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Department of Defense



Fiscal Year 1998

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)


	Executive Summary
I DoD Use of Polygraph Examinations II Fiscal Year 1998 Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph (CSP) Examinations CSP Refusals Specific CSP Examination Results Significant Information Developed III Utility of the Investigative Polygraph IV Training and Qualification Standards for Department of Defense Forensic Psychophysiologist (Polygraph Examiners) V Polygraph Research


The Department of Defense (DoD) uses the polygraph in criminal investigations, counterintelligence cases, foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations, and for requests for exculpation. This report contains numerous examples of polygraph utility in resolving counterintelligence and security issues as well as criminal investigations. The polygraph is clearly one of our most effective investigative tools.

The Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) trains all federal polygraph examiners. The basic polygraph courses are taught at the Masters Degree level. The Institute also offers specialized courses in forensic psychophysiology through their continuing education program. In addition, DODPI conducts on-going evaluations of the validity of polygraph techniques used by federal examiners as well as research on new polygraph techniques, instrumentation, analytic methods, and polygraph countermeasures.

In Fiscal Year 1998, the Department published a handbook for all federal polygraph examiners which sets forth standardized techniques and procedures for conducting polygraph examinations. The handbook also outlines a Quality Assurance Program (QAP) wherein DODPI inspects federal polygraph programs to ensure compliance with both those techniques and procedures taught at DODPI and the continuing education requirements established by the polygraph community for polygraph examiners.

Approximately 68 percent of our polygraph examinations are conducted as a condition for access to certain positions or information under the DoD Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph (CSP) Program. The DoD CSP Program is authorized by Public Law 100-180. The purpose of the CSP Program is to deter and detect activity involving espionage, sabotage, and terrorism.

The DoD conducts CSP examinations on military personnel, DoD civilian employees, and DoD contractor personnel. Of the 7,461 individuals examined under the CSP Program in Fiscal Year 1998, 7,334 showed no significant physiological response to the relevant questions (non-deceptive) and provided no substantive information. The remaining 127 individuals yielded significant physiological responses, or were evaluated as inconclusive and/or provided substantive information. Of these 127 individuals, 106 received a favorable adjudication, seven are still pending adjudication, 13 are pending investigation, and one individual received adverse action denying or withholding access.


The Department of Defense has used the polygraph for almost half a century. It is used in criminal investigations, counterintelligence cases, foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations, exculpation requests, and as a condition for access to certain positions or information. The polygraph is a tool that enhances the interview and interrogation process. Often it is the only investigative technique capable of providing essential information to resolve national security issues and criminal investigations. The use of the polygraph as a condition for access is limited by a statutory quota for CSP examinations.

The following table reflects Department of Defense Polygraph Program statistics for Fiscal Year 1998.

Fiscal Year 1998 Counterintelligence-Scope
Polygraph Examinations

Section 1121 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100-180, December 4, 1987; 101 Stat. at 1147) authorizes the Department of Defense to conduct CSP examinations as a condition for access to certain information.

The purpose of the CSP Program is to deter and detect espionage, sabotage, and terrorism. The following topics are covered during the CSP examination: (1) Involvement with a foreign intelligence/security service, involvement in espionage; (2) Involvement in terrorism; (3) Unauthorized foreign contacts; (4) Deliberate failure to protect classified information; and (5) Damaging/sabotaging government information systems, clandestine collection, or defense systems. These CSP topics meet the needs of both DoD and the Intelligence Community facilitating the transfer of security clearances.

In Fiscal Year 1998, the Department published a handbook for federal polygraph examiners standardizing techniques and procedures for conducting polygraph examinations. The handbook also outlines the Quality Assurance Program (QAP) wherein DODPI inspects federal polygraph programs to ensure compliance with the techniques and procedures taught at the Institute. DODPI trains all federal polygraph examiners. This allows for standardization and promotes reciprocity, thus eliminating unnecessary polygraph examinations. Memorandums of Agreement are being staffed, by federal agencies that have polygraph programs, to obtain their concurrence with the provisions contained in the handbook.

