The intelligence expenses are those which more attention receive when is spoken on the secret departures. In the EE. UU. the analysis of the intelligence budget constitutes a fundamental aspect for the exercise of control on the part of Congress. In addition to these expenses that have classified character should be considered the special access programs not related to intelligence. The whole is known as the - " presupposed in black " - (black budget).
It is extremely illustrative to specify the form in which the American intelligence budget is studied by the legislators. 23 Though it must remain clear that the said country circumstances are only and therefore not extrapolables to our reality, their/its/your/his experience can be of interest for the incipient practical that they are being developing in the Argentina.
The legislative commissions that have jurisdiction in the various constitutive portions of the intelligence budget are the following: Intelligence; Defense; Foreign Relationships; Justice; so much the of the Senate as of the House of Representatives. Indeed, also they have responsibility the commissions linked to budget.
This multiple responsibility is given by the interdepartmental nature of the intelligence budget, in which meet not only the CIA and the Office of the Directing of Central Intelligence, but also the Defense Department with their/its organizations and intelligence activities for the defense, and the State Departments, of Justice, of the Exchequer and of Energy, each one of those which includes organizations, elements y/o intelligence activities or contrainteligencia. The presentation of the budget transmitted by the President, the laws of budget appropriation as well as the laws of appropriation of the same contain detailed budgetary information the one which appears, in each case, in the form of annex with secret classification.
The general budget transmitted by the American president to the Congress contains, in their/its/your/his portion devoted to the intelligence, several documents prepared by the Executive:
The legal sustenance for the exercise of the budgetary control in intelligence matter is consider the Presupposed designated paragraph of the Intelligence Activities contained in the Title V of the National Security Record. Their/its/your/his article 504, clause - " to " - stipulates the following:
- " The available assigned funds for an intelligence agency can be spent for an intelligence activity or related to intelligence only if ...dichos funds have been específi-camente authorized by the Congress to be used for such activities " -.
Legislation approved in August of 1991 incorporated into paragraph of the mentioned Record precedentemente greater precisions in this regard. The new clause - " d " - was specifying:
" - (1) except that will be envisaged specifically by law, available funds for an intelligence agency that they will not be assigned funds can be spent for an intelligence activity or related to intelligence only if said funds are used for activities informed the corresponding parliamentary commissions according to procedures that identify
With this clause is enabled the exercise of the legislative control also on the funds that they could originate of third parties or as product of the intelligence activities. Obviously this is a legislative consequence of the affaire Iran-contras.
The legislative resolutions that gave birth at two óclock intelligence commissions of the Congress also include specific letter on their/its responsibilities with respect to budget. 24
The analysis of the documents transmitted by the President to the commissions before cited gives as a result the project of annual law of authorization of the intelligence budget. A great portion of the same is of classified character. Constitutes esta the legislative instance that tries exclusively and in detail the intelligence budget, being at the same time the instrument through the one which the legislative American exercises their/its/your/his legal supervision imperium and control over the secret expenses. The same permits the legislators of the commissions with responsibilities in the topic, a deep commitment concerning budget appropriations in the matter. It is tried thus to assuring the efficient and appropriate use of the involved public funds.
Only two items of the intelligence budget are published annually. It is considered the funds destined Staff of the Intelligence Community and Withdrawals and Pensions System of the CIA. Between 1980 and 1986 also it was public the amount assigned to the activities of contrainteligencia of the FBI. (to see Table D.)
A concrete example of the paper of the Congress in this matter is the approval of a mechanism for the funds transfer within program NFIP (National Program of External Intelligence). The article 104 clause d. of the Record of Organization of Intelligence of 1992 - a law of October of said year that restructures and reorganizes a substantial part of the intelligence system - establishes that:
- " the Central Intelligence Director, with the approval of the Administration and Budget Office, it can transfer assigned funds of a program to other, both included in the National Program of External Intelligence... " -.
The same article determines that:
- " all funds transfer pursuant to this clause will be carried out according to the applicable existing processes to the notices of repro-gramación for the corresponding legislative commissions. All transfer proposed that is notified to the corresponding legislative commissions will have to be accompanied by a report that explain the nature of the transfer proposed and the way in which satisfies the requirements of this clause. Furthermore, the Select Intelligence Commission of the Senate and the Permanent Select Commission of Intelligence of the House of Representatives will have to be notified in immediate form of all funds transfer accomplished pursuant to this clause in any event in which the transfer, of other manner, might have required a rescheduling notice pursuant to the outstanding processes to date of this article. " -
Other example, emerged with motive of the discussion by the budget of the fiscal exercise 1994, it is a discrepancy between the two intelligence commissions. In effect, the commission of the House of Representatives not assigned to him/her/you presupposed to a specialized intelligence agency - Central Images Office -. With this posture disagreed openly the Commission on armed forces of the same Chamber and also the Intelligence Commission of the Senate. This last included a departure within intelligence budget for the agency in question. This discussion is public, however, the assigned amounts are secret, though they can be estimated.
