Table 11.2. Chronology of the development of criteria for declassifying atomic energy information, 1945-1992

First use of the atomic bomb Smyth report--1945 Tolman committee--1945 AEC--1974 DOE--1987 DOE--1990, 1992 Proposed general description criteria

(this document, Chaps. 4, 5, and 11)

Information control factors
Generally known by competent scientists The information is already substantially known outside the project The published state of the art in the U.S. and elsewhere The extent to which the information has been published, publicized, or otherwise disseminated The published state of the art in the U.S. and elsewhere Published state of the art
Can be deduced or guessed by competent scientists from what is already known, combined with knowledge that the project was, overall, successful; could be discovered by a small group (15, of whom not over 5 would be senior men) of competent scientists working in a well equipped college lab in a year's time or less The information is readily obtainable from theory or minor experimentation Extent to which the information can be duplicated through simple theoretical calculations and experiments Extent to which the information can be duplicated by competent scientists through simple theoretical equations or minor experimentation, or by reverse engineering an unclassified product
Known but unpublished classified state of the art (U.S. and abroad)
Extent of foreign knowledge of unpublished, unclassified, state of the art in the U.S.
Known but classified state of the art (U.S. and abroad)
Extent to which technological progress has made the information less sensitive Extent to which technological progress has made the information less sensitive
Extent to which the information has been compromised by unauthorized disclosure Extent to which the information has been compromised through unauthorized disclosure
Information disclosure risks
Use reveals "breakthrough" scientific and technical information--that a major new weapon was feasible Disclosure would jeopardize U.S. military security Assistance to the development of nuclear weapons capability in other nations Impact on U.S. national security of release of the information Assistance to development of nuclear weapons by a non-nuclear country Assistance to other nations in developing new armaments
Assistance to improvements in nuclear weapons of a nuclear weapons state Assistance to other nations in improving armaments
Assistance in the production of special nuclear material Assistance to other nations in producing materials for armaments
Could be discovered by a small group (15, of whom not over 5 would be senior men) of competent scientists working in a well equipped college lab in a year's time or less Extent of effort required in developing the information Cost of acquiring the information
Disclosure would weaken U.S. position in international discussions Detrimental effects on foreign relations Detrimental effects on foreign relations Detrimental effects on foreign relations
Disclosure would jeopardize patent position Value of the information to U.S. classified programs Any other national security impact or significance Any other national security impact or significance
Detrimental effects on classification program credibility Detrimental effects on classification program credibility
Information disclosure benefits
Use provides a major advantage in winning a war Advancement of military aspects of nuclear science or technology Adverse effects of classification on progress in the field under consideration Benefits to the progress in a U.S. program Benefits to the U.S. program Benefits to the progress of the U.S. program
The feasibility of providing adequate security protection Continuing classification costs Benefits to the U.S. program of eliminating classification costs
Of true scientific interest and likely to be truly helpful to scientific workers in the U.S. Advancement of science or technology, in general Value of information to U.S. unclassified programs Benefits to general scientific and technical progress
Advancement of nonmilitary aspects of nuclear science or technology Technology transfer benefits Technology transfer benefits
Benefits to U.S. foreign relations Benefits to U.S. foreign relations, arms control negotiations, or treaty obligations Benefits to U.S. foreign relations, arms control negotiations, or treaty obligations
Importance to a reasonable understanding of what was done on the project as a whole Importance of the information to public discussion and education Importance of the information to public discussion and education
Disclosure defined what could be revealed--the remaining secrets would be better kept Adverse effects of classification on delivery schedules for items (e.g., weapons to stockpile) Any other significant benefit to the U.S.
Has no real bearing on the production of atomic bombs Strengthening the credibility of the classification program Benefits to classification program credibility Benefits to classification program credibility