“SIDE-BY-SIDE AS EQUALS”
An unprecedented collaboration
between the Russian and American
Nuclear Weapons Laboratories
to reduce the nuclear danger

“I’ve been waiting forty years for this”

Academician Yuli Borisovich Khariton
Scientific Director Emeritus
Arzamas-16 (Sarov)
Memories tend to be short in this rapidly changing world. It has been only four years since the Soviet Union collapsed and separated into independent states. Yet the U.S.-Soviet superpower struggle and the threat of all-out nuclear war are already matters for historical studies. Nuclear weapons stockpiles are being reduced, and the end of the Cold War has enhanced global security. Nevertheless, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought forward new dangers, primary among them being the ultimate fate of the old Soviet nuclear arsenal and the increased threat of nuclear proliferation.

The United States was able to act quickly: To support agreements by Bush and Gorbachev during the fall of 1991 that their respective countries would dismantle a large part of the arsenals of the Cold War, Congress passed legislation to help the Soviet Union destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons and establish safeguards against proliferation. Department of Defense (DoD) funds amounting to 400 million dollars per year were redirected into the so-called “Nunn-Lugar” program (named after Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar who initiated the legislation). After the Soviet collapse in December 1991 and in subsequent years, the scope of the Nunn-Lugar program was extended to promote stabilization of defense personnel and, where possible, their conversion to civilian activities. This visionary government initiative under DoD leadership has made significant progress in the destruction of delivery systems and missile silos slated for elimination under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START I. However, efforts aimed at stabilizing the people and facilities of the Russian nuclear complex and safeguarding the associated nuclear materials initially proved to be difficult.

In the context of these highly visible efforts, another smaller and quieter effort was proceeding steadily and with remarkable success. Nuclear weapons scientists from Los Alamos and from Arzamas-16 (the birthplace of the Soviet atomic bomb, now called Sarov) began working together on basic science projects almost immediately after the Cold War ended, and the mutual trust and respect gained through that lab-to-lab scientific effort has become a springboard for a larger lab-to-lab effort in nuclear materials control throughout the Russian nuclear complex.

What were the seeds for this unprecedented collaboration, and how did it get official approval? How did it grow into the larger effort in nonproliferation? How are these lab-to-lab efforts affecting the government-to-government efforts started under Nunn-Lugar, and what are the prospects for furthering nonproliferation goals in the future?

We asked Laboratory Director Sig Hecker and other Los Alamos staff involved in the lab-to-lab effort to address those questions. Their experiences of interacting with the Russian nuclear scientists through the remarkable changes of the last decade bear testimony to the power of personal ties and trust in the pursuit of shared interests. These interactions may reflect the universal values of the scientific community and presage the realization of the long-held belief that those values are a key to resolving the most difficult global problems.
Part I  Roots of the Lab-to-Lab Collaboration

The Scientific Roots of the Collaboration

Sig Hecker: Many people have expressed surprise when I tell them of the joint work with our Russian counterparts from the atomic city of Arzamas-16. The fact that we are working not only on peacetime science projects but also on the sensitive issues of nuclear materials control strikes them as even more surprising. I always emphasize that much of our success is due to the trust and personal friendship that we have been able to develop with the Russian nuclear scientists.

Here we’d like to tell the story of how that happened, and to my mind, it starts about ten years ago and has two main threads: One is the work associated with the Joint Verification Experiments, an arms control effort that engaged our nuclear weapons testing experts with their Soviet counterparts in a very close technical working relationship for over two years, and the other is the very significant personal interactions in pure science between people from our nuclear-weapons-design labs and their counterparts in the Soviet Union. John Shaner and Max Fowler of Los Alamos, for example, have been following developments in their fields in the Soviet Union for more than thirty years. I’ll ask John to begin describing those early years.

John Shaner: As early as the late 1950s, Soviets at the nuclear weapons institutes were publishing seminal papers in the open literature in my area of expertise, which is shock-wave and high-pressure physics. Through the 1960s, we got to know each other through publications, we referenced each other’s work, and since we were working on similar problems, we had a pretty good idea of the quality of work on both sides. Although personal contacts with people like Lev Al’tshuler and Rurik Trunin from Arzamas-16, the Russian counterpart to Los Alamos, and Evgenii Avrorin from Chelyabinsk-70, the Russian counterpart to Livermore, did not occur until the 1980s, when they finally happened, it was like meeting old colleagues.

Sig Hecker: A particularly important set of meetings were those between Max Fowler and Academician Alexander Pavlovskii of Arzamas-16, one of Andrei Sakharov’s students. Both Max and Pavlovskii were pioneers during the 1960s in the field of explosively-driven pulsed power for the generation of ultra-high magnetic fields. Their interaction provided the initial basis of trust for trying to initiate a lab-to-lab collaboration, and their mutual interest, and that of their junior colleagues, led directly to the work in pulsed power that forms the bulk of lab-to-lab scientific interactions with the nuclear scientists of Arzamas-16. Max, when did it all start?

Max Fowler: I first heard of Alexander Pavlovskii in 1965 in connection with Megagauss-I, the first international conference on using high explosives and magnetic-flux compression to create ultra-high magnetic fields. At Los Alamos, we were interested in using this pulsed-power source to initiate controlled fusion. The Soviet interest was presumably identical. Pavlovskii was an author on four of eight Soviet abstracts submitted to Megagauss-I. We were looking forward to meeting him, but none of those authors were permitted to attend the conference. Supposedly they were from the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow, a civilian institute focussed on nuclear reactors. But at that time, every Soviet nuclear scientist had to say he was from Kurchatov. Not until Megagauss-V in 1989, when relationships between the Soviet Union and the United States were thawing, did we learn that Pavlovskii and his colleagues in pulsed power were from a secret city, now known to be Arzamas-16. Sakharov called it “the Installation” in his autobiography, and of course, it is the Soviet nuclear weapons design center where their first atomic and hydrogen bombs were made.

John Shaner: We should remind people that Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 were places that weren’t supposed to exist and never appeared on any Soviet maps until after the Cold War.

Los Alamos Science: Max, when did you first meet Pavlovskii?
Max Fowler: We had hopes of meeting him, as well as Vladimir Chernyshev, at the second Megagauss conference in Washington, D.C., in 1979. Their papers were actually read at that meeting, but again they were not allowed to attend. So Pavlovskii and I didn’t meet until 1982 at a conference at the Lavrentyev Institute of Hydrodynamics in Novosibirsk in Siberia. And it was truly exciting to see each other after knowing for seventeen years that we were working on very similar things. At subsequent conferences, we discussed our work and began to develop a rather strong friendship. He had a tremendous sense of humor, and it was a pleasure to exchange ideas with him even though, or perhaps because, each of us was trying to get information from the other.

In the meantime, U.S. intelligence had been keeping track of the Soviet activities in this area and knew that their effort became fairly large in the early 1960s. I would guess it was stimulated by our 1960 paper in which we reported using these magnetic-flux-compression generators to create fields in the range of 10 to 15 megagauss and stated our intention to apply those fields to the problem of fusion. The Soviets put quite a bit of money into their effort, and in the early 1980s, the Air Force was so impressed with the reported performance of one of Pavlovskii’s high-energy generators that they asked us to duplicate it. That was the LIGA project. Some of the LIGA results were presented at Megagauss-III in 1983. Pavlovskii had made his first visit to the United States in connection with a steering committee meeting for Megagauss-V, and with my help, he had taken a tour of various facilities from Florida and New York to the west coast and places in between. Unfortunately, between then and June, he had his first heart attack and was unable to attend Megagauss-V. But at the conference, I received a letter from him written in English in which he wrote, “It seems that it is high time to think about a joint program of works on both superhigh magnetic fields cumulation and experiments setting in such fields. What’s your opinion?”

Dear Dr. C. M. Fowler.
Owing to circumstances over which I have no control we shouldn’t meet at the conference “Megagauss – 5”. I feel somewhat unhealthy and doctors don’t recommend me to go to Novosibirsk. I’m getting well now.
In spite of this unforeseen situation the preparation of the book shouldn’t be delayed.
If you’ve managed to compile a variant of plan–prospect of a future book, I ask you to send it with Dr. G. A. Shvetsov and to inform about the adress of correspondence.
There is one more question for discussion. During the last years the evolution of explosive method for superhigh fields obtaining by coaxial shells system magnetic flux compression allows to obtain a field with intensity of about 18 MOe. On this way it seems real to achieve the fields reproducibility of 20 – 30 MOe during the next few years. The reports concerning these problems will be made at the conference. The experiment with such facilities will be both expensive and complicated enough. It seems that it is high time to think about a joint program of works on both superhigh magnetic fields cumulation and experiments setting in such fields. What’s your opinion?
Dear Dr. C. M. Fowler, I wish to thank you once more for organization of such a wonderful trip across the USA, which deeply impressed me. I send you the book “The Problems of Modern Experimental and Theoretical Physics” involving the articles on magnetic cumulation, and a small souvenir – a box with your portrait in memory of our first meetings in Novosibirsk. The painter used a photograph of year, 1983, that is why it was difficult to reproduce the versatility as a feature of your character. But his main effort to depict you full of strength and energy I share completely and wish you health and durable creative activities.
I hope for a successful work on the book, scientific contacts expanding and meetings with you. I ask you to give my sincere thanks to your wife for warm reception. My wife thanks you for souvenirs.
Sincerely yours,
A. I. Pavlovskii

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Sincerely yours,
A. I. Pavlovskii
letter back to Los Alamos, but there was no way to respond.

At that same meeting, we found out that he was from the secret city where the first Soviet atomic bomb was built, and that it was roughly a few hundred miles from Moscow.

**Krik Krikorian:** Of course, our intelligence people knew that the name of their ‘Los Alamos’ was Arzamas-16, and that it had been previously called several other names.

**Los Alamos Science:** And do we know what the ‘16’ stands for?

**Steve Younger:** The Russians like to joke that the ‘16’ was meant to make us look for the other fifteen. In reality it is a postal code.

**Irv Lindemuth:** Another interesting event at Megagauss-V was when Bob Reinovsky and I met Vladimir Chernyshev, who is also from Arzamas-16 and also a leader in the design of magnetic-flux compression generators. I first heard of Chernyshev in 1988 when our International Technology Division asked me to evaluate Russian papers on fusion. One particularly interesting paper was written by Vladislav Mokhov and Chernyshev and outlined a novel approach to controlled fusion involving pulsed power and magnetic flux compression. My colleagues and I believed then and still believe that the approach is very promising. We now call it magnetized target fusion. The paper attracted interest in part because it had been submitted to the prestigious Soviet physics journal *Doklady* by Yuli Kharton, who was the chief designer of the first Soviet atomic bomb.

At Megagauss-V, I tried to discuss that very interesting paper with Chernyshev. He apparently was not allowed to talk to Americans about fusion, but he was willing to talk about the Russian pulsed-power capability, which was evidently very impressive, and he even said, “Maybe some day we can do an experiment in which you and your colleagues design the load and we provide the generator.”

**Los Alamos Science:** It must have been surprising to get offers for collaboration from scientists who were from the closed city of Arzamas-16. After all, this was 1989 and the Cold War was still in progress. Did either of you take these overtures seriously?

**Max Fowler:** Not really. But on a later trip to the Soviet Union, we learned that they were quite serious.

**Sig Hecker:** Max, before we get ahead of our story, let’s find out from John how the contacts in high pressure science developed during the 1980s.

**John Shaner:** The first time I personally met people from the shock wave groups at Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 was at an international conference on high pressure science in Kiev in 1987. Well-known people from both of their institutes were anxious to meet their U.S. counterparts to discuss as much as we could of the thirty years of technical work that we had been reading about in the literature. Podurets and Trunin were there from Arzamas-16, and Boris Vodolaga and Avrorin were there from Chelyabinsk-70. Evgenii Avrorin, the technical director from Chelyabinsk-70 even chaired a session. A Russian friend told me dur-

... it was truly exciting to see each other after knowing for seventeen years that we were working on very similar things. At subsequent conferences, we discussed our work and began to develop a rather strong friendship. [Pavlovskii] had a tremendous sense of humor, and it was a pleasure to exchange ideas with him even though, or perhaps because, each of us was trying to get information from the other.
The Joint Verification Experiments and Viktor Mikhailov

Sig Hecker: These technical contacts in the late 1980s bring us to the second main thread of our story, which involves the Soviet-American Joint Verification Experiments of 1988 and the effort to ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. In that dramatic effort, the Soviets came to the Nevada Test Site and both sides made an on-site measurement of the yield of a U.S. nuclear device and compared the results, and then both sides did the same for a Soviet device at their test site in Semipalatinsk. Those joint experiments and the associated negotiations in Geneva involved many interactions with their nuclear scientists, in particular with Viktor Mikhailov. Mikhailov is now the head of MI-NATOM, the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, and he has become the primary government authority in Russia supporting the lab-to-lab effort.

To understand the unfolding of events, let’s remember that the Soviet-American interactions of the 1980s were not all wine and roses. President Reagan often referred to the Soviet Union as the evil empire. In 1983, our country had an enormous defense buildup and SDI was born. The nuclear weapons resurgence in terms of new systems and money flowing back into the program was also enormous.

Steve Younger: I remember a Livermore nuclear shot in the mid-1980s and on the nuclear device can was painted in 12-inch letters “Eat neutrons Ivan.” We should also keep in mind that the SDI work we did in the mid-1980s was directed towards shooting down Soviet missiles. They were the targets, and by golly, we studied their vapor trails and all sorts of stuff.

Sig Hecker: And then came the Reagan-Gorbachev summit at Reykjavik in 1986. I was just flabbergasted. I could not believe that these two men were saying they were going to get rid of all nuclear weapons. But they said it. To me that was a really significant change—not completely convincing, but still significant.

I became Director of the Laboratory on January 15, 1986, and at that time, one of the key issues was the ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. The treaty set a 150-kiloton limit on the yield of underground nuclear tests. The Americans had been observing the treaty for ten years since the signing by Nixon and Brezhnev, and the Soviets claimed they were too. But the means to verify the treaty were not specified, and there were many claims of cheating by both sides. About 160 such claims were on file in Geneva, so the status of the treaty was fairly shaky. Nevertheless, Reagan wanted the treaty ratified by the Senate before he left office in 1988. The Joint Verification Experiments were intended to demonstrate that the methods agreed to by each side to verify treaty compliance could be fielded effectively and without undue interference with nuclear experiments. The activities associated with those experiments were the principal Soviet interface that we thought about and talked about at that time. I’ll let Don Eilers tell you about that.

Don Eilers: President Reagan really wanted better verification of the yields of the Soviet tests, and he would often repeat the phrase “trust but verify” in both Russian and English. He was being pushed by the hardliners in the Defense Department who were concerned that the Soviets were testing more powerful devices than the treaty allowed. In 1984 Reagan made a speech at the United Nations in which he proposed that the CORRTEx technology be used to verify the Soviet yields. That was a startling proposal because CORRTEx requires performing the nuclear yield measurement at the site where the nuclear device is being tested. In the past, we had determined the yields of Soviet nuclear tests by seismic methods at distances thou-
sands of kilometers from the actual test site, and the Soviets presumably did the same for us. But CORRTEX is a hydrodynamic measurement in which the cables must go down into a satellite hole near the nuclear device, and then when the device goes off, the speed of the shock wave along the cable gives you a very accurate estimate of the yield, or explosive power, of the device.