Is worth the trouble to consign also the concepts poured by a specialist with motive of an analysis on the secret Defense budget for the year 1994: - " due to the fact that the access to the - " programs in black " - is severely restricted, the same are subject to a smaller attention by the Defense Department and by the the one which Congress receive the not secret programs. This lack of control has generated problems of performance and costs increase in a number of secret programs during the last years, carrying to the fact that some members of the Congress to support that the policies of secret classification of the Pentagonal have tos be reformuladas, and that the expense in secret programs would have to be reduced more. " - 25
According to a specialist in spatial policy, contrarily what were tended to believe, the budgets of the NRO (National Recognition Office), NSA (National Security Agency) and DAY (Intelligence Agency for the Defense) appear presented in the annual budget of the Defense Department and results possible to deduce them: - " Simple arithmetic reveals the budgets of these intelligence agencies with a mistake margin of perhaps a 10%, some few hundred of million of dollars. " - 26
The mentioned publication precede - fear you was diving in the various programs of the several components of the defense budget. The author was deducing as soon as for 1993, the NRO required approximately 7 billion of dollars, the NSA counting on 3,9 billion, of those which 1,3 billion would be invested in research and development and 2 billion in operations, and the DAY with 600 million, being destined 450 million for operations.
In November of 1994 product of an apparent misfeasance of the White House, was known that the budget of the American secret services was patrolling in fact the u$s 28 billion, of those which 13,2 billion were intended for the several intelligence agencies of the Defense Department. 27
The representative democrat Give Glickman, president of the Intelligence Commission of the House of Representatives, increased a project to make public the intelligence budget, that it was not approved in the Chamber.
Given the difficulties that imposes the secret for the correct control by the Executive as by the Congress, in the last years were displayed governmental initiatives to replant the policies of safety classification in order to favor a greater opening. The Executive Order 12.959 that came into effect in October of 1995, establishes the descalificación automatic of the information on national safety. Through the new system is permitted the safety classification to presuppose only in the cases in which it will be possible to identify or to describe the prejudice that would result to be revealed. 28
In fact, far from be a simple procedure, the analysis of the secret expenses involve to a great number of legislators and of steps, that make of the same a task of meaningful importance. With safety can be developed other forms simpler to achieve the same objective without because of this is affected the responsibility than fits to him/her/you to the Congress in matter of control and supervision.
Different is the plan that in this matter is in effect in Federal Germany. In effect, in what is relevant to the intelligence expenses, the German Parliament counts on a budgetary subcommittee for the authorization of the intelligence budget, belonging to the Budget Commission of the Bundestag. The same is integrated by five representative federal deputies of the current principal policies. Their/its/your/his primary responsibility is to discuss the budget of the programs proposed for each budgetary year, including the corresponding estimates to the three intelligence organizations: the Federal Service of Foreign Intelligence (Bundesnachrichtend - BND), the Federal Protection Office of the Constitution (Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz - BfV, to cargo of contrainteligencia), and the Military Intelligence Service (Militarischer Abschrimdienst - MAD), dependent of the Federal Chancery, Ministry of the Interior and Defense Ministry respectively. It is of emphasizing that this is the only one legislative instance in which is discussion and eventually is approved the intelligence budget.
The Federal Accounts Court (Bun-desrechnungsho) also has responsibility in the matter. In their/its/your/his quality of independent legislative body and not linked to Executive, investigates the intelligence budget, information that then it is delivered solely to the budgetary subcommittee before mentioned. As opposed to the United States, in which in the intelligence commissions are analyzed the activities as well as the budget, Germany has those functions distributed in different commissions. In addition to the already mentioned subcommittee, the Parliament counts on a specific commission for the intelligence activities, and a commission and subcommittee, both devoted to the investigation and authorization of the telephonic and postal interceptions that accomplish the intelligence organizations. This last activity of parliamentary control stems from a specific mandate content in the article 10 of the German Constitution.