Public Law 100-180 authorizes DoD to administer CSP examinations to persons whose duties involve access to information that has been classified at the level of top secret or designated as being within a special access program under section 4.2(a) of Executive Order 12356 (superseded by Executive Order 12958). This includes military and civilian personnel of the Department and personnel of defense contractors. The number of CSP examinations has been limited to 5,000 per fiscal year since Fiscal Year 1991. For Fiscal Years 1988 through 1990 the ceiling was 10,000. The quota reduction took place two years after new exemptions for cryptographic and reconnaissance programs were adopted. Public Law 100-180 exempts certain intelligence agencies and functions from the 5,000 quota: (1) individuals assigned, detailed or under contract with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), (2) persons employed, assigned, detailed, under contract or applying for a position in the National Security Agency, (3) persons assigned to a space where sensitive cryptographic information is produced, processed, or stored, and (4) persons employed by, assigned or detailed to, an office within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs or a contractor of such an office.

The following table reflects CSP examinations conducted by the Department of Defense in accordance with Public Law 100-180.

(1)  Special Access Programs				1,680
(2)  DIA Critical Intelligence Positions		1,054
(3)  TOP SECRET						0
(4)  Examinations for Interim Access to Sensitive
Compartmented Information				2
Total Examinations Conducted Under the 
Congressional Ceiling					2,736
Exempted Examinations*					4,725

DoD Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph Program
TOTAL**							7,461

*NOTE: Includes detailees to CIA and NSA, assignees to cryptographic information processing spaces, persons in non-NRO reconnaissance programs.

**NOTE: Does not include polygraph examinations conducted by NSA. A table of polygraph examinations conducted by NSA is contained in a classified annex to this report. Nor does it include examinations conducted by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which are conducted under the authority of the Director Central Intelligence.

CSP Refusals

In Fiscal Year 1998, nobody declined CSP testing required as a condition of access to certain information. Department of Defense policy states those persons who decline to take the examination are denied access to the classified material in question, but are retained in their position or transferred to other positions in the organization of equal pay and responsibility, commensurate with the clearance level held before the declination.

Specific CSP Examination Results

The polygraph examination results for the 7,461 individuals tested under the Department of Defense Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph Program are as follows:

Two hundred and eight individuals required more than two series (a series is defined as the collection of at least two polygraph charts on an examinee). A total of 72 examinations required more than one day to complete.

There were 7,334 individuals whose polygraph examination results were evaluated as no significant physiological response (non-deceptive).

An additional 110 individuals made admissions relevant to the issues being tested, and through further testing, the examiner was able to resolve all relevant issues favorably to the subject.

After reviewing the psychological data, the polygraph examiner was unable to render an opinion for two individuals. One of these individuals made admissions relevant to the issues being tested.

There were four individuals whose polygraph examination results were evaluated as significant physiological response (deceptive) and who made no admissions to the relevant issues.

Eleven individuals made admissions relevant to the issues being tested but continued to be evaluated as significant psychological response (deceptive) during further testing.

Of the 127 individuals whose examination results were evaluated as yielding significant physiological responses, or evaluated as inconclusive and/or provided substantive information, 106 received a favorable adjudication, seven are still pending adjudication, 13 are pending investigation, and one individual received adverse action denying or withholding access.

Significant Information Developed

The following cases reflect significant information developed during DoD CSP examinations covered by this report. It should be noted that all these individuals had been interviewed previously by security professionals and investigated by other means without any discovery of the information obtained by the polygraph examination procedure. In most cases the information was elicited from the subject in discussion with the examiner.

Most of the information developed during CSP examinations relates to the removal of classified material and computer media to residences. Classified material was sometimes comingled with personal papers, and often when discovered was either destroyed or returned to government control. Sometimes the classified material was deliberately taken home to prepare a briefing or to meet a deadline. Classified material was also left in hotel rooms on TDY trips. These types of admissions were followed-up with additional polygraph testing to determine whether the material was compromised, or if any other material was still outside of government control.


During examinee's initial CSP examination, he exhibited "Significant Response" to relevant questions concerning the mishandling of classified material. Examinee provided a post-test admission regarding deliberately removing government computer disks from his overseas military assignment and transporting them to his parent's home in his accompanied baggage. Examinee indicated that he had erased all the classified data and had placed personal files, i.e. letters on them. Examinee voluntarily returned the disks to government control. The examinee denied placing the classified disks into any other computer system or using them on a personal home computer. The examinee also denied copying any other classified material to the disks or onto a personal computer. Further investigation determined that the examinee had degaussed the disks prior to returning them to government control. Examinee refused further interview and requested a lawyer. The intent is to interview the examinee with his lawyer followed by a confirmatory polygraph test.