**Los Alamos Science:**
*Was the CORRTEX technology new in 1984?*

**Don Eilers:** No. Don Westervelt and I had started working on it back in 1975, right after Nixon and Brezhnev signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and during the negotiations on the companion Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty, which was signed by Ford and Brezhnev in 1976. We actually fielded the first CORRTEX system in 1976 on one of the U.S. high-yield nuclear tests. Our Soviet counterparts in the 1970s were Vadim Simonenko, Nikolai Voloshin, and all those guys at Chelyabinsk-70 whom we were to meet again in 1986 at the Nuclear Testing Talks in Geneva leading up to the Joint Verification Experiments.

Those talks were a direct result of the Reagan Initiative and were designed to discuss methodologies for verifying the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. The U.S. delegation was led by Ambassador Bob Barker from DOD, and Bob Jeffries and I were part of that delegation. The Soviets were proposing seismic methods to measure the yield, and the United States was proposing CORRTEX measurements. In the course of a year and a half, we went through several two-week sessions in which all we did was basically look at one another across the table. Nothing happened until Secretary of State George Schultz and Soviet Foreign Minister E. A. Shevardnadze got together in September 1987 and proposed full-scale negotiations with the objective of ultimately doing joint verification experiments, or JVEs, in which the two sides would make simultaneous hydrodynamic (CORRTEX-like) measurements of nuclear yield and compare results. By November, there was an agreement to have preliminary exchange visits to our respective nuclear test sites, and in December 1987, Schultz and Shevardnadze signed an agreement on the conduct and objectives of the JVEs.

Now there is some confusion over who proposed those experiments. The Russians think they did and Bob Barker thinks that it was done over a cup of tea in Washington. Voloshin asserts in an unpublished manuscript that, “It was a proposal from the Soviets made during the April 1987 ministerial.”

In any case, the preliminary visits were set up for January 1988. The object of these visits was to familiarize one another enough so that we could more easily negotiate an agreement for carrying out the JVEs. They were really kind of exciting times. A delegation of twenty of us led by Bob Barker went first to Moscow, where we had a night at the Bolshoi Ballet, and went on to the Soviet nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan.

**Sig Hecker:** We should point out that you were the first Americans ever to set foot on a Soviet test site, and that was considered a pretty big deal by the hardliners in Washington.

**Don Eilers:** Right. The Russians flew on the same airplane with us, and we landed in a rip-roaring snowstorm at Semipalatinsk. That evening at dinner, we met Viktor Mikhailov for the first time. He was then the Director of the Scientific Research Institute of Impulse Engineering in Moscow, the institute responsible for many types of nuclear testing diagnostics. He certainly appeared to be leading their technical group, and I thought, “Boy, what an intense guy.” He exuded self-confidence and pride. It was quite obvious that he was well respected, and everybody and his brother listened to him. He even gave some of the technical presentations on their timing and firing system during our stay at the test site. Voloshin and Simonenko were also there.

The atmosphere of the visit was eerie. Armed guards surrounded our hotel, and we were permitted to walk only about a few hundred feet down to and along the bank of the Irtysh River. Continued on page 10
Chronology of the

• **1965** Megagauss-I, the first international conference on ultra-high magnetic fields, reveals first glimpse of Soviet pulsed-power program to Western scientists. Pavlovskii and other Soviet scientists from the secret nuclear-weapons-design city of Arzamas-16 submit abstracts but are not allowed to attend.

• **1975** Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), signed by Presidents Ford and Brezhnev, limits yields of underground nuclear tests to 150 kilotons.

• **1982-1989** Fowler of Los Alamos and Pavlovskii develop connection at Megagauss and other conferences.

• **1982-1984** Reagan begins initiative to improve TTBT verification and the prospects for ratification. Reagan suggests CORREX methodology, which requires on-site verification of nuclear yields.

• **1986** Gorbachev starts policy of glasnost. Gorbachev and Reagan hold Reykjavik Summit.


• **1988** Joint Verification Experiments (JVE)—Soviet and U.S. teams develop consistent methodology and then perform joint on-site yield measurements at each other’s nuclear weapons test sites. Soviet scientists discuss possibility of collaboration and present possible list of topics.

• **1988-1990** Continuing Soviet-American negotiations on procedures for implementing the TTBT.

• **1989** First written offer of collaboration—Pavlovskii sends offer to Fowler.

• **Fall 1990** Opening of the Soviet Nuclear Design Institutes to American Scientists. In August, Avrorin, chief scientist of Chelyabinsk-70 invites Shaner and Livermore scientists to visit the nuclear weapons design city of Chelyabinsk-70. Avrorin proposes thirteen areas of collaboration. In October, Mikhailov takes Eilers and U.S. delegation to visit Arzamas-16.

• **September 1990** TTBT ratified under the Bush administration.

• **1991** Los Alamos Director Hecker speaks with Alessi, head of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation office of the DOE, concerning the possibility of collaborations with the Soviet nuclear institutes.

• August 1991 Unsuccessful coup is staged against the Gorbachev government.

• **September 1991** Chernyshev and Mokhov present Lindemuth with a written proposal signed by the Director of Arzamas-16 for joint Russian-American work on magnetized target fusion.

• **November 1991** Passage of the Nunn-Lugar legislation earmarking 400 million dollars of the DoD budget to help transport and store Soviet nuclear warheads and establish safeguards against proliferation.

• **November-December 1991** At the invitation of Pavlovskii and Avrorin, Dan Stillman and Krik Krikorian are the first American scientists from the U.S. nuclear weapons establishment to visit both Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70. Stillman delivers to Hecker a list of possible areas of collaboration generated by Khariton and Avrorin.

• **December 1991** The Soviet Union collapses and Independent States break from Russia. Hecker proposes to DOE Secretary Admiral Watkins that lab-to-lab scientific collaborations with Russian nuclear weapons institutes might address President Bush’s concern of a potential “brain drain” of Russian nuclear scientists.
Lab-to-Lab Program

- **February 1992** Directors’ Exchange visits—Directors Belugin and Nechai visit Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. Later in the month Directors Hecker and Nuckolls visit Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 and discuss possibility of lab-to-lab collaborations.

- **May 1992** ISTC program is launched under Nunn-Lugar. International Science and Technology Centers are mandated to help redirect weapons of mass destruction expertise to civilian and peacetime activities.

- **October 1992** First lab-to-lab contracts signed between Los Alamos and Arzamas-16. Two experimental series are planned.

- **August 1992-December 1993** Large-scale, nuclear material storage facility is planned under Nunn-Lugar. Augustson and Mullen from Los Alamos and Il’kaev, Yuferev, and Zykov from Arzamas-16 work together to plan modern MPC&A (materials protection, control, and accounting) system for storage facility.

- **February 1993** Pavlovskii dies.

- **August 1993** “You are driving us into the hands of the Chinese.” Younger receives Russian complaints that no American money has been forthcoming. Younger informs Domenici of the situation. Domenici speaks on the floor of the Senate about the dangers of not supporting the Russians.

- **September 1993** IPP program launched. Congress allocates 35 million dollars of foreign appropriations money for an industrial partnership program with Russian scientists to help scientific conversion.

- **September 1993** First Russian-American lab-to-lab experiment performed at Arzamas-16. Russians and Americans “working side-by-side as equals.”

- **October 1993** Second series of lab-to-lab experiments performed at Los Alamos. Measurement of critical magnetic field of high $T_c$ superconductor. First Russian scientists allowed behind the fence.

- **December 1993** Efforts on Russian storage facility are suspended.

- **January 1994** Lab-to-lab umbrella contracts on scientific conversion activities signed by Hecker and Belugin. Proposal to include MPC&A activities under the umbrella contract is presented.

- **March 1994** Curtis of DOE approves Hecker’s proposal for a lab-to-lab materials control program.

- **June 1994** Hecker and Belugin sign contract to begin lab-to-lab MPC&A program.

- **1994-1995** Scientists from Los Alamos and Arzamas-16 perform six more series of experiments under umbrella contract.

- **1994-Present** Lab-to-lab MPC&A program grows from 2 to 45 million dollars. Government-to-government program in MPC&A moves to DOE. Participation in lab-to-lab increases from one Russian institute to eight. Similar growth occurs in the government-to-government program.

- **April 1996** Start of Dirac series. Experiments extend Russian-American lab-to-lab work in ultra-high fields to a larger international community.
The first night we had a problem with the guards because we wanted and needed exercise and were quite irritated that the guards had set the boundary about fifty yards short of the agreed walking distance. Fortunately, the issue was quickly resolved by Ambassador Barker and General Ilyenko, Commander of the test site. The nights were cold, about thirty degrees below zero, and the days were filled with trips to the test site, for example, to the forward camp where we and our equipment would be housed during the JVEs, and to a site where they were drilling a hole for a nuclear test and where we were briefed on their drilling and logging operations. One night Mikhailov was talking to me about what he used to do and said that, among other things, he sat on a committee for targeting U.S. cities. Then he said, “Don, it makes a big difference now that I can place faces at those targets.” He meant the job would be much more difficult.

Max Fowler: Did he speak English?

Don Eilers: Very little, but he understands a lot of English.

Sig Hecker: John, you played an important role in the JVEs, too. Tell us about that.

John Shaner: In January 1988, after the formal negotiations with the Soviets had started, Bob Jeffries came back from Geneva wanting to add a technical expert in experimental shock wave physics, and he asked me to join the technical experts group. My role was to provide technical support during the meetings and negotiations as well as to advise on the requirements on rock samples and experimental procedures we would need as part of the hydrodynamic yield measurements.

Don Eilers: We were going to use a hydrodynamic yield determination methodology that we had been working with since 1962 and that could be carried out by both sides and compared openly. One essential procedure involved measuring the shock properties of the rocks taken from the point of explosion, then using that data to construct a theoretical model of the rock, and using the model in a hydrodynamic calculation of the shock wave generated by the explosion. That methodology was incorporated in the JVE Accord, which was signed by Gorbachev and Reagan in Moscow in May 1988.

John Shaner: I remember many discussions with Vadim Simonenko, from Chelyabinsk-70, concerning the measurements, procedures, and theoretical models. There was some apprehension that our measurements and models might be different enough that we might not agree on the final outcome. In July, at the Nevada Test Site, we compared the first experimental results on shock propagation in the rocks, and they agreed so well that we were both relieved.

Don Eilers: And then everyone’s concerns turned to smiles several weeks later when we exchanged the CORRTEX and the Soviet data from the first JVE explosion “Kearsarge.” The agreement was good, resulting in yields with acceptable uncertainty. The entire process was repeated for “Shagan,” the JVE performed at Semipalatinsk, and it
gave similar agreement between the two sides. Those successes demonstrated the viability of hydrodynamic-yield measurement technology and methodology for improved verification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

**Los Alamos Science:** Sig, what was your experience with the JVEs?

**Sig Hecker:** For me, a key event was going out to the actual experiments at Nevada. Mikhailov was leading the Soviet group, and as Don pointed out, he appeared to be a proud and even arrogant scientist type. It was interesting to watch him and the other Russians operate, to see the sense of technical competence and the pride in their work. I remember visiting Mikhailov in the Soviet instrument trailer, and he was very anxious to show me this oscilloscope that he had developed in his institute in Moscow.

**Don Eilers:** Mikhailov had shipped two SRG-7’s—7 gigahertz oscilloscopes—to our test site. They had a bandwidth beyond the range allowed for use by the JVE Accord because they were capable of recording classified device performance information. We had nothing similar in capability on the American side. Mikhailov had them sent just to shake up everybody and to demonstrate that the Soviets had good technology.

**Sig Hecker:** He certainly was very proud of that equipment. But the conversation that I remember most was in the mess hall with Simonenko. He was sitting there trying to sell me on the idea that we should really be doing joint underground scientific experiments—JSEs instead of JVEs. And so we talked a bit about the type of science that you could do underground. All unclassified, of course.

**Don Eilers:** Simonenko often talked about doing underground equation-of-state experiments and other high-pressure physics. In fact, when we went back to Geneva following the JVEs, Simonenko, Avrorin, and Voloshin spent the better part of an afternoon in the Soviet Mission discussing this with John Shaner, Don Westervelt, and myself and presenting us with diagrams of proposed experiments.

**Sig Hecker:** One striking thing about the JVEs was the enormous pressure to make sure that everything worked. Clearly it would have been an international embarrassment, for instance, if our device hadn’t gone off at all, or if the yield were way over the allowed limit, or if the CORRTEX system hadn’t worked. I had my fingers crossed.

**Don Eilers:** Well, we were sure the CORRTEX system would work because of the redundancy and safeguards in the system, but we still worried that the yields be well below the threshold so there would be no complaints about violating the treaty.

We completed the JVEs—both the U.S. shot Kearsarge and the Russian shot Shagan—by September 1988, but the negotiations went on, and the treaties were not complete until May 1990. Many of the issues remaining after the initial demonstration related to the implementation of the treaty and were technical in nature. For example, Don Westervelt, Keith Alrick, Larry Pirkl and I from Los Alamos, David Conrad from Livermore, Horace Poteet from Sandia, Charles McWilliam from DOE/Nevada, and Bill Summa from the Defense Nuclear Agency worked with the Russians on designing devices to prevent classified information from being picked up by the Soviet and U.S. sensing cables. This technical effort was very successful, and we were able to put together a treaty that was not only ratified in 1990 but also implemented on three U.S. tests. In particular, Soviet hydrodynamic yield verification measurements were done on the
Junction test in 1992, one of the last underground tests we did.

**Joe Pilat:** Don, I think it is important to note that there were some very difficult political as well as implementation issues that had to be addressed by the Soviet and American delegations. For example, the requirement of notification well in advance of a nuclear test and the presence of foreign personnel at the site of a test were real stumbling blocks. But the technical problems were always addressed in a professional, collegial fashion among experts who recognized the common backgrounds they shared.

**Don Eilers:** Very definitely. Over a period of two years, the Russian and American scientists had been through a period of initial posturing, particularly by the Russians, that neither side liked, but had then gone on to develop a great deal of mutual respect and pride about the actual technical accomplishments. We also developed the level of trust and cooperation that was needed for successful implementation of the treaty.

**Steve Younger:** Mikhailov has a trophy table in his office and the biggest thing on it is the JVE plaque. He’s very proud of that.

**Don Eilers:** One thing to remember is that Mikhailov always headed their technical group, both at the JVEs and at the negotiations in Geneva. Even after he became Deputy Minister of MINATOM, Mikhailov took time out to spend three days with us in Moscow in October 1990 negotiating all the technical nitty-gritty details of the anti-intrusiveness devices. He sat there, and he was on top of the issues all the time.

**Steve Younger:** And he still is. I had lunch at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in October 1994, and he came up to me and wanted to talk about the calibration of neutron detectors in the recent lab-to-lab experiments on fusion. He can talk about our joint experiments as an expert in the field.

**Opening Up the Russian Nuclear Institutes—August 1990 to December 1991**

**Los Alamos Science:** In 1990, several of you were invited to visit the Soviet nuclear weapons labs. Was this in the context of the negotiations for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty?

**John Shaner:** The invitations certainly grew out of those contacts. For example, while negotiating the procedures of the JVEs, Simonenko and I had occasion to discuss basic high-pressure science, which is the subject of an All-Union Conference held every year or so by the Russians. Attendance at those conferences had been restricted to Soviets, and the frankness of the discussions was legendary. By the late 1980s the Soviet scientists thought it would be useful to involve Americans, just as we had involved Russians in our American Physical Society conferences. As a result of those discussions, several scientists from the United States were invited to an All-Union meeting on high-pressure equation-of-state issues to take place near Irkutsk in August 1990. About two weeks before our scheduled departure, Evgenii Avrorin, whom we had gotten to know well in Geneva, arranged for a few of us to stop at Chelyabinsk-70 for a two-day visit on the way to Irkutsk. All of us involved, including Avrorin, understood that we did not have enough time to get all of the correct approvals, but we could probably get the most important ones—and we did. With less than a week to spare, three people from Livermore and I were able to get permission from Washington to make the visit.