To root of the scandal on the presumed participation of the Spanish government in the activities of the GAL (groups antiterroristas of release), from the opposition the Popular Party sponsored the creation of an investigating commission on the use of the reserved funds. The initiative did not prosper due to the denial of the coalition oficialista liderada for the PSOE. 29
The polemics on the reserved funds utilization promoted that in April of 1995 the Spanish Supreme Court ordered an investigation on the Vice-president to determine if it had managed irregular of the same. 30 Most recently, the Justice opened a cause by presumed public wealth embezzlement originating from reserved expenses in which is found accused an ex Interior minister - José Luis Corcuera -, an ex State secretary for the Security and an ex general director for the safety of the State. 31
As consequence of the ventilation of these situations, the Parliament of Spain has created a legislative commission to control the - " reserved expenses " - those which only they will be destined for defense and safety of the State.
A meaningful episode occurred in the highest fields of the Government of the Ecuador involves the discretionary use of reserved funds. According to the journalistic chronicles, resign it you vice-president Alberto Dahik, embezzlement accused, it could not justify before the Court the funds deviation reserved for personal use. The fled from the ex - official to Costa Rica when the Court had ordered their/its/your/his processing and preventive prison, adds a scandalous note to the table; the Congress accepts to him/her/you the resignation to the vicepresidencia in absence.
The President Durán Ballén dictated a decree that permits not to reveal the, as of this, secret microfilmes that contain the records of the reserved accounts of the vicepresidencia.
In an interview conceded to a morning Argentine, the President of the Ecuadoran Supreme Court, Dr. Carlos Solórzano, were dilated on the controversy. The justice was expressing their/its/your/his hope concerning that the president Durán Ballén signed a decree to modify the condition of State secret conferred to the microfilmes " - ..y is permitted a total investigation " -. To the señalár-sele that the governmental argument were sustained in which of be revealed the destination of the reserved funds were violated the law, the Dr. Solórzano said: - " That criterion is not so exact. For that is precisely the discre-cionalidad of the judge, to accede to reserved documents and to establish what actually it is reserved - and not to introduce it in the process because in that moment would be converted into public - and what can be revealed. That will be my duty when could see the microfilms: to prove what expenses were meant to the internal or external safety of the country (that they are reserved) and what expenses were destined at the other end. " -
On the procedures that regulate the expenses reserved the Dr. Solórzano said: - " Here there is no a law very exact. It has been laws very ancient, instructive, bylaws..., but there is no a very exact legislation neither very agreed with the current reality " - and when was asked to him/her/you if was or not forbidden to reveal the managing of the secret accounts, the judge answered: - " Not, it is not forbidden. More yet, the penal procedure code establishes that the judge wide has powers to investigate " -. 32
According to subsequent press reports, in a dijudication record of the secret accounts were indicated that - " Between 5 of August of 1992 and 30 of September of 1995 were spent 17.8 billion of sucres, of 19.69 billion that entered in the accounts of the secret expenses of the vicepresidencia, remaining a balance of 1890 million " -. Thus, the ex Ecuadoran vice-president Alberto Dahik would have spent some 6.2 million of dollars of the expenses account reserved during their/its three years in the Government. The advocate of Dahik was clarifying, however that - " The accounts of Dahik were not secret, and of this situation full had knowledge the controller from the date in which were opened the accounts " -. 33 The judicial cause continues their/its/your/his procedure.
Finally it fits to recall the judicial processing of the ex Venezuelan president Carlos Andrés Pérez by embezzlement of - " reserved expenses " -.
23. Alfred B. Meadows, - " Intelligence Budgets: Contents and Releasobility " -, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, August of 1989, Washington D.C.; George Picket, - " Congress, the Budget and Intelligence " -, in Intelligence: Police and Process, it edited by A.C. Maurer, M. D. Tunstall and J. M. Keagle, Westview Press, Boulder, 1985.
24. Resolution of the Senate 400, 19 of May of 1976; Resolution of the House of Representatives 648, of the 14 of July of 1977.
25. Steven Kosiak, Defense Budget Project, Washington D.C., 28 of June of 1993.
26. John Pike, - " The NRO, NSA & DAY Budgets: Everything you always wanted to know but weren't cleared to ask " -, F.A.S., Washington DC, 20 of July of 1993.
27. The Nation, 6 of November of 1994, citing a cable of the agency AFP.
28. Secrecy & Government Bulletin, N 54, November of 1995 p. 1; and N 49, June of 1995, p. 1-2, Federation of American Scientists, Washington D.C.
29. The Nation, 28 of December of 1994.
30. The Nation, 4 of April of 1995.
31. The Nation, 26 of October 1995.
32. To See The Nation, special notes by C. M. Reymundo Roberts, 16, 17, 21 (article to the president of the Supreme Court), 22 of October of 1995, Buenos Aires.
33. The Nation, 1ro of December of 1995, Buenos Aires.