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# Hypersonic Missile Defense: Issues for Congress


The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and Space Development Agency (SDA) are currently developing elements of a hypersonic missile defense system to defend against hypersonic weapons and other emerging missile threats. These elements include the tracking and transport layers of the National Defense Space Architecture (NDSA) and various interceptor programs. As MDA and SDA continue to develop these systems, Congress may consider implications for oversight and defense authorizations and appropriations.

## Background

Hypersonic weapons, like ballistic missiles, fly at speeds of at least Mach 5, or roughly 1 mile per second. Unlike ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons do not follow a ballistic trajectory and can maneuver en route to their target. Russia reportedly fielded its first hypersonic weapons in December 2019, while China is expected to field its first in 2020. The United States is not expected to field hypersonic weapons before 2023. (For an overview of hypersonic weapons programs in Russia, China, and the United States, see CRS Report R45811, *Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Kelley M. Saylor.)

The maneuverability and low flight altitude of hypersonic weapons could challenge existing detection and defense systems. For example, most terrestrial-based radars cannot detect hypersonic weapons until late in the weapon’s flight due to line-of-sight limitations of radar detection. This leaves minimal time for a defender to launch interceptors that could neutralize an inbound weapon. **Figure 1** depicts the differences in terrestrial-based radar detection timelines for ballistic missiles versus hypersonic weapons.

**Figure 1. Terrestrial-Based Detection of Ballistic Missiles vs. Hypersonic Weapons**



**Source:** CRS image based on an image in “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” *The Economist*, April 6, 2019, <https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-faster-than-mach-5-are-coming>.

U.S. defense officials have stated that both existing terrestrial- and space-based sensor architectures are

insufficient to detect and track hypersonic weapons; former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Mike Griffin has noted that “hypersonic targets are 10 to 20 times dimmer than what the U.S. normally tracks by satellites in geostationary orbit.”


## National Defense Space Architecture

SDA developed the National Defense Space Architecture to “unify and integrate next generation capabilities across [the Department of Defense (DOD)] and industry.” The NDSA aims to be a “single, coherent proliferated space architecture with seven layers,” which include the data tracking and transport layers depicted in **Figure 2** and discussed below. Other layers include the *custody layer* to support the targeting of mobile ground assets; the *battle management layer* to provide space-based command and control; the *navigation layer* to provide “alternate positioning, navigation, and timing for potential GPS-denied environments”; the *deterrence layer* to detect potentially hostile actions in deep space; and the *support layer* to facilitate satellite operations for the other NDSA layers. Once fully fielded, as is planned by 2025, the NDSA would encompass 550 satellites and provide full global coverage.

## Tracking Layer

SDA began the process of building the tracking layer—which is to “provide global indications, warning, tracking, and targeting of advanced missile threats, including hypersonic missile systems”—through the Tracking Phenomenology Experiment (TPE). The TPE objective is to develop a missile sensor algorithm capable of tracking hypersonic weapons. In parallel, SDA plans to develop eight satellites as part of a Wide Field of View (WFOV) architecture. SDA then intends to expand this architecture to provide global coverage. SDA requested \$72.4 million for TPE and related programs in FY2021.

Working in tandem with the SDA’s tracking satellites will be the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS), previously known as the space sensor layer, which is being developed by MDA and funded by SDA. HBTSS is to provide more sensitive, but more limited (or Medium Field of View [MFOV]) coverage, compared to WFOV. For this reason, WFOV is intended to provide cueing data to HBTSS, which could then provide more specific, target quality data to a ground-based interceptor. By 2023 SDA plans to expand the tracking layer to include 70 WFOV and MFOV satellites, which, according to SDA director Dr. Derek Tournear, “will give us enough coverage in low-Earth orbit so that we can have essentially regional persistence.”

**Figure 2. Selected Elements of the NDSA**

Source: CRS image; not to scale.

Section 1682 of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) tasks the director of the Missile Defense Agency to “develop a hypersonic and ballistic missile tracking space sensor payload”; however, HBTSS was not funded in MDA’s FY2021 budget request due to “competing priorities.” Similarly, Section 1662 of the Senate version of the FY2021 NDAA (S. 4049) tasks MDA with accelerating the development of HBTSS such that it may enter into testing by December 31, 2022, “with full operational deployment as soon as technically feasible thereafter.” Section 1653 of the House version (H.R. 6395) tasks MDA “to develop a hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor [HBTSS] payload to address missile defense tracking requirements.” Overall, SDA requested \$99 million in FY2021 to “develop and demonstrate a hypersonic tracking layer by FY2023.”

### Transport Layer

SDA has stated that the NDSA’s transport layer, which is intended to connect the tracking layer to interceptors and other weapons systems on the ground, will “enhance several mission areas including missile defense.” On May 1, 2020, SDA issued a solicitation for bids to build 20 satellites that would compose the initial tranche of the transport layer. SDA intends to field this initial tranche in FY2022, adding an additional tranche every two years.

### Interceptors

In September 2018, MDA commissioned 21 white papers to explore hypersonic missile interceptor options including interceptor missiles, hypervelocity projectiles, laser guns, and electronic attack systems. In January 2020, MDA issued a draft request for prototype proposals for a Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapons System interceptor. This effort is intended to “reduce interceptor key technology and integration risks, anchor modeling and simulation in areas of large uncertainty, and to increase the interceptor technology readiness levels (TRL) to level 5” (validating components in a relevant environment).

In addition, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is working on a program called Glide Breaker, which “will develop critical component technology to support a lightweight vehicle designed for precise engagement of hypersonic threats at very long range.” DARPA requested \$3 million for Glide Breaker in FY2021—down from \$10 million in FY2020. Overall,

MDA requested \$206.8 million for hypersonic defense in FY2021—up from its \$157.4 million FY2020 request—and \$659 million across the FYDP.

### Issues for Congress

Some analysts have suggested that space-based sensor layers—integrated with tracking and targeting systems to direct high-performance interceptors or directed energy weapons—could theoretically present viable options for defending against hypersonic weapons. The 2019 Missile Defense Review notes that “such sensors take advantage of the large area viewable from space for improved tracking and potentially targeting of advanced threats, including hypersonic [weapons].”

Other analysts have questioned the affordability, technical feasibility, and/or utility of hypersonic weapons defense. In addition, some analysts have argued that the United States’ current command and control architecture would be incapable of “processing data quickly enough to respond to and neutralize an incoming hypersonic threat.”

Some analysts have questioned the current division of labor between the SDA and MDA on hypersonic missile defense. SDA director Tournear has responded to criticisms of potential redundancies between the two agencies, stating that they both report to the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and are co-contributors to a hybrid architecture.

### Potential Questions for Congress

- Is an acceleration of research on hypersonic missile defense options both necessary and technologically feasible? Does the technological maturity of hypersonic missile defense options warrant current funding levels?
- How are SDA and MDA collaborating on various elements of hypersonic missile defense? Are their current roles increasing or decreasing costs and the speed and efficiency of technology development?
- Does DOD have the enabling capabilities, such as adequate command and control architectures, needed to execute hypersonic missile defense?

#### Related CRS Products

CRS In Focus IF10541, *Defense Primer: Ballistic Missile Defense*, by Stephen M. McCall.

CRS Report R45811, *Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress*, by Kelley M. Saylor.

#### Other Resources

Department of Defense, *Missile Defense Review: Executive Summary*, 2019, [https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/11-2019-Missile-Defense-Review/The%202019%20MDR\\_Executive%20Summary.pdf](https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/11-2019-Missile-Defense-Review/The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf).

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