Examinee exhibited "Significant Response" to a question concerning deliberate mishandling of classified material. Examinee admitted that on orders of superiors, while in Bosnia, he provided Russian military personnel with large quantities of classified material that technically should not have been released to non-NATO members. Also, during numerous planning sessions, he took copious notes and retained some of the notes at his residence. He did not believe the notes were classified. He subsequently returned the notes and computer disks to government control. Upon examination, some of the material was classified SECRET. The examinee subsequently successfully completed a polygraph examination addressing having any other classified material outside government control, or providing classified information to other unauthorized persons. This matter was referred for further investigation.


Examinee exhibited "Significant Response" to a question concerning having a secret relationship with, working with, and providing classified information to a non-US Intelligence Service. During five days of interviews and polygraph tests, examinee disclaimed any unreported contact with a non-US Intelligence Service or representative. Between 1985 and 1997, examinee was involved in HUMINT intelligence activities. He admitted security violations related to HUMINT operations, but denied any unauthorized activity with a foreign intelligence service. The examinee continued to exhibit "Significant Response" to the above topics, and the matter was referred for additional investigation.


Examinee exhibited "Significant Response" to a question concerning deliberately mishandling classified material. Examinee admitted to keeping SECRET material in his home. He kept the material with him through five military assignments, two of which were overseas. This matter was referred for further investigation.


During CSP testing, examinee, who has access to a Special Access Program, admitted to the removal of classified material during the late 1970s, while he was on active duty. The examinee claimed that he removed the material as a memento of his assignment. He was honorably discharged from the military in 1980 and has maintained the classified material in an insecure unauthorized location. During a search of his residence, classified material was recovered. Examinee denied other removals of classified material or the disclosure of classified material to unauthorized persons. Additional polygraph testing will occur after a security review of the material has been conducted.


During CSP testing, examinee admitted intentionally disabling the taxi lights of an aircraft in order to avoid working a weekend period. In addition, he admitted to fabricating a Maintenance Action Form reporting the taxi lights were inoperable so the pilots would be forced to use another aircraft. Following this admission, the examinee was administered additional CSP testing which he successfully passed. An investigation of the wrongful destruction of government property has been initiated.


During CSP testing, examinee was evaluated as "Significant Response" and subsequently made numerous admissions concerning the disclosure of a classified TDY location to several members of his family and his foreign national girifriend. He also admitted providing his girifriend classified information about his specialty, Unit mission, and location of duty assignment. A counterintelligence investigation has been initiated.


During CSP testing of a military member assigned to NSA, examinee disclosed that he had been having a romantic relationship with a Vietnamese citizen while on an overseas TDY. He further stated that he continued the relationship even though he was aware that the military would not sanction the relationship. He also stated that he was married at the time. Examinee did not successfully complete his polygraph processing and the information obtained during his examination was provided to his parent military organization. He was denied access to the NSA site.


After unsuccessfully completing his periodic CSP examination, an NSA employee admitted that he suspected his wife may be engaged in intelligence activity against the United States. The examinee met his spouse while he was on a cover assignment overseas. Since returning to the United States, his wife received U.S. citizenship and has been operating a day care facility. Examinee admitted to providing classified informatior to his wife and knowledge of her having a close association with a foreign intelligence service. This case has been referred to the FBI for additional investigation.

Utility Of The Investigative Polygraph

During Fiscal Year 1998, DoD investigations obtained unique and significant information from interviews conducted with the aid of the polygraph. In all illustrated instances, the polygraph examination process produced significant security or criminal information which would not otherwise have been secured for the specific investigation. The polygraph examination process was also valuable in helping to establish the innocence of persons charged with serious infractions.


During a background investigation for a DoD contractor employee, information was received alleging that the employee sexually abused children, assaulted his former wife, raped a female neighbor, and misused prescription drugs. The employee denied the allegations and agreed to take a polygraph examination in support of his denials. During the pre-test interview, the employee admitted to the use of illegal drugs, abusing prescription drugs, committing the statutory rape of a minor female, sexually abusing two daughters of his current spouse, attempting to kill his former spouse, and attempting to commit suicide. This matter has been referred to appropriate law enforcement agencies.


