSP Program is authorized by Public Law 100-180. The purpose of the CSP Program is to deter and detect activity involving espionage, sabotage, and terrorism.
The DoD conducts CSP examinations on military personnel, DoD civilian employees, and DoD contractor personnel. Of the 7,890 individuals examined under the CSP Program in Fiscal Year 2000, 7,688 showed no significant physiological response to the relevant questions (non-deceptive) and provided no substantive information. The remaining 202 individuals provided substantive information. Of these 202 individuals, 194 received a favorable adjudication, three are still pending adjudication, five are pending investigation, and no one received adverse action denying or withholding access.
IThe Department of Defense has used the polygraph for almost half a century. It is used in criminal investigations, counterintelligence cases, foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations, exculpation requests, and as a condition for access to certain positions or information. The polygraph is a tool that enhances the interview and interrogation process. Often it is the only investigative technique capable of providing essential information to resolve national security issues and criminal investigations. The use of the polygraph as a condition for access is limited by a statutory quota for CSP examinations.
DOD USE OF POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS
The following table reflects Department of Defense Polygraph Program statistics for Fiscal Year 2000.
Criminal 2,096 18.8% Exculpatory 499 4.5% Cl Scope 7,890 70.9% All Others* 646 5.8% Total** 11,131 100%
* Includes examinations conducted in support of personnel security investigations, counterintelligence and intelligence operations, and polygraph assistance to non-DoD federal agencies.
** Does not include polygraph examinations conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA). A breakout of polygraph examinations conducted by NSA is contained in a classified table submitted with this report. Nor does it include polygraph examinations conducted by the National Reconnaissance Office, which are conducted under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).
IISection 1121 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100-180, December 4, 1987; 101 Stat. at 1147) authorizes the Department of Defense to conduct CSP examinations as a condition for access to certain information.
Fiscal Year 2000 Counterintelligence-Scope
The purpose of the CSP Program is to deter and detect espionage, sabotage, and terrorism. The following topics are covered during the CSP examination: (1) Involvement with a foreign intelligence/security service, involvement in espionage; (2) Involvement in terrorism; (3) Unauthorized foreign contacts; (4) Deliberate failure to protect classified information; and (5) Damaging/sabotaging government information systems, clandestine collection, or defense systems. These CSP topics meet the needs of both DoD and the Intelligence Community facilitating the transfer of security clearances.
The Department published a handbook for federal polygraph examiners standardizing techniques and procedures for conducting polygraph examinations. The handbook also outlines the Quality Assurance Program (QAP) wherein DODPI inspects federal polygraph programs to ensure compliance with the techniques and procedures taught at the Institute. DODPI trains all federal polygraph examiners. This allows for standardization and promotes reciprocity, thus eliminating unnecessary polygraph examinations.
Public Law 100-180 authorizes DoD to administer CSP examinations to persons whose duties involve access to information that has been classified at the level of top secret or designated as being within a special access program under section 4.4 of Executive Order 12958. This includes military and civilian personnel of the Department and personnel of defense contractors. The number of CSP examinations has been limited to 5,000 per fiscal year since Fiscal Year 1991. For Fiscal Years 1988 through 1990 the ceiling was 10,000. The quota reduction took place two years after new exemptions for cryptographic and reconnaissance programs were adopted. Public Law 100-180 exempts certain intelligence agencies and functions from the 5,000 quota: (1) individuals assigned, detailed or under contract with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), (2) persons employed, assigned, detailed, under contract or applying for a position in the National Security Agency, (3) persons assigned to a space where sensitive cryptographic information is produced, processed, or stored, and (4) persons employed by, assigned or detailed to, an office within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs or a contractor of such an office.The following table reflects CSP examinations conducted by the Department of Defense in accordance with Public Law 100-180.
(1) Special Access Programs 2,128 (2) DIA Critical Intelligence Positions 1,234 (3) TOP SECRET 0 (4) Examinations for Interim Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information 0 Total Examinations Conducted Under the Congressional Ceiling 3,362 Exempted Examinations* 4,528 DoD Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph Program TOTAL** 7,890
*NOTE: Includes detailees to CIA and NSA, assignees to cryptographic information processing spaces, persons in non-NRO reconnaissance programs.
