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(U) SHAMROCK and MINARET Classification Guide, 389-00 (b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

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Description of Information	Classification/Markings	Reason	Declass	Remarks
(U) The information in this classification guide pertains to specific facts derived from public testimony. Any details of SHAMROCK or MINARET activity not addressed in this guide should be referred to N5P52, Information Security Policy, for determination.				
(U) A. HISTORICAL ACTIVITY				
(U) A.1. The fact that the U.S. has intercepted, analyzed, and in some cases decoded foreign communications since the Revolutionary War.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) A.2. The fact that during the Civil War and WWI, the U.S. intercepted foreign telegrams sent by wire.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) A.3. The fact that elements of the military have been assigned the task of obtaining intelligence from foreign radio transmissions since the 1930s.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) A.4. The fact that during WWII, the U.S. Army and Navy intercepted and analyzed enciphered/coded radio messages.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) A.5. The fact that during WWII, all international telegraph traffic was screened by military censors, located at telegraph companies, as part of a censorship program. Messages from foreign intelligence targets were turned over to military intelligence.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) B. NSA- GENERAL				
(U) B.1. The fact that signals are intercepted by many techniques and processed, sorted, and analyzed by procedures that reject inappropriate or unnecessary	UNCLASSIFIED			

signals.					(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36
(U) B.2. The fact that lists of words, including names, subjects, locations, etc. are used to sort out information of foreign intelligence value from that which is not of interest.	UNCLASSIFIED				
(U) B.3. The fact that unwanted messages (for example, between two U.S. citizens) are rejected as early in the selection process as possible.	UNCLASSIFIED				
(U) B.4. The fact that NSA confines its activities to communications involving at least one foreign terminal, and excludes communications between U.S. citizens or entities.	UNCLASSIFIED				
(U) B.5. The fact that directives now in effect in various agencies preclude resumption of collection activity based on the names of U.S. citizens unless personally approved by the Attorney General.	UNCLASSIFIED				
(U) C. SHAMROCK - PARTICIPATING AGENCIES AND COMPANIES					
(U) C.1. The fact that the term SHAMROCK was given to a message collection program in which the Government persuaded three international telegraph companies - RCA Global, ITT World Communications, and Western Union International, to make available in various ways certain of their international telegraph traffic to the U.S. Government.	UNCLASSIFIED				
(U) C.2. The fact that SHAMROCK was a continuation of the military censorship program of WWII.	UNCLASSIFIED				
(U) C.3. The fact that the Army Security Agency (ASA) was the first Government agency responsible for SHAMROCK. When the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) was created in 1949, it inherited the program, as did NSA on its creation in 1952.	UNCLASSIFIED				
(U) C.4. The fact that SHAMROCK operated from 1947-1973, and involved use of Watch Lists 1967-1973.	UNCLASSIFIED				(U) See MINARET section for guidance on Watch List activity.
(U) C.5. The fact that initially, the Government only used the telegrams relating to certain foreign targets, and then began to extract telegrams of certain U.S. citizens.	UNCLASSIFIED				
(U) C.6. The fact that while the original purpose of SHAMROCK was to obtain	UNCLASSIFIED				

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foreign intelligence, programs frequently did not distinguish between messages of foreigners and messages of U.S. citizens.				
(U) C.7. The fact that RCA Global, ITT World Communications, and Western Union International were not paid for their services to SHAMROCK.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) C.8. The fact that only the Director, Deputy Director, and a lower-level manager at NSA had operational responsibility for SHAMROCK at any one time.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) C.9. The fact that each of the companies involved limited knowledge of SHAMROCK to two or three individuals due to concerns regarding the legality of the operation.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) C.10. The fact that Secretary of Defense Forrestal gave assurances in December 1947, saying he was speaking on behalf of the President and the Attorney General, that the companies involved would not be subject to criminal prosecution as long as "the current administration" was in office. Secretary of Defense Johnson provided the same assurances in 1949.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) C.11. The fact that President Truman, Attorney General Tom Clark, and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger were aware of and approved of Project SHAMROCK.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) C.12. The fact that offices of RCA Global, ITT World Communications, and Western Union International in New York City, NY; Washington DC; San Francisco, CA; San Antonio, TX; and Miami, FL participated in SHAMROCK.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) C.13. The fact that approximately 90% of the messages collected for SHAMROCK came from New York City, NY.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) C.14. The fact that in the beginning, the Government received paper tapes of messages that had been transmitted by overseas cables, as well as microfilm copies of messages that had been sent by radio.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) C.15. The fact that NSA never received domestic telegrams from the companies involved.	UNCLASSIFIED			(U) None of the companies had operations which included passing