An investigation was initiated when a buyer for a large aircraft manufacturer told investigators of accepting money from subcontractors in return for orders. The buyer named eight companies and individuals that had paid him kickbacks. The buyer consented to confirming his story by polygraph. The buyer passed the polygraph and began cooperating in the investigation. As a result, polygraph examinations have been conducted on 18 individuals. Three of these individuals were found truthful and 15 were found deceptive. Fourteen of these individuals made admissions of wrong doing and have implicated other individuals and companies in various kickback schemes. As of this time, there have been 31 guilty pleas resulting in convictions in federal court and $2.8 million in fines and restitution.


During a periodic polygraph examination, an SCI cleared contractor reported that he had "hacked" approximately 1,000 times into a computer that his company used for an NSA project. Access was obtained by writing unauthorized scripts that bypassed the firewall protection. The contractor employee also reported that his employer allowed a non-U.S. citizen (Croatian) to access an NSA SCIF to perform maintenance on a computer used on an NSA contract. The contractor successfully completed additional polygraph testing confirming the information he reported.


During a routine after duty hour's inspection of a NATO facility, classified documents were discovered in a maid's storage room. The maid, a host country civilian contractor, was interviewed with the help of an interpreter and acknowledged having the papers in the storage area. The maid denied knowing about their sensitivity. She explained that she could neither read nor understand English and that she had obtained the papers from the general trash. Further investigation corroborated the maid's story. It was determined that there was extreme lack of security at the facility and that numerous classified documents had been previously tossed out in the unclassified trash. The maid consented to undergo a polygraph examination to verify her statements. The examination was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter. The maid successfully passed the examination.


During a periodic CSP examination, an employee of an NSA SCI contractor, reported information about two Vietnamese nationals who were trying to obtain "extremely proprietary" information for the Vietnamese government. The employee stated that the Vietnamese were able to obtain information relating to computer codes hardware design, engineering design specifications, and sample chips for cloning. Subsequently the employee successfully completed the polygraph examination.


During a periodic polygraph examination of an NSA cleared contractor, the examinee admitted compromising classified information to representatives of the Israeli military. The classified information was improperely released during an approved training course. Prior to releasing the information, the contractor was specifically told not to release the information. The contractor employee released the classified information because he felt it was fundamental to the operation of the system for which they were receiving the training. The employee also provided unauthorized classified information to the French Government while answering technical questions.


An investigation was initiated when a mother reported that she entrusted her two children into the care of an Army member and his wife to babysit for a two week period and upon her return she was told by her four year old daughter that the soldier had sexually assaulted her. The soldier denied any sexual contact and agreed to take a polygraph examination. After being evaluated as deceptive, the soldier admitted to sexually fondling the four year old daughter.


An investigation was initiated when an Army member reported the theft of his 1995 Jeep Wrangler valued at $8,000.00, alleging it was stolen from an on post parking lot. The vehicle was later discovered destroyed by fire. The stereo equipment, valued at over $1,400.00 had been removed from the vehicle and an accelerant had been used to ignite the vehicle. There were no signs of forced entry to the vehicle and a gas can was discovered in the vehicle. The owner was administered a polygraph examination and was evaluated as deceptive. He subsequently admitted to the intentional arson of the vehicle by his wife and a friend in order to defraud both the government and an insurance company.


A background investigation was conducted on an Army member who was born in Armenia and has relatives living there. The member previously served in the Soviet Army as a doctor. While on assignment at Fort Benning, Georgia, he reported having contact with two Russian Army officers who had been attending training at Fort Benning. His background investigation could not be completed, so the Army member agreed to undergo a polygraph examination to verify his statements regarding his contacts with foreign nationals or any foreign intelligence service. The Army member successfully completed his polygraph examination.


A polygraph examination was requested to determine an Air Force civilan employee's involvement, if any, in the theft of a $12,000 computer system from the base golf course. The computer system was taken from a building located inside a locked maintenance area. The investigation developed a suspect and he agreed to take a polygraph examination. The polygraph examination indicated deception. The suspect subsequently admitted stealing the computer system and selling it for $150.00. The investigation has been referred to local law enforcement authorities.