We spent the first day of our visit at the original 1955 site of Chelyabinsk-70. There we discussed a wide range of scientific topics including high-pressure science and hydrodynamic instabilities. On the second day, we drove about 15 miles to the north to the present site, where we saw facilities for studying hydrodynamic instabilities, large pulsed reactors and electron-beam machines, and an explosive test site.

On that second day we were presented with a list of 13 potential topics for collaboration in areas of nuclear science and hydrodynamics. That list was very similar to one we had received in Geneva more than a year previously. Then came the surprise. Chuck MacDonald
from Livermore and I were asked to participate in a video-taped interview with Avrorin to discuss our reactions to this historic visit. Chuck and I were pretty concerned about this as neither of us were very experienced in this kind of sensitive public discussion. I never did find out how Avrorin used this tape.

Los Alamos Science: Don, didn’t you get to visit Arzamas-16 at about the same time?

Don Eilers: Yes. While in Moscow at the October 1990 negotiations on anti-intrusiveness devices, Mikhailov surprised us and seized the initiative by inviting the U.S. delegation, including myself, Keith Alrick, Don Westervelt, and Larry Pirkl, to visit their secret nuclear weapon design city Arzamas-16. Such an invitation to Arzamas-16 had never been made before, and of course, it was not clear to the delegation members that the United States would give permission.

The approval took some time in coming, but when it finally did, they flew us to Arzamas-16 for a most extraordinary day. We were greeted by a whole crowd including Khariton, Belugin, Trutnev, Pavlovskii, and others. They showed us an accelerator, a high-powered laser system, and a few things like that, and then we had a wonderful picnic with a big bonfire, snow flurries falling, and lots of good food and vodka.

At one point, Mikhailov told Westervelt, “You are looking at the most peace-loving men in the world. They have been working here for forty years, and the only reason they were working on nuclear weapons was to make damn sure we never had a war.” Similarly, when we first arrived at Arzamas, Khariton gave us a little speech in the House of Scientists, and one of the first things he said was, “I’ve been waiting forty years for this.”

While we were in Arzamas-16, Chernyshev gave me a letter to bring back to the Laboratory. It was addressed to Denny Erickson and in it he mentioned Max Fowler’s recent visit to Siberia and the discussions on pulsed power, and then he wrote, “I would like to raise a question on collaboration in this field.”

Los Alamos Science: Max, what happened on that trip?
Max Fowler: As I alluded to earlier, during my trip to Novosibirsk in September 1990, Pavlovskii told me that he could get my Laboratory Director and possibly me into his “Explosives Firing Area.” In hindsight I would guess this was the first indication that Arzamas-16 might be opened up to American nuclear scientists. Pavlovskii and I exchanged telegrams back and forth about this visit and in November he indicated that we could bring even more people. My return message suggested the names of John Birely and John Browne as two high-level Los Alamos people who might have special interest in such a visit. At that time, I also spoke with Don Westervelt about his trip to Arzamas-16, and we decided to alert Sig that he might receive two independent invitations to Arzamas-16.

Los Alamos Science: What was the official U.S. reaction to these unofficial visits and offers of collaboration from these formerly secret cities?

John Shaner: Well, the National Security Council stepped in and demanded that Admiral Watkins, then Secretary of Energy, develop a plan for future visits. Watkins, in turn, called in the DOE Lab Directors and demanded a plan for future interactions. I drew one up for Sig, dated December 10, 1990, that outlined a step-by-step process for starting collaborative efforts. The process would begin with an exchange of lab directors, followed by a meeting to establish topics and procedures, then bilateral technical discussions to establish details of the collaborations, and finally the initiation of active collaborations. Sig really liked the proposal and sent it to the National Security Council, but they were preoccupied at that time with the Gulf War, so we heard nothing from Washington for about nine months.

Irv Lindemuth: But we did respond to the pulsed-power group at Arzamas-16. First of all, Don Eilers brought back from his visit to Arzamas-16 a prospectus in Russian describing what was going on at their laboratory (called VNIIEF). And a few innocent statements in that brochure provided clear confirmation that they were, indeed, working on the magnetized target approach to controlled fusion that we had found so interesting. We then wrote a letter to Chernyshev, and in addition to asking about a paper of his, we also asked if a collaboration was really possible. The letter went unanswered, but then Bob Reinovsky and I and several others from Phillips Laboratory and Livermore had extensive discussions with Chernyshev and Pavlovskii at the IEEE Pulsed Power Conference in San Diego in June 1991. Academician Mesyats, a Vice President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, was leading the delegation, and the Soviets were openly courting collaborative work in pulsed power. The discussions were primarily between Los Alamos and Phillips Laboratory and the Arzamas-16 people. The
Russians seemed very confident that, if the United States was interested in collaboration, then such a collaboration was possible. They even indicated that if we expressed interest, Gorbachev would bring it up with Bush at their July summit meeting. That did not happen, but Pavlovskii and Chernyshev visited Phillips Laboratory and Los Alamos after the San Diego conference and continued discussions about collaboration. One of the outcomes was the recognition of a common interest and an invitation for us to come visit Arzamas-16.

Los Alamos Science: Did that visit take place before the collapse of the Soviet Union?

Irv Lindemuth: No, I don’t think they were quite ready. However, I was invited by the Soviet Academy of Sciences to teach at the International School on Plasma Physics and Controlled Fusion in September of 1991 in a resort town on the Black Sea, and I was hoping to visit Arzamas-16 in connection with that trip. You remember there was a lot of unrest in the Soviet Union at that time. The coup attempt had been made in August 1991 and many trips to the Soviet Union were being cancelled. But my wife and I decided to go anyway. We spent the week and a half at the conference and when we returned to Moscow, we were taken to an apartment in Kurchatov Institute. About three hours later, someone came and knocked and said, “Chernyshev and Mokhov and some of their people are here to meet with you.” Chernyshev and Mokhov were very apologetic that it wasn’t possible to take us to Arzamas-16, but they then presented a written proposal signed by Belugin, the Director of Arzamas-16, as well as them selves for joint U.S. work on the magnetized target approach to controlled fusion (they call it MAGO). After I read the proposal, my first statement to them was, “Wow, I don’t know if our government is ready for this. All I can do is take it back and see what happens.” On the front page of the proposal were blanks for Sig Hecker and others at Los Alamos to sign.

Sig Hecker: That brings us to the Soviet collapse in December and the breakthrough on our side. But I think the events from August 1990 to December 1991 are quite important. For the most part, it was one of fits and starts and not getting very far. I felt the pressure from you folks coming back from Russia, and from John Shanken in particular, that we have an opportunity to go over there and learn something about the Soviets and their programs. And so I tried to work with the Washington folks at DOE, principally Vic Alessi who was heading up the Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control. Vic was really one of the avant garde DOE people, but even he didn’t really pick up on this opportunity until later.

Reaching Out

Los Alamos Science: What do you believe was the origin of the opening up of the Russian nuclear institutes and the offers of collaboration, and was this a more general phenomenon?

Krik Krikorian: In Colin Powell’s recent autobiography, he describes a conversation he had in Moscow in 1987 with Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States during during much of the Cold War. Dobrynin said, in effect, we finally have a lawyer running this country, and this lawyer is saying to the military, “Why do you tell me we have to have this weapon or that weapon? I don’t intend to conquer the Americans.” I think the winds of change started with the book Gorbachev wrote on perestroika in 1987. The idea that the door was opening filtered out to the people in Russia and we saw the effects at Los Alamos. For instance, in 1988 Academician Vladimir Fortov, who was on the Chernobyl safety committee, visited Los Alamos. He approached Sig about information on reactor safety, and the next day, there was a stack of paper a foot high to take back to Moscow.

The Lab has always been open to developing contacts and exchanges with the Russians in unclassified areas of research. The Soviets were also working collaboratively with us on issues of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through IAEA safeguards and the Nonproliferation Treaty. Los Alamos has had a long history of sending Laboratory staff to the IAEA—the International Atomic Energy Agency—in Vienna. And there, you would meet a certain side of the Russian technical community—they were nuclear people, but definitely not nuclear weapons types. The Soviets set up a support program to the IAEA similar to the U.S. program, and as part of the exchanges that took place, Americans got to visit various facilities associated with their nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear reactors, and such.

Ron Auguston: I was there in 1988 with the IAEA to help the Soviets teach a course on safeguards in Dimitrograd. And we got very, very, royal treatment. At one point, I was left in Moscow for a couple of days, and to my surprise, I was completely free to wander all over Moscow on my own. The next year, two of my Soviet hosts from Dimitrograd came to Los Alamos and we did some measurements on spent fuel at the Omega West Reactor. Now the government-to-government MPC&A program will be working with Dimitrograd to set up collaborations on improving safeguards of their nuclear material.

Hugh Casey: Tech transfer was another area that started to open up during glasnost and perestroika. In 1988, the Soviets started a series of conferences that they advertised as attempts to bring their defense technology to the west. In fact Krik, myself, and Tony Rollett attended what they called a MATec conference—Materials and Manufacturing Conference—in Helsinki, Finland.
Representatives from key Soviet defense institutes and the Academy of Sciences were there, although none from the nuclear weapons centers. I was astonished by one presentation in which they were trying to market the very specialized technologies that had been used for building ICF capsules. I couldn’t imagine who they thought the buyers would be.

Krik Krikorian: At that time it was clear that the Russians had no concept of marketing. They thought if you had a good product, people would just jump on the bandwagon and buy it. Well that wasn’t the case at all.

Hugh Casey: There were only a handful of Americans at the Helsinki conference, a few western Europeans and a few Japanese. Most attendees were from eastern Europe. Our presence drew a lot of attention, and they seemed to know an awful lot about us. Probably they had done some background checks. But the interactions were quite demonstrative and very friendly. Most important, we were able to identify some interesting equipment and technology that subsequently became one of the models for the current lab-to-lab Industrial Partnership Program.

Los Alamos Science: What area of Russian technology was so intriguing?

Hugh Casey: We were particularly intrigued with high-powered gyrotrons that produce ultrahigh-frequency collimated microwave beams. We were interested in some applications involving the sintering of ceramics and had a proposal in to DOE to build our own equipment, but it would have been very costly. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, we were able to acquire those original pieces of equipment, and they are now installed in an industrial user facility operated by the Laboratory’s accelerator division. We actually ended up getting the equipment free of charge through an industrial partner that became involved with Los Alamos

through the technology transfer initiative of the early 1990s. It is now an on-going project that has been running for many years and will be one of the larger success stories in terms of transfer of high technology to U.S. industry. Ford Motor Company, for example, is the first major corporation to actually have put these to use into production-scale processing.

Los Alamos Science: Was there some sort asymmetry during the late 1980s? Were the Russians reaching out while we Americans were holding back?

Sig Hecker: You are asking whether the Russian nuclear scientists were really more aggressive in trying to build bridges with us, and I think the answer is yes. We were also enormously interested and curious because we knew so little about their weapons program. There was an enormous asymmetry in the knowledge of our programs and our science because we did almost everything in the open, and so little of their work made it into the literature. But it took a long time for us to get over the intelligence mode and into the outreach mode. We suspected them of being interested purely for the intelligence reason. And yet, I think they were interested in the partnering outreach mode probably much earlier than we were.

Don Eilers: I believe our 1990 visit to Arzamas-16 is an example. When Mikhailov invited us, he explained how difficult it had been for him to arrange the visit. It involved two discussions with Gorbachev’s deputy and many others. Then, to help the U.S. delegation win consent for the visit, he assured us that there were no conditions attached to the visit—in other words, reciprocity by the United States was not an issue. But we knew from the discussions at the Nevada Test Site and in Geneva during the previous two years that the possibility of collaboration was of great interest to the Russians.

Krik Krikorian: In the same vein, Khariton and Pavlovskii took the initiative to give us a list of topics for possible collaboration when Dan Stillman and I visited Arzamas in December 1991. Dan delivered that list to Sig.

Sig Hecker: In terms of motivations, Don Westervelt and others suggested in their trip reports that the Russian nuclear scientists believed working with Los Alamos would give them credibility within their own country and would help them get funding from their government. That was a key driving force. The Russian scientists were also concerned with how to keep their people interested in their programs. Everything was heading downhill so fast for them, and working with the Americans offered a ray of hope. That was evident in 1990. But I didn’t experience it directly until February 1992 when I went to Russia for the Directors’ exchanges.
Paul White: It’s interesting that the technical interactions in Geneva during the Threshold Test Ban Treaty negotiations were, in many ways, the very first contacts that the Russian nuclear scientists from the weapons institutes had with the international scientific community. And it was very important for them to try to establish their reputations as bona fide scientists in that community. So, after some initial posturing, they were very forthcoming.

Steve Younger: There was a cultural element too. For a thousand years in Russia, interaction with the West in areas of science, literature, and so on has been considered a social distinction.

Hugh Casey: Economic pressures in the form of food and medical shortages and missed paychecks were being felt in Russia for years before the Soviet collapse. Research and development funds for defense work were drying up, and so financial woes also provided some motivation to look to the West for new opportunities.

Krik Krikorian: There is another factor that needs to be brought out. Irv was exposed to it, and so were Danny Stillman and I. The fact is they had already started defense conversion. They even gave us a videotape describing it.

Don Eilers: Conversion was the main topic of the briefing we received on our 1990 visit to Arzamas-16, and it was also the main topic of the prospectus that Irv mentioned earlier. In fact, they told us during the visit that they had already converted about 15 per cent of their activities to non-defense work.

Joe Pilat: With regard to what Don, Krik, and Hugh have said, I think it would be a mistake to attribute to Soviet scientists a free reign during this period. Prior to the Soviet collapse, I believe they were still operating largely within, or in some cases, at the margins of a fairly limited and circumscribed governmental agenda.

Certainly, the interactions that Max, John, and Irv described, and the ones that Steve Younger and Ron Augustson will describe later, are an object of total fascination. Ten years ago, one couldn’t have imagined the breakthroughs we have witnessed in recent times. But one of the biggest problems in dealing with historical reflection is reading the future back into the past. Many of the issues that are really germane to this discussion are questions that don’t have consensus answers. When did the Cold War end? When did the roles of the nuclear weapons in the United States and the Soviet Union (and then Russia) begin to change to reflect changes in the world? When was this reflected in policies and postures in governments and then the laboratories? I think we need to look at the laboratory interactions in that broader context.

For the moment, I will just offer my concept of when things changed. Looking back at the Gorbachev era, there is a tendency to see in its early years and throughout its existence many of the things that happened only after Gorbachev got ousted from power. For example, the golden age of arms control that occurred during the Gorbachev era, from the INF treaty to START I, was a continuation of classical arms control. It was an effort to create stability through restraints of various kinds. And although it included unprecedented reductions of nuclear arms, the agreements were essentially Cold War agreements in content, context, and structure. They were bilateral, and they were designed to ameliorate a fundamental U.S.-Soviet conflict. Gorbachev did put forward proposals for total disarmament. But should those have been taken seriously? Probably not. If you look at the long history of Soviet arms-control negotiations, you see these kinds of sweeping proposals.

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... Khariton and Pavlovskii took the initiative to give us a list of topics for possible collaboration when Dan Stillman and I visited Arzamas-16 in December 1991. Dan delivered that list to Sig.
In 1946, the Soviet reaction to the Baruch plan to put nuclear weapons under international control was, “No, but let’s disarm totally.” The statement was meant to create a political high-ground and at the same time serve the political interest of the Soviet Union, which was to have their own nuclear arsenal.