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				telegrams within the United States after 1963.
(U) C.16. The fact that the government did not tell the companies that it was extracting telegrams of certain U.S. citizens.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) C.17. The fact that RCA Global and ITT World Communications provided NSA with the bulk of their international message traffic, which NSA then selected for traffic of foreign intelligence targets.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) C.18. The fact that in the 1960s, RCA Global and ITT World Communications began to store their international paid message traffic on magnetic tapes, which were turned over to NSA.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) C.19. The fact that NSA made copies of magnetic tapes in its rented office space in New York City, NY.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) C.20. The fact that Western Union International sorted the traffic itself and provided NSA only with copies of the traffic of certain foreign targets and all the traffic to one country.	UNCLASSIFIED			(U) Information regarding foreign entities targeted shall be classified in accordance with existing guidance.
(U) C.21. The fact that Western Union International microfilmed copies of outgoing international telegrams for pickup by a government courier.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) C.22. The fact that in Washington, DC, the companies turned over copies of particular traffic to the FBI, who then passed it to NSA.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) D. MINARET - REQUESTING AGENCIES AND SUBJECT MATTER				
NOTE: (U) Names included on Watch Lists are the equity of the submitting agency and may not be released without referral to that agency.				
(U) D.1. The fact that the term MINARET was used beginning in 1969 for Watch List activity which had begun in 1967 and lasted through 1973.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) D.2. The fact that MINARET was conducted in response to requirements levied by its customers.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) D.3. The fact that from 1967-1969, "the procedure for submitting names was more informal"; starting in 1969, the procedure was formalized and the names for Watch Lists were submitted through channels in writing.	UNCLASSIFIED			

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(U) D.4. The fact that there were no warrants obtained for any of the intercepts of U.S. citizens for Watch List activity.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) D.5. The fact that the information produced by MINARET was, with one exception, entirely a by-product of NSA's foreign intelligence mission.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) D.6. The fact that the one instance in which foreign messages were intercepted specifically for MINARET purposes occurred as follows: The collection was of telephone calls passed over international communications facilities between the United States and South America. The collection was at the request of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) to produce intelligence information on the methods and locations of foreign narcotics trafficking.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) D.7. The fact that NSA asked CIA to assist in the collection as described in the previous entry. This lasted for approximately 6 months, late 1972-early 1973, when CIA stopped due to concern that the activity exceeded CIA statutory restrictions.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) D.8. The fact that during the early 1960s, requesting agencies asked NSA to look for reflections in international communications of certain U.S. citizens traveling to Cuba.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) D.9. The fact that beginning in 1967, requesting agencies provided names of citizens and organizations (some of which were U.S. citizens and organizations) in an effort to obtain information which was available in foreign communications as a by-product of NSA's normal foreign intelligence mission.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) D.10. The fact that from 1967-1973, requirements for Watch Lists were developed in four basic areas: International Drug Trafficking, Presidential Protection, Terrorism, and Possible Foreign Support or Influence on Civil Disturbances.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) D.11. The fact that the CIA submitted Watch Lists covering requirements on international travel, foreign influence, foreign support of so-called U.S. extremists and terrorists, and U.S. persons active in the anti-war movement	UNCLASSIFIED			(U) These lists included approximately 30 U.S. citizens and approximately 700 foreign individuals and groups.

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<p>(U) D.12. The fact that the FBI submitted Watch Lists to NSA covering requirements on foreign ties and support to certain U.S. citizens and groups. These lists contained names of so-called extremist persons and groups, individuals and groups active in civil disturbances, and terrorists.</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>			<p>(U) These lists included approximately 1,000 U.S. citizens and approximately 1,700 foreign individuals and groups.</p>
<p>(U) D.13. The fact that the DIA submitted a Watch List covering requirements on possible foreign control of, or influence on, U.S. anti-war activity. The list contained names of individuals traveling to North Vietnam.</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>			<p>(U) This list included approximately 20 U.S. citizens.</p>
<p>(U) D.14. The fact that the Secret Service submitted a Watch List covering requirements in support of their efforts to protect the President and other senior officials.</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>			<p>(U) This list contained names of persons thought to be a threat to Secret Service protectees, as well as the names of the protectees themselves.</p> <p>(U) This list included approximately 180 U.S. citizens and approximately 525 foreign individuals and groups.</p>
<p>(U) D.15. The fact that the BNDD submitted a Watch List in 1970 covering requirements related to foreign sources of drugs and foreign organizations and methods used to introduce illicit drugs into the United States.</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>			<p>(U) This list contained names of suspected drug traffickers.</p> <p>(U) This list included approximately 450 U.S. citizens and over 3,000 foreign individuals.</p>
<p>(U) D.16. The fact that the Army requested from NSA any available information on foreign influence over, or control of, civil disturbances in the U.S.</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>			
<p>(U) D.17. The fact that, between 1967 and 1973, there was a cumulative total of approximately 450 U.S. persons on the Narcotics List, and about 1,200 U.S. names on all other lists combined.</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>			
<p>(U) D.18. The fact that, at the height of the Watch List activity, there were approximately 800 U.S. citizens on the Watch List, approximately one-third of which were on the Narcotics List.</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>			
<p>(U) D.19. The fact that, between 1967 and 1973, approximately 2,000 reports were issued by NSA on international narcotics trafficking, and about 1,900 reports were issued covering</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>			