**NOTE: Does not include polygraph examinations conducted by NSA. A table of polygraph examinations conducted by NSA is contained in a classified annex to this report. Nor does it include examinations conducted by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which are conducted under the authority of the Director Central Intelligence.
In Fiscal Year 2000, no one declined CSP testing required as a condition of access to certain information. Department of Defense policy states those persons who decline to take the examination are denied access to the classified material in question, but are retained in their position or transferred to other positions in the organization of equal pay and responsibility, commensurate with the clearance level held before the declination.
Specific CSP Examination ResultsThe polygraph examination results for the 7,890 individuals tested under the Department of Defense Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph Program are as follows:
One hundred and ninety nine individuals required more than two series (a series is defined as the collection of at least two polygraph charts on an examinee). A total of 66 examinations required more than one day to complete.
There were 7,688 individuals whose polygraph examination results were evaluated as no significant response to the relevant questions (non-deceptive). The remaining 202 individuals yielded significant responses and/or provided substantive information.
One hundred and ninety one individuals made admissions relevant to the issues being tested, and through further testing, the examiner was able to resolve all relevant issues favorably to the subject.
Eleven individuals made admissions relevant to the issues being tested but continued to be evaluated as deceptive during further testing.
Of the 202 individuals who yielded significant responses and/or provided substantive information, 194 received a favorable adjudication, three are still pending adjudication, five are pending investigation, and no one received adverse action denying or withholding access.
Significant Information Developed
The following cases reflect significant information developed during DoD CSP examinations covered by this report. It should be noted that all these individuals had been interviewed previously by security professionals and investigated by other means without any discovery of the information obtained by the polygraph examination procedure. In most cases, the information was elicited from the subject in discussion with the examiner.
Most of the information developed during CSP examinations relates to the removal of classified material and computer media to residences and unauthorized foreign contacts. In some of those cases, classified material was comingled with personal papers, and often when discovered was either destroyed or returned to government control. In some cases, the classified material was deliberately taken home to prepare a briefing or to meet a deadline. Admissions of removal of classified material were followed-up with additional polygraph testing to determine whether the material was compromised, or if any other material was still outside of government control, or if the extent and nature of the foreign .contacts were different than reported. Following subsequent polygraph testing the results were provided to appropriate security officials for adjudication.
During a CSP examination, the examinee admitted that on orders of superiors, while in Bosnia, he provided Russian military personnel with large quantities of classified material that technically should not have been released to non-NATO members. Also during numerous planning sessions, he took copious notes and retained some of them at his residence. Subsequently he returned the notes and some computer disks to government control. He also stated that he read to a girifriend from an untranslated Russian document. Subsequently, he successfully completed additional polygraph testing regarding having any other classified documents outside of government control or providing classified information to other unauthorized persons.
During CSP testing, a contractor employee, aurrrendered TOP SECRET/CODE WORD material he had in his possession. The examinee agreed to a permissive search of his residence where additional classified material was found. This matter has been referred for further investigation.
During a CSP examination, the examinee admitted to the unauthorized removal of TOP SECRET/SCI material from a facility on one occasion and unauthorized disclosure of classified information while deployed to South West Asia. Further investigation is ongoing.
During CSP testing, examinee admitted that in 1991, during Operation Desert Storm, he was provided a SECRET topographical map containg turning points and refueling requirements to friendly bases. He also had 10 to 15 SECRET target maps. He retained the maps at his residence until 1997 when he shredded the target maps, but retained the SECRET topographical map in his household goods. This matter was referred for further investigation.
During CSP testing, examinee provided information regarding her mishandling of classified information. The examinee stated that she could think of a half-dozen instances where she had accidentally divulged classified material. She admitted on three occasions she divulged NATO satellite communications to persons not authorized to receive such information. She also had a friendship with a Russian emigré to Israel who specialized in cryptography.
During CSP testing, examinee admitted that the day prior to his polygraph test, he destroyed approximately 200 pages of classified material at his residence. The classified material was obtained the prior year while he was assigned to an overseas position. He discovered the material while he was unpacking his personal effects and it was destroyed due to his anxiety over the pending polygraph test. Following this admission, he successfully completed his polygraph test.