An Air Force civilian employee, who occupied a position with access to sensitive classified information, was removed from that position for suspicious behavior relating to unexplained absences from work. During the pre-test interview, examinee admitted to addiction to crack cocaine. The examinee agreed to undergo polygraph testing to determine if she had compromised any classified information entrusted to her. The examinee successfully completed her polygraph testing with no deception indicated.


During an NSA applicant polygraph examination, the examinee admitted that she had a friendship with an Israeli intelligence officer. She advised that she met the intelligence officer at a math conference in San Diego, California and began a six month relationship with him. The intelligence officer told the applicant that she should not mention anything about the intelligence officer since NSA would not hire her if the relationship became known. The applicant indicated "Specific Reponse" on her polygraph examination and subsequently admitted that the relationship was sexual in nature and that she has continued contact with the intelligence officer.


An investigation was initiated based on allegations that a government contractor had submitted false statements and progress reports on two government contracts resulting in the payment of over $2.5 million on an Army contract and $3.1 million on a Navy contract. Additionally, the government paid for supplies in excess of $30,000.00. The systems manager of the firm was administered a polygraph examination after denying any knowledge or participation in the fraud. The polygraph examination results were evaluated as deception indicated. The manager subsequently admitted to receiving kickbacks, disposal of the property in question, filing fraudulent claims and progress reports.


An investigation was initiated when a United Services Organization (USO) in Germany discovered the theft of over $6,000.00. The civilian manager reported the theft and indicated that 30-50 people had access to the funds. The manager agreed to take a polygraph examination. The results indicated deception. The manager subsequently admitted that she had a gambling problem and had stolen the money to support that habit. The investigation is still pending.


A baby was admitted to the hospital with a broken leg. The father stated that he broke the baby's leg accidently when the baby fell from the father's lap. The father agreed to take a polygraph examination. The results of the polygraph examination indicated deception. During the post-test interview, the father admitted to physically abusing the child.


An investigation revealed deliberate tampering with the window in the nose landing gear housing on an operational C141 aircraft. After numerous interviews, two individuals were identified as suspects. Both suspects agreed to take a polygraph examination. One of the suspects was evaluated as nondeceptive on his polygraph examination. The other suspect was evaluated as deceptive on his examination and confessed to removing screws from the window of the nose landing gear housing.


Local law enforcement authorities requested investigative assistance after a Navy member was discovered dead in the Norfolk, Virginia area. The Navy member died as a result of several bullet wounds. A suspect was identified and he agreed to take a polygraph examination. The results of the polygraph examination indicated deception. The suspect subsequently admitted to being a passenger in a vehicle when another individual in the vehicle shot and robbed the Navy member. The suspect also admitted to helping dispose of the body.

Training and Qualification Standards for
Department of Defense Forensic
Psychophysiologist (Polygraph Examiners)

The Department of Defense maintains very stringent standards for polygraph examiners. The Institute's basic polygraph program is the only program known to base its curriculum on forensic psychophysiology, and conceptual, abstract, and applied knowledge that meet the requirements of a master's degree-level of study. Candidates selected for DoD polygraph positions must meet the following minimum requirements:

All federal polygraph examiners receive their basic polygraph training at DODPI. In Fiscal Year 1998, the Institute trained 59 new polygraph examiners. After completing the basic polygraph training, DoD personnel must serve an internship consisting of a minimum of six months on-the-job-training and the conduct of at least 25 polygraph examinations under the supervision of a certified polygraph examiner before being certified as a DoD polygraph examiner. In addition, DoD polygraph examiners are required to complete 80 hours of continuing education every two years. To help meet this requirement, the Institute offers 19 different specialized courses in forensic psychophysiology. In Fiscal Year 1998, approximately 550 students attended the specialized courses.

Department of Defense Forensic Psychophysiologists
(Polygraph Examiners)

			Average Number
Fiscal Year		Of Examiners		Attrition Rate

1994			192			19%
1995			176			18%
1996			164			19%
1997			153			18%
1998			147			15%

Polygraph (Forensic Psychophysiology) Research

Mandated by Congress, the research program at the Institute is focused on: (1) developing new psychophysiological detection of deception (PDD) techniques, instrumentation and analytic methods to improve PDD technology; (2) conducting research on PDD countermeasures; and (3) evaluating the validity of PDD techniques.

To facilitate the research, a small grant program was established in Fiscal Year 1992. In Fiscal Year 1998, the Institute funded four grant proposals. An additional proposal is currently under review. Another two proposals were funded by contract.