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terrorism, executive protection and foreign influence over U.S. groups. This equates to approximately 2 reports per day.				
(U) D.20. The fact that a major terrorist act in the U.S. was prevented due in part to MINARET reporting.	UNCLASSIFIED			(U) Details regarding the terrorist act shall be classified in accordance with existing guidance.
(U) D.21. The fact that some large drug shipments were prevented from entering the U.S. due in part to MINARET reporting.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) E. LOCATIONS				
(U) E.1. The fact that CIA provided an office in New York City, NY to NSA 1966-1973 for the purpose of copying telegrams.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) E.2. The fact that NSA found accommodation in New York City, NY after the CIA pulled out of the arrangement in 1973.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) E.3. The fact that a courier traveled to New York City, NY each day from Ft. Meade, MD to bring back paper/magnetic tapes containing copies of international telegrams sent from New York City, NY the previous day using the facilities of RCA Global, ITT World Communications, and Western Union International.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) F. NSA PROCESSING OF SHAMROCK AND MINARET MATERIAL				
(U) F.1. The fact that MINARET activity consisted of scanning international communications already intercepted for other purposes to derive information which met MINARET requirements.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) F.2. The fact that all MINARET collection was conducted against international communications with at least one terminal in a foreign country. The foreign terminal (with one exception) was the initial object of collection.	UNCLASSIFIED			(U) Information regarding foreign entities targeted shall be classified in accordance with existing guidance. (U) See item 38.
(U) F.3. The fact that, of the 2,000 reports issued 1967-1973 on international narcotics trafficking and the 1,900 reports issued during the same time period on terrorism, executive protection, and foreign influence on U.S. groups, over 90% had at least one foreign communicant and all had at least one foreign terminal.	UNCLASSIFIED			

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<p>(U) F.4. The fact that NSA personnel made analytic amplifications on Watch List submissions to enhance the selection process.</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>			<p>(U) For example, aliases and addresses of persons and organizations on the Watch List were added.</p> <p>(U) Aliases and addresses, as identifiers of the names themselves, are the equity of the submitting agency and may not be released without referral to that agency.</p>
<p>(U) F.5. The fact that paper tapes of messages that had been transmitted by overseas cables and microfilm copies of messages sent by radio were sorted by hand for certain foreign intelligence targets; such traffic could be readily identified by special codes in the heading of each telegram.</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>			
<p>(U) F.6. The fact that the magnetic tapes were processed for items of foreign intelligence interest, typically telegrams sent by foreign establishments in the United States or telegrams that appeared to be encrypted.</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>			
<p>(U) F.7. The fact that it is estimated that in the later years, NSA selected about 150,000 messages a month for review. Thousands of these messages were disseminated to other agencies.</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>			
<p>(U) G. DISSEMINATION OF SHAMROCK AND MINARET INFORMATION</p>				
<p>(U) G.1. The fact that very strict controls were placed on handling of MINARET information.</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>			
<p>(U) G.2. The fact that receiving agencies were clearly instructed that MINARET information could not be used for prosecutive or evidentiary purposes.</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>			
<p>(U) G.3. The fact that MINARET material was delivered only to designated offices in receiving agencies in order to minimize the risk that the information would be used for purposes other than foreign intelligence.</p>	<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>			<p>(U) In this instance, the "receiving agencies" are considered to be the same agencies that submitted names for Watch Lists. See "Requesting Agencies and Subject Matter."</p> <p>(U) For example, the BNDD had responsibilities for domestic drug law enforcement as well as for working to curtail international narcotics trafficking. Watch List information supported</p>

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				only the latter function.
(U) G.4. The fact that, 1967-1969, information from MINARET activity relating to international messages between U.S. citizens or organizations was issued for background use only and hand-delivered to requesting agencies.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) G.5. The fact that, 1967-1969, if the U.S. citizen or organization were only one correspondent of the international communication, the information was published as a normal product report but in a special series to limit distribution.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) G.6. The fact that, starting in 1969, information dealing with executive protection and foreign influence over U.S. citizens and groups were provided for background use only and hand-carried to requesting agencies.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) G.7. The fact that, when requirements were received in 1970 to supply intelligence regarding international drug trafficking and in 1971 to supply intelligence regarding international terrorism, the information was provided for background use only and hand-carried to requesting agencies.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) H. TERMINATION OF SHAMROCK/MINARET				
(U) H.1. The fact that SHAMROCK was terminated by order of the Secretary of Defense, and the Senate Select Committee began studying SHAMROCK in May 1975.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) H.2. The fact that concern regarding NSA's role in MINARET activities increased in 1973 due to the following three factors: 1. Concerns that it might not be possible to distinguish definitely between the purpose for the intelligence gathering which was served by the requirements, and the missions and functions of the departments and agencies receiving the information and 2. Concerns that requirements from such agencies were growing and 3. Concern that new, broad discovery procedures in court cases were coming into use which might lead to disclosure of sensitive intelligence sources and methods.	UNCLASSIFIED			
(U) H.3. The fact that MINARET activity which involved U.S. citizens ceased	UNCLASSIFIED			



operationally in the summer of 1973, and was terminated officially in the fall of 1973.

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