During a CSP examination, a military member, assigned to the National Security Agency, admitted, that on two occasions, he had deliberately disclosed SECRET information to unauthorized persons.
During a CSP examination, examinee admitted that approximately two and a half years ago, while assigned to an aircraft carrier, he used his personal laptop computer to type a SECRET document regarding a weapons system. He could not recall if he ever deleted the document from his computer's hard drive, which was at his private residence. He also admitted discussing classified information with a relative and a former college classmate and discussing ship movements with family and friends.
During CSP testing, examinee admitted storing classified information at his quarters in Hawaii. He stated that he moved to Hawaii from Fort Meade, Maryland and had attempted to obtain a courier orders but was unable to get this support, so he elected to hand carry the documents with him to Hawaii. He stored the documents in a closet at his residence in Hawaii. He denied providing the material to unauthorized persons. The documents were returned to Government control.
Utility of the Investigative Polygraph
During Fiscal Year 2000, DoD investigations obtained unique and significant information from interviews conducted with the aid of the polygraph. In all illustrated instances, the polygraph examination process produced significant security or criminal information, which would not otherwise have been secured for the specific investigation. The polygraph examination process was also valuable in helping to establish the innocence of persons charged with serious infractions.
An investigation was initiated regarding the theft of a diamond ring, valued at $4,000.00, from a guesthouse room operated by the U.S .Government. One of the housekeeping staff was suspected of stealing property in the past. It was determined that she was responsible for cleaning the room from where the ring was stolen. She was interviewed and denied stealing the ring and agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. The results of the examination indicated deception, and she confessed to stealing the ring which was recovered.
An investigation was initiated regarding a suspicious fire aboard a U.S. ship. The suspect denied involvement and requested a polygraph examination to support his denial. The polygraph examination resuits indicated deception and the suspect admitted to lighting a mop on fire with his cigarette lighter and then putting the mop into the fuel tank.
An investigation was initiated regarding the possible arson of a motor vehicle. One of the suspects was interviewed and admitted assisting another individual in stealing the vehicle, but denied setting the car on fire and agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. During the polygraph interview, he admitted assisting the other individual in setting the fire.
A National Guard Unit discovered that a number of intrusions had been made to its computer system. Two individuals assigned to a Health Clinic were identified as suspects. Both were interviewed and admitted hacking into the system, but said they did so to identify weaknesses in the system. Both of them admitted to obtaining not only their supervisor's passwords but also the systems administrator's passwords, which gave them root directory access. Additional polygraph testing determined that they did not plant any viruses or back doors in the system.
An investigation was initiated regarding a bomb threat made to a high school on a military installation A military dependent was identified as a possible suspect. The suspect denied placing the bomb threat and agreed to undergo a polygaph examination. The suspect was evaluated as deceptive during the polygraph examination and admitted to placing the bomb threat in order to avoid attending school.
An investigation was initiated regarding allegations that a woman was raped. The victim stated that she and the accused had been to a local bar and had a few drinks. The victim believes she may have been drugged and did not recall the sexual events of the evening. She stated that she woke up the next day with only her under-garments on and was later told by the accused that they had sexual intercourse. The victim stated that she would not have consented to sexual intercourse and believed that she had been raped. The accused requested to undergo a polygraph examination to support his denial that he raped the victim. The polygraph results indicated deception and the accussed admitted that the victim had passed out when he began having sexual intercourse with her.
An investigation was initiated regarding a reported robbery of $6,646 from a community club. During the investigation, several inconsistencies surfaced during the interviews of the club employee who reported the alleged robbery. The polygraph results were evaluated as deceptive and the employee admitted that he had fabricated the robbery incident and had stolen the funds himself over a period of time.
An investigation was initiated regarding an allegation of physical child abuse. The suspect, a licensed daycare provider on a military installation, was acused of striking a child with her hand. The suspect was interviewed and denied the allegation and agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. The polygraph examination results indicated deception, and the suspect confessed to striking the child.
An investigation was initiated when it was discovered that a number of wild horses had been slaughtered in the deserts of Nevada. The investigation developed two military suspects and a civilian suspect. One of the military suspects agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. During the polygraph examination, the suspect admitted killing one horse and shooting into the herd. He also implicated the other military suspect and the civilian suspect.