When put to the test, Gorbachev did not act as if he took these broader goals seriously. If you remember, it took him two weeks to admit that the accident at Chernobyl happened. Near the end of his reign, the United States put forward the Open Skies proposal, a transparency measure that had very little negative security consequences, but Gorbachev stonewalled on that, primarily in response to the concerns of his military.

I believe the real government-level changes didn’t start until the coup, its failure, and then the collapse of the Soviet Union. And for anything that occurred prior to the collapse that pertended later changes, one really needs to ask oneself whether or not that was the intention. Soviet diplomats and academics, for example, were traveling to international conferences and starting every statement with the words, “Now I offer only my personal opinion.” It was somewhat surprising to all of us in that era of glasnost that all their personal opinions were the same!

Steve Younger: I agree with Joe in many respects. Certainly, information was tightly controlled until the 1990s. There were some publication of forbidden novels, but it was a crime to have them, and they were viewed as socially unacceptable, almost as pornography is viewed in this country. Foreign magazines and newspapers were available to only a very limited number of people. And Sakharov, the golden boy of their nuclear program, was treated very roughly, as were some of their other scientists. One other thing I’d like to mention. Sometimes Americans like to think that the Russians didn’t really like communism and wanted to be just like us. But that’s not true. Many of them believed in communism as a philosophical system that was better than capitalism. And many of them still do today. Until recently Russians lived in an element of fear. They were not “just like us” in this respect.

Paul White: I agree that the direction of the individual technical contacts was very different than the direction in which the government was moving at the time. … Then, when the political environment changed in December 1991, those relationships made it possible for a reaching out to occur with official sanctions and with a successful outcome.

Steve Younger: Before the collapse, the Russians lived under a system in which they had just a few very close friends because, if they talked too freely outside that circle, they could end up disappearing one night, and their names would be removed from the official registers. So I don’t think it’s possible to overestimate the importance of these personal interactions. The relationship between Max Fowler and Pavlovskii, for example, during the initial stages of starting up the scientific interactions with Arzamas-16 was absolutely essential to getting things off the ground.

Sig Hecker: The progress since then was immensely faster because we happened to have a number of people who over the years have been able to build personal relationships, from John Shaner, to Max Fowler, to Don Eilers, to Hugh Casey, and so forth.
Part II  The Lab-to-Lab Program in Scientific Conversion and Nuclear Materials Control

The Soviet Collapse and the Lab Directors’ Visits

Sig Hecker: The big opportunity to get Washington support for direct collaborations with the Russian nuclear institutes came on December 16, 1991 in Leesburg, Virginia. Admiral Watkins, then Secretary of Energy, was holding a retreat for DOE Lab Directors. Many momentous events had already occurred in the Soviet Union, including the abortive coup attempt and Yeltsin’s heroic stand, and it was clear that the Soviet Union was breaking up into separate independent states. President Bush was worrying about a possible “brain drain” of Russian nuclear scientists to would-be nuclear proliferants such as Iran and Iraq, and Congress was working on the Nunn-Lugar legislation to help prevent the Soviet nuclear arsenal from being broken up.

Watkins raised the topic of a brain drain with the Lab Directors, and so we organized a special evening session at which Vic Alessi outlined some background on arms control and nonproliferation. At one point Watkins, showing obvious frustration and concern, asked us, “What can be done to keep their scientists there?” Of course, I had been trying to get Washington interested in letting us work with their nuclear institutes for a year or more. I raised my hand and I said, “Let me tell you Admiral. If I were in their shoes, as a director of one of their institutes, I would have all kinds of ideas about how to keep my scientists at home. So why don’t we go ask them?” Watkins responded immediately with, “Why don’t you?” And at the end of that session, Polly Gault, who was his Chief of Staff, walked up to me and John Nuckolls and said, “Can you go to Russia before Christmas?” Christmas was too soon, but by mid-February their Directors were here, and by the end of February, John Nuckolls and I went over to Russia. Those were the first steps toward the lab-to-lab program.

Los Alamos Science: Did the DOE finally get behind the lab-to-lab effort?

Sig Hecker: Yes. And for the most part the interactions were quite formal and even suspicious. The friendliest part was an interaction between Boris Litvinov and my wife at our museum.
My wife speaks Polish, and it turned out his Ukrainian and her Polish were close enough that they could actually carry on a conversation.

**Steve Younger:** But for me there was certainly some scientific excitement during their visit to Los Alamos, especially during the lecture that Pavlovskii delivered. It was the most exciting physics talk that I ever heard. He spoke about nuclear reactors and atomic physics and plasma physics and pulsed power and lasers and everything you could think of, all with the air of someone who had worked extensively in every area. I knew right then that no matter where he was from, we had to work with him.

**Los Alamos Science:** Sig, in what way was the visit to Russia different?

**Sig Hecker:** From the moment we stepped off the plane at Arzamas-16, the offer of friendship was obvious. I had brought John Immele, then Associate Director for Nuclear Weapons, and John Shaner from Los Alamos, and John Nuckolls, then Director of Livermore, had brought along George Miller and Chuck McDonald. That evening Khariton gave a talk on the early days of nuclear weapons. He talked about his doctoral work in the UK at the Cavendish Laboratory under Rutherford from 1926 to 1928, and he related the story of why they copied and tested our device when they were first designing their atomic bomb—they knew it would work, and their lives were at stake.

The next morning John Immele and I experienced the pleasing irony of being the first two Americans to take an early morning jog in this once secret city. The temperature was a grizzly minus 5 degrees fahrenheit, but we couldn’t turn down the opportunity. The first morning a guard restricted our run to the circumference of a nearby soccer field. But afterwards I complained to Belugin, and then John and I were free to run into town, through apartment building complexes, and in
their beautiful woods along the river. We were also treated to fine dinners every night, and of course, the Russians like to drink vodka and make toast after toast. The best toast I gave was at the big banquet at Arzamas at the end of our stay there. I said, “Now after fifty years of competition and being adversaries, we are learning to work with the Russians, and we are finding that we have much in common. However, we all know that competition is important to success. So thank God for Livermore! But, then maybe we can learn to work with them as well.” They all broke out in laughter—because the relationship between Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 is just as competitive as the relationship between Los Alamos and Livermore.

John Shaner: We spent some time at Chelyabinsk-70 during this visit to Russia. And while there, we worked out the beginnings of an agreement for collaboration with both institutes.

Sig Hecker: The scene at Chelyabinsk-70 was fantastic. There we were, people from Los Alamos and Livermore, and then Chelyabinsk-70 and Arzamas-16, sitting around a table crafting this document in Litvinov’s office with a picture of Lenin on the wall and beside it, a big picture of Kurchatov, the scientific leader of the nuclear energy program.

John Shaner: It was like the Tokyo stock exchange. People running around...
with sheets of paper yelling and screaming in at least two different languages.

**Sig Hecker:** We would get into roadblocks because the same word means different things in Russian and English. The amazing thing is we came up with an agreement. And, of course, the Russians wanted us to sign it, so we did, but only after including a large number of caveats that the agreement was not binding without U.S. government approval. The list of topics for collaboration began with scientific experiments and then went down through nuclear materials control, nuclear safety and security, and various arms-control-related things. We promised to take it back to Admiral Watkins for approval, and they said they would take it to Mikhailov.

**Los Alamos Science:** Was there any indication during that first visit or later that their scientists were worried about a brain drain, an exodus of talent and ideas?

**Sig Hecker:** It was certainly apparent that they were facing economic hardship, but they did not approach us on that basis. They made it clear from the beginning that what they wanted from us was collaboration. Pavlovskii, in particular, indicated very forcibly during the Los Alamos visit that they were not interested in welfare. They clearly felt that they were our equals and did not want to be treated in any other way. And more to the point, they said that being able to demonstrate that they could work with Los Alamos on scientific projects would buy them significant credibility with their government. That was a key issue. In due time we also realized that they knew a few U.S. dollars went a long way in Russia, and that fact was, of course, very important in all that has happened.

**John Shaner:** Sig, during that first visit to Russia, we also tried to get them interested in participating in ISTC.

**Sig Hecker:** That’s right. John is referring to the International Science and Technology Center, which was spawned by Secretary of State Jim Baker in connection with the Nunn-Lugar program. The idea was that the United States, the European Union, and Japan would provide funding to help keep scientists from the New Independent States busy working on non-nuclear-weapons-related topics. So that initiative had some of the same motivations as our lab-to-lab effort (see “The International Science and Technology Centers in the Former Soviet Union”). Our government really wanted the Russian defense labs to take advantage of the ISTC funding mode. I pushed that pretty hard at Arzamas, but Belugin and Trutnev were extremely negative. They saw working with us as a ray of hope and a mechanism for keep-
ing their people stable and working, but they saw ISTC as nearly worthless. I told them that if they refused to cooperate with this international effort, it would put us in a rather difficult position. Their response was interesting. They said that as we get closer to sensitive issues such as those associated with nonproliferation, they didn’t mind sharing with us, but they wouldn’t want to share with this kind of broader international community. So despite the years and years of being Cold War enemies, they had a lot more trust and more interest in working with us than with any neutral parties. Later on, of course, they did get involved in the ISTC program.

John Shaner: Right now, they probably have a quarter to a third of the total ISTC funding, which is about $84 million dollars. ISTC didn’t start dispersing real money until 1994, but then the scientists at Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 got involved.

Los Alamos Science: The Nunn-Lugar program had been announced prior to your trip, so the Russians must have been expecting some financial commitment.

Sig Hecker: Yes. Before leaving Russia, we had a close-out dinner with Mikhailov in Moscow and he was already complaining about the lack of action and the lack of money. If I hadn’t met him at the test site, I would never have suspected that he was a very dedicated knowledgeable scientist. He acted much more like a hard-nosed Russian bureaucrat. Afterwards though, Nechai and Belugin assured us that Mikhailov would support the collaborations if we could get approval by the U.S. government.

Don Eilers: I’d like to say a few words about Mikhailov’s position. As minister of MINATOM, Mikhailov is responsible for ten closed cities and twenty-five other cities that make up the nuclear-weapons industrial complex. And he always gave the impression that it was his personal responsibility to make sure that each of the one million people who worked in that complex was supported somehow. He feels a tremendous sense of responsibility.

Sig Hecker: It seems that Directors Belugin and Nechai feel the same way. During our visit they proudly told us that the MINATOM complex is responsible for about half of the gold mining in the country and about a third of the fertilizer production. MINATOM also built the 1980s stadium for what was to be the Olympics in Moscow. The reason they gave was that the MINATOM complex was an organization that worked, whereas much of the rest of Russia was not functioning very well. Now the gold stems from uranium mining, and the fertilizer is closely related to the production of explosives. So those activities are not so surprising. But the MINATOM cities were doing many other things that were not so obviously related to nuclear weapons and nuclear power.

What struck me most, though, was the enormous commonality we had with the Russians from Arzamas-16 in terms of how we treated our jobs, how we felt about the science we had to do, how we understood the reasons it needed to be done, and the patriotism we felt for our country. As I listened to them talk, I could swear, except for the translation, that they were telling our story. Belugin was giving the pitch I used to give about nuclear testing, and Trutnev was trying to convince me of why we can’t possibly have a comprehensive test ban. I listened and then I said, “We’ve made all those arguments. We’ve lost those arguments. And just like us, you have to start thinking that you have to do this job in another way.” And so the feelings about our jobs are just about as identical as you can get.

The Lab-to-Lab Effort: Getting It Off the Ground

Sig Hecker: On the way back from Russia, John Nuckolls and I stopped to see Watkins and presented him with the agreement we had constructed with the Russians. Just about instantly he gave us the go-ahead to do the scientific col-
laboration. And that was the birth of the lab-to-lab program. He also said that all the other topics needed to be approved and worked through the same government interagency process that all Nunn-Lugar programs were subject to. So he could not approve nuclear materials control and accounting or even the environmental topics.

John Shaner: I guess we had gotten a little carried away with respect to nuclear-weapons safety and security issues, and the National Security Council said, “There’s no way you are going to do that without interagency oversight.”

Sig Hecker: When we got back to Los Alamos, John Immele asked Steve Younger if he would like to be involved. Steve, as program manager for ICF (inertial confinement fusion), was already working in the area of pulsed power and was interested in working with Pavlovskii. So he picked up the ball and really started to run with it.

John Shaner: Next, in May 1992, Paul Stokes from Sandia, Bill Dunlop from Livermore, and I had a meeting with Vic Alessi and Bob Galucci from the State Department in which we established the ground rules for the lab-to-lab process, including getting everything briefed in Washington and supporting other State Department activities such as ISTC. Galucci was the one who led the group trapped in the Baghdad parking lot at the end of the Gulf war, and he also negotiated the agreement with North Korea to stop reprocessing their reactor fuel. We were lucky to get his attention to our projects in between those events. Later in May 1992, Steve Younger and I and others from Los Alamos, Sandia, and Livermore went to Moscow to meet with the Russians and lay the groundwork for scientific interactions.

It took another eighteen months for ISTC to get all the bureaucracy in place and to actually dispense money. Our lab-to-lab effort was able to start right away and included actual contracts to be paid by our own laboratory-directed research and development (LDRD) funds as well as expert exchanges in the topics for which we’d agreed to develop proposals.

Steve Younger: At that May 1992 meeting, a curious thing happened. Although I was not the head of the delegation nor an expert on Russian science, Pavlovskii singled me out and said, “I want to give you a list of proposed topics of collaboration, and I want you to write comments on it and give it back to me in the morning.” I was later told that the Russians at Arzamas-16 had picked me as their principal representative in the United States. Perhaps it was because I was in
charge of the Los Alamos pulsed-power effort, which was the area of collaboration that Pavlovskii and his colleagues had been pushing for some time. In any case, I marked up the list and crossed out huge sections because some of them were very sensitive and others were outright classified. It was apparent from their list and from the interactions at that meeting in May that one reason the Russians wanted to work with us was because we were the other nuclear superpower, and they wanted to work on nuclear things. They said, now that the Cold War is over, let’s work together to exploit the peaceful opportunities of nuclear explosives or nuclear energy, but also as the nuclear stewards of the superpowers, it’s our responsibility to work together. Our response to many of their proposals was that we weren’t allowed to talk about many of the things on their list, but there were some topics that were real possibilities.

Los Alamos Science: When did you reach a substantive agreement on joint projects?

Steve Younger: One month later during our visit to Arzamas-16, we worked out a specific agreement. Other members of the Los Alamos pulsed-power group went with me: Max Fowler, Irv Lindemuth, and Bob Reinovsky. The week started out in a less than congenial fashion with Belugin’s saying to me, “I’m tired of Americans coming to the Institute and making promises and not delivering anything. Americans talk, talk, talk but never do anything. Unless this meeting results in something substantive, this will be your last visit to Arzamas-16.” Then he got up and walked out of the meeting room. Pavlovskii then asked me to give the American response to the 11-page list of topics he had handed me in Moscow. Khariton was sitting across from me taking detailed notes as I spoke. We were all in roles we could never have anticipated. During the week we carried out a delicate dance as we explored which projects in pulsed power were of mutual interest. They also demonstrated one of their pulsed-power generators, and they invited Max to be the first American to press a detonator button at a Russian nuclear weapons institute.

Max Fowler: Yes, it was my one and only visit to Arzamas-16, and they honored me by letting me push the button. Pavlovskii was still alive then.

Steve Younger: Max was also the first American to accept payment for working at Arzamas-16.