During Fiscal Year 1998, the Institute developed a prioritized research plan and presented it to the Security Policy Board. This plan describes a series of projects to be completed in support of PDD research. Its successful completion is dependent on the availability of resources. The plan has been approved in its entirety by the Personnel Security Research Subcommittee.

The Institute began listing research abstracts on the DODPI World Wide Web page in Fiscal Year 1998 to make them more available to the public. The site includes links to the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) where the full text of the reports can be obtained. DTIC took over the publication of DODPI research reports in Fiscal Year 1998.

Research Projects

0culomotor and Pupil Analysis for PDD. Studies are ongoing to examine changes in pupil size and eye movement during a PDD examination. Some of the studies indicate changes in pupil diameter can be used to detect deception.

Improvement of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory Automated PDD Examination Scoring System (POLYSCORE). The Institute has contracted with the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory to update and improve their POLYSCORE computer program. POLYSCORE is a computer program designed to evaluate data collected during a PDD examination. Several data analysis techniques have been evaluated and those which improve POLYSCORE's accuracy have been incorporated into a new version. POLYSCORE continues to be evaluated so that additional enhancements can be made.

Detecting Stress in the Voice. The Institute, in collaboration with the Chief, Department of Neuroendocrinology and Neurochemistry, Division of the Neurosciences, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, is measuring the human voice during stressful circumstances to determine if there are characteristic changes associated with stress. Although the measures were shown to be reliable indicators of human stress, there was no correlation between those measures and measures provided by a computer voice stress analyzer (CVSA), a device currently being used by many non-federal law enforcement agencies. The utility of other voice stress analytic techniques is not ruled out.

Vagal Tone Monitor/ARIS. This project was designed to investigate the feasibility of using a Vagal Tone Monitor and Autonomic Response Indicator System (ARIS) software to monitor changes in cardiovascular activity during a PDD examination. The Vagal Tone Monitor and ARIS software measure the direct influence of the vagal nerve on heart rate. Data collection has been completed and an analysis is underway.

A Field Study to Test the Validity and Comparative Accuracy of Voice Stress Analysis as Measured by the Computerized Voice Stress Analyzer: In a Psychological Context. Funds were awarded to an investigator employed by the Michigan State Police Polygraph Unit to access the validity of the computerized voice stress analyzer using subjects who are being tested for actual crimes. Data collection has been completed for this project and a final report is expected in Fiscal Year 1999.

Thermal Imaging During a PDD examination. This project is designed to examine the efficacy of thermal imaging technology as a measure of deception. Infrared thermal imaging, a non-intrusive and non-invasive technology, will be used to determine if peripheral changes in skin surface temperature occur during a PDD examination, and if such changes are indicative of deception.

Test of Mock Theft Scenario Incorporating Judgment, Choice, and Consequences. This study is another in a series of research projects being conducted to delineate a standardized scenario, for laboratory studies. The goal is to implement a reliable standardized scenario for PDD testing in laboratory studies to further the development of new and improved technology and procedures for PDD testing. A research protocol has been drafted and submitted for peer review.

Polyscore 3.3 and Psychophysiological Detection of Deception Examiner Accuracy Rates when Scoring Examinations from Actual Criminal Investigations. This study was designed to examine Polyscore and human examiner accuracy rates using data collected during actual criminal investigations. The final report is being reviewed prior to publication.

Rank Order Assessment. Two computerized PDD scoring algorithms and two trained examiners using a ratio-based manual scoring process were evaluated. The report will be submitted for final review prior to publication in Fiscal Year 1999.

Effects of Prior Demonstrations of Polygraph Accuracy on Outcomes of Probable Lie and Directed Lie Polygraph Tests. Funds were awarded to investigators at the University of Utah to examine the usefulness of administering an acquaintance test during a PDD examination. A know solution peak of tension, or acquaintance, test is used to demonstrate to examinees that the PDD procedures can accurately detect deception. In addition, the investigators will compare the accuracy of tests administered using directed, versus probable, lie comparison questions. Data collection has begun and a final report is anticipated in Fiscal Year 1999.