An investigation was initiated regarding a threat and damage to government property when someone painted swastikas and left a threatening note on the door of U.S. Army quarters. A U.S. military member had been observed leaving the area and was subsequently interviewed. The suspect denied any involvement in the incident and agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. The results of the polygraph examination indicated the suspect was truthful in his denial. The victim was reinterviewed and confessed that he had commited the offense to get attention.
An investigation was initiated regarding an allegation that a military member had sexually molested his four year old stepdaughter. The military member denied any sexual contact with the victim, and agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. The polygraph examination was evaluated as deceptive. Subsequently, the military member admitted to sexually molesting his stepdaughter.
An investigation was initiated regarding the theft of a lap computer from a military installation. During the investigation, a source reported that he heard a military member admit to the theft of the computer. The suspect was interviewed and denied any involvement in the theft of the computer and agreed to undergo a a polygraph examination. The polygraph examination was evaluated as deceptive. Subsequently, the suspect admitted to the theft of the computer.
An investigation was initiated regarding the death of an infant on a military installation. The cause of death was the "shaken baby syndrome". Both the military mother and civilian father were interviewed and agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. Both polygraph examinations indicated deception. The mother refused to answer any further questions. The father admitted that he and his wife had an argument while the wife was holding and shaking the baby. All of a sudden, the wife threw the baby on the couch. The baby started choking and he administered CPR and took the baby to the hospital.
An investigation was initiated when a military member reported that his wife was missing. After a thorough investigation, the wife could not be located. The husband was interviewed and agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. The polygraph examination results indicated deception. Subsequently, the husband admitted to killing his wife and disclosed the location of her body.
A contractor, being sponsored for access to NSA information, disclosed during a polygraph examination, that he had been approached by a military officer of a foreign government to provide classified information on a sensitive government project. The details of this incident were obtained and disseminated for further investigation.
During a polygraph examination, a U. S. military officer, with access to NSA classified information, admitted friendships with Russian and PRC military officers, and also admitted downloading classified information on to his home computer.
IVThe Department of Defense maintains very stringent standards for polygraph examiners. The Institute's basic polygraph program is the only program known to base its curriculum on forensic psychophysiology, and conceptual, abstract, and applied knowledge that meet the requirements of a master's degree-level of study. Candidates selected for DoD polygraph positions must meet the following minimum requirements:
Training and Qualification Standards for
Department of Defense Forensic
Psychophysiologist (Polygraph Examiners)
1. Be a United States citizen.All federal polygraph examiners receive their basic polygraph training at DODPI. In Fiscal Year 2000, the Institute trained 62 new polygraph examiners. After completing the basic polygraph training, DoD personnel must serve an internship consisting of a minimum of six months on-the-job-training and conduct at least 25 polygraph examinations under the supervision of a certified polygraph examiner before being certified as a DoD polygraph examiner. In addition, DoD polygraph examiners are required to complete 80 hours of continuing education every two years. To help meet this requirement, the Institute offers various specialized courses in forensic psychophysiology and related disciplines. In Fiscal Year 2000, approximately 555 students attended the specialized courses.
2. Be at least 25 years of age.
3. Be a graduate of an accredited four-year college or have equivalent experience that demonstrates the ability to master graduate-level academic courses.
4. Have two years of experience as an investigator with a federal or other law enforcement agency. Two years of comparable experience may be substituted for this requirement.
5. Be of high moral character and sound emotional temperament, as confirmed by a background investigation.
6. Complete a DoD-approved course of polygraph instruction.
7. Be adjudged suitable for the position after being administered a polygraph examination designed to ensure that the candidate realizes, and is sensitive to, the personal impact of such examinations.
Department of Defense Forensic Psychophysiologists
(Polygraph Examiners)Average Number Fiscal Year Of Examiners 1994 192 1995 176 1996 164 1997 153 1998 147 1999 144 2000 138
VMandated by Congress, the research program at the Institute is focused on: (1) developing new psychophysiological detection of deception (FDD) techniques, instrumentation and analytic methods to improve PDD technology; (2) evaluating the validity of existing and future PDD techniques; and (3) the conduct of research on PDD countermeasures.