Max Fowler: Yes, I told Pavlovskii, “You know, I’m working for you now, and I would suggest payment—maybe an extra vodka toast.” They later gave me a bottle of vodka as payment, and everyone signed the label.

Steve Younger: During that trip we also became acutely aware that many of the scientists were facing financial catastrophe. And I’m not using that word lightly. It’s one thing not to be able to replace the TV if it breaks. It’s quite another not to be able to buy insulin for your kid who is a diabetic and who is going to die unless you find some money. That’s the kind of financial pressure they were facing.

Irv Lindemuth: Even that past January, when Bob Reinovery and I visited, we saw that the people were extremely concerned about their future. Inflation had taken off. They had missed a few pay checks. And they didn’t know what the future would bring. During the June visit Steve made it clear to them that we wanted a real collaboration, that we were there for the long term, and that real dollars would be involved. We also expressed our concern on a more personal level, which eventually grew into an exciting cultural and humanitarian exchange between the Los Alamos and Arzamas-16 communities—what we call the sister city connection. (See “Arzamas-16 and Los Alamos—The Sister City Relationship”)

Steve Younger: The week was successful on a number of levels. By Friday we had identified six topics in pulsed power and had written and signed a protocol saying we were going to do experiments on two of those
topics, we were going to find funding for the experiments, and we were going to carry them out within the next fiscal year. When I got back to the United States, I wrote to Mikhailov saying that, in my opinion, a collaboration existed between Arzamas-16 and Los Alamos.

Then, over the summer we worked out the difficult process of how to finance these activities and how to write suitable contracts.

**Sig Hecker:** Steve came to me and suggested that LDRD funds would be the most neutral funding source and quite appropriate because we were going to engage the Russians in basic scientific enterprises. But we were on extremely thin ice in terms of the funding.

**Steve Younger:** There were many people in the United States who didn’t want us to work with the nuclear institutes. They were afraid we might be working on nuclear weapons and giving away secrets. Or maybe we were all spies, or maybe all the money we spent would go to the communist party.

**Irv Lindemuth:** John and Steve took many trips to Washington to inform people that we were going to spend LDRD money for this purpose. Although some people raised flags, most were glad that somebody was doing something.

**Sig Hecker:** John and Steve pounded the pavement until they won the support of the folks at the DOE. DOE didn’t come up with any money. We had to go into our own coffers, but the DOE did back us up so that we could get this money to the Russians.

**Steve Younger:** We had another big problem, and that was how to move money because there was no precedent for this type of collaboration. John Shaner and I came up with the concept of deliverables. When they delivered the work, we’d give them the money. Since no up-front money was involved, there was no way to complain that the money was being used for some inappropriate activity.

**Sig Hecker:** In contrast to the government-to-government approach, which we will be discussing shortly, we decided not to keep track in detail of what our Russian collaborators did with that money. We didn’t know whether they had to pay taxes or support infrastructure. The only thing we knew is that we got one heck of a lot of return for the money that we gave them.

**Steve Younger:** And they feel they received a fair exchange for what they gave us. But that summer of 1992, we had many table-pounding conversations in which they would say we were paying them too little, and we would say, “Hey look, this is how much money we have. You claim you have lots other buyers? Where are they?” And after calling their bluff, we would come to an agreement. Then, in October 1992, Pavlovskii and Chernyshev came to Los Alamos to sign the first contracts between Arzamas and Los Alamos.

**Los Alamos Science:** What was the agreement in those first contracts?

**Steve Younger:** We formalized what we had agreed to in June, namely, to collaborate on two experiments. One was a test of Chernyshev’s very big high-explosive pulsed-power generator to be done at Arzamas. The second was a series of experiments in which Pavlovskii’s generators would be used to produce the ultra-high magnetic fields and apply them to the measurement of the critical magnetic fields of high-temperature superconductors. That series was to be done at Los Alamos in Ancho Canyon (see “Lab-to-Lab Scientific Collaborations between Los Alamos and Arzamas-16 using Explosive-Driven Flux Compression Generators”).

The contracts included dollar amounts for various deliverables. For example, to test Chernyshev’s generator at Arzamas, we agreed to pay 100,000 dollars, and for the second set of experiments at Ancho Canyon, we paid 100,000 dollars for five of Pavlovskii’s high-magnetic-field generators, and we paid the way for the Russians to come to Los Alamos. The funding for both came from LDRD, and all of that money went to Russia. At that time...
DOE did not want money that had been appropriated for the U.S. nuclear weapons program to go to Russia. Afterwards, that restriction was relaxed, and we were able to spend programmatic money. This year we will send about 550,000 dollars to Russia. This money will fund unique science that neither side could do on its own.

Krik Krikorian: As a contrast, it cost us almost 300,000 dollars in 1982-1983 to replicate the Pavlovskii generator for project LIGA.

Los Alamos Science: Pavlovskii died February 12, 1993. Since his relationship with Max Fowler was one of the mainstays of trust for building the collaboration, were you concerned that his death might threaten progress?

Steve Younger: Yes, very. At the
time we received notice of his death, Carl Ekdahl, Denny Erickson, Jim Go-forth, Irv Lindemuth, Bob Reinovsky, and I were within a few days of leaving for a visit to Arzamas-16. We had to postpone the visit, and Irv scrambled to reconstitute the visit within a few weeks. As soon as we arrived in Arzamas-16, they took our team to see Pavlovskii’s grave, which was mounded with flowers. We added a large basket with the inscription “From the American colleagues,” and the whole scene was recorded by the Russians on videotape.

At the big banquet that evening, I was seated next to Yuri A. Trutnev, the deputy chief scientist at Arzamas-16 under Khariton and also a leading designer of nuclear-weapon secondaries. To begin with, Trutnev was extremely skeptical about the joint work with us. He did not see a path to real collaboration and worried about our buying technology and walking away. But we spoke intensely through the entire banquet—so much so that during one of the breaks (Russian banquets are marathon affairs so they have breaks!), one of the officials at Arzamas said to Trutnev, “You are not allowing Steve to eat. He must be hungry.” Trutnev merely pushed him away. Neither of us ate anything that evening, but by the end we were great friends, and Trutnev understood that we were all dedicated to the national security mission of our respective laboratories and that working together might promote the stability and integrity of both institutions. As to how to do it, that dinner was the origin of the “step-by-step” approach that became the cornerstone of the lab-to-lab process.

During that week, they began to understand that we were there for the long haul. We didn’t want to steal their technology and run. We wanted to develop real collaborations, to work side by side as equals. That phrase is very important, because there were a lot of Americans running around the country touting the fact that they were buying Russian technology for a song, that the Russians weren’t business men, so they were able to rob them blind. Instead, we were saying, “We’re going to be here this year, we’re going to be here next year, and if politics allows, we’re going to be here ten years from now.”

Los Alamos Science: Did all go smoothly after your March visit?

Steve Younger: Not exactly. The first experiment was set for August 1993 in Arzamas. But shortly before the scheduled date, I received word that the experiment would have to be delayed because they were not ready. I lost my temper at that point and had Irv Lindemuth call Chernyshev at 1:00 am Arzamas-16 time. I told him that I wanted an explanation and I would be in Moscow to be picked up at the appointed time. During that visit we were
taken, as a kind of consolation prize, to their device assembly area, which is one of the tightest security areas at VNIIEF (the nuclear institute at Arzamas-16). And there, behind so many fences that I lost count of the number, we saw Chernyshyev’s generator. It is a column ten feet tall and is mounted vertically. The whole time we were surrounded by a ring of Russian technicians, each one a huge bear of a person. And when we moved even twenty feet from the generator, they would let us know we were out of line by literally bumping up against us. At one point Jim Goforth stood on a chair to view the top of the generator, and one of those big burly Russians came over, and with a big smile, just picked up Jim at the knees with one arm to give him a better view.

One month later, that was September 1993, we were back for the first joint experiment. The Russians were clearly very excited about it. They held a news conference before the shot. Mikhailov, who was out of the country, was being given daily reports about our progress. And three TV crews were out at the firing point to witness the actual test. Chernyshyev’s generator outfitted with American diagnostics was flanked on either side by a Russian and an American flag. The tension was so high you could have cut it with a knife. Everyone worked feverishly to get ready for the countdown, and then five, four, three, two, one . . . The bunker shook and we knew immediately that all had gone well. There was a tremendous shaking of hands and congratulations and on-the-spot interviews by the press. At that very first joint experiment, everyone was aware that we were making history.

At the banquet the next night, when all the pressure was off and after the usual toasts, someone began playing an accordion and there developed a most amazing sight—Russian and American weapons scientists dancing together and telling jokes and trading family pictures at what had been the most secret place in the Soviet Union. I was reminded of the statement by former Laboratory Director Norris Bradbury that the purpose of nuclear weapons is not to wage war, but to give the politicians time to solve the problems.

Max Fowler: The next month, a team of eight Russians came to Los Alamos to do a series of high-magnetic-field experiments using a Pavlovskii generator and some of our own as well. We were able to measure the value of the critical magnetic field in a high-temperature superconductor and how that value changes with temperature. I guess I’m rather proud of that work. It was also a historic series in the sense that those were the first joint Russian-American experiments done behind the fence at Los Alamos.

Sig Hecker: After those successes, Steve was able to engineer a major lab-to-lab umbrella contract with Arzamas-16 that would allow the two labs to work together on scientific topics of mutual interest. We put a cap on the amount that could be spent, a total of 2 million dollars, and identified a large...
number of potential topics for collaboration. The first task orders were written in a mid-night meeting in Jim Jeffery’s office that involved Steve, John, and Valeri Zorya from Arzamas-16. By then, Steve had been able to deliver money for the experiments that we just talked about, the first money that Arzamas had received from the United States, and so Steve was really golden in their eyes. They trusted him and they liked him. Similarly, in January 1994 when Director Belugin and Radi Il’kaev came here for the big signing ceremony, a real friendship developed between Belugin and me. He was at my home for dinner, and I have photos of him watching me carve the turkey in my kitchen and later singing Russian folk songs in my dining room.

**Los Alamos Science:** Is the umbrella contract still in effect, and what has been done under it?

**Steve Younger:** Yes, it is still in effect and it has become the mainstay of our collaboration. Rather than having to hash out all of the legal details on every contract, the Master Task Order specifies this up front so that work can begin with as little as a two page task order. This is why Los Alamos was able to move so quickly. Similar agreements are now in place with many other Russian institutes, and other U.S. labs have copied our idea.

**Irv Lindemuth:** In terms of the pulsed power work, following the initial experiments Steve mentioned earlier, we did six additional experimental campaigns covering a spectrum from pulsed-power technology to solid-state physics to controlled fusion.

**Sig Hecker:** In retrospect, the end of 1993 through the beginning of 1994 was the time when the lab-to-lab effort really began to take off. The pulsed-power work with Arzamas-16 was securely established, but also the Industrial Partnership Program was born.

**Steve Younger:** The importance of the Industrial Partnership Program (IPP) and also the umbrella contract were highlighted in the August 1993 visit before the first joint experiment. During that visit, Director Belugin called me aside for a private conversation with no security people present. Only Valeri Zorya, senior manager at Arzamas was there to translate. Belugin said to me, “The Americans have made a lot of promises, but we have not received any money. We are facing extreme hardship. We are not receiving regular salaries from our government, we do not have money to buy medical supplies for our children, and we are getting desperate. If America isn’t going to help us, we are going to have to do something else.”

On my return, I reported this conversation to Senator Pete Domenici. That’s the origin of Domenici’s summary of the plight of the Russian nuclear scientists, “You’re driving us into the hands of the Chinese.” He said that on the floor of the Senate during his plea for a foreign aid appropriation to support the Russian scientists. During the fall of 1993, Irv Lindemuth and I went all over Washington to drum up money and support, and to sell the idea of scientific conversion, the idea that we need to support Russian nuclear scientists to do non-nuclear scientific work.

**Hugh Casey:** Yes, this was an extremely fortunate coincidence. John Hnatio was the DOE employee on assignment with Domenici’s staff, was trying to develop the concept of an industrial partnership program with the scientists of the former Soviet Union.

**Irv Lindemuth:** We were moving eight to ten people a month from Arzamas-16 to Los Alamos. They were often seminars, or physicists and mathematicians who were interested in science, and they are still doing research here. Many of them have PhDs in physics from American universities, and they are very capable.
of the technology transfer program at DOE and helped us acquire the gyrotron equipment from the Ukraine that we had first discussed at the MATec conference back in 1988. He was also instrumental in setting up the Special Metals Processing Consortium at Sandia National Laboratory. Those two programs involved Russian technology, and when John moved to Domenici's office, he proposed them as models for partnering among industry, the national labs, and the Russian institutes.

John formed a lab team from Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, Sandia, Argonne, and Oak Ridge National Laboratories to develop a program plan that DOE could propose to the State Department. Domenici initiated legislation to provide funds. And those actions resulted in the development of the program (see “The New Independent States Industrial Partnership Program”).

IPP differed from ISTC in encouraging direct interaction between U.S. laboratory and NIS institute staff. Also the IPP concept involved an 'exit strategy' whereby the funding responsibility would transfer from the government to private industry over the life of the project. Technology transfer and commercialization were to be used as a nonproliferation tool to prevent “brain drain.”

**John Shaner:** The congressional language stated that the program was to address institutes and scientists with knowledge of weapons of mass destruction. The other criterion was that funds be used for projects that were potentially self-sustainable economically. IPP has an end game of self-sustainability.

**Los Alamos Science:** What level of funding was obtained for IPP?

**Hugh Casey:** Domenici succeeded in getting an appropriation of 35 million dollars for fiscal year 1994, which was intended to grow to 50 million dollars for fiscal year 1995 and continue for a period of five years at which time we hoped that projects would be supported entirely by private industry. In fact, we received the 35 million dollars at the end of fiscal year 1994 and only after great bureaucratic arm wrestling. We received no funds in fiscal year 1995, but we have 10 million dollars of DOE funds for fiscal year 1996, and we expect an additional 10 million dollars of DOD Nunn-Lugar funds for this year. Despite the funding struggles, the program has been most successful, and we are aware of Senate-committee recommendations calling for increases in funding for fiscal year 1997 and beyond. We are extremely optimistic about the future of IPP.

**John Shaner:** Along with these efforts, we have continued to support other government programs such as ISTC. As early as October 1992, we had the first of our topical expert exchanges that had been worked out during the previous May meeting. Fourteen of us from Los Alamos, Sandia, and Livermore flew to Chelyabinsk-70, picking up a contingent from Arzamas-16 on the way, for a week-long conference on environmental science. As a result of that conference, we not only got to know a new set of faces, but we also worked out a set of twelve proposals for joint work. To date, seven or eight have been funded through ISTC. We have also held technical meetings on reactor safety, applied math, and computer science.

**Hugh Casey:** It’s interesting that we have experienced spontaneous integration of ISTC and IPP projects. That increases the possibility of funding larger projects and also brings industry in as a full partner in the early stages of these projects.

One last point. In all my experience with international exchanges, including those with the British, the French, and the Japanese, the Russian exchanges provide the only example in which technical information is flowing predominantly into, as opposed to out of, the United States. The former Soviet Union is our technological equal in many areas, and because of the economic crisis in the New Independent States, we are gaining valuable knowledge for modest investments. This fact is not appreciated by those that dismiss our efforts as “foreign aid,” and “industrial welfare.”