Validity of Outside Issue Questions in the Control Question Test. Outside issue questions are those which address topics that are not included in the relevant and comparison questions (i.e., Do you believe I will only ask you the questions we reviewed?, Is there something else that you are afraid I will ask you questions about?) Investigators at Boise State have proposed, and have been funded, to determine the validity of outside issue questions. A final report is anticipated during Fiscal Year 1999.

The Frequency of Appearance of Evaluative Criteria in Polygraph Charts. The Institute teaches that 23 unique physiological responses may be predictive of deception during a PDD examination. Investigators at Forensic Research Inc. have been funded to determine the frequency and predictive value of these criteria in actual PDD examinations. Analysis has begun and a final report is anticipated during Fiscal Year 1999.

Evaluation of DODPI Evaluation Techniques. Several laboratory studies, published by the University of Utah, have reported high accuracy rates during PDD chart evaluations. Data from the University of Utah studies is currently being evaluated by federal examiners. A final report comparing the decision accuracy of the university and federal examiners is anticipated in Fiscal Year 1999.

A Comparison of Decision Accuracy Rates Obtained by Computer Programs Designed to Evaluate Examination Data. Four vendors currently sell computer programs purported to evaluate accurately PDD examination data. The Institute is currently conducting an idependent evaluation of these computer programs and a report is anticipated in Fiscal Year 1999.

A Compilation of Studies on the Effectiveness of Event-Related Stimuli as a Control Procedure in the Psychophysiological Detection of Deception (PDD). A typical PDD examination involves the use of two or three different types of questions. The two types of questions that are evaluated are the comparison and the relevant questions. The relevant questions are those regarding the specific issue during the examination (i.e., Did you steal the money?) The comparison questions are similar in nature to the issue. Responses from the comparison questions are compared to those of the relevant. The event-related test uses only relevant questions. This designed to evaluate the effectiveness of PDD examinations which only use relevant questions. Work on this project contines in Fiscal Year 1999.

Exploration of Manual and Automated Scoring Methods for Relevant/Irrelevant Multiple Issue Screening Examinations. The Relevant/Irrelevant (RI) PDD screening format is used by some federal agencies for applicant screening and employee vetting. The development of an objective means of interpretation of the polygraph recordings in this role is the goal of this project. Live cases conducted by a contractor for which ground truth was established independently have been subjected to automated and human scoring systems. The data are being evaluated to determine which series of decision rules maximize decision accuracy. The outcome will help identify the best means of interpretation for these types of polygraph data. A report is expected in Fiscal 1999.

Pretest Interview Project. DODPI is currently designing research to identify important variables in the interview that precedes PDD examinations, the pretest interview. A report is expected in Fiscal Year 1999.

Effects of Question Phrasing, Complexity and Length on Examinee Performance: Development of a Comprehensive Index. The Institute is currently evaluating a proposal to study the effects of question phrasing, complexity and length on PDD examination decision accuracy in order to create a comprehensive index for future use.

Phasic Electrodermal Reactivity to Equivalent Psychological Stimuli Presented During Varying Electrodermal Baseline Levels. The electrodermal response measured by most analog polygraphs is skin resistance while the response measured by most digital instruments is skin conductance. It is not known which, if either, measure provides a more accurate presentation of the electrodermal responses to equivalent stimuli at different electrodermal baseline levels. Proposals to resolve this question will be considered during Fiscal Year 1999.

Other Activities

International Use of PDD. The Institute maintains contacts with PDD examiners in other countries to keep abreast of polygraph development around the world. The Institute issues periodic reports summarizing international polygraph activity.

A Computer Prograin for Generating and Modifying Polygraph Charts. DODPI instructors currently use numerous polygraph charts produced during field cases to teach students to identify diagnostic features in the tracings. It is recognized that instruction would be more effective if the characteristics of the tracings could be modified by instructors during class to show various forms and combination of features. Such a capability would better prepare students to evaluate the complex psychological patterns they will later encounter when they perform PDD tests in the field. DODPI is developing a statement of work for a system that will allow instructors to tailor tracings real time for this purpose.

Presentations. DODPI researchers presented results of their research in several fora in Fiscal Year 1998, including the Federal Interagency Polygraph Seminar, the annual seminar for the Society for Psychophysiological Research, the annual seminar for the American Polygraph Association, and the International Organization of Psychophysiology. The researchers have also provided formal instruction to federal examiners at the course sponsored by the University of Virginia, and the basic and advanced courses at DODPI.

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