Polygraph (Forensic Psychophysiology) Research
To facilitate research, a small grant program was established in Fiscal Year 1992. During Fiscal Year 1997, the Institute developed a Prioritized Research Plan at the request of the Security Policy Board staff. This plan outlines a prioritized series of projects to be completed in support of the PDD community. The plan was approved by the Personnel Security Research Subcommittee and provides the basis for the acceptance of research efforts conducted by or on behalf on the Institute. In January 1999, the institute began an effort to broaden its presence in the scientific and academic communities. This initiative seeks to give the DoDPI a research workforce that is competitive with the best minds from academia and persons knowlegable of emerging technologies. As a result of this effort, during Fiscal Year 2000, the Institute published a revised research plan to include the Government's interest in less-invasive techniques and to enhance DoDPI's ability to answer agency-specific customer questions.
Current Research ProjectsAn Examination of Response Parameters of Electrodermal Recording (EDR) to Standard Stimuli. The objective of this project is to investigate whether equivalent electrodermal responses are obtained to equivalent psychological stimuli presented at different electrodermal tonic levels. The outcome will determine if resistance or conductance is a more accurate measure during PDD examinations.
Effects of Augmented Physiological Feedback on the Detection of Deception. This project will determine if augmented feedback improves the accuracy of PDD examinations.
Scaled P300 Scalp Profiles in Detection of Deception. Previous electroencephalographic (EEG) studies of deception have been limited to changes in the amplitude of responses to specific questions. An investigator at Northwestern University has been awarded funds to pursue a unique measure of deception, the distribution of EEG activity over the scalp. A preliminary report was favorable.
High Definition EEG/ERP Recordings and the Detection of Deception. The University of South Carolina will conduct research on brain activity as it relates to the detection of deception. The project will use high-density EEG/ERP recordings, and correlate these findings with current autonomic nervous system recordings during a PDD examination.
Remote Sensing of Emotion and Stress Using Laser Doppler Vibrometer. This project involves the use of emerging technologies to develop methods for deriving simultaneous information from the laser doppler signal regarding multiple physiological functions including body tremor, respiration, cardiac function, muscle contraction, and sweating. Laser Doppler Vibrometry recording methods do not require the invasive attachment of physical transducers and could be adapted to multiple-examination settings. Preliminary results are very favorable.
Non-invasive Detection of Deception methods for Field Use. A search for an effective non-invasive method of lie detection has persisted for many decades. Previous research on voice-based detection of deception methods has met with limited success. A new voice-based detection of deception device called the "Vericator", has been developed by a private company. Capable of multiple modes of operation, "Vericator" offers a versatile package that cen be used in a wide array of environments and situations, ranging from the strict question/answer format demanded of the polygraph to a free-flowing telephone conversation. The current project will assess the validity of the Verificator's on-line mode of operation. Three different scenarios will be conducted in a pilot study to determine its effectiveness and sensitivity across different environments. Data analysis will be conducted using the direct veracity decisions produced by the Vericator in addition to its peripheral measures of stress and deception. Following the successful development of a scenario, multiple sites will be used to facilitate the rapid collection of data. This will allow for quick assessment of Vericator as an effective tool for the detection of deception.
Development of an Expert System for Human Assisted and Automated R/I. This project is designed to develop a novel waveform application for scoring the Relevant/Irrelevant test format polygraph data. A number of advanced analytical methods have been applied to electroencephalographic (EEC) and magnetoencephalographic (MEG) signals which may be applied to the analysis of the physiological polygraph data. The goal of this project is to use traditional polygraph data and combine this data into a novel waveform that will enhance the accuracy of the PDD examiner decision. This technique is highly accurate and reliable for single trial analysis and should be adaptable to similar datasets collected from polygraph examinations. If successful future analysis may include additional human physiological data for enhanced accuracy.
Test for Espionage and Sabotage (TES) Validation Project. TES is the primary counterintelligence security screening polygraph examination used in the federal government. There have been two previous research studies on TES which indicated that TES had an accuracy rate in the range of 80 to 90 percent. However, the sample sizes were rather modest. A subsequent study with a larger sample did not produce accuracies as high. It is unknown if the disparity in accuracy between the studies was associated with the participant variables, experimental conditions, or the test format. Two pilot studies have since been conducted with new methodology that closely approximates real world espionage activities and produces subject samples that better represent the typical TES candidate in the government setting. The goal is to conduct studies that have the best generability to government's use of the TES.