**Nunn-Lugar and the Lab-to-Lab Materials Control Program**

**Sig Hecker:** We are at a point to tell the nuclear material controls story, which has been my primary interest from the beginning. Shortly after Secretary of Energy O’Leary was appointed, I wrote a letter to her and identified the control of nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union as the most important national security issue facing the DOE. I did not get much of a response from Washington until over a year later in April 1994 when Charlie Curtis was appointed as Under Secretary in charge of national security programs. Our introductory meeting happened to be on the day after he had been taken to task at a Congressional hearing on reported thefts of nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union. The hearing was instigated by Tom Cochran of the Natural Resources Defense Council and other antinuclear watchdogs. There were complaints that the government-to-government efforts in nuclear material control under Nunn-Lugar were bogged down, that we were at loggerheads with the Russians, and that nothing much was being done to prevent theft of these dangerous materials.

When I walked in to see Curtis, I started giving the speech on materials control that I’d been giving for almost a year. Curtis responded immediately with, “What do you want to do?” And I had a plan in my back pocket that had been laid out at the Los Alamos meeting in January 1994 when Belugin and I had signed the lab-to-lab umbrella contract. At that time Mark Mullen, Ron Augustson, and some of the folks from Arzamas-16 had suggested that a lab-to-lab materials control component

“Side-by-Side as Equals”—a round table
to be included in the lab-to-lab umbrella contract. They were very frustrated with the lack of progress on the big storage facility they had been working on through the Nunn-Lugar channels, and they also explained that the Nunn-Lugar effort to institute materials control at civilian institutes was floundering. Consequently, the lab-to-lab channel looked like a much more hopeful route to improving materials control in Russia. Don Cobb, Program Director for Nonproliferation at Los Alamos, discussed this possibility with Belugin and myself at that January meeting, and we all agreed that it was a good idea.

But remember, we were under some restrictions set by DOE. John Birely, Paul White, Ron Augustson and many other folks at the Lab were working in the government-to-government mode since 1992 because Watkins had told us that all topics other than pure science had to be considered through the interagency process associated with the Nunn-Lugar legislation.

Los Alamos Science: Before we go forward with the lab-to-lab materials story, let’s backtrack for a moment and ask Paul White to give us a little background on the purpose of the Nunn-Lugar program.

Paul White: The Nunn-Lugar effort grew out of a meeting in September of 1991 between Bush and Gorbachev. They were proposing literally unprecedented reductions in nuclear warheads, especially tactical warheads, some of which were agreed to under START I or planned under START II. They also began talking specifically about dismantlement of those warheads. Noting the economic burden involved, Bush offered U.S. assistance for the dismantlement of those strategic and tactical systems. The official implementation of that offer came in November of 1991 with the so-called Nunn-Lugar program, which authorized the use of 400 million dollars of Department of Defense funds, funds that had already been appropriated for other things.

The program got off the ground in March of 1992 at a big meeting with the Russians involving 60 representatives of the United States. Some of the framework agreements under which Nunn-Lugar assistance would be provided were crafted at that meeting. The movement of missile systems and warheads back to Russia would increase the exposure of these systems to the possibility for an accident, so emergency response equipment was one area of assistance that was on the table. Other areas for assistance included storage facilities for putting the materials that would come out of dismantlement, containers for moving the materials, increased security and protection for the warheads while they were in transit, and material control and accounting systems for the storage facilities. Materials control and accounting systems for civilian nuclear facilities were also discussed at that time.

Los Alamos Science: Was there any indication that the Russians were worried about the security of their nuclear materials?

Krik Krikorian: By that time the Soviet Union had become a confederation of independent states, and nuclear weapons were in the Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and so on. Somehow those weapons had to be brought into Russia and put somewhere and disassembled. But the physical security forces were no longer reporting to one government, so there were inherent problems of materials control.

Paul White: Actually separate agreements were crafted with Ukraine, with Kazakhstan, and with Belarus. The agreement with the Russian Federation really emphasized a new look at the existing system of government security and accounting for nuclear materials and then the development of appropriate changes to accommodate the new political situation. There weren’t really any discussions about weaknesses in the basic security. But during informal conversations, one of the first questions some Russians asked me was how to deal with the question of personnel reliability at their nuclear facilities.

John Shaner: And in the less formal lab-to-lab context, I remember one of the chief designers at Arzamas-16 saying, “You Americans are lucky. Your borders have always been permeable and your military not very well disciplined, so you had to design these materials controls into your system. We had impermeable borders and a well disciplined military until a few years ago, and now we have neither, and we don’t have those controls designed into our system.” So the scientists already knew that there was a potential problem there.
Sig Hecker: John’s comments hit the nail right on the head in terms of the overall security problems of both the weapons and the materials. But the materials control and accountability issue was one of the most difficult things to get the Russians at Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 to talk about. During our February 1992 visit, I asked questions and essentially got no answers. At Arzamas-16, I told them I had a personal interest in plutonium, and I kept asking, “Where do you do the plutonium work?” At Arzamas-16 they said they do it someplace else. In Chelyabinsk-70 they actually toured us through their plutonium lab, which was up on the third story of some building.

John Shaner: Right above the tritium lab.

Sig Hecker: It’s clear they would not have passed inspection by Admiral Watkins’ Tiger Teams that had just been through Los Alamos. I would ask them, “Suppose there was some sort of a threat in the country and you would have to ascertain within a couple of hours whether you have all of your plutonium. How would you respond to that kind of question.” I just got this stony silence.

Paul White: These materials control issues are so closely tied with their security system that they constitute a very difficult area for them to talk about. The initial contacts on materials control were at the government level under Nunn-Lugar. And they weren’t about to admit officially that they had difficulties. So progress was agonizingly slow, particularly in that area.

Ron Augustson: Mark Mullen and I participated in the government-to-government program to design and build a storage facility for retired nuclear warheads, and our job was to design a modern MPC&A system, that is, Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting system, for the facility. It turns out that our Russian counterparts for this task were Radi Il’kaev, Sergei Zykov, and Vladimir Yuferev from Arzamas-16. We first met them at the meeting held by the U.S. Corps of Engineers in Omaha, Nebraska in August 1992. At that time they expressed their commitment and responsibility regarding the retirement and disposal of nuclear weapons. Il’kaev said very earnestly to Mark and me, “Arzamas-16 and Los Alamos have caused this problem, and it is up to us to solve it.”
However, progress on the storage facility was extremely slow. Meetings were held through 1992 and 1993, but everything was bogged down in the politics and administrative requirements of working with the Department of Defense. There was no money to pay the workers in Russia to build the facility and no money to buy Russian materials and equipment. The DOD wanted all the money to be spent here in this country. On the other side, the Russians did not admit the importance of our particular interests, which were safety analysis and protecting materials from insider threats.

It was all very discouraging, but we did continue to talk with Il’kaev and particularly with Zykov and Yuferev. For example, Mark met them in October of 1992 at a Nunn-Lugar-sponsored seminar in St. Petersburg on MPC&A. There were about a hundred Russian participants, but Mark spent most of his time with the folks from Arzamas-16 and started to communicate more intensely. He also began describing to them the components of a modern computerized material control and accounting system and even drew one on a paper napkin that would be suitable for a storage facility. Mark was gratified to see how quickly Sergei Zykov picked up the concepts, and he and Sergei were able to discuss specific designs and problems almost immediately.

Los Alamos Science: Did the Russians finally admit that they needed such systems?

Ron Augustson: During the spring of 1992 and through the summer, we still weren’t hearing that there was a problem. But as the contacts grew, not only with the folks from Arzamas but with others as well, we learned that the Russians have a tremendous system of paper records, but nobody checks those records, and they were never meant to be used to draw an inventory. The emphasis was on putting product out, making a certain number of weapons from a certain amount of material. If they had a good process, they’d have more plutonium than they needed and they’d put that aside in case they ever had a need for it. After a while, they would lose track of where they put the stuff. Through the fall of 1992 and into 1993, we were definitely getting the picture that they didn’t have a good idea of how much plutonium or highly enriched uranium they had at any given location.

[Under Secretary Charlie Curtis] had been challenged by Congress on the issue of theft and on the fact that the Nunn-Lugar effort was not getting anywhere. So when I suggested a lab-to-lab materials control effort, he jumped at the chance and said that he would come up with some money if we could make the arrangements.

Sig Hecker: In April 1993, Trutnev was here, and he also started to open up a little bit on this issue. It wasn’t until I was at Arzamas-16 in June 1994 to sign the lab-to-lab agreement on nuclear materials control, more than two years after I had first broached the subject, that Belugin admitted they had that kind of problem. We went to visit the famous convent at Divejevo, about twenty kilometers outside of Arzamas-16, and we went through a double guarded fence. And I asked, “How do you know that someone doesn’t get out of this place with plutonium in their lunchbox?” And he said, “It can’t happen.” And I said, “How do you know it can’t?” And he said, “Because the consequences would be grave if someone tried to do this.” And I pressed further, “But how do you know that they’re not getting any out?” And then he finally said, “It’s a problem.” It took that long for them to really admit they would not know if someone had stolen some material. They were pretty well protected from the outsider threat. After all, they still do have the double fence around the whole town, not just their facilities. But with Russia falling apart, the insider threat became worrisome and that’s what finally got them to agree to working with us on the problem.

Ron Augustson: Before that, in the fall of 1993, Mark and I had developed a close working relationship with Il’kaev, Yuferev, and Zykov, and that’s when we decided to ask Sig if we could include the materials work in the umbrella contract of January 1994. Sig told us he couldn’t do it without DOE approval.

Los Alamos Science: Sig, how did you finally break through this bureaucratic barrier and get the materials control work off the ground?

Sig Hecker: It started with that introductory meeting with Under Secretary Curtis in April 1994. As I said earlier, he had been challenged by Congress on the issue of theft and on the fact that the Nunn-Lugar effort was not getting anywhere. So when I suggested a lab-to-lab materials control effort, he jumped at the chance and said that he would come up with some money if we could make the arrangements. How much did we need? I said about two million dollars for fiscal year 1994 and maybe ten million for the next year. Charlie said he would find the money one way or another and we should just go do it. And we decided it would be included under the lab-to-lab umbrella contract that we had signed in January with Arzamas-16. I then went to Steve Younger and the next key moment was when Steve called Il’kaev on the tele-
phone and proposed that we do a joint MPC&A program. That’s when the trust we had built up through the scientific interactions really paid off.

Steve Younger: I called Il’kaev and said, “Look, I know it’s an issue of national sovereignty, but my government considers it important that we begin a lab-to-lab program on materials control. Is that possible?” Il’kaev, of course, had to get guidance from Moscow, from Mikhailov I assume, but it took only one weekend of telephoning back and forth and we had approval from the Russian side. After that Mark Mullen, Gene Kutyreff, and Ron Augustson took over and did the enormous job of planning the actual program. I think they worked round the clock for several days to get a plan organized that we could present to Charlie Curtis.

Sig then told Charlie that it was a “go” with the Russians, and Charlie carved out two million dollars for fiscal year 1994. Six weeks later Sig was at Arzamas-16 to sign the first six contracts for a lab-to-lab nuclear material control program. And within two months a demonstration of MPC&A was being constructed at Arzamas-16. Half of the equipment at the demonstration was Russian and half was American. Everything about the demonstration was planned together, and the plan was written in Russian and English.

Los Alamos Science: How did all this happen so quickly?

Ron Augustson: Well, we had been discussing materials control systems for the storage facility, and specifically the Russian capabilities in that area, for almost two years with Zykov, Yuferev, and Il’kaev. So it was rather easy to develop plans that would involve the Russians as real partners with us. The idea was to create a demonstration of control and accounting systems at Arzamas that could be viewed by officials at other institutions in MINATOM. It would demonstrate the value of modern computerized systems to counter threats from insiders.

Paul White: We need to recognize that this lab-to-lab agreement on doing materials control was a tremendous breakthrough. The government-to-government process was completely paralyzed by a collection of difficulties: the sensitivity of the issue, the questions of pride, the organizational questions within the Russian government of who’s responsible for what. But while these difficulties were occurring, discussions were going on between Mark Mullen and Sergei Zykov and others. And personal friendship and trust with people like Il’kaev were being established through the scientific interactions, and both of these allowed the breakthrough to occur.
Steve Younger: As we’ve stressed, the issue of personal trust is extremely important in Russia. I still remember when Sig and Belugin signed the first nuclear materials control contracts in June 1994. There was a pause as Belugin picked up his pen. He looked over at Sig, and you could see him thinking, “I’m taking a hell of a risk here. And you had better be telling me the truth.” Not only their careers, but also their families’ reputations and their children’s’ education were at stake. They all remembered what happened to people after Khruschev’s thaw froze again.

Sig Hecker: Belugin gave me his pen after the signing.

Krik Krikorian: It’s clear that the lab-to-lab science programs were the confidence building programs in dealing with those folks. I think that’s the bottom line. Money was transferred, good faith was transferred, the products actually came out, and the respect was developed.

We should also point out that apparently Mikhailov has been behind the MPC&A from the beginning and his endorsement opened the door to fast implementation.

Los Alamos Science: How did Los Alamos expand the MPC&A activities beyond MINATOM to Kurchatov and the other civilian institutions?

Sig Hecker: Most important was that Charlie Curtis had given me clear jurisdiction to make decisions, saying, “Look Sig, Los Alamos should lead the labs in doing this and you should do the right thing.” So we were able to assure the Russians at these institutions that we were the lead laboratory and could determine the way things were going to happen. Il’kaev definitely wanted Arzamas to take the lead in the MINATOM complex, and he thought Mikhailov would support that approach, but Kurchatov was run independently, and then there was their GAN, which is the Russian equivalent to our Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

For those organizations, we again built on the personal contacts that Ron and his whole crew had developed through many years of work in the IAEA. For example, Ron and Mark Mullen had friends at Kurchatov who had participated in IAEA activities and actually understood materials problems. So during the June 1994 trip, we went to Kurchatov to establish an agreement on MPC&A. While at Kurchatov, we witnessed their security problems in real time. We went into their reactor where they have a lot of highly enriched uranium, and there was a guard on duty, but he didn’t even have a rifle. The institute is right off the streets of Moscow. There were not even bars on some of the windows. And so it was brought home that materials protection and control really is a serious issue.

We signed an agreement with Kurchatov, and then through the lab-to-lab approach, we have expanded to other institutions that have significant amounts of weapons material.

Ron Augustson: Actually, our contacts at Kurchatov are doing us a big favor right now, because they served as an entree into the Russian naval fuel storage facilities for ship and submarine reactors. And this week, as we speak, there is a group of lab-to-lab people over at Kurchatov showing the navy people how we do vulnerability assessments.

Los Alamos Science: What is the present status of the materials work?

Ron Augustson: It’s been going remarkably well. First, I should point out that, although Los Alamos is the lead laboratory for this activity, five other DOE national laboratories are now participating: Lawrence Livermore, Sandia, Brookhaven, Oak Ridge, and Pacific Northwest. Together we’ve developed a working relationship and a program plan with eight MINATOM institutes, and we plan to add two more to the list this spring. Within the program, the Russians are working busily on implementing MPC&A systems, integrating U.S. equipment into the systems, and gearing up to produce Russian equipment to use at the most sensitive locations within their facilities. In the process of implementation, hundreds of Russian technical people are becoming MPC&A experts. Those experts are needed to operate, maintain, design, and update the MPC&A systems in the near future. So together, we’re implementing and building infrastructure for short- and long-term improved safeguards (see “Russian-American MPC&A: Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting in Russia”).

Our success in this area led to the transfer of the government-to-government effort in MPC&A from DOD to DOE. That transfer became official in fiscal year 1996. The understanding was that DOE would operate the pro-
Program in the manner of the lab-to-lab program, which included the ability to write contracts to pay for work by Russians and the ability to buy Russian as well as American equipment. So the government-to-government effort is now proceeding in parallel with the lab-to-lab effort.

