STEVEN AFTERGOOD                   )
     Plaintiff,     		   )
                                   )	Case No. 02-1146 (RMU)
v.                                 )
Washington, DC 20505               )
     Defendant.                    )


1. My name is A. Bryan Siebert. From approximately 1992 until my retirement in January of 2002, I served in the career Senior Executive Service as the Director of the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear and National Security Information. There I was the senior-most career executive in charge of DOE classification policies. From 1994 to 1998 I led the largest comprehensive review of classification policy in the history of the government. Prior to this position I spent most of my career in the nuclear weapons program as a manager in various capacities. These included the senior position of Director of International Security Affairs involving the DOE in determining the government's policies in arms control, export control, and nonproliferation all of which entailed certain technical interface with the intelligence community. I have held a Q clearance, Top Secret, NATO, SI/TK and Gamma security clearances and related accesses to intelligence information. I have participated in policy matters involving intelligence at the level of the NSC and the White House. I provided the managerial expertise and other assistance to help the government protect classified information in several large lawsuits against the government. For example, one involved allegations of damage from fallout due to atmospheric tests; another involved allegations of plutonium contamination having health consequences at DOE's Rocky Flats operations near Denver, Colorado. These suits involved tens of thousands of classified documents sought by the plaintiffs. I held original classification authority for DOE. During my tenure as Director, none of my classification decisions were ever overruled (e.g. by the courts). These decisions involved information concerning nuclear weapons (protected by statute) and National Security Information (protected by Executive Order). This information is considered to be some of the country's most sensitive, the loss of which could have grave national security consequences. Intelligence information was often considered as a factor in determining what to classify and what to declassify. I was responsible for managing the comprehensive updating and rationalization of approximately a hundred classification guides. I was responsible for training hundreds of classification officers from DOE and from other government agencies including the Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense so that they would make the correct classification judgments involving Restricted Data. (Restricted Data involves information about the design, testing, and production of nuclear weapons.)

2. Based on my professional experience, my personal knowledge and the official documents that I have reviewed, I attest to the following facts concerning the classification of intelligence spending in the Department of Energy (DOE) and government-wide.

3. The size of the DOE annual intelligence budget is unclassified. In the current fiscal year (FY 2003), for example, the executive branch openly requested, and Congress appropriated, $41,246,000 for the DOE intelligence program, according to published budget documents.

4. The rationale for not classifying the DOE intelligence budget total is accurately characterized in a June 24, 1994 letter to Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists from John G. Keliher, then-Director of the DOE Office of Nonproliferation and National Security. A copy of this letter is attached as Attachment S-1.

5. The DOE intelligence program budget is a composite of several distinct intelligence program elements, both classified and unclassified, as is the aggregate intelligence budget that is the subject of this lawsuit.

6. Thus, the total DOE intelligence figure includes spending for the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), the amount of which is classified. Other portions of the DOE intelligence budget are unclassified.

7. Based on my knowledge, the open publication of the DOE intelligence budget total does not in any way compromise the security of the classified spending for the NFIP that is contained in that budget. Based on my further knowledge, the fact that the DOE intelligence budget figure is unclassified has not impeded the conduct of classified DOE intelligence programs or led to their exposure.

8. Likewise, the unclassified DOE intelligence budget figure does not pose any threat to intelligence sources and methods.

9. The total DOE intelligence budget is of course much smaller than the total government-wide intelligence budget. But the fact that it is a smaller aggregation of program elements means that, based on the logic of the DCI, it is theoretically more, not less, sensitive than the overall total figure. That is because, to borrow DCI Tenet's "jigsaw puzzle" metaphor, it is much easier to assemble a jigsaw puzzle of ten pieces than it is to assemble one of ten thousand pieces.

10. The jigsaw puzzle metaphor (sometimes referred to as the mosaic principle), however, can often mislead, as in this case. Neither the disclosure of the DOE intelligence budget total nor that of the aggregate budget total would place properly classified information at risk or compromise intelligence sources and methods with which I am familiar.

11. As a matter of sound security policy, unnecessary classification is to be avoided since it imposes financial and operational costs on the government. As a matter of good public policy, unnecessary classification is to be avoided because it impedes oversight and accountability. In my opinion, the classification of the intelligence budget total is unnecessary and therefore unwise. It should be disclosed, just as the DOE intelligence budget total has safely been for many years.

12. This declaration was provided without compensation. It is unclassified.

I hereby certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed this 19th day of April, 2003.

PDF Version

Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

June 24, 1994

Mr. Steven Aftergood
Editor, Secrecy & Government Bulletin
Federation of American Scientists

Dear Mr. Aftergood:

Thank you for your interest in the Department's policy on public disclosure of its intelligence budget. I am delighted to provide the following in response to your questions.

Question 1: When other agency intelligence budgets are classified, why is the size of the DOE intelligence budget not classified?

Question 2: In his capacity as Director of Central Intelligence with overall intelligence budget responsibility, has Mr. Woolsey authorized DOE to disclose the size of its intelligence budget?

Question 3: Is the DOE budget for "intelligence" identical with the DOE portion of the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget? If not, is the DOE NFIP budget subsumed within the DOE "intelligence" budget? What is the basic difference between DOE NFIP and non-NFIP intelligence activities?

Question 4: Has DOE identified any damage to national security resulting from disclosure of the size of its intelligence budget?

The Secretary of Energy has provided leadership in not only redefining what the Department's business lines are, but also how the Department does business. We embrace continuous quality improvement as the only path to successful change. It is my firm belief that the Department's UNCLASSIFIED intelligence budget is consistent with the Secretary's new vision for the Department.

In addition, it is also consistent with the intention to continue DOE's rich heritage of meeting important national goals.

If you have additional questions, please feel free to contact Notra Trulock, III, Director, Office of Energy Intelligence.