The Effects of Prior Demonstrations of Polygraph Accuracy on Outcomes of Probable Lie and Directed Lie Polygraph Tests. Investigators at the University of Utah are examining the usefulness of administering an acquaintance test during a PDD examination. An acquaintance test is used to familiarize examinees with the PDD procedure, and reassure the examinee that the FDD procedure is effective. Unfortunately there have been no systematic studies to determine the validity or efficacy of this procedure. This study will examine the usefulness of the acquaintance test and also compare the directed versus probable lie comparison questions where the comparison test is used and not used.
Evaluation of DODPI Evaluation Techniques. Several polygraph laboratory studies published by the University of Utah have reported higher accuracy rates for PDD chart evaluations than DoDPI has found in its laboratory studies. One of the possible sources of these differences is the method of chart interpretation. In the present study, the University of Utah decision rules will be compared to those of DODPI to determine how the differences in rules influence PDD decision accuracy. The study will attempt to determine the best combination of decision rules to maximize decision accuracy.
Application of Thermal Image Analysis to Polygraph Testing. Infrared thermal imaging, a non-intrusive and non-invasive technology may be used to determine if peripheral changes in skin surface temperature (SST) are related to psychological stress. Preliminary results are favorable and additional studies need to be conducted to determine if the technology is useful for PDD. The purpose of this study is to explore an alternative method of measuring the same physiological activity to increase sensitivity. This method would also have utility for screening interviews.
R/I Expert System. Each year the federal government performs thousands of multiple issue polygraph screening examinations on employees and prospective employees. One of the common testing techniques in this application of the polygraph is called the Relevant/Irrelevant (R/I) test. The R/I format interprets relevant and irrelevant questions, with repetition, in a series that is unpredictable to the examinee. Currently R/I charts are interpreted globally by the testing examiner. The R/I technique is one of the last remaining techniques for which an acceptable, obective form of analysis has not been developed. An expert analytical system would enhance the consistancy of chart interpretation.
TES Algorithm. The John Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory will develop and implement a computerized algorithm for evaluating the Test for Espionage and Sabotage (TES) polygraph screening examination used extensively within the federal government. This effort will have an immediate impact on the quality of the polygraph screening process.
Polygraph Countermeasure Detection Expert Assistant The primary purpose of this effort is to quickly field a countermeasure screening tool. Polygraph experts will provide the knowledge necessary for the programmers to implement rules into the computer algorithm. This will provide the field examiner with a countermeasure screening algorithm.
Walter Reed Army Medical Hospital. Voice stress analysis has been widely promoted to law enforcement agencies as a means to detect deception. Although controlled laboratory studies do not indicate the voice stress analysis technology is any more effective than chance, in detecting deception, there is a possibility that voice stress analysis is responsive to psychological stress. DoDPI working with Walter Reed, will record voice stress samples, objective stress questionnaire data, salivary cortisol, heart rate, and blood pressure as well as plasma hormones responsive to stress. The data will be combined with on-line voice stress data from another DoDPI study to independently validate the potential utility for voice stress data analysis.
U.S. Library of Congress. As part of the DoDPI mission to monitor foreign polygraph activity, the Institute collects research publications from foreign sources and under contract with the U.S. Library of Congress provides translations of selected articles and publications.
Other DODPI Research. DoDPI is also conducting research on Cardio Element Analysis, A History of Comparison Questions, Scoring and Decision Rules in an Objective Scoring System, Rank Order Scoring Systems, Normative Respiration Data from Field Polygraph Examinations, Exploratory Study of Traditional and Objective Scoring Systems, Horizontal Scoring Systems, Case Study of a Spy, and Costs and Benefits of Spot Scoring.
Other ActivitiesThe Institute maintains contacts with PDD examiners in other countries to keep abreast of PDD development around the world. The Institute issues quarterly reports summarizing international PDD activity. During the last few years PDD activity has increased significantly worldwide.
DoDPI taught a total of 15 courses to more than 1,000 students within the polygraph community. Additionally, the DoDPI staff provided polygraph related instruction to more than 100 state and local law enforcement students.