Funding levels are also on the rise. This year the lab-to-lab effort, including the work with the Russian naval storage facilities, has 5 million dollars in funding; the DOE-to-GAN program has 10 million dollars; and the government-to-government MPC&A program for the civilian institutes has 30 million dollars. Moreover, DOE is asking for an increase in fiscal year 1997 and is hopeful that they’ll get it.

In terms of the program’s future, we’re heading toward including all MINATOM facilities with inventories of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. That means, for example, dismantlement facilities as well as the naval storage facilities. With this experience and expertise under our belts, the United States and Russia will be in a position to provide leadership to the world in global management of nuclear material.

**Sig Hecker:** That’s truly exciting. The thing to remember about the MPC&A program is that it had to be done. Whatever the Russians do later on, if they themselves know where their materials are, the world will have gained immeasurably.

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**Lab-to-Lab versus Government-to-Government**

**Joe Plit:** I want to raise an issue here. In looking back at the early years of Nunn-Lugar MPC&A, we’ve implied a lot of criticism of the U.S. bureaucracy, but it would be wrong to create the impression that the Russian bureaucracy, which includes representatives from government, MINATOM, and the Ministry of Defense, wasn’t equally or more responsible for the stalemate in the government-to-government sphere.

**Sig Hecker:** Bureaucratic difficulties notwithstanding, I personally think that Nunn-Lugar was one of those visionary pieces of legislation. It provided the umbrella for us to do the lab-to-lab effort in stabilizing both people and materials. Otherwise, we would have been accused of making policy. The Nunn-Lugar program has proceeded in the fashion in which you make treaties—very slowly and painfully arguing about every single word. We were able to tunnel underneath the bureaucracy and do the direct lab-to-lab but still under the auspices of the U.S. government.

Also, we thought the lab-to-lab scientific collaborations were a jump start and eventually would merge with ISTC. At first, the Russians at Arzamas-16 preferred to deal with us on a one-to-one basis rather than to deal with us through this much larger bureaucracy, but now both avenues are working. Similarly, we always thought that our program in materials control would eventually merge with the government-to-government program because we had the same people working on both, and as Ron just pointed out, that is coming to pass.

**Paul White:** The restrictions of the government-to-government program—wherein no money could go to the Russians and everything must be done with U.S. people and materials—has now been dropped, at least in principle. In practice, our government still has to learn how to do this, but things have changed. Since the start of the Nunn-Lugar program, over a million U.S. dollars have been authorized to be spent directly in the former Soviet Union. (This is in contrast, however, to the hundreds of millions spent on U.S. goods and services provided to the former Soviet Union.) Also, working in collaboration with the Russians rather than imposing our will is now part of the program. The discussion we are having here has pointed out the importance of the psychological aspect in making things work. The policy kinds of things have to be in place. But to lubricate the process, these personal interactions are very important.

**Ron Augustson:** It’s interesting that at the meeting last week in Washington, Mikhailov and O’Leary signed a simple one-page joint statement on MPC&A that was not possible until very recently. It listed six new facilities that Mikhailov is opening up to the MPC&A program, including Krasnoyarsk-26 and Sverdlosk-44, which are part of the nuclear weapons complex, and four other facilities that are part of the government-to-government activities. So the government-to-government and lab-to-lab programs are meshed together in the one document.

**Los Alamos Science:** What progress has been made in the government-to-government program

**Paul White:** Over one billion dollars has been spent on the overall program. The vast majority of that money has gone for demilitarization of delivery vehicles and filling up silos with concrete. And generally, the money was spent to purchase U.S. material for delivery to Russia.

**Sig Hecker:** An approach needed to get public support . . .
Paul White: Right. We may occasionally quibble about some of the difficulties of working within the government-to-government framework, but it would be wrong to underestimate the significant progress made by this more formal aspect of our cooperative efforts with the Former Soviet Union.

We’ve already mentioned U.S. assistance to facilitate the destruction of the delivery vehicles, including ICBMs, scheduled for elimination under the START I agreement. In many cases, the silos that held those missiles are being destroyed as well, with Secretary of Defense Perry being on hand for one well-publicized such event. Under agreements with Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, warheads stationed on these territories have been, or are being, transported back to the Russian Federation for dismantlement, and U.S.-provided equipment has helped to ensure that these transfers are accomplished safely. In partnerships between the DOD and the DOE labs, the United States has supplied flexible armored blankets to shroud warheads during transportation. Accident response equipment has been provided to ensure effective assessment and remediation in case of any accident during such transfers. Rail cars used for such transfers have been upgraded with U.S. assistance, and containers for fissile material are being supplied for shipment and storage of the nuclear materials resulting from the dismantlement of the warheads themselves. With help from this program, the Soviet nuclear arsenal has been moving steadily on its course back to Russia. Kazakhstan has already returned all of its nuclear weapons, and Belarus and Ukraine are expected to become non-nuclear states by the end of 1996.

Right now, in one of the biggest efforts under the Nunn-Lugar program, the DOD is working productively with MINATOM on the design and construction of the large storage facility that Ron and Mark Mullen were involved in at the very beginning of the effort in 1992. Los Alamos is continuing its support of this effort with analysis of facility safety and the review of the Russian design for the facility’s nuclear material protection, control and accounting system.

Los Alamos Science: What are the successes of the lab-to-lab program in terms of nonproliferation goals? For example, is scientific conversion working, and is it a realistic goal?

Sig Hecker: We have contributed to the stability of the scientists at the nuclear weapons institutes and to their involvement in non-military projects. But did we convert them? I don’t necessarily think so, nor is this a realistic goal. If we didn’t have the nuclear materials MPC&A project, then I would say it would be way too early to judge the ultimate effect of this lab-to-lab effort. On the other hand, I believe the materials control effort is a real contribution to nonproliferation objectives. It represents a quantum jump in the overall world security because the real issue is nuclear weapons proliferation. We would have liked to have started earlier, but the double fences around Arzamas-16 and many of the other nuclear installations are still pretty impressive. So I think we might have gotten through this window of opportunity just in the nick of time.

The danger of losing the scientists to Iraq or Iran has always seemed quite small to me because those folks are patriots. Given the way they grew up in those closed towns, they’re not likely to go live in Iraq. But in a very short period of time that could change because they won’t have to leave their country to design a bomb for a rogue nation. It will require only a few scientists hooked up through the Internet to the leader of that nation. Then the seriousness of the threat increases significantly. But for the time being, I think we’ve made some contribution through scientific conversion as well.

Joe Pilat: I would share Sig’s impressions on the nonproliferation benefits of the lab-to-lab programs. But there’s one element that I would like to ex-
I think we’ve done the right things in the lab-to-lab MPC&A, but right now we’re plugging our fingers in a dike. The question is whether we’ll be ultimately successful in helping the Russians and others from the former Soviet Union to safeguard their nuclear materials. The extent of the Russian political drift to the left (or right), the funding from the Russians themselves that is ultimately needed to make materials control successful and operational over the years, and whether, in fact, we can continue to push the process in Russia are all open issues or questions. We’ve done as well as we can at this stage, but it’s still too soon to tell how these unprecedented experiments in cooperation will pan out.

**Sig Hecker:** Let me just add to Joe’s concern. Whatever we do to secure nuclear materials, we are still going to be faced with the fact that the material is there. And so future political upheavals could result in the wrong people getting their hands on this material and using it for aggressive or terrorist purposes. So we’re really not done. And that’s why I drew up what I call a plutonium road map. The road map outlines some possible ways to get to an end state in which there is significantly less weapons-grade nuclear material in the world. And the ways to reach that state can be productive in the sense that they extract a good amount of the energy from the nuclear material as it is being transformed. Only when we reach that end state can we rest easier. We’re talking about a very long-term, maybe a 100-year, problem. And if we let up at any point along the way, we will have still opened the flood gates.

**Paul White:** This long-term problem of how to deal with nuclear materials is another area where we are having very constructive engagement with the Russians through official government channels. For example, there is a Joint U.S.-Russian Steering Committee on Plutonium Disposition. Several technical working-groups under this committee are cooperatively examining a variety of methods for long-term material disposition.

**Sig Hecker:** On the front page of the New York Times a couple of years ago, there was a picture of Mikhailov and O’Leary, and O’Leary is quoted as saying that plutonium is not only a security liability but also an economic liability. And Mikhailov says plutonium is for my children, which is exactly the view that the Russians have. And that’s one of the reasons that my vision for the long-term plutonium road map includes the importance of international collaborations. I doubt that our government will bury our plutonium if the Russians keep theirs above ground. There’s just no way.

**Paul White:** I would definitely agree that the aspect of nonproliferation that deals with the nuclear materials question is far more important than science conversion. On the other hand, Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 were, by and large, single-purpose laboratories, whereas Los Alamos and Livermore were multi-program laboratories engaged in issues of nonproliferation, materials control, and other scientific applications. Now, through the lab-to-lab effort, Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 are very actively engaged in supporting MPC&A technology in their country and are also actively looking for ways in which they can apply their knowledge of radiation detectors and materials analysis to other problems of nonproliferation. They are branching out and finding activities other than just the design and manufacture of nuclear warheads, and so MPC&A is actually playing a role in science conversion.

**John Shaner:** And all these scientific conversion activities increase their prospects for getting a broader support base within their own government. Ultimately, the U.S. government is not going to underwrite the whole Russian nuclear weapons complex. The conversion activities are providing work that’s not directly related to weapons of mass
destruction. It also gives a chance for a little bit of stability while the economy has a chance to recover.

Los Alamos Science: Is there a hope that the nuclear institutes will become integrated into the larger scientific community?

Irv Lindemuth: Yes. We’ve certainly started the process of integrating their laboratories into the world-wide scientific community. I’ve always felt that the best thing that we could hope for with Arzamas-16 is that somehow they evolve into a laboratory something like ours.

Joe Pilat: Clearly, we don’t want to see a catastrophic collapse leading to a brain drain and the like, but we need to be careful here. Many people in our country would say that the maintenance of healthy nuclear weapons labs in Russia is not necessarily in the U.S. interests. On the other hand, the goal of scientific conversion or integration is certainly in our interests.

John Shaner: The point is that stabilizing the materials through MPC&A won’t do the whole job. We need to stabilize people as well. That’s going to require making their economic situation good enough that this very small minority of people who know about nuclear weapons labs in Russia is not necessarily in the U.S. interests. On the other hand, the goal of scientific conversion or integration is certainly in our interests.

Los Alamos Science: Are the employees of the nuclear institutes subject to black market temptations?

John Shaner: I think they are subject. Although there is no questioning the patriotism of our Russian colleagues, catastrophic economic conditions can make anything possible.

Krik Krikorian: There’s always the hundredth of one percent of people, and it doesn’t take very many to mess up a system. But there has not been a universal threat from that so far.

Joe Pilat: I think Krik’s right. It’s just like the brain drain. That threat was initially exaggerated and the theft scenarios are also exaggerated. There is a concern, there are problems that need to be resolved. And John gave an excellent overview of what we can do to help, but ultimately the Russians have to resolve their own problems.

Irv Lindemuth: Do you see other countries trying to foster a long-term relationship with the Russians?

John Shaner: Arzamas-16 is working with France and Germany on a number of science and technology projects. They are certainly developing short-term relationships. I know that industrial firms trying to work in Russia are indeed taking a long view of this issue of integrating Russia into the world economy, both for what they can contribute and for the potential market downstream.

Joe Pilat: All the nuclear-weapons-
states’ laboratories and institutes are very interested in how they could diversify their portfolios. And the sooner we can look carefully at those issues and try to find a means of addressing them broadly, the better off we will be.

Sig Hecker: In a sense the lab-to-lab program has been a means to jump start this process of conversion from work on weapons of mass destruction to work on projects that are not weapons-related.

Los Alamos Science: Is Los Alamos trying to use the lab-to-lab approach to promote nonproliferation in other parts of the world?

John Shaner: China obviously is another player in this nuclear future. In our little way, we are trying to lay the groundwork for a small group of people to establish technical respect and trust at their nuclear institutes. From there we would hope to build a growing relationship and take advantage of opportunities like we did in the case of nuclear material control in Russia. But it’s a much more complicated phenomenon when you start adding more and more countries to the playing field and you’re not exactly sure where they’re headed.

Los Alamos Science: What effect will a more conservative Russian regime have on the lab-to-lab efforts?

John Shaner: These efforts are so clearly in the interest of both sides that I’m confident that even a more conservative regime will look relatively favorably on it. The material control program has started to engage the most sensitive nuclear institutes, but that engagement is very controlled, and it could probably be made acceptable even to a very conservative regime.

Ron Augustson: I would hope that the scientific conversion activities would also continue. They provide a very necessary foundation and they engage the academicians and the really top-notch scientists who don’t have much interest in MPC&A as a technical topic but are interested in ultra-high magnetic fields and topics like that. And in turn, those people are listened to by people within the government.

Krik Krikorian: One of the fundamental problems is that Russian science and funding for Russian science are declining. For instance, the number of people employed by MINATOM has gone from roughly a million down to 800,000 or 700,000. That’s a severe change. Their science is so big that they really can’t afford it all. MINATOM has one empire, the Russian Academy is another empire. And guys like Velikhov have wrangled their institutes away from both.

Joe Pilat: I would share John’s assessment that the likely political path in Russia is a continued drift to authoritarianism, and that the MPC&A activities should survive that drift. Scientific collaborations, so long as they’re not too close to sensitive areas, also have a decent chance of survival, in part because they represent a source of funds.

The areas that concern me most are the more far reaching, especially the prospect of major collaborative efforts in dismantlement and further arms control. A continued drift to the left (or right) is going to create a climate more hostile to those activities. In terms of the issues we’re interested in, there is a significant minority in Russia that has viewed as treasonous all of the arms control and collaborative activities with the United States since the time of Shevardnadze (former Soviet foreign minister, and now president of Georgia) and Gorbachev.

Nevertheless, we are likely to see some level of cooperation. Even during the Cold War, we had some shared objectives, so there is no reason we shouldn’t have them now. I think it is of particular interest that the Laboratory has been able to supplement, complement, and push a relatively well-defined government-to-government agenda through the lab-to-lab programs that we are discussing today. But we will have to see how the new political situation created by the Duma elections affects both the lab-to-lab efforts and the broader government efforts that they serve and on which they are based.

Steve Younger: We should not be surprised if there are some problems along the way. Don’t forget that getting the first contract signed, doing the first scientific experiment, and getting the MPC&A program going were all very challenging at the times that we did them. Now we want to work together on improving the security of real weapons material. Despite the problems, I am encouraged by the determination on both sides to get this important job done. If we and the Russians don’t do it, who will?

Sig Hecker: Thank you all for participating in this round table and sharing your views on how our collaborations with the Russians began. The views presented tell the story from a Los Alamos point of view. Today, five other Department of Energy laboratories are contributing to efforts designed to help Russia control its nuclear materials. It would also be very interesting to hear the Russian version of this story. Since all along we have worked side-by-side as equals, maybe we’ll hear their story some day.

I can’t predict which way Russian politics will turn in the future, but I will sleep better knowing that they are in greater control of their nuclear materials today than they were just two years ago. This dialogue recounts a story that is a testament to what can be accomplished when scientists and engineers are encouraged by a courageous government official, Charles Curtis in this case, to help solve a crucial international problem.
The Participants

**Sig Hecker** is the Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, a position he has held since 1986. He joined the Laboratory as a technical staff member in the Physical Metallurgy Group and has served as Chairman of the Center for Materials Science and as Division Leader of the Materials Science and Technology Division prior to becoming Director. Sig began his professional career as a senior research metallurgist with the General Motors Research Laboratories in 1970 after two years as a postdoctoral appointee at Los Alamos.

**Steve Younger** is the Director of the Los Alamos Center for International Security Affairs (CISA) and is responsible for overseeing Los Alamos interactions in Russia, China, and elsewhere. In 1992, he organized the first scientific collaboration between the U.S. and Russian nuclear laboratories and has participated in many joint experiments involving our counterpart institute at Arzamas-16. Previously, Steve was Deputy Program Director for Nuclear Weapons Technology. He maintains an active research interest in atomic and molecular physics and has extensively published in these fields.

**John Shaner** is a Laboratory and American Physical Society Fellow and has been the Deputy Director of CISA since its inception. His responsibilities include oversight of active programs involving Los Alamos and sensitive technical institutions in sensitive countries. John is currently involved in joint projects with institutions in the republics of the Former Soviet Union, and has responsibility for developing a lab-to-lab program with the institutes of the China Academy of Engineering Physics, the agency responsible for the Chinese nuclear weapons. In 1993, John was the recipient of the E.O. Lawrence Award for National Security.

**Max Fowler** joined the Laboratory to organize a team to develop and apply explosive-driven magnetic flux compression devices. Over the years, he and his colleagues have used this technique to generate energy sources to power a number of plasma-producing devices, lasers, imploding foils, electron-beam accelerators, and rail guns. This early work influenced subsequent megagauss solid state research, liner implosion of plasmas, and the initiation of the “Megagauss” Conferences. Max is a Laboratory Fellow and has recently been awarded an Honorary Doctorate from Novosibirsk State University for his work in high-energy density physics and in furthering scientific relations between the United States and Russia.

**Donald Eilers** has served as a CORRTEX technical expert on the U.S. delegation to the bilateral Nuclear Testing Talks whose goal was improving verification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. He held the position of U.S. Scientific Team Leader on both the U.S. Kearsarge and the Soviet Shagan Joint Verification Experiments whose sets of experiments successfully demonstrated the CORRTEX verification technology at those nuclear test sites. Don had the distinction of being among the first scientists to visit the Soviet nuclear weapons test site in Semipalatinsk and the nuclear design facility of Arzamas-16. Don received the Laboratory’s Distinguished Performance Award and the Department of Energy’s Award of Excellence.

**Nerses (Krik) Krikorian** currently is a Laboratory Fellow who began his career as a physical chemist with the Manhattan Project. During his career, Krik was Deputy Group Leader and Group Leader of the Critical Technologies Group of the International Technology Division. He has visited over fifteen Russian laboratories as well as the nuclear weapons design laboratories and several Chinese scientific laboratories. Through Krik’s numerous publications on rare earth and
refractory carbides, intermetallic phase relationships, thermodynamics, crystallography, and superconductivity, he has developed an international reputation in high-temperature chemistry.

**Hugh Casey** is the Project Leader for the New Independent States Industrial Partnering Program (IPP), located in CISA. In his current assignment, he is the Chairman of the IPP Inter-Laboratory Advisory Board (ILAB), representing the ten DOE multi-program laboratories responsible for implementing the cooperative projects with the weapons institutes in the former Soviet Union. Hugh’s technical expertise and interests include joining, net shape processing, rapid solidification processing, advanced materials, and applications of modeling of materials synthesis and processing.

**Irv Lindemuth** is currently Project Leader for International Collaboration in Pulsed Power Applications with responsibility for providing technical leadership for the pulsed-power/magnetized-target fusion collaboration between Los Alamos and its Russian counterpart, the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF), located at Arzamas-16 (Sarov). His areas of expertise include thermonuclear fusion, advanced numerical methods for the computer simulation of fusion plasmas, and related pulsed-power technology. He received the Distinguished Performance Award in 1992 for his work in the formative stages of the LANL/VNIIEF collaboration.

**Paul White** is a member of CISA where he has been applying his experience to the development of technical collaborations between the U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons laboratories. Paul has been long been interested in issues at the intersection of technology and national security policy and was, for several years, Deputy Director and later Acting Director of the Center for National Security Studies. Paul was involved as a technical expert on the U.S. delegation to the Nuclear Testing Talks in Geneva.

**Ronald H. Augustson** is the Project Leader for the US-Russian Lab-to-Lab Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) Program at the Laboratory. Ron is a member of the Lab-to-Lab Steering Group. His duties include oversight of the LANL technical support activities to the program, establishment of strong working relationships with our Russian collaborators, and providing program support to the steering group.

**Joseph Pilat** is a member of the Nonproliferation and International Security Division with the Laboratory. His work has included special advisor to the Department of Energy’s representative at the Third Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and advisor to the U.S. Delegation at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Joseph also served as representative of the Secretary of Defense on the Fourth NPT Conference.
Los Alamos and Arzamas-16: the “Sister Cities” Relationship

The two cities of Arzamas-16 and Los Alamos are situated on opposite sides of the globe, separated by ten time zones, and once separated by Cold War secrecy and politics. Each is a nuclear weapons research city and the birthplace of its country's atomic bomb. Moreover, each began its existence as a secret city.

As the people of Arzamas-16 and Los Alamos came to know each other over the last several years, the recognition of similar histories, national security missions, and educational, family, and patriotic values led the two communities to reach out to each other and begin to share a “sisterhood.”

Interactions between Los Alamos and Arzamas-16 began with the lab-to-lab scientific collaborations between their respective nuclear institutes. Los Alamos scientist Irv Lindemuth, who participated in the lab-to-lab collaborations in pulsed power and high magnetic fields, has played a key role in the interactions as messenger between the two communities.

The sister cities story begins with Lena Panevksina, Alexander Pavlovskii’s personal interpreter, who thought that the scientific interactions between Arzamas-16 and Los Alamos could be extended to include a cultural exchange. During a November 1992 visit to Los Alamos, Panevksina raised the issue with Lindemuth, and that discussion led to a series of letters exchanged between government officials of the two cities. In December of 1993, Lindemuth made a presentation to the Los Alamos City Council that told the history of Arzamas-16. He explained the similarities between the two communities to the Council and noted that the community of Arzamas-16 sometimes jokingly refers to itself as “Los Arzamas.” The council voted unanimously to invite Arzamas-16 to become a “sister city” to Los Alamos (see “Sister Cities International”).

Also in 1992, Lena Gerdova, an interpreter for Vladimir Chernyshov, started a pen-pal exchange between high school students in Arzamas-16 and Los Alamos. Through Lindemuth, Gerdova arranged to visit Ann Eilert’s tenth grade class at Los Alamos High School. A number of the students wrote pen-pal letters, and Gerdova returned to Russia with the letters in her suitcase. Lindemuth came back from Arzamas-16 in March 1993 with the first replies. Additionally, in December 1993, some two-hundred Los Alamos students contributed artwork to a Bradbury-Science-Museum-sponsored “Friendship Book” on the theme of peaceful relations between the two nations, a book that in January 1994 was presented to Arzamas-16 Director Vladimir Belugin.

The pen-pals relationship spread to Gallup, NM when scientists from Arzamas-16 came to New Mexico in November 1993 for a joint experimental campaign in Los Alamos’ Ancho Canyon. During a side trip to the Grand Canyon, Jim Goforth, a member of the pulsed-power group, and his sister, Marge Spurlin, a high school teacher from Gallup, arranged for the visitors to be welcomed into the homes of Gallup residents. That visit combined with Spurlin’s enthusiasm led students in Gallup to join the letter-writing campaign.

Ultimately, the letter writing spread throughout the Los Alamos school system and to several schools in Arzamas-16. Several hundred students from both sides of the Atlantic have participated.

Earlier that year, when the Los Alamos pulsed-power group was in Arzamas-16 for the first joint scientific experiment, they were taken to visit the local hospital. There, they learned from Dr. Valentina Ponomaryova, the director of the childhood and maternity center, that essential medical supplies were

We would like to thank the Los Alamos Monitor for allowing us to use information from articles written by Steve Shankland and Chairman Schaller.

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were available in Russia but were priced beyond the reach of the citizens of Arzamas-16, who were regularly going unpaid as the Russian government struggled financially.

When the Los Alamos scientists returned home and reported what they had seen, the Los Alamos community expressed a desire to help. Upon the advice from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow that cash donations to the Arzamas-16 hospital would be the most expedient and effective way to help, Lindemuth and John Eilert of the Laboratory’s Environmental Safety and Health Group opened a bank account in December 1993 to launch the Arzamas-16 Children’s Medical Fund. Donations from Los Alamos, the surrounding communities, and even from Colorado and Pennsylvania began to arrive.

When Arzamas-16 Director Vladimir Belugin visited Los Alamos in January 1994, he was given more than six hundred dollars to take to Dr. Ponomaryova. Later, Cari Zocco took over as Chairwoman of the Medical Fund, and over the years, additional cash donations have been forwarded to Dr. Ponomaryova.

Soon thereafter, Ken Bower, a member of the Laboratory’s Community Involvement and Outreach Office, and then Treasurer of the American Chemical Society Central New Mexico Chapter, told Lindemuth that his Chapter had accumulated a cash surplus and would like to distribute the money in Russia. Lindemuth and Bower first located a charitable medical organization (MAP International) that had access to surplus medical supplies and then a U.S.-State-Department-supported shipping organization that would ship to Russia at no cost to the donor. Bower leveraged ten thousand dollars in Medical Funds and American Chemical Society fund donations into a twenty-foot shipping container full of medical supplies that arrived in Arzamas-16 in early 1995. The medical supplies had a U.S. wholesale value of five-hundred thousand dollars.

The sister cities relationship was consummated in May 1994 with the visit to Los Alamos by eight students and two teachers from Arzamas-16 and their participation in the first New Mexico High School Critical Issues Forum, a series sponsored by the Laboratory’s Science Education and Outreach Group. The topic of the first forum was to be nuclear dismantlement; the format would involve teams of students from New Mexico high schools researching dismantlement and then developing proposed policies for U.S. assistance to Russia. When Lindemuth heard about the forum he called Judith Kaye, leader of the Outreach group, who agreed that Russian students could participate. Frantic phone calls to Arzamas-16 and

“The idea of sister-city relationships is one of “people-to-people,” of citizen diplomacy “from heart-to-heart.” Only in this way will the ice left from the cold war be melted....We would like to believe that if all Americans are like the “citizens” that visited Arzamas-16, then you and I will not perish on this fragile planet.”

From a report in the Arzamas-16 Courier covering the May 1995 visit of the Los Alamos civic delegation.

Above: Russian students and teachers from Arzamas-16 at the athletic field of Los Alamos high school in October 1995.
Right: Los Alamos students Tony Maggiore and Chih-Cheng Peng open pen-pal letters from fellow students in Arzamas-16.
Bottom: Bob Reinovsky (left) greets Russian high school teacher during visit to Arzamas-16.
Like Los Alamos, modern Arzamas-16 (upper photo) is situated in a region of great natural beauty. The Sarovka and Satis Rivers flow into the Volga River separating the city into distinct sections.

“Side-by-Side as Equals”—a round table

Sister Cities International

Sister Cities International is a national, non-profit, volunteer-membership organization joining United States and foreign communities. Sister city affiliations lead the national movement for volunteer participation and community development in the international arena.

The Sister City Program began shortly after World War II and developed into a national initiative when President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed the people-to-people program at a White House Conference in 1956. He hoped that involving citizens internationally might lessen the chance of future world conflicts. Initially grouped with the National League of Cities, Sister Cities International became a separate, not-for-profit organization in 1967. The procedure for establishing an official Sister City affiliation requires that an agreement be signed by the respective mayor of each city and ratified by each city council, or its equivalent.

Membership in Sister Cities International is designed to improve the cultural understanding of people of different nations as well as provide new prospects for trade and business. Student and professional exchanges and other learning experiences in schools may be initiated through direct inter-school contracts. Membership in Sister Cities International provides eligibility for various grant programs.

Sister Cities International represents 125 million Americans in 1,200 U.S. cities and their 1,900 partners in 120 countries worldwide. Since 1986, partnerships between U.S. cities and those in the Former Soviet Union have grown from six to one hundred and fifty-two. Today, partnerships with Japanese and German cities represent the largest number of sister-city affiliations by country.

hours of paperwork on the part of the Russians produced two teams of Arzamas-16 students to present their ideas on the dismantlement issue. The combined plan of the participating teams produced the clever acronym “TRUST,” “The Russian-United States Transition.” After the forum, the plan was presented to U.S. Department of State personnel Joe De-thomas and Ann Harrington in Washington, D.C. Some pen-pals were able to meet face-to-face during this visit.

In February 1995, two gifts were presented to Bob Reinovsky and Linde-muth by Gennadi Karatayev, the Arzamas-16 City Administrator. A cast bronze bell and an invitation for a Los Alamos civic delegation to visit Arza-mas-16 to participate in the May 9 Victory Day celebration commemorating the end of World War II in Europe. A seven-member delegation accepted the invitation and became the first U.S. civic visitors permitted into Arzamas-16 by the Russian government. Among the delegation was Steve Shankland of
the Los Alamos Monitor, the first non-Russian media representative ever permitted into the city.

The May 1995 visit to Arzamas-16 set the stage for an October visit to Los Alamos by a 15-member Arzamas-16 delegation. In January of this year, Los Alamos Middle School teacher Jeanne Allen was notified that she had been awarded a twenty-nine thousand dollar thematic exchange grant from Sister Cities International. Through this grant, five students and a teacher from Los Alamos and San Ildefonso Pueblo will visit Arzamas-16, and five Arzamas-16 students and a teacher will come to Los Alamos. The students will research water-quality issues, using New Mexico’s Rio Grande and tributaries of Russia’s Moksha River. The Laboratory will participate in this project by providing tours, lectures, and analytical assistance.

From the beginning of their modern existence, the people of Los Alamos and Arzamas-16 have been committed to the security of their respective nations. When the changing global political climate made it possible to work together to reduce the nuclear danger, the two cities embraced the opportunity.

The Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church visits the monastery of St. Serafim. Academician Yuli Khariton, the “Soviet Oppenheimer,” is on the right.

Arzamas-16 Changes Name

A formal request by the people of Arzamas-16 in August 1995 led Boris Yeltsin to officially change the name of the city back to its historic name of Sarov.

Originally a provincial center, the town was the site of the Sarova monastery next to the Sarovka River. Before the Communist revolution, thousands of Russians, including the czar, made pilgrimages to the site to benefit from the pure water of the Sarovka River. The water is said to have healing powers and is a marketable commodity of the city today. In 1923, the monastery was closed by the communists and many priests were executed. Many of the buildings, including a spectacular cathedral, were destroyed, and the remaining buildings were converted to secular use. The high bell tower visible from much of the city stands as a monument to the earlier times.

The city disappeared from unclassified maps in 1946, the same year the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics, the weapons design facility, was built. The village was then given status as a city and, over the years, labeled with a series of classified code names. In 1990, the Soviet government first acknowledged the city’s existence openly. Most in Sarov support the name change, but others feel that Arzamas-16 more correctly reflects the city’s greatest achievements—nuclear weapons.

The city of Sarov remains a “closed” city with entrances and exits carefully monitored by armed guards at the periphery. Mr. Gennadi Karatayev, the City Administrator, recognizes that considerable time and money will be required to separate the necessarily classified technical areas from the remainder of the Institute and from the community. Nevertheless, Karatayev has expressed the hope that within ten years his city and much of the Institute will be “open,” not unlike Los Alamos. Once again, members of the Russian Orthodox Church may now make pilgrimages to the sacred shrines of St. Serafim, the monastery’s most